

— THE —
LARGER·ASPECTS
OF · SOCIALISM

WILLIAM·ENGLISH·WALLING



Class HX 86

Book W16

Copyright N° _____

COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT.

THE LARGER ASPECTS
OF SOCIALISM



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED
LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

THE LARGER ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM

BY

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

AUTHOR OF "SOCIALISM AS IT IS"

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1913

All rights reserved

HX 86

.W16

COPYRIGHT, 1913

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Set up and electrotyped. Published April, 1913

3

Press of J. J. Little & Ives Co.
New York

\$1.50

©Cl.A343898

241

PREFACE

Socialism can be approached equally well from two opposite directions. It may be treated either as a social movement that aims to build up a new civilization, or as a new civilization that is gradually being embodied in a social movement. In my "Socialism As It Is" I followed the first method and discussed the economic and political features of Socialism exclusively; in the present volume I shall proceed in the reverse direction and deal exclusively with its larger aspects, its intellectual and spiritual side.

As the two books were conceived and written together, they are parts of a single whole; but they are built on entirely independent foundations. In dealing with the economic and political movement I followed the inductive method; taking the activities of the movement itself as my point of departure, I concluded with its generalizations. In discussing the cultural movement I have followed the deductive method. Taking as my point of departure the philosophy of modern science, which I show to be wholly Socialistic in its bearings, and wholly dependent upon Socialism for its practical applications, I have first shown what results are reached by approaching each of the subjects I have discussed from this new standpoint, and I have then pointed out how the Socialist movement is, as a matter of fact, moving along the same line. This philosophy I have called pragmatism, because I believe pragmatism is Socialism, if taken in what seems

to me to be its most able and consistent interpretation, that of Professor John Dewey.

From the point of view of its basic assumptions, then, I might have called the present volume "The Philosophy of Socialism"; from the point of view of its conclusions it might be entitled "The Sociology of Socialism." I conceive of all the intermediate subjects covered as being related equally to these two poles of my problem. But as many readers have not been in the habit of considering all these subjects in connection either with philosophy or with sociology, either one of the above titles or even a combination of the two would have appeared to such readers as too narrow.

In view of the variety of the matters discussed, it is scarcely necessary to call the reader's attention to the fact that the work consists of Socialist *criticism* and not of my individual views. I have used every effort to find a pragmatic or Socialist writer at every point, and offer my individual opinions only where such writers are either lacking or do not exist to my knowledge. Such instances are, however, relatively few, and I hope to convince my readers that the general standpoint I have presented is that of the philosophy of modern science and of the Socialist movement.

Cedarhurst, Long Island, March 15, 1913.

INTRODUCTION

SOCIALISM A NEW CIVILIZATION

"Socialism is not only a doctrine, a system, a method. It is all this and more; it is a civilization."

—Canalejas, late Premier of Spain.

WILHELM LIEBKNECHT held that Socialism includes "all the life, all the feelings and thoughts of man"; the eminent Austrian publicist, Anton Menger, says that the Socialist movement does not consist merely in a propagation of an economic doctrine, but that "the whole domain of mental life must be filled with the Socialist spirit: philosophy, law, morals, art and literature";¹ while in the opinion of Jaurès "all the great human forces, labor, thought, science, art, even religion and humanity's conquest of the universe, await on Socialism for regeneration and further development."²

"Socialism," writes H. G. Wells, "is a great initiation of construction, organization, science and education," which contains an "immense creative element." In the final chapter of his "New Worlds for Old," Wells points out that the advance of Socialism must take three forms. The first of these in point of time is the propaganda, but the first in importance is the development of Socialism itself:

"First logically, and most important, is the primary intellectual process, the elaboration, criticism, discussion, enrichment and enlargement of the project of Socialism.

This includes all sorts of sociological and economic research, the critical literature of Socialism, and every possible way—the drama, poetry, painting, music—of expressing and refining its spirits, its attitude and conceptions. It includes, too, all sorts of experiments in living and association. In its widest sense it includes all science, literature and invention.”³

Third in point of time, and as yet least important, comes that phase of Socialism which the general public, unfortunately, often supposes to be the whole, namely the political side, “the actual changing of practical things in the direction of the coming Socialized State, the actual Socialization.” Wells is at great pains to make his readers seize the fact that this is the least pressing part of the Socialist activities: “Socialism is a moral and intellectual process, let me in conclusion reiterate that. Only secondarily and incidentally does it sway the world of politics.”

Another Englishman, the economist and publicist John A. Hobson, though a collectivist and opposed to Socialism, has stated in a few words just what those conditions are that force all the more far-sighted and representative Socialists to the broader conception of the task that lies before them:

“The history, the political economy, the literature and the biology taught in schools and colleges under the control of persons whose training and character are molded by ‘class’ influences will inevitably be anti-democratic. They will continue to construct and propagate, as they have always done, a politics and an economics designed to ward off assaults upon the vested interests of which they are the intellectual mercenaries. Since the real power of the people rests not in the possession of votes, but in the capacity to use them, the real struggle for democracy centers around the struggle for free education,

free alike from the financial, political, and moral control of the classes. Educational democracy is an essential condition of political and industrial democracy."

The American who has come nearest, perhaps, to an adequate expression of the larger Socialism is Walt Whitman. For Whitman realized that his ideals were not to be reached by a struggle against nature alone, or against social inertia and disorganization, ignorance and poverty, but declared war also against social forces and classes hostile to democratic progress. He says, almost in so many words, that political democracy can become social democracy and build up a new society only through an actual conflict of the new civilization with the old:

"For feudalism, caste, the ecclesiastic traditions, though palpably retreating from political institutions, still hold essentially, by their spirit, even in this country, entire possession of the more important fields, indeed the very sub-soil, of education, and of social standards and literature.

"I say that democracy can never prove itself beyond cavil until it founds and luxuriantly grows its own forms of art, poems, schools, theology, *displacing all that exists, or that has been produced anywhere in the past, under opposite influences.*" (Italics mine.) ⁴

Fundamentally Socialism means, not merely a political and economic revolution, nor even a revolution in history, science, literature and art, but both of these together. The conflict is between two classes and the whole of the two civilizations they represent.

The present-day culture, like that of every period of the past, is the culture of the ruling class. Representing the interests and views of a class which is still maintained in power largely by coercive means, it is necessarily based in large part on the military concep-

tion of command and obedience, in other words on the idea of authority. Then it is a leisure class culture, for the ruling classes have always enough surplus power to support a certain amount of inert parasitism in their midst as well as the active parasitism of the beast-of-prey variety. This aspect of our culture is very near to what is commonly called aristocracy, when the word is used in the social rather than in the political sense. And finally, our culture has been competitive, not only in commerce, but throughout. Indeed it has been competitive almost as long and continuously as it has been a ruling class or a leisure class culture; for the periods since the beginning of written history when the merchants and capitalists were not a dominating factor in society have been relatively few. And, finally, another system of class rule, the regime of status and hereditary caste of which Spencer speaks, however contradictory it may seem to the competitive system, has often existed alongside of it or in combination with it. Competition for property and power among the members of the governing classes, under the limitations the welfare of these classes suggests, has co-existed with status and caste since the days when Hammurabi ruled Babylon some 2,100 years B. C.

Every element of culture is shaped by the social system or civilization of which it is a part; this applies alike to philosophy, to science, to history, to sociology, to psychology, to morality, to religion, to literature, and to art. The Socialist who appeals to a cultured audience in the name of the new civilization which is struggling against the old is forced in some measure to touch upon all these subjects. But it is only figurative to say that two civilizations, two social systems, or two cultural systems are struggling against one another. As a matter of fact it is two bodies of men that are in conflict. And the fact that it is a class struggle (to employ a

much abused phrase) means that the whole personality of the members of each class is involved and that every feature of present-day life is affected. Whatever the ruling classes as a whole stand for may rightly be called a part of present civilization, and whatever a sufficient majority of representative Socialists stand for, whether in philosophy, science, or literature, is an indication of what the Socialist civilization will probably be.

It is in vain that, for the purpose of immediate political gains, Socialist parties sometimes pass "self-denying ordinances," like the Parliament of the British Commonwealth under Cromwell, pledging themselves to abstain from exerting any special influence on these larger aspects of life or from taking into consideration their effect on practical political and economic activities. Such an effort is not only vain but mistaken, as the movement can lose nothing in the long run by building on the broadest possible foundations. Marx and the other most representative Socialists, therefore, never described Socialism as a purely political and economic doctrine and never failed to point out its larger relations.

The principle that asserts the absolute interdependence of the cultural and the economic and political sides of civilization and human progress is the most basic of the whole Socialist philosophy and policy. It is the essence of what is called "the materialist interpretation of history." Unfortunately, in the discussion of this principle attention has been centered almost entirely on the adjective "materialist" and it has been repeatedly explained by eminent Socialists that this word is not used in the ordinary sense. What is more important is to understand that the word "history" refers not to the past so much as to present-day society and civilization.

I have pointed out in a previous volume that the only

definition of Socialism is the Socialist movement. But when we come to deal with the larger aspects of Socialism this definition is no longer sufficient. Organized Socialism often attempts to confine itself to political and economic activities; when we get beyond this sphere we no longer have the movement *as a whole* to guide us, and we come against the difficulty that the Socialist Congresses have decided that Socialism can have no *official* position on questions outside the political and economic struggle. When, however, the overwhelming majority of Socialists *do* have ascertainable and common opinions on some of these broader issues, and these opinions are clearly outlined in the official party press and literature, we can still direct ourselves by the movement—though we can no longer say that it has *fought out* such opinions or that it has tested them in practical life or that it is ready to stake its existence upon them, as we can of its political and economic principles.

This does not necessarily mean that the movement considers these larger aspects of Socialism less fundamental, but that it regards it as less necessary to concentrate immediate attention on them. Indeed Socialist writers and thinkers are *expected* by the movement to confront and handle every issue and to discuss every subject from the Socialist standpoint, though each Socialist writer is forced, in the lack of any official formulation on these broader questions, to restate the Socialist philosophy as he sees it. And he always begins, naturally, with those Socialist principles that are most accepted, that is its economic and political philosophy, which is the method I have pursued. What, then, is this economic and political philosophy—very briefly, since this is not the main subject of the present volume?

In my "Socialism As It Is," I dealt with Socialism purely as an economic and political movement. I

showed that this movement was not a struggle for any fixed program of reforms but a struggle for the control of industry and government by the non-privileged. As an effort to increase the *relative* power of the masses at the expense of the ruling classes until the latter are abolished, this movement can have a fixed program only for the time after class rule will have been overthrown.

It is customary for Socialist writers, in spite of these admitted facts, to define the Socialist movement as being *mainly* a class-struggle of working people against capitalists and then to proceed to qualify this definition. This procedure is not in accord with the present methods of science, which demand, instead of a rigid definition with an unlimited number of qualifications, a definition broad and loose enough so that it does not need to be qualified. From this standpoint perhaps the nearest we can come to a definition is to say that Socialism is *a movement of the non-privileged to overthrow the rule of the privileged in industry and government*. It is true that this definition draws no sharp line between the classes in conflict, but no sharp line exists. It may be admitted even that it is no real definition at all. But some such tentative statement or working hypothesis, then, is a better way to approach the subject, more accurate and less misleading than any dogmatic definition could be. In other words, *Socialism is a struggle of those who have less, against those who have more, than equal opportunity would afford*.

Many of the non-privileged who are not workingmen are by no means nearer to privilege than the workingmen are. Privilege is a matter of income, hours, leisure, place of living, associations and opportunity, rather than of mere occupation. The phrase, "class-struggle," is a survival from the middle ages. Class division by occupation was a medieval condition, when the

son followed in the father's footsteps; now the worker in each class can put his children in a thousand occupations—the only limitation is the social *level* on which he lives. Before the period of large scale industry, corporations, and trusts, the lower level was chiefly filled with employees of private industry; later, numerous official and professional elements were gradually added to it; and now, as the government takes on more and more industrial functions, government employees promise within a few years to become the most numerous of all. To *classify* an individual economically, especially in modern society, we must then consider not only his occupation, as some Marxists seem to imply, but we must attach an equal weight to his income level. The question is not only how an individual makes his living, but how much of a living he makes.

The conflict of Socialism with present society is not in reality a class-struggle. It is not a struggle between *two* social classes or even *two* groups of social classes. It is a class struggle only on one side. The ruling class or ruling classes are more or less unified; Socialism represents the opposition of all the rest of the population, but not of a class. It is not a struggle between classes; it is a struggle of the ruling class against the rest of the human race.

To describe this great conflict of civilizations as a struggle between classes is to place the most useful of phrases in the hands of the enemy. Anti-Socialists can and do say: On both sides is a class, each is selfish, each wishes to rule, and in either case one class or the other will be conquered. Then the only way to end the struggle is for both the classes to stop struggling and cultivate mutual understanding. The easiest way to put an end to this talk is to drop the old misleading phrase, and to reply: There is only one class, the class that

wants to rule humanity and must be conquered by humanity, and the only way to do this is to fight relentlessly to deprive that class, and each and every member of that class, of their privileges and power. Both the phrases, "class struggle" and "class-consciousness," may legitimately be used, then, to mean exactly the opposite of what the majority of Socialists intend them to mean. When a Socialist says that the exploited should be "class-conscious" he means, strange to say, that there must be no exploited class. It is answered most plausibly, that to be class-conscious can only mean to want to advance the interests of one class as a class. On the contrary, true Socialists must be ready, within reasonable limits, to give up an opportunity of advancing either themselves *or their class* every time they believe such a sacrifice brings nearer the abolition of their class and of all other classes.

A "class-conscious" worker engaged in a "class struggle" to advance the interests of his class, without any further aim, is exactly the opposite to a Socialist; he is a reactionary doing all in his power to restore the régime of status or class. History is full of the struggles of one class to conquer another class. The present conflict, being the first effort of the whole population outside of the ruling class not only to conquer that class but to put an end to all classes, is not a class struggle like its predecessors, but *an anti-class struggle*. But the phrase has served a useful purpose in the past, and we must remember what it has come to mean to those who use it most, as well as what it actually says. Only it must always be remembered also that it is used by Socialists in a special and technical sense and does not mean exactly what it says.

What part then of the theoretical formulations of the Socialism of the past remains *wholly* unobjection-

able from the modern pragmatic standpoint? Only this, that all truth must come from social activity, that not only sociology but all the culture and civilization of the future must come from the actual struggles of that social movement which represents the future as against the past, the movement which is preparing the new society. The magnitude of this truth is so great that even the leading Socialist writers have barely touched upon it from time to time, only to step down again to the semi-dogmatic and partial truths of "the materialist conception of history" and "the class-struggle." The larger and deeper truth is so generally accepted, so fundamental and so pervasive within the Socialist movement that it is taken as a matter of course, has become sub-conscious and is rarely discussed or formulated.

All the leading Socialist writers have seen this truth and stated it; for example, take a recent article by the ultra-revolutionary Marxist Anton Pannekoek:

"Scientific Socialism, as established by Marx and Engels, combined into a harmonious unity two things, which from the bourgeois point of view, appeared to be irreconcilable opposites: on the one hand dispassionate objectivity, science indifferent to ideals, and on the other hand the passionately sought subjective ideal of a better society. Those who do not take the point of view of scientific Socialism believe that an ideal, that is to say, something which we desire, can never be a subject matter of science, and that, conversely, passionate desire must be a hindrance to objective truth. To the alleged objective science of society they give the name of sociology; and the sterility, the lack of results which is everywhere in evidence in the countless books of these 'sociologists,' furnishes the best refutation of their contention that social truth is born of dry book-learning, rather than of participation in the social struggles." ⁵

"Social truth is born in social struggles." What a pity that this momentous revolutionary concept should lie buried among so many lesser and more partial truths! This truth and this *alone* is the essence of all Socialism from Marx to modern pragmatism. And this truth in itself is a sufficient basis for a *complete* revolution in every phase of our present class culture.

All other Socialist teachings serve to tie the movement down almost as much as they serve it. Only the truth, that this is the only movement that challenges the old society to mortal combat, and that it is recognized by all in authority as being the one movement they have to fear, opens out ever new horizons and possibilities. Only the struggle of the new society against the old guides us either as to our ultimate aims or our tactics. *Where we meet the most resistance, there we know our efforts promise to bring the greatest fruits.*

Up to this point I have spoken only of what the larger Socialism is; far more important is the inquiry as to what it is becoming, what it is going to be. If Socialism is the philosophy and policy of the Socialist movement it must evidently be in a state of constant evolution, for it would be difficult for the most belated Socialist to deny that fundamental changes are occurring in the movement. Not only is it growing in mere size, but it is evolving in the fullest sense of the word; that is, like every living thing, it is taking on characters that could not have been predicted even by omniscience, to say nothing of the merely human powers of foresight of its early formulators. Indeed the evolution of the Socialist movement and of the policies and philosophy that grow out of it is becoming so rapid to-day that it amounts practically to a revolution. The revolution in policy involved in the turning about of the movement to face "State Socialism" instead of private capitalism, I have

dealt with in a previous volume. The change that is taking place in the philosophy and the other larger aspects of the movement, which is no less revolutionary, is the subject of the present work.

As Socialism first appeared at a time when even the most radical ideas were formulated in a dogmatic manner, it could be no exception to the rule, however advanced its early thinkers may have been. As a consequence, all their successors who took their point of departure, not from the living and growing reality, namely the movement itself, but from those older theories were also more or less dogmatic, whether their dogmatism consisted in trying to reverse the spirit of Marx's teachings, or in attempting the impossible task of making them more revolutionary. Bernstein and the Revisionists in Germany, Jaurès and the Reformists in France, the Fabian Society and the Independent Labor Party in Great Britain, attempted to tone Marxism down by a counter dogmatism which they usually regarded as "criticism" either of Marx's data, or of his political economy. The Syndicalists in France and Italy, while declaring themselves Marxists (as did the French and Germans just mentioned, though not the English), endeavored to make their Marxism more revolutionary, either by incorporating some points of the Anarchist philosophers or through attempting to apply some new metaphysics, as that of Bergson.

The revisionists of Marxism, whether right revisionists or left revisionists (to employ the Continental terms), that is whether their purpose was to make the movement less revolutionary or more revolutionary, based their reasoning not upon the movement itself but mainly on its early theories. What is actually happening, then, as a result of all these tendencies, or rather in spite of them, is that the older theory is neither being

merely revised nor wholly repudiated but that it is being completely revolutionized. Without endeavoring to settle any of the older questions put by the revisionists, revolutionary Socialists are beginning to formulate their opposition to present society in the terms of a philosophy and science which have grown up altogether since the time of Marx and Darwin (the patron saint of the English Fabians).

The tendency of the newer Socialist thought is not to struggle *against* the old, nor to turn the movement to the right or to the left, but to enable it to go *more rapidly* ahead—in the same revolutionary direction in which it originally started and, on the whole, has been traveling ever since. And in order to go more rapidly ahead the great need is not to patch up theories of 1850 for the purpose, but to employ such new principles and methods as most adequately express the present day movement and the present period generally. The older theories, as I have said, may be taken not only as having been satisfactory for the time in which they were formulated, but as still having, beyond doubt, a very considerable value to-day. But it is not necessary, in order to save what is of value, to try to adapt these older theories to present need, for whatever was vital and of lasting worth has long ago been embodied in the movement itself, at least wherever it has reached an advanced state, as for example in Germany. By basing our theory henceforth on the movement (where it is mature), instead of following the opposite method of trying to base the movement on a theory, we not only have the best possible form of Marxism and a policy in accord with modern thought, but we are gaining from the movement something which is vastly more important than all its theories, namely its actual experience—in which is incorporated not only a whole phase of modern

civilization and a large part of the history of our generation but some of the deepest subconscious strivings, which are as yet not capable even of the most tentative formulation. If we study the Socialist press and periodicals, the tactics of the leading Socialist Congresses and the writings of the most representative Socialist writers (when they are not dealing with theoretical questions), we not only gain a more profound insight into Socialism than by any other method, but we are laying the only possible authentic foundation for Socialist political and economic policy as well as Socialist culture and civilization.

Nearly all the difficulties of Socialism in the past have come from the efforts of this or that theorist or faction to narrow it to suit their purpose. But there is now an opposite and equally dangerous tendency, since the movement has begun to grow so rapidly, to make Socialism too broad. I have given many reasons why we should take the broader view of Socialism, but we cannot identify it with the universe or with all progress, for it would then have no definite meaning at all. We cannot agree with H. G. Wells, for example, that "scientific progress, medical organization, the advancement of educational method, artistic production and literature are all aspects of Socialism."⁶ This, to use a phrase employed by Wells himself in another connection (only a few lines below), is to do "sheer violence to language." And what is worse, it confuses Socialism with the stage of society which is preceding it, and against which Socialism is undoubtedly chiefly to be directed, namely "State Socialism." As we are now in a transition period between private or individualist capitalism and the so-called "State Socialism," much of the progress of the present must still be accredited to the first mentioned form of capitalism, while another part of present prog-

ress, and undoubtedly the larger part of the progress of the immediate future, will have to be accredited to "State Socialism," which is clearly what Wells means by Socialism in this passage.

Because of this confusion with collectivism or "State Socialism," many of the efforts to define Socialism, though of a purely practical character, and intended to be based on the movement, are as misleading as any dogma. The best known example is the statement that Socialism means democratic collectivism or industrial democracy, a formula that can easily be limited to the progressive reforms of individualist capitalism and of "State Socialism." The practical or political and economic problem of Socialism is neither how much of industry the government controls (the problem of collectivism), nor the form of government (the problem of democracy), nor even how much of industry a democratic form of government controls (the problem of democratic collectivism), but this—Does a class, or group of classes, control the government?

It is evident that collectivism, government ownership of monopolies, the appropriation of the land rent by the state, and the placing of labor on the level of maximum efficiency, are not Socialism.

"State Socialism" seeks merely to rearrange institutions; Socialism seeks to bring new social forces into a position of power, which is the same as to create new forces as far as practical results are concerned. One of the chief spokesmen of British "State Socialism" (J. R. MacDonald) says that "Socialism is not a *tour de force* of the creative intelligence." This holds true only of that "State Socialism," for which this writer speaks. Nor is genuine Socialism the product of the creative intelligence of a single person or of any limited number of persons, but it certainly is the product of *creative in-*

telligence of humanity. MacDonald expresses the "State Socialist" philosophy further when he says that society has not been and will not be "created by human voluntary agency." While Socialists would agree that humanity has been guided chiefly by involuntary forces in the past, the very essence of the great change that Socialism is to inaugurate is that the new society is to be consciously organized—nor can that great revolution in civilization and culture be prepared for except by voluntary effort. This is the meaning of Marx's well-known phrase, "With Socialism real history *begins*."

In the early stages of the political and economic movement Socialists were accused of being "destructive." They replied by proving that they not only favored and were ready and able to aid every constructive social movement, but had concrete plans for the complete reconstruction of society at every point, that is, for revolution. On its cultural side Socialism is more than constructive, it is *creative*. For it has sought, already with wonderful success, not merely to direct old forces into new channels, or to improve and accelerate good beginnings that have already been made, but to create new beginnings and new forces. And it has shown that in this creative function it is limited neither by abstract definitions, by political and economic programs, nor by historical precedents which we now call evolutionary "laws."

The work of the nineteenth century radicals, to abolish outworn institutions, though it may be viewed as a part of the process of constructon, could scarcely satisfy the demand for a great *creative* social principle, as Spencer and Morley both acknowledged, nor can the solution of merely material problems, the providing of material means for civilization, the more systematic organization of industry and the more scientific exploita-

tion of labor which is the kind of "construction" that capitalism has hitherto undertaken or proposes to undertake. The "State Socialism" of the immediate future promises to leave the present class culture intact. It remains for the Socialist movement to supply the principles and the forces required to create a new type of man and society.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
PREFACE	iii
INTRODUCTION—SOCIALISM, A NEW CIVILIZATION . . .	v
I. PRAGMATISM AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY	i
II. THE APPEAL TO SCIENCE	30
III. "EVOLUTIONISM"—AND AFTER	47
IV. THE REIGN OF BIOLOGY	73
V. THE ABUSE OF HISTORY	87
VI. SOCIETY AS GOD	112
VII. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE NEW SOCIETY—AS SEEN BY MAX STIRNER	139
VIII. THE SOCIALIST VIEW OF MORALITY	161
IX. NIETZSCHE AND THE NEW MORALITY	191
X. THE SOCIALIST EXPLANATION OF RELIGION	228
XI. THE NEW EDUCATION AND THE OLD	257
XII. SOCIALISM AND THE NEW EDUCATION	296
XIII. MAN, WOMAN, AND SOCIALISM	321
APPENDIX A—SOCIALISM AND PRAGMATISM, AS SEEN IN THE WRITINGS OF MARX AND ENGELS	373
APPENDIX B—SOCIALISM AND RELIGION	386
NOTES	392
INDEX	405

THE LARGER ASPECTS
OF SOCIALISM

THE LARGER ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM

I

PRAGMATISM AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

UNTIL the period of modern science and industry it was held that "man" was the purpose of the universe, which was formed in every part to serve his needs, either directly and physically, or in some more indirect and spiritual way. Just as it had formerly been believed that the sun revolved around our earth, so it was then held that Nature revolved around Man.

Then came the beginnings of modern science and industry and the theory of evolution and seemed at first to expel man forever from this central position in the universe. If man was now regarded as the last and highest product of evolution, he was all but insignificant in the mighty whole. It was held as equally absurd, whether he regarded himself as the purpose of the universe, or merely made himself the center about which his own thinking revolves. Nothing during this period would have been considered more preposterous than Pope's saying that "the proper study of mankind is man" or Rousseau's that the subject on which men should concentrate their best thought was "the study of human relations."

In the third period, into which we are now entering, mankind has again become the center—this time by *hypothesis*, that is because he chooses to place himself there. Man can understand the universe, it is now seen, only as it has a meaning for man, only in proportion as he can make it a part of his life and use it for his purposes. It was not created for him, but it is significant only as he can compel it to serve him; the new view is not anthropomorphic but it is anthropocentric.

Philosophy and science evolve with society, and as social reorganization begins in the twentieth century to take the central position held during the nineteenth by mechanical and biological progress, all society advances towards a humanist or anthropocentric view. The new philosophy does not hold, as did the ancient and medieval anthropomorphism, that man is the center of the universe, but it regards man as the center, the starting point and the end of all the thinking and activities of man. And it contends that our most deep-seated, widespread, and fatal errors are due to our having forgotten this simple and essential truth.

Herbert Spencer spoke for the generation just gone when he wrote of "the littleness of human intelligence in face of that which transcends human intelligence." In the science of the Nineteenth Century mankind was, indeed, reduced to an atom. Not only did this affect the more materialistic philosophers, like Spencer, but also the idealists and transcendentalists that followed Kant and Hegel. In complete reaction both against the materialism and the idealism of the Nineteenth Century, both equally remote from humanism, modern science, applied to sociology and psychology, is now producing the new philosophy which usually goes under the name of pragmatism.

Professor R. B. Perry excellently characterizes prag-

matism as that philosophy which views knowledge as a mode of life, emphasizes the crucial importance of human effort, considers civilization as the first desideratum and not the totality of nature, centers its attention on man's conquest of nature through the only true knowledge, which is power, emphasizes society rather than the individual, because this brings the greatest efficiency for the conquest of nature, considers man chiefly in his relation to his fellows rather than in his relation to "the universe," and "proposes to possess the future instead of the present and the past." Here we have in a few words what are undoubtedly the chief traits of this new philosophy.¹

Perry also brings out sharply the contrast of pragmatism to previous philosophies. The preceding "absolutism" whether idealistic or materialistic in substance, was mathematical and dialectical in method, and claimed to establish "ultimate truths" with "demonstrable certainty," while pragmatism holds philosophy itself to be no exception to the rule that *all* hypotheses are answerable to experience. That which absolutism held to be most significant, namely the logical unity of the world, is for pragmatism a negligible abstraction. That which for absolutism is mere appearance—the world of time and space, the interaction of man and nature and of man and man—is for pragmatism the quintessence of reality. The one is the philosophy of eternity, the other the philosophy of time.

Perry says that pragmatism is a biocentric philosophy, that is that it revolves around biology. This would apply to Bergson, but for James, Dewey, and other pragmatists the term anthropocentric is far more accurate. Pragmatism came only when, to the reaction against the absolutism of Kant and Hegel, was added the reaction against the domination of philosophy by the physical and

natural sciences. This Perry practically admits when he adds "*the moral and social sciences*" to biology as forming together the basis of pragmatism. There is no doubt that the categories supplied by biology are largely responsible for the new philosophy. But it was only when these categories were applied to man and his problems that pragmatism was born.

Pragmatism, in its humanistic form, as formulated by Professor John Dewey, has arisen largely from psychology and related studies. But the new tendency is world-wide, and may be seen equally well in the effort of many sociologists to give their science a basis independent of biology. Both by the psychologists and sociologists philosophy is brought down from the realm of abstraction and reduced to a view of life that can be used for the practical service of mankind—and must inevitably be so used if the modern world of thought is not to be reduced to the utmost chaos and confusion.

"Philosophy," as Dewey points out, "must in time become a method of locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis." The purpose of all science and philosophy is not the promotion of knowledge or the accumulation of data, but the service of man. And this is required equally for the sake of mankind and the sake of science.

Dewey says that civilization is foredoomed to failure except as the individual can work with a definite and controllable tool:—"This tool," he continues, "is science. But this very fact, constituting the dignity of science and measuring the importance of the philosophic (*i. e.*, scientific) theory of knowledge, conferring upon them the religious value once attaching to dogma and the disciplinary significance once belonging to political

rules, also sets their limit. The servant is not above his master.”² In a word, science and philosophy, colossal as their importance is, do not rule life, but serve it.

In this consistent and social form the new pragmatism becomes a Socialist philosophy, in which science and industrial democracy are practically one: “Democracy, the crucial expression of modern life, is not so much an addition to the scientific and industrial tendencies as it is the perception of their social or spiritual meaning. . . . Democracy is estimable only through the changed conception of intelligence, that forms modern science, and of want, that forms modern industry.”³

Thus science in its broader conception, in which the social sciences are also included, is taken as the basis of the pragmatic philosophy, while this larger science roots in turn in the movement toward industrial democracy, that is in the underlying industrial and social tendencies of our time.

The central principle of all three tendencies in science, philosophy and society has been well expressed by John A. Hobson, when he says that modern thought recognizes that “so far as the selection, valuation and utilization of ‘realities’ go, Man is the Maker of the Universe.”⁴

“Man is the Maker of the Universe.” Here is the principle which underlies both modern science and philosophy and the modern social movement, that is Socialism. Psychology and sociology are already doing away with the contrary principle, man’s fear of the “laws of nature”—or rather the use of so-called laws of nature by the classes to hinder the faith of the masses in the possibilities of progress. Pragmatism, if the new philosophy continues to bear that name, will rapidly annihilate the reactionary philosophical theories spun out on the older “scientific” basis. And finally, Socialism,

armed with the new philosophy, will revolutionize all civilization and culture—as soon, that is, as economic and social conditions permit the masses to realize and to utilize the new science and the new philosophy.

Let me now very briefly summarize pragmatism as variously conceived by some of its modern exponents. I shall not deal with it at all in its extreme form, as presented by Schiller, but only in the somewhat less extreme presentation of James, and in the very reasonable form in which it is given to us by Dewey, concluding with a few words concerning the brilliant, though fantastic, pragmatism developed by Bergson—if indeed this latter philosopher is a pragmatist.

One of the best brief statements of James' standpoint was made by Dewey on James' death. James' philosophy, according to this statement, was a reaction against reigning philosophies in so far as the latter "regarded reality as having a fixed and final character, and reduced everything to parts of one embracing whole." Such a theory "left no place for genuine novelty, for real change, for adventure, for the uncertain and the vague, for choice and freedom—in short, for distinctive individuality," while James insisted precisely on "novelty, plasticity or indeterminable variety and change as genuine traits of the world in which we live." Evidently in Dewey's view evolution had really evolved no philosophy of its own until James and others began to build up what Dewey calls the experimental philosophy.

The basis of James' reasoning, as that of other pragmatists, is their attitude to truth. James demands that every idea be tested by the question: "What sensible difference to anybody will its truth make?"⁵ And he claims that the answer to this question will put one in the best possible position for understanding what the idea means and for discussing its importance. .

From this point of view the evolution of knowledge and the evolution of man's activities are absolutely interdependent, so that the world of thought is immediately and forever connected with the actual evolution of the world of life.

James has a twofold remedy against the reign of intellectualism and abstraction. First he would restrain and limit the use of conceptions by the appeal to direct observation, and second, in the place of abstractions, he would use hypotheses:

"Use concepts when they help, and drop them when they hinder understanding; and take reality bodily and integrally up into philosophy in exactly the perceptual shape in which it comes. . . . The only way to get the rest without wading through all future time in the person of numberless perceivers, is to substitute our various conceptual systems which, monstrous abridgments though they be, are nevertheless each an equivalent for some partial aspect of the full perceptual reality which we can never grasp.

"This, essentially, is Bergson's view of the matter, and with it I think that we should rest content. . . . The philosopher, although he is unable as a finite being to compass more than a few passing moments of such experience, is yet able to extend his knowledge beyond such moments by the ideal symbol of the other moments. He thus commands vicariously innumerable perceptions that are out of range. But the concepts by which he does this, being thin extracts from perception, are always insufficient representatives thereof; and, although they yield *wider* information, must never be treated after the rationalistic fashion, as if they gave a *deeper* quality of truth. The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience. Here alone do we acquaint ourselves with continuity, or the immersion of one thing in another, here alone with self, with substance, with qual-

ities, with activity in its various modes, with time, with cause, with change, with novelty, with tendency, and with freedom." ⁶

"The two mental functions thus play into each other's hands. Perception prompts our thought, and thought in turn enriches our perception. The more we see, the more we think; while the more we think, the more we see in our immediate experiences, and the greater grows the detail and the more significant the articulateness of our perception." ⁷

The above passages give sufficiently James' view as to concepts or generalizations, and the rôle they should fill in philosophy and life. His discussion of the hypothesis is an equally essential part of his thought, and an equally important element in the reaction against intellectualism:

"'Intellectualism' is the belief that our mind comes upon a world complete in itself, and has the duty of ascertaining its contents; but has no power of re-determining its character, for that is already given. . . .

"It postulates that *to escape error* is our paramount duty. . . . And if by the same act we renounce our chance at truth, that loss is the lesser evil, and should be incurred.

"It postulates that in every respect the universe is finished in advance of our dealings with it. . . .

"That 'evidence' not only needs no good-will for its reception; but is able, if patiently waited for, to neutralize ill-will

"Finally, that our *beliefs* and our acts based thereupon, although they are parts of the world, and although the world without them is unfinished, are yet such mere externalities as not to alter in any way the significance of the rest of the world when they are added to it." ⁸

To this intellectualism James replies by advocating the use of the hypothesis:

"We often *cannot* wait but must act, somehow; so we act on the most *probable hypothesis*, trusting that the event may prove us wise. Moreover, not to act on one belief, is often equivalent to acting as if the opposite belief were true, so inaction would not always be as 'passive' as the intellectualists assume. It is one attitude of will." ⁹

James endorses the statement of another philosopher that "we are only as we are active." The question becomes, then, what real activities are. "If there *be* real creative activities in being, radical empiricism (pragmatism) must say somewhere that they must be immediately alive."

James calls his pragmatism not only radical empiricism, but also humanism, an equally suggestive term. He accepts as humanism Dewey's view of what we might call the complete relativity of truth, namely, that "the more true" is "the more satisfactory." There is no truth, there are only truths, and these truths are only *more or less* true in so far as they are more or less satisfactory as hypotheses.

But it is held by James and Dewey that the satisfactoriness which determines the truth of a proposition must not conflict with "consistency." Many intellectualists have supposed that pragmatism was here surrendering its citadel to the older logic, but James goes on to explain that the pragmatist's logic is not the logic of the intellectualists. The "consistency" of which he speaks is "emphatically not a consistency between an Absolute Reality and the mind's copy of it, but an actually felt consistency among judgments, objects and manners of reacting in the mind." The logic or consistency required by pragmatists, in other words, comes entirely from the practical necessities of activity. It is an outcome "of the natural fact that we are human beings that

develop mental *habits*—habit itself proving adaptively beneficial in environment where the same objects or the same kind of objects recur, and follow law.”¹⁰

At times, indeed, James’ standpoint is far from individualistic. His idea that philosophy itself must evolve (since it is dependent on future experience) is certainly as radically social as is conceivable:

“We must not forget, in talking of the ultimate character of our activity-experiences, that each of them is but a portion of a wider world, one link in the vast chain of processes of experience out of which history is made. Each partial process, to him who lives through it, defines itself by its origin and its goal; but to an observer with a wider mind-span who should live outside of it, that goal would appear but as a provisional halting-place, and the subjectively felt activity would be seen to continue into objective activities that led far beyond. We thus acquire a habit, in discussing activity-experiences, of defining them by their relation to something more. . . . You think you are just driving this bargain, but, as Stevenson says somewhere, you are laying down a link in the policy of mankind.”¹¹

Perry says that to the pragmatist all knowing is “a phase of life, of action in an environment,” and that “an idea is what an idea *does*.”¹² He quotes Dewey as saying: “It is in the concrete thing *as experienced* that all grounds and clues to its own intellectual or logical rectification are contained.” In *experience*, in “*activity situations*,” in the study of *the knower in his environment*, lies the problem of life, of science and of philosophy, according to pragmatism.

“True ideas,” says James, “are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas

are those that we can not. The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation." ¹³

James, as I shall show, swings around the circle, and comes back to positions that sometimes nearly approach those of theology and metaphysics (see Chapter X). It is largely, no doubt, his very successful and brilliant efforts to popularize pragmatism that have led some of his over-encouraged theological readers to misinterpret even such clear passages as the one just quoted. It is assumed by such readers that, if the truth of a fact is determined by the event, this may mean that any event, or, to use James' own all-too-suggestive term, any "sub-sequential utility," may be sufficient to establish a supposed fact as true, and that an idea may even be verified by "sentiment" or proved by "its immediate pleasantness or by its tonic effect upon the will" (Perry). Perry, on the contrary, would only allow such verification to establish an idea as true in those cases where verification proper is impossible; in this very limited sense only, he thinks, is James' famous doctrine of "the right to believe" justifiable. For such cases Perry makes the following sensible provision:

"Appeal to sensible facts and inference from established truth both leave the issue doubtful. But meanwhile it is necessary to act on *some* such hypothesis. We must in the practical sense believe where we cannot in the theoretical sense know. And here we are justified in allowing our tastes and our hopes to incline the balance. For we should be no better supported by proof if we believed the contrary, and should lose the emotional values beside." ¹⁴

Indeed, the fact that the only pragmatism known to the general public is that of James makes it questionable whether the same term should be used for the widely different pragmatism of Dewey with which I am chiefly concerned. Perry calls himself a realist; there can be little question that Dewey is as near to Perry as to James. James' pragmatism is largely philosophical, that of Dewey is pragmatic, in that it concerns itself with life rather than with ultimate generalizations. As to ultimate problems, Dewey is probably a realist as much as Perry—he concedes that humanity is ultimately limited by reality and fact. But as a pragmatist he gives chief weight not to the ultimate but to the proximate, and here what matters is not "what is," but "what man can do." He does not attempt to make a metaphysics out of pragmatism as James does, for this opens the door again to that very philosophic dogmatism, absolutism, and unrealistic idealism, against which every progressive social and radical philosophy has arisen. In so far as ultimate problems are vital we must be realists. But consistent pragmatism holds that ultimate problems are not basic. To attempt to solve ultimate problems by pragmatic methods is the reverse of pragmatic.

Dewey's pragmatism is consequently altogether more solid and circumspect than that of James. He insists (according to Perry) that though the truth of an idea is determined by the event, this is only true for "the specific purpose and the specific situation that gave rise to the idea." Dewey says:

"It is the failure to grasp the coupling of truth of meaning with a *specific* promise, undertaking, or intention expressed by a thing, which underlies, so far as I can see, the criticisms passed upon the experimental or pragmatic view of truth." ¹⁵

This is a flat denial of the proposition that an idea is true in so far as it works *in any respect whatsoever*.

The pseudo-pragmatic point of view that "an idea which was shown to be contrary to sensible fact, or contradictory to accredited truths, might be proved true by affording a surplus of sentimental or utilitarian value," is very rightly renounced by Perry and others as "reactionary."¹⁶

It must be noted, however, that James does not go so far as to take up an outright *unrealistic* point of view, as Schiller and some other pragmatists do. While he is willing that truths should be verified by a "subsequential utility," he believes that they are at the same time an adaptation to real preëxisting environment. While man makes *his* world, James concedes that he does not make the whole universe, as may be seen from the following passage:

"'For him [the pragmatist], as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about. . . . This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited "reality" *ab initio*, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain "an epistemological realist."'"¹⁷

Dewey's position is most briefly put in his little volume, "How We Think." He points out that etymologically "to prove a thing means primarily to try it, to test it." "The guest bidden to the wedding feast excused himself because he had to prove his oxen." Dewey insists that knowledge as well as science can be "proved" only in this way:

"Not until a thing has been tried—'tried out,' in colloquial language—do we know its true worth. Till then it may be pretense, a bluff. But the thing that has come

out victorious in a test or trial of strength carries its credentials with it; it is approved, because it has been proved. Its value is clearly evinced, shown, *i. e.*, demonstrated." ¹⁸

The process by which we "prove" consists of a double movement back and forth between "facts and meanings":

"A movement from the given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive (or inclusive) entire situation; and back from this suggested whole—which, as suggested, is a *meaning*, an idea—to the particular facts, so as to connect these with one another and with additional facts to which the suggestion has directed attention." ¹⁹

At a later stage of reasoning Dewey says we reconstitute our data on the facts of the case, and that we mean by the facts of the case "those traits that are used as evidence in reaching a conclusion or forming a decision":

"Thinking, in short, must end as well as begin in the domain of concrete *observations*, if it is to be complete thinking. And the ultimate educative value of all deductive processes is measured by the degree to which they become working tools in the *creation* and *development* of new *experiences*." ²⁰

This definition regards experience not as something that is presented to us, but something that we create and develop. Dewey, like James, points out that it is not our senses that define objects to us, but our practical activities, and that modern science is not a new kind of observation but a new kind of activity:

"The substitution of scientific for superstitious habits . . . is the result of *regulation of the conditions* under which observation and inference take place." ²¹

Dewey does not relegate the intellect to an inferior position as James and Bergson do. He even believes in intellectual development to the point of gradual acquirement of delight in thinking for the sake of thinking. His view of the function of the intellect is as appreciative as it is critical:

"Abstract thinking, it should be noted, represents *an* end, not *the* end. The power of sustained thinking on matters remote from direct use is an outgrowth of practical and immediate modes of thought, but not a substitute for them. The educational end is not the destruction of power to think so as to surmount obstacles and adjust means and ends; it is not its replacement by abstract reflection. Nor is theoretical thinking a higher type of thinking than practical. A person who has at command both types of thinking is of a higher order than he who possesses only one. Methods that in developing abstract intellectual abilities weaken habits of practical or concrete thinking, fall as much short of the educational ideal as do the methods that in cultivating ability to plan, to invent, to arrange, to forecast, fail to secure some delight in thinking irrespective of practical consequences." ²²

While he agrees that the intellectual method is "a transformation which the flux of life undergoes in the interest of practice primarily, and only subordinately in the interests of theory," Dewey does not conclude from this that intellectual knowledge is less valuable. On the contrary, in so far as the intellect has been purely practical and scientific, it is to be relied upon.

Bent on using the intellectual faculties to the full,

Dewey definitely rejects all empiricism, thereby opposing himself most completely to James. His method of thinking he terms not "radical empiricism," but "experimental" or "scientific":

"The change of attitude from conservative reliance upon the past, upon routine and custom, to faith in progress through the intelligent regulation of existing conditions, is, of course, the reflex of the scientific method of *experimentation*. The empirical method inevitably magnifies the influence of the past; the experimental method throws into relief the possibilities of the future. The empirical method says, '*Wait* till there is a sufficient number of cases'; the experimental method says, '*Produce* the cases.' " ²³

There is all the difference in the world between experience and experiment. Experiment follows after intellectual or theoretical thinking, experience *may* ignore this kind of thought or reduce it to an entirely subordinate rôle. Experimental thinking leads from hypothesis to experiment, and from experiment back to hypothesis again, from fact to meaning and meaning to fact. It looks always forward to future experiment and hypothesis. Experience outside of experiment, while it lowers the significance of hypothesis and meaning, also looks to the past—which is an essential part of experience. In a word, whatever empiricism implies beyond experiment is the very opposite to experiment.

This experimental attitude Dewey considers to be natural to mankind from his infancy. And it has only to be protected and perfected:

"The attitude of childhood is *naïve, wondering, experimental*; the world of man and nature is new. Right methods of education *preserve and perfect* this attitude, and thereby short-circuit for the individual the slow

progress of the race, eliminating the waste that comes from inert routine." ²⁴

Far from regarding "the evolution of the race" with awe, Dewey, it will be seen, considers it to have been altogether too slow and proposes a short circuit. This mode of thought is equally far removed from that of the historians, of the biological "evolutionists," and of James in his effort to find a function for all the religious aberrations of mankind.

Bergson bases his philosophy on a radical separation of biology from physics, Dewey on a union of biology and psychology. The union of mind and matter is solved, or avoided, by studying the nature of life and its evolution.

"The pragmatic theory points out that mind or intelligence is an accomplishment of just this process of organic growth in nature and in society." Mind is, so to speak, a device for keeping track of the increased differentiation and multiplication of conditions, and planning for and arranging for in advance, ends and means of activity which will keep these various factors in proper adjustment to one another. ²⁵

Not only does Dewey insist that mind is developed chiefly through social activity, but also that social sympathy is essential to sound thinking. He and Professor Tufts object to the separation of intellect and emotion from one another, and add that "the only truly general, the reasonable, as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever," is "the *generous* thought." ²⁶

"Sympathy," continue these writers, "is the general principle of moral knowledge, not because its commands take precedence of others (which they do not necessarily), but because it furnishes a most reliable and effica-

cious *intellectual* standpoint. It supplies the criterion *par excellence* for analyzing complex cases." ²⁷ It is this same sympathetic or vital relationship with our subject which Bergson proposes as the basis of a greater science of life and human evolution, though he adopts a psychology the *very opposite* of Dewey's when he contrasts this inner or intuitional attitude with the intellectual, instead of fusing the two into one.

Pragmatism, as represented by Dewey, insists not only that philosophy must be viewed as a product of the social environment, but that *psychology* must also be studied in the same light. The human mind is to be understood neither by any amount of abstract discussion, nor by any amount of experimentation, but is a product of evolution, and should be studied only from the standpoint of biology and the evolution of man, especially in society,—“experience is a matter of function and habits, of active adjustments and readjustments, of coördination of activities rather than of states of consciousness.” ²⁸ If *states* of consciousness are abandoned as the material of psychology, we see that even the work of James must rapidly become antiquated, just as his broad but individualistic discussion of religion is outgrown because it gives consideration neither to social environment nor to social evolution. For to Dewey, mind itself being largely a social organ, states of consciousness are therefore, for the most part, significant and comprehensible only as they fulfill some social function.

It can be shown that on one side pragmatism is a reaction against and a departure from older philosophies, the result of the profound studies of these philosophies made by the pragmatists; but it does not depend on them, and would have arisen quite independently. Its basis is social evolution, and not evolution in

the world of ideas. Dewey does not at all agree with Hegel that intellectual progress consists in the reaction of the new *idea* against the old, but rather holds that, with the evolution of *industry, science, and society*, the most fundamental of the old questions become practically unimportant and are therefore *abandoned*.

"Intellectual progress," says Dewey, "usually occurs through sheer abandonment of such questions, together with both of the alternatives they assume—an abandonment that results from decreasing vitality and interest in their point of view. We do not solve them; we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place." ²⁹

According to this, the true pragmatic standpoint, there are not several lines of evolution, the evolution of philosophy, the evolution of science, the evolution of machinery, and so forth, but only one, the evolution of society. And it is on this evolution that philosophy must rest. Dewey regards philosophy as being not a cause but a result, the product of social evolution, though he does not underestimate its importance on that account. "The genetic standpoint makes us aware that the systems of the past are neither fraudulent impostures nor absolute revelations; but are the products of political, economic, and scientific conditions whose change carries with it change of theoretical formulations." ³⁰ This might be called the economic interpretation of philosophy; it is completely in accord with the Socialistic standpoint.

Dewey's view of the history of philosophy is practically identical with the Socialist view of history in general. The thinking of the individual is necessarily

dependent to a high degree on his social environment, on the stage of history in which he lives. For instance, Dewey portrays the conditions in ancient Greece, and shows that not only the politics but also the whole philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle were dependent on these conditions. With Plato the "pure reason" or the "ideal" played the tyrant, just as custom had previously done in the society that preceded Plato; "reason was to take the place of custom as a guide of life; but it was to furnish rules as final, as unalterable as those of custom." The rules that Plato furnished were, like the previously existing customs, founded on the economic and social conditions of the time; not only in spirit but in fact.

"The city-state was a superficial layer of cultured citizens, cultured through a participation in affairs made possible by relief from economic pursuits, superimposed upon the dense mass of serfs, artisans, and laborers. For this division, moral philosophy made itself spiritual sponsor, and thus took it up into its own being. Plato wrestled valiantly with the class problem; but his outcome was the necessity of decisive demarcation after education, of the masses in whom reason was asleep and appetite much awake, from the few who were fit to rule because alertly wise. The most generously imaginative soul of all philosophy could not far outrun the institutional practices of his people and his times." ³¹

Nor did the philosophy of Aristotle rest on any more concrete or lasting basis. His ideal state was a militant city state just as Plato's was, and, like Plato, he idealized on the supposition that conditions around him were lasting:

"Aristotle's assertions that the state exists by nature, and that in the state alone does the individual achieve

independence and completeness of life, are indeed pregnant sayings. But as uttered by Aristotle they meant that, in an isolated state, the Greek city-state, set like a garlanded island in the waste sea of barbaroi, a community indifferent when not hostile to all other social groupings, individuals attain their full end. In a social unity which signified social contraction, contempt, and antagonism, in a social order which despised intercourse and glorified war, is realized the life of excellence! . . . Aristotle promptly yielded to the besetting sin of all philosophers, the idealization of the existent: he declared that the class distinctions of superiority and inferiority as between man and woman, master and slave, liberal-minded and base mechanic, exist, and are justified by nature—a nature which aims at embodied reason.”³²

Dewey points out that all the limitations of the narrow city states of Greece became fixed in a philosophy which was as narrow as they, especially in “its inability socially to utilize science.” Leaving physical science to one side, the ancient philosophy had no way by which it could automatically grow and expand, but was worked up from the very beginning into a moral theory; that is, it was directed, and even developed in the first instance, for political ends. The Greek philosophers did not subject the individual to the actually existing state, nor the state to the individual, but they wished to subject both to an “external cosmic order,” that is to say, to a kind of theocracy which “restricted the free use of doubt, inquiry, and experimentation, of the human intelligence.”³³ In other words, the one, but fatal, fault of the Greek philosophy was that it was not evolutionary, and this led to the very same philosophical and sociological errors that are serving as the basis of the “State Socialism” of our time—to which, indeed, Plato’s Republic is in many respects similar.

I shall not follow Dewey's brief sketch of the history of philosophy farther, but shall merely take his reference to the greatest of modern philosophers, Kant and Hegel, men who wrote after modern science had first dawned on the world, but before the renaissance of biology and psychology and before the latest and greatest industrial revolution—that of transportation—had taken place, *i. e.*, before industrial democracy was dreamed of. Living at a time when individualist capitalism was being founded, it was natural that Kant should make the individual the center of the Cosmos. He looked at society as composed of individuals who “are ends in themselves.” But having broken the authority of mere tradition by this thoroughly revolutionary and pragmatic principle, Kant, like his Greek predecessors, almost succeeded in retracing his steps and establishing a new authority.

“Reason became a mere voice which, having nothing in particular to say, said Law, Duty in general, leaving to the existing social order of the Prussia of Frederick the Great the congenial task of declaring just what was obligatory in the concrete. The marriage of freedom and authority was thus celebrated with the understanding that sentimental primacy went to the former and practical control to the latter.” ³⁴

The only difference in practical effect between Kant's philosophy and the Greek was that Kant's ethics and theology were somewhat separated from his metaphysics, which provided a large and independent foundation for physical science, and that he did not *succeed* altogether in counterbalancing his elevation of the individual by his elevation of “Reason.”

Hegel delivered a second blow at tradition and authority by making the evolution of humanity his central

concept and this was a tremendous advance, but he did not stop there.

"The outcome was the assertion that history is reason, and reason is history: the actual is rational, the rational is the actual. It gave the pleasant appearance (which Hegel did not strenuously discourage) of being specifically an idealization of the Prussian nation, and incidentally a systematized apologetic for the universe at large."

In neither the case of Hegel nor in that of Kant does Dewey minimize their importance, because their work, like that of all other philosophers, was relative to the times in which it was conceived. The philosophy of Hegel is only human and like that of Plato represents both the period in which he lived and the class to which he belonged.

"But in intellectual and practical effect, it lifted the idea of process above that of fixed origins and fixed ends, and presented the social and moral order, as well as the intellectual, as a scene of becoming, and it located reason somewhere within the struggles of life." ³⁵

Both Kant and Hegel, not only in their social philosophy but even in their metaphysics, reflected the particular form of government the ruling classes had evolved in their time, namely, the semi-capitalistic, semi-individualistic autocracy of Prussia. By allowing for this fact we lose nothing of their message, but, on the contrary, are far more free to accept and assimilate all that seems good in their thinking, in spite of its inevitable limitations.

Bergson's criticism of philosophy has the same basis as Dewey's, except that he centers attention on the evolution of science rather than the evolution of society, and

we may admit that science is *the* intermediary in this connection. Hitherto philosophy has not examined sufficiently into the basis of the reasoning of the sciences, and this is why much that it has done has become almost valueless, because it has been simply the slave of physical and chemical science and of that natural science that is based upon them. Psychology, biology, sociology, and philosophy have suffered because they have allowed physical science to dominate in fields where it should be subordinate, so that the overthrow of the merely mechanical philosophy of Spencer or Haeckel is equally important to science, to philosophy, and to social progress.

The mechanical philosophies, Bergson says, are descendants of the opposite or "final" philosophies that have ruled since the days of Plato, and all have grown out of man's life and history. They are all reflections of the kind of thinking that man learned from his work. Everything that he did had its means and its ends. The attention of the first philosophers was fixed on moral problems and ultimate ends, and their philosophies were then all "final," *i. e.*, they were either theological or closely resembled theology. Later, as man began to gain a control of nature, his attention was centered on means. He lived with the forces of nature and his philosophy became mechanical. Our philosophy must, according to the pragmatist view, continue to be drawn from our activities. But we do not need to lose ourselves any longer either in original causes or ultimate ends; and our attention becomes more and more fixed in the *process* itself, in the transformation of means into ends and the incorporation of ends in means, *i. e.*, in human evolution.

Evolution, in other words, makes any philosophy of the older kind impossible, though it by no means obvi-

ates the necessity for a philosophy, *i. e.*, the most systematic and the broadest generalizations that are consistent with our new activities. Evolutionary philosophy, however, can no more be given a complete form, can no more near completion than can evolutionary science. It must be the collective and progressive work "of many thinkers, of many observers also, completing one another, correcting one another, adjusting themselves to one another." ³⁶

Science and philosophy are social products, but society is in turn affected in the profoundest possible way by this same science and philosophy. That is, in making philosophy a product of social evolution and a tool for social activity, Dewey does not at all overlook its profoundest aspect and its power actually to create. But, as a pragmatist, he is even more interested in life and in social problems than he is in philosophy or psychology. Philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, are constantly revolutionized by the evolution of the social environment, but the more important aspect of the matter is that this new philosophy, psychology and pedagogy must in turn have a revolutionary effect on social evolution. Intelligence become practical means practice become responsible:

"Theory located within progressive practice instead of reigning statically supreme over it, means practice itself made responsible to intelligence; to intelligence which relentlessly scrutinizes the consequence of every practice and which exacts liability by an equally relentless publicity." ³⁷

The older idealism, in divorcing theory from practice, allowed the materialism of the age to become more materialistic still, and this is what Dewey refers to when

he speaks of theory having reigned *statically* supreme over practice. This condition is to be reversed, that is, revolutionized, as theory and practice become one.

And just as the marriage of theory and practice promises so much for the future, so their separation in the past Dewey believes to have been one of the chief forces that have retarded social evolution. He says that the diversion of the intelligence from practical problems, "from discrimination of plural and concrete goods, from noting their conditions and obstacles, and from devising methods for holding men responsible for their concrete use of powers and conditions, has done more than brute love of power to establish inequality and injustice among men." And this view also accords thoroughly with that of the Socialist writers when they say that real human history, the *conscious* effort of mankind as a whole to improve its condition has not yet begun and will only begin with Socialism.

But Dewey sees also that the spiritual domination of mankind through false ideas and their material domination through brute forces are in essence one, that the diversion of the minds of men from real to fictitious problems through the separation of theory and practice "has confirmed with social sanctions the principles of feudal domination."

"All men require moral sanctions in their conduct," he writes, "Class-codes of morals are sanctions, under the caption of ideals, of uncriticised customs; they are recommendations, under the head of duties, of what the members of the class are already most given to doing. If they are to obtain more equable and comprehensive principles of action, exacting a more impartial exercise of natural power and resource in the interests of a common good, members of a class must no longer rest subject in responsibility to a class whose traditions con-

stitute its conscience, but must be made responsible to a society whose conscience is its free and effectively organized intelligence.”³⁸

This social philosophy is in complete accord with that of the Socialists. Socialists speak of the coming victory of one class over another, but a society without classes is the object of the conflict. And the chief resistance to the new society that is forming, and to human progress generally, comes from the morality, the culture and the civilization of the ruling class.

The most positive result of the pragmatic philosophy for Socialism, as far as its broader *generalizations* go (I discuss the *applications* of this philosophy throughout the remainder of the volume) lies in the fact that philosophy itself evolves and must continue to evolve; this means, of course, that both evolutionary and Socialist philosophy must evolve. And just as the former has already advanced from the vague shape which it held in the minds of Darwin and Spencer, so the latter has also advanced from the form it had with Marx and Engels, and these currents are coming together in the far more subtle and at the same time more practical pragmatism of such men as Dewey.

Not only do philosophies evolve, but the fact that they evolve must be made the basis of philosophy. “The thoroughly vital question for us all,” says James, “is what is this world going to be—what is life going to make of itself?” And one of the most vital questions as to the future of the world and life is “What is philosophy going to be?” We can only hope to see ahead a few years, and even there our chief conclusions are negative, though none the less valuable for that. We can see, for example, that the philosophy of the future, like that which is forming to-day, is going to look ahead,

and not backward, as a great deal of the philosophy of the past has done. To look ahead practically means for men to develop their power over their nature and themselves, and not to give their strength to abstract speculation. And this conclusion can seem negative only to those whose object is speculation and not life.

The most valuable part of every philosophy has always been that *intellectually negative* and destructive criticism of the previous philosophies which serves as an introduction to the new dogma at which the philosopher has aimed. For certain subconscious, involuntary, and unfelt assumptions that are too certain and matter-of-fact to be felt as being even worthy of expression underlie this criticism in large part and are at the bottom the most positive, social and lasting contributions of the philosophy. The so-called constructive ideas, on the other hand, have always been dogmatic, ultra-intellectual, unrelated to many important phases of life, largely individualistic, and *destructive* of the most vital impulses, of subconscious and semi-conscious strivings, and of new thought.

Pragmatism is the first philosophy that has rested satisfied with this criticism and has attempted no purely *intellectual* construction. It is only when considered from a purely intellectual standpoint that it is negative, however. For underlying this criticism is the assumption, become conscious, willed and felt at last, that the intellect is of no value whatever in itself but exists purely for the service of life.

Pragmatism therefore does not seek to show what the intellect in itself can accomplish for man, but what it can do to aid him in all his activities: natural science, sociology and psychology, education, literature and art.

Pragmatism, in a word, teaches that the purpose of philosophy is merely to supply methods of investigation

and thought. In itself it is only a spirit drawn from the practical needs and activities of men; in its application it is a revolution in all the higher fields of human effort, the great social revolution, as it appears in the world of thought.*

* For the pragmatic tendencies in the writings of the historic formulators of Modern Socialism, Marx and Engels, see Appendix A.

II

THE APPEAL TO SCIENCE

THE new philosophy opposes all intellectual authority. Above all, it denies the authority of "Science," viewed as an accumulation of "facts" or "laws." At the same time it is the philosophy of science, for its aim is to make the scientific method and attitude the basis of all human thought and activity.

In the daily thinking of most educated people science is held to have provided us with certain universal "laws," though the true scientist has long ago admitted that science works exclusively with hypotheses. But it is inevitable that the general public should take the broadest hypotheses of the day, such as those of evolution, and make them the foundation of its thinking. The only cure for this is that the generalizations of science should be so broad and so hypothetical in their very form of statement as no longer to be capable of use for the purpose of setting up these new dogmas, which have been so well termed the "superstitions of science."

Unfortunately for this purpose the philosophers of science until the advent of pragmatism almost ignored the broadest of all hypotheses, the basis of science itself. They forgot that science owed its origin to the evolution of human society, and that its future lay exclusively in the service of that society. This social or pragmatic hypothesis regards science as a means, the previous phi-

losophies of science regarded it as an end; pragmatism wishes science to serve life, evolutionism wanted science to rule over life.

In answer to the question, "What knowledge is the most worth?", Herbert Spencer did not hesitate for a moment to answer, "Science." If the term were used in a sufficiently broad sense, including psychological and social science, this is precisely the pragmatic and Socialist attitude, but Spencer himself and nearly all of his successors used the word "Science" in a restricted sense (indicated by the capital "S") in which the physical and natural sciences dominate the whole, either because they are held to be the most fundamental or because the body of ascertained and measurable facts is greater in this field, or because the manner of thinking that is natural to these sciences and dominates them is conceived to be the best.

It is in the spirit of this same crude and dogmatic materialism that Haeckel has referred to evolution as "the key to the universe." Certainly it is a vast advance that science and philosophy are being reconstructed around the evolutionary concept, but nothing could be more wholly unscientific than the assumption that we have in evolution, or any other hypothesis, a "key to the universe." If, then, we find a Socialist philosopher like Dietzgen offering a system of scientific reasoning as a key to the riddles of the universe, we will certainly attach no particular significance to the fact that he was a Socialist, but merely remember that he was caught, as even Socialists must frequently be (according to their own philosophy), in the current of his times.

Kautsky and other leading Socialists, following Marx, attack the prevailing scientific philosophy, especially in the social sciences, on the very ground of its materialism, "which stands below that of the Eighteenth Century be-

cause it is a purely natural philosophy and has no theory of society to show." Kautsky does not abandon the use of the term "dialectical *materialism*" for the underlying philosophy of Socialism, as we might expect him to do in view of this critical attitude toward present-day science, but he insists that this phrase means something very different from the materialism of natural science. He has tried all conceivable alternatives for materialism and found them wanting. "The word socialism covers to-day such various wares, among them some really worthless, Christian and national socialisms of all kinds," that he finds the "socialist philosophy" insufficient. He also rejects the proposed phrases "dialectical *monism*" and "dialectical *realism*." ⁵

Here we see into the very heart of the Socialist thinking on this fundamental question—at least in Germany. It does not seem to be held conceivable that a Socialist philosophy could exist without Hegel's theoretical and abstract "dialectics" (see Appendix A). The habit of absolute generalization has not yet completely broken down, and in so far the modern scientific spirit is not yet wholly adopted. But the word "materialism" is used merely in lieu of a better one. The alternative expressions which Kautsky considers, "monism," "realism," and others, show that the Socialist reasoning is concrete, that it makes no separation between the physical and the psychical and that it views science and philosophy as a single whole. And indeed Kautsky claims that the greatest contribution Marx has made to the world's thought is not in the field of economics so much as in the efforts that he made towards the unification of the social and natural sciences by uniting them both with life itself. Whether Marx wholly achieved this object in his own thinking might be questioned, but it cannot be denied that he has been the chief promoter

of a movement which promises to achieve it in the near future.

The true bond that holds the sciences together and gives them a rational basis is what an able thinker has called "the work of human reconstruction." Separated from this social foundation not only are the natural and psychological sciences divided by an impassable gulf, but all the sciences tend to disintegrate, and to become irresponsible toward one another as they become irresponsible to society, until finally the demand becomes irresistible for a scientific dogma to bind them together again. The natural unifying force, human service, having failed, there results either chaos or an artificial system—such as that of Spencer or of Haeckel.

Related to the doctrine that progress must be slow (see the following chapter), John' A. Hobson says there is another equally reactionary doctrine, viz. "that progress can only be secured by rigorous division of labor."

"Thus retarded and divided, the powers of reason were no longer available for co-operation in the great work of human reconstruction. If scientists are kept in touch with practice and reality, the crudely exaggerated specialism would necessarily disappear; it is the result of the artificial and unnatural isolation of scientists and owed its origin to the leisure and privileged classes."

Hobson points out that this doctrine of thorough and expert work in a narrow field "under the guise of modest industry was in large degree a cloak for intellectual cowardice."

"The trend," he continues, "was everywhere toward division of labor, breaking 'the one' into 'the many.' Now division of labor is only a true economy when a sound principle of co-operation underlies and dominates the division, maintaining the supremacy of the

unity and harmony of the whole process. Modern science has preserved no such economy. . . . There is no warrant for believing that the notion that 'a simple system of natural liberty' and 'enlightened self-interest' is any better economy in the intellectual than in the industrial field. . . . It is not that intellectual labor is over-divided, but that there is no proper correlation of its specialisms, no proper harvesting and assimilations of its fruits. This can only be attributed to an abandonment of central intellectual control." ¹⁶

Hitherto it has been generally held that the work of the great mass of scientists, whether directly related to the other activities of humanity or not, has always more or less general value and usually a high practical value also, so that the change of attitude proposed by Dewey and Hobson and the scientists and philosophers who think as they do will mean a revolution in the world of thought. It is true that in the past also many of the great scientific thinkers have been consciously or unconsciously inspired by some social ideal. But it is also true that some of the most profound and acute intellects we have possessed have gone astray because they did not hold in view the essentially human end of all scientific research. No matter how brilliant their minds and how great their labors, it is practically certain that a large part of their work will not fit in with the rest of science and will be largely discarded or outgrown before it has proved of any value.

Science rests chiefly on the highly organized social machinery made possible by the discovery of printing and later by improved methods of communication. For what is it that differentiates modern science from all that went before? Is it not evident that it is nothing else than coöperative effort both in the thinking out of hypotheses and in the observation of facts? If one

consults any book of science nowadays one finds not only thousands and tens of thousands of references to the work of other scientists, published largely in periodicals, which imply not only constant coöperation, but also more or less familiarity with the generalizations and the investigations of all the related sciences. This was recognized at the very dawn of science, in Francis Bacon's Utopia, "The New Atlantis," which was concerned, not with mere political or economic changes, but almost exclusively with the new science he predicted, with its discoveries, still more with its methods, and most of all with the form of social organization for scientific purposes which underlies those methods and makes them possible.

Spencer, having forgotten these fundamental facts, was thrown back on the old dogmatic habit of thought. Reasoning, for instance, against any theory of equal human rights, he says that under any given circumstances it would be impossible to reduce such a theory to practice, and his ground is this: that, since no *absolutely universal* principle of equality can be found, no principle can be found. Socialists would not argue that a system of social inequality based on a theory of unequal rights would be impracticable under all circumstances, but that it would be undesirable under any of the circumstances with which we are familiar in present-day civilization.

With the same abstract logic Spencer reasons that Socialism, based on a distribution of wealth in accordance with the productivity of each laborer, is impossible because we cannot ascertain what each has contributed. Socialists would reply that, while it is perfectly true that no accurate measure can be found, there are many cases to-day where an approximation toward such a measure has been made and approved by all concerned—as, for instance, in many producing families, in some partner-

ships, in some coöperative societies, etc. And, worst of all, Spencer actually wants us to believe that until "communism" can be carried to the same extent as "those compound polyps in which a number of individuals are based upon a living trunk common to them all . . . it will be best to stand by the old doctrine."⁹ In other words it is always "all or nothing." All this kind of *à priori* reasoning comes from the eighteenth century and is prævolutionary. Communism, for instance, is already practiced in many public school systems—so Spencer was forced to close his eyes to the possibility of such a "communistic" institution being permanent.

Spencer's social and political views and prejudices were an exaggeration of those of his class; his general scientific attitude was that of his whole generation. Not only did he refuse to respect scientific generalizations which were not universal, but in applying them to human affairs he gave them almost the same force as the theologians had claimed for their dogmas or the absolute kings for their laws. The most he hoped for humanity, it seemed, was that it would at least be governed by "laws" rather than by sheer coercion. He even feared that this time was far off, that it would be long before "reverence for law as rooted in the moral order of things will serve for the power of reverence which enforces laws."¹⁰ But to the modern Socialist and pragmatist one reverence is as bad as another, and moral or the scientific dogmatism is only one degree better than external force which rules in a military despotism.

"Laws of science," says Dewey, "are not governmental regulations which limit change, but are convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of time, and then registered in statistical forms that are amenable to

mathematical manipulation. To suppose that this device of short-hand symbolization presages the subjection of man's intelligent effort to fixity of law and environment is interesting as a culture survival, but it is not important for moral theory." ¹¹ Elsewhere Dewey has objected that science is not a body either of *fact* or of *law*, but only an effective method of inquiry. Spencer himself defined science as "an extension of the perceptions by means of reasoning" or as "quantitative prevision." Both of these definitions are sound because they point to processes rather than to facts or laws. So that the science and social science which Socialists support teaches, not any body of definite generalizations or dogmas, whether the universal laws of Spencer or the universal hypotheses of Mill, but only to see always farther into our natural and social environment in order to foresee what is likely to happen, or what mankind can accomplish.

Dogmatism and opportunism are the inevitable result on both sides of the separation of science from the social movement. In his profound study of the logic of moral science, Dewey denies that scientific generalizations can be expected to be free from the personal prejudices and social position of the scientific observer. In other words, the scientist's personal equation and social environment are at least as important as his observations. Scientists are subject to their social environment just as non-scientists are. This finally deposes science from the position of irresponsible dictator, free of all social control, which she occupies in so many minds. If Dewey expects science to guide us, this does not mean that he expects the scientists to guide us. Only in so far as the true spirit of science has been held to by the scientists, and only as this spirit has been grasped by the community at large, can science actually guide our social

life; and only as life and science are truly social is true science possible.

This is very far from a priesthood of science, as proposed by Mill and others. Such a priesthood would be the very climax of class government, whereas Socialism and pragmatism teach that we are going in the very opposite direction, toward a social revolution that will put an end to all aristocracies, even this so-called aristocracy of intellect, and establish democratic control. Herbert Spencer also leans in the same direction, when in his "sociology" (in passages quoted below) he fully recognized the possibility that a man of science might err in sociological questions. But he seemed to assume the *natural* sciences to be relatively free from ordinary human prejudice and bias.

Evolutionary science, as applied to history and sociology, means, as Dewey says, "that we are ceasing to take existing social forms as final and unquestioned," and that the only alternative to the inevitable revolution that is impending is the maintenance of "an arbitrary and class view of society." In his presidential address to the American Psychological Association (in 1899), he pointed out that as the new psychology "makes its way and is progressively applied to history and all the social sciences, we can anticipate no other outcome than increasing control in the ethical sphere—the nature and extent of which can be best judged by considering the *revolution* that has taken place in the control of physical nature through a knowledge of her order." That is, the application of science to social and ethical questions means nothing less than the abolition of class rule in society.

Psychology is perhaps the most centrally located science, since it touches the natural sciences on the one side and social science on the other, and especially in Dewey's

view, so that what is said of psychology will apply to a large extent to science as a whole.

"The application of psychology to social institutions is the only scientific way. . . . It marks just the recognition of the principle of sufficient reason in the large matters of social life. It is the recognition that the existing order is determined neither by fate nor by chance, but is based on law and order, on a system of existing stimuli and modes of reaction, through knowledge of which we can modify the practical outcome. There is no logical alternative, save either to recognize and search for the mechanism of the interplay of personalities that controls the existing distributions of values, or to accept as final a fixed hierarchy of persons in which the leaders assert, on no basis save their own supposed superior personality, certain ends and laws which the mass of men passively receive and imitate. *The effort to apply psychology to social affairs means that the determination of ethical values lies, not in any set or class, however superior, but in the workings of the social whole*; that the explanation is found in the complex interactions and interrelations which constitute this whole. . . .

"Our control of nature, with the accompanying output of material commodities, is the necessary result of the growth of physical science—of our ability to state things as interconnected parts of a mechanism. Physical science has for the time being far outrun psychical. We have mastered the physical mechanism sufficiently to turn out possible goods; we have not gained a knowledge of the conditions through which possible values become actual in life, and so are still at the mercy of habit, of haphazard, and hence of force. . . . The anomaly in our present social life is obvious enough. With tremendous increase in control of nature, in our ability to utilize nature for human use and satisfaction, we find the actual realization of ends, the enjoyment of values,

growing unassured and precarious. At times it seems as if we were caught in a contradiction; the more we multiply means, the less certain and general is the use we are able to make of them. No wonder a Carlyle or a Ruskin puts our whole industrial civilization under a ban, while a Tolstoi proclaims a return to the desert. But the only way to see the situation steadily, and to see it as a whole, is to keep in mind that the entire problem is one of the development of science, *and of its application to life.*" (My italics.) ¹⁴

And once more the reader must be reminded that the modern view, as so ably represented by Dewey, assumes not only that the sole function of science is to serve humanity, but that it is only in so far as a science does this that it is logical, scientific, or in any sense real. He does not tolerate the widely accepted opinion that if the scientists are left alone to work out their sciences without conscious regard to general human affairs such a science will afterwards necessarily be applicable, or will necessarily even have a real theoretical value—provided only it is accepted by the world of science.

"The world doubtless owes a great deal to its pure researches and scholars," says Dewey, "but it would owe a great deal more still to them if they had been educated in social habits and thinking, and had the bearings of their abstract ideas upon social matters. As it is, they have been largely shunted off into an isolated and remote class—isolated and remote socially, that is—where the results of their thinking are quite 'safe' because not translated from symbols into the facts of action."

On account of their greater eloquence I shall refer to the expressions of literary philosophers as well as those of scientists. But the critical attitude to science is just

as strongly developed among the scientists themselves. Let me quote a few of the criticisms of William Ostwald, which are almost identical with those of Dewey (see his lecture before the Monist Congress in 1911, entitled "Die Wissenschaft").

"We need a criterion for the endless number of things that we can know, in order to decide where we shall most of all spend our energies and what we shall leave aside as less important or not important at all. And the only criterion that exists for this purpose is the possibility of practical prophecy.

"Applied science is one which foretells and *determines* the future and through the accomplishments of the relations foretold brings the proof and shows that its prophecy is correct and reliable. . . .

"But that criterion by which we can discriminate between true sciences and those that are not true (or scholasticism) is but little known and is never thoroughly used. Thus in our time, side by side with true science, a great mass of scholasticism arises and is cultivated so that the present work of our universities, for example, contains at least fifty per cent. of scholasticism." (My italics.)

This criterion of Ostwald, it may be seen, is a compromise between the thorough-going attack of a Nietzsche and the uncritical attitude that is so common, according to which all science is supposed to be self-justified. In the demand that science must be able to prophesy, he distinguishes it not only from what he calls scholasticism, but also from intellectualism.

Ostwald, like all the true scientific philosophers, makes everything depend on concrete achievements, but even this criterion is insufficient. All science has tended for years to test itself by its power to bring about concrete results of some kind. We may slightly paraphrase Ost-

wald's language and say that the test of true science must be not only that it must tell us which of an infinite number of possible investigations we shall undertake, but also to which of the innumerable concrete achievements that are possible we shall give our energies. He claims that the only way by which we can prevent science from becoming metaphysical is to make it human, and that this also is the only criterion by means of which we can choose among the infinite number of possible concrete achievements: "We can confidently assert that knowledge will be scientific in proportion to its social importance."

When the so-called pure science is separated from "its mother, technique," it is separated from the soil from which it receives its nourishment. As a pure science is no longer directed by an effort to serve the human race it loses all direction and guidance. In a word it becomes irresponsible, and when it becomes irresponsible it becomes an institution for manufacturing reasons for retrogressive social and scientific policies, or at the very best it becomes an excuse for individuals who refuse to fulfill more useful functions.

Yet even John Stuart Mill seemed almost ready to adopt the priesthood of science theory, under which society loses all control. He taught in his "Logic" that "there really is one social element which is predominant and almost paramount among the agents of social progression, . . . the state of the speculative faculties of mankind, including the speculative beliefs concerning themselves and the world by which they are surrounded." Mill did not seem to realize that speculative beliefs may be the opposite of progressive, that if false theories and generalizations serve the ruling class they will be artificially maintained after their time and when overthrown will be immediately replaced by newer theories equally false, and so on indefinitely.

That Mill nevertheless favored government by an intellectual élite is shown further in his essay, "On Liberty," where he argues that the Many even in democracy should let themselves be guided by the highly gifted one or Few. But Professor Lester F. Ward has shown that exceptionally gifted children are as likely to come from the children of one class as from those of another, and that if educational opportunity is equalized the production of talents is likely to increase a hundred-fold. The enlightened few which Mill had in mind, being scarcely one per cent. of those who, according to Ward's calculation, were born with natural talents, were themselves a part of a highly privileged class; and Ward has demonstrated in detail that where the intellectually gifted were not well born they were nearly always favored by chance or circumstance. No social policy, then, could be more fatal than to endeavor to increase the popular respect for the few intellectual leaders who happened to have arrived at the top. They should be valued on their merits, but according to Ward's calculation the public has a right to feel that it contains potentially far more wisdom than they.

"In the administration of the social estate the first and principal task," says Ward, "is to hunt up all the heirs and give to each his share. But every member of society is equally the heir to the entire social heritage, and, as we have already seen, all may possess it without depriving any of any part of it. And as the social heritage consists of the knowledge that has been brought into the world, this task is nothing less than the diffusion of all knowledge among all men."¹⁸

This might be called *the socialism of knowledge*, for what else is the demand that all knowledge be given to all men, or at least an equal opportunity to acquire it.

The fundamental reason that civilization has progressed chiefly in the material field and has done so little comparatively towards the full development of human beings is the fact that it has been confined to the few.

"Most of the progress, due to ideas," says Ward, "is of that superficial kind which merely produces material civilization through the conquest of nature, and does not penetrate to the lower strata of society at all. This is because the truth is possessed by only a minute fraction of society. It therefore has great economic value but very little social value. What the progress of the world would be if all this truth were socially appropriated no one can foresee, but its effect would probably be proportioned to the number possessing it."

Largely the product of a privileged class out of touch with the great bulk of mankind, and therefore without a central guiding principle, the effect of much of our science on general culture and education has become nothing less than reactionary. Nobody has felt some of the worst features of this situation more strongly, or expressed them more powerfully, than has Friedrich Nietzsche:

"The severe helotism to which the immense extent of the sciences at present condemns every individual," says Nietzsche, "is a principal reason why the more fully, more richly, and *more profoundly* endowed natures no longer find suitable education and suitable *educators*. There is nothing from which our civilization suffers more than from the superfluity of presumptuous hod-men and fragmental humanities; our universities are, against their will, the real forcing-houses for this mode of stunted growth of intellectual instincts."

"The sciences, blindly driven along, on a *laissez faire* system, without a common standard, are splitting up, and losing hold of every firm principle."

"Above all, the wonderful way in which the German savants fall to their dish of knowledge, shows that they are thinking more of Science than mankind; and they are trained to lead a forlorn hope in her service, in order to encourage ever new generations to the same sacrifice. If their traffic with knowledge be not limited and controlled by any more general principles of education, but allowed to run on indefinitely,—'the more the better,'—it is as harmful to learning as the economic theory of *laissez faire* to common morality. . . ."

But "science, as a whole, has a goal, a will, an ideal, a passion, of a great faith. . . ."

"A philosophy, a 'creed,' must always exist, in order that from it sciences may receive a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a *right* to existence." ²⁴

Nietzsche deplores the effect of Copernicus's philosophy in making earth no longer the center of our universe. This scientific attitude, he says, has made existence look "still more fortuitous, still more commonplace, still more dispensable—within the *visible* order of things."

"Is not just the self-diminution of man, is not his *will* to self-diminution ever since Copernicus making irresistible progress? Alas, the belief in his dignity, his uniqueness, his irreplaceability in the rank-sequence of beings is gone; he has become an *animal*, an animal without allowance, or reserve,—he, who in his former belief was almost a God ('Child of God,' 'God-man'). . . ."

"It seems as though man, since Copernicus, had slid upon an inclined plane,—he ever more rapidly rolls away from the center. Whither? 'Into the Nothing? Into the *piercing* feeling of his nothingness?' . . . Good! This were just the straight road into the *old* ideal?" ²⁵

By his concluding words Nietzsche means that this science, far from leading us away from religion and asceti-

cism, as Tolstoi imagines, is leading us back towards them. He suggests that the annihilation of the significance of man by science is a subject of stoical pride to the typical scientist who maintains "this laboriously acquired self-contempt of man as his last and most earnest claim to self-esteem." Far from curing us of the old superstition and dogmatism, Nietzsche says that this kind of non-human, or one might almost say anti-human "science" has given us a conception of the universe and of man's place in it which is far more paralyzing than any of the older religious conceptions, such as those of "God," and "immortality."

In an age of science, we must at least agree, whatever superstitions or dogmas, whatever false methods of work or narrowed outlook on life, are imposed upon us in the name of science are a thousand times more dangerous and reactionary than those that come down to us from a former age.

III

"EVOLUTIONISM"—AND AFTER

The theory of evolution is so popular that most people speak and act as if it was the one thing in the world not subject to evolution. All acknowledge that the secondary generalizations which have grown out of the evolution hypothesis, such as "the struggle for existence" and "the survival of the fittest," are being continually transformed, but it is supposed that the main idea does not change—which shows a survival of the dogmatic habit of mind. It is already widely admitted, for instance, that the chief service of the theory of the survival of the fittest was as an illustration of the general theory of evolution, an hypothesis that helped more firmly to establish that theory and to bring about its general acceptance; but it is not generally understood that if all such secondary hypotheses evolve this must soon revolutionize the whole theory of evolution.

Without attempting to go into the history of the evolution hypothesis even during the last century, it is necessary for a clear conception of the Socialist attitude toward that theory to point out one or two changes through which it has passed; I am not speaking of evolution in the narrow sense in which it is often used as being primarily applicable to biology and the natural sciences, but as applying equally to all the arts and sciences and institutions and ideas that humanity has produced.

Socialists remind us that the economic and political

stage that a society has reached will always affect its ideas and theories, so that the great industrial revolutions of the last century must have revolutionized the prevailing views of evolution. At the end of the Eighteenth Century and even up to the middle of the Nineteenth both political thought and scientific thought were largely Utopian. That is to say it was recognized that many social and political conditions, as well as some of the chief generalizations of philosophy and science, were not permanent and would undergo change. On the other hand, the thinkers of the time wrote and talked as if this great impending revolutionary change when once brought about would introduce a society, as well as a theoretical basis for science, which would at last be permanent—the wish being father to the thought. That is, while they considered society to be in a state of transition, they looked forward in the near future to a time when *in the more fundamental matters at least* this transition would practically cease. In other words, it is difficult to say whether they were evolutionists at the bottom or not, for they seemed to have a horror of fundamental and indefinitely continued evolution.

After the capitalist classes of England and of the Continent had gained the upper hand (about 1848), their views of evolution changed materially, and a stage was reached which is well marked by the science and politics of Herbert Spencer. At this period constant evolution (being a need of capitalism) was accepted as applying without exception to *all* the ideas and *all* the institutions of the present and also of the immediate future. But the thinkers of this generation did not entirely abandon either the Utopian view in politics or the absolute and non-evolutionary conception in science. Herbert Spencer still spoke of “the perfect society,” “the ultimate man,” etc., suggesting, at least theoretically, a time when

evolution would be complete. These absolute conceptions were still needed to establish absolute moral and sociological "laws" for the masses, who in the age of newspapers, skilled labor, and of relative international peace could no longer be governed by mere coercion. Spencer's science also had the same fault in that evolution consisted for him in a progressive adaptation to environment, which environment was treated as fixed and not as being itself in evolution. So that he actually supposed progress toward complete adaptation or perfection (corresponding to Utopia) and conceived biological evolution as having a final end—at least theoretically.

Such considerations as these suggest that even the prevailing conception of evolution itself, to say nothing of the lesser Darwinian doctrines of struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc., should be viewed with a critical eye. It is evident, for example, that the evolutionary processes of nature are not all equally successful. When the evolutionary theory first came into vogue, and for a long time afterward, it was supposed that the mere statement that such and such a series of changes in biology or any other field was the one that actually took place was all that could be said. It was taken to be absurd to criticise nature, and to do this was supposed to be a survival of the earlier anthropocentric standpoint. The new view, as I have said, while disclaiming any connection with this earlier anthropomorphic dogmatism, in which Nature or God placed man at the center of the universe, is frankly anthropocentric, in that it holds man must place himself at the center, and does not hesitate to say that nature succeeds in one case and fails in another, does better here and worse there. The acceptance of this anthropocentric habit of mind is absolutely vital not only in biology, but espe-

cially in sociology, of which one of the axioms is that the methods by which humanity has evolved are altogether superior to and more economical than those by which the animals have developed.

Of nature's methods before the appearance of man Mrs. Gilman says:

"These are ingenious and reasonably effective, but their development is slow, requiring many generations of heartless 'elimination of the unfit' to gradually evolve the fit. If his claws are not good enough, he dies, those having somewhat better claws survive; slowly the claws improve. He cannot in one lifetime invent and manufacture better claws, but has to be tediously and expensively 'selected,' the whole beast sacrificed to the defective claw.

"Further, his excellence is checked by the interaction of parts,—all his tools being part of him, and modifying each other. The more things he can do, the less perfectly he does a thing; the more perfectly he does a thing, the fewer things he can do. The beaver, for instance, is a highly developed builder, but he cannot run well, or climb trees. Where you find the most perfect specialization of an animal's machinery to a particular function, you find the creature practically helpless otherwise—as the ant-eater. So we find the executive capacity of an individual animal limited, first by his body and its slow methods of adaptation.

"His stimuli are also limited. This small machine is kept going by its own supply of nervous energy, replenished by food, sleep, air, and water. It will run so long, and then must rest and 'be fired up'. Special excitants of fear, pain, or unusual hunger may temporarily accelerate his activity, but he has then to rest the longer. His executive capacity is limited, second, by his small nervous energy and narrow range of stimulus.

"It is further confined, thirdly, by the narrow circles

of his instincts, desires, or ideas, if he has them. The governing impulse is simple race-preservation, mingled with the self-preserving instincts; egoism and familism cover his range of interests. Hope, fear, desire,—all are for self or family.

"So we find in the individual animal, his efficiency is limited by (a) his personal mechanism, (b) his personal nerve force, and (c) his personal interests. For such an agent work—continuous expressions of energy—would indeed be difficult. But now examine the position of the human being.

"Man's tools do not grow on him. He has been able to evolve improved tools without sacrificing a thousand slow generations to breed them. He adds to his executive ability (a) the power of numbers, and of the 'ready race' (wild dogs have this), (b) the power of division of labor (ants and bees have this), (c) *the tool, detachable and exchangeable.*" (My italics.)¹

Mrs. Gilman and the Socialists are by no means alone in this "humanism," which asserts the superiority of human over merely biological evolution. Not only is it accepted by most of the sociologists, but it plays a central rôle in much of the philosophy of the time, as, for instance, in that of Bergson, who says that it is the use of tools which enables man to do an indefinite number of practical things that not only differentiates him from the animal world and shows the superiority of human evolution, but has given him intelligence instead of animal instinct. Bergson says that we ought not to name mankind *Homo sapiens*, but *Homo faber*, that intelligence may even be *defined* as "the faculty of manufacturing artificial articles and special tools for making tools and to vary this manufacture indefinitely." Of the effect of the steam engine he speaks in even stronger terms than those usually employed by Socialists:

"The revolution that it has brought about in industry has at the same time entirely upset relations between men. New ideas are rising. New feelings are on the way to blooming out. In thousands of years when the distance of the past will only allow its broad lines to be perceived, our wars and our revolutions will count for little if they are remembered at all. But of the steam engine, with the influences of every kind that accompany it, we will speak perhaps as we are speaking now of bronze and cut stone; it will serve for us to define the age."

This contrast between men and animals, so ably described by Bergson and made the very basis of his whole philosophy, both of the psychological and of the natural and physical sciences, is either ignored or denied by many of the scientists, the sociologists and the philosophers of our time. Animal biology has played an absurdly exaggerated rôle, so that instead of explaining problems of humanity in terms of human evolution or civilization, which is so infinitely superior to the animal kind of evolution, the overwhelming majority of writers constantly refer the problems of mankind to biology. Herbert Spencer, for instance, as well as many Socialist writers, including Mrs. Gilman, constantly refer to the psychic qualities of the two sexes being biologically determined. Now the theory of sexual selection is sharply questioned by leading biologists as applied even to animals. As applied to man, it becomes fantastic. The contrast between the men and women of our time is due infinitely more to differences of early training than it is to fundamental biological differences. And in exact proportion as mankind develops, as civilization advances by leaps and bounds, the merely animal part of man becomes of smaller importance. (I do not say that the physiological aspect of man becomes of less importance.)

There is a related aspect of the evolution theory, as commonly conceived and applied, that makes of it perhaps the most reactionary philosophy that the world has ever known; for in proportion as the theory of evolution is broad and fundamental, so if it becomes false it becomes correspondingly more dangerous. Logically the conception of evolution belongs even more to the future than it does to the past, for evolution is cumulative and the rate of evolution is accelerating; and for all human progress it is the future alone which really concerns us. This is the very essence of the new pragmatic philosophy. But evolution has laid emphasis on the *whole process* of development, most of which lies in the past, rather than on the conditions and problems of the present. So, *instead of leading us toward the future, it has almost universally led us back into the past.* From the philosophical standpoint of a Dewey or a Bergson evolutionary science concerns itself primarily with the future, but as a matter of fact it has been the cloak for the greatest revival of respect and reverence for the past that the world has ever known. Actually it is teaching, unconsciously, the same thing that was taught by most ancient churches, namely, that all things are to be respected in proportion to the length of their history.

Nordau has expressed the close connection between the retrospective and the reactionary eloquently and in a very few words:

“Much that outrages the intelligence to-day, by its absurd and contemptible injustice, is convincingly explained by the discovery of its origin and the fact that it *then* was rational, well founded, and, if not abstractedly just, at least suited to the conditions of the time. Written history is a zealous and eloquent counsel for the existing order, and secures acquittal or a judgment of

extenuating circumstances for many a client that deserves condemnation." ²

The general tendency of "culture," as it has been a class product, has been to turn back to the past, and the evolution theory, instead of impeding, has enormously strengthened this great reactionary force.

In other words, we have in evolution as now commonly interpreted the pure worship of what has been and still continues to be. In the superstitions and the traditions of the past there may have been an element at least of a poetic or symbolic truth. The religion of evolution to-day has not even a poetic justification. To be sure, it does not usually exist in a pure and undiluted form, and is frequently mixed with more or less of pragmatism. It is possible, however, to find many cases of a purely anti-pragmatic evolution, and this is perhaps the most fundamentally false and dangerous doctrine that was ever presented to the mind of man.

I am not speaking of anything in the least abstruse. Public opinion perfectly well recognizes the danger when it has not become too sophisticated. W. J. Bryan, for instance, speaks the truth when he says that the Darwinian theory is dangerous: "I don't know of any argument that can be used to prove that man is an improved monkey that may not be just as well used to prove that the monkey is a degenerate man" (lecture entitled "The Prince of Peace"). Indeed, we actually see books widely circulated to prove that certain so-called inferior races are halfway between the man and the monkey. Slavery reduced the slave to the position of a work animal, but theoretically it classed him as a man, if a totally different kind of a man. Neither the slave owners of Rome, nor those of our South before the war, had yet reached this climax of philosophy by

which they could persuade themselves that their slaves actually were beings somewhere between man and the animals. While modern sociologists, pragmatists, and Socialists do not deny the biological connection between the man and the monkey, they do not apply biological generalizations without qualification to men, for they believe with Bergson that the revolution that has been gone through with since we were something less than men is the most momentous fact in the universe.

If we are not to make a misanthropic religion out of evolution, we must, above all, avoid any element of fatalism in our view of it—we must never say that what was must have been. We must remember that evolution in this and that case should be conceived of as having been slower than it might have been, and that evolution actually may go backward, which implies that it could also go forward more rapidly than it has. Degeneracy is universally acknowledged to occur, but it is supposed to be always the degeneration of the unfit. What I am suggesting, and it seems in accord with scientific fact, is that what we might call a perfectly normal, fit, and admirable species, adapting itself successfully to an environment, may, through sheer bad fortune, lose this power and go backward. It is important to remember that the superiority or inferiority of any species or of any element of human civilization is only a superiority or inferiority with reference to a given environment and that all environment is subject to constant change.

It is a peculiarly paralyzing, narcotizing theory that teaches that mankind on the whole and in the long run necessarily goes forward. Pragmatism and Socialism point out, on the contrary, that, on the whole and in the long run, mankind has every opportunity to go forward, but that the result depends largely, though within

limits, on mankind. If it is taught that society is fatally bound to progress, the people are not on the alert to discover and remedy the constantly recurring cases of social reversion—or perhaps we should not say reversion since society may turn back along paths it never pursued before. These popular biological terms nearly always contain more or less of logical error.

As evidence against the fatality of progress, I may refer to Mrs. Gilman's excellent illustration of the inferiority in many respects, if not on the whole, of the life of our lowest class of laborers when compared with that of primitive tribes. It is commonly assumed that all society has now advanced beyond the primitive stages. Mrs. Gilman shows that while the larger part of society has so advanced a certain minority has probably actually gone backward after all these centuries—for it must be remembered that primitive people are now known to have been by no means savage, as was formerly supposed. The problem of judging the point these classes have actually reached to-day is a complicated one, but Mrs. Gilman's remarks certainly apply to many kinds of unskilled workers who may be called the menial servants *of society*. These classes show signs not of diminishing, but, on the contrary, of increasing in numbers. And lack of independence and of contact with nature probably makes them less interesting and less representative specimens of the human race than any but the most primitive tribes.

It is supposed that evolution teaches that the condition which follows is usually better than that which went before, though none of the philosophers of evolution at the present time justify such a view as a general principle. Retrogression, it is conceded, is always possible, and often takes place—but this fact is often forgotten.

The partial justification of war, and the apology

for war before the period of civilization are only one side of this falsely evolutionary view. From the same standpoint, slavery, autocracy, and the rule of private property and of social classes are defended. H. G. Wells, for example, speaks for innumerable writers of the day when he says: "The world has needed Private Ownership," while Lester F. Ward declares that the world once needed slavery to discipline men and women to agriculture and habits of industry, just as it needed autocratic kings to weld warring tribes into nations and nations into empires, to build high roads, end private wars and establish the idea of law, and a wider than tribal loyalty." Dr. J. G. Frazer of the University of Liverpool even defends superstition from an "evolutionary" standpoint:

"Superstition has supplied multitudes with a motive, a wrong motive it is true, for right action; and surely it is better, far better for the world that men should do right from wrong motives than that they should do wrong with the best intentions. What concerns society is conduct, not opinion; if only our actions are just and good, it matters not a straw to others whether our opinions be mistaken. The danger of false opinion, and it is a most serious one, is that it commonly leads to wrong action; hence it is unquestionably a great evil and every effort should be made to correct it. But of the two evils wrong action is in itself infinitely worse than false opinion." (Psyche's Task.)

Again this widely known anthropologist argues that although a body of false opinions is a most dangerous guide in practice, and the evils which it has wrought are incalculable, still "they ought not to blind us to the benefit which superstition has conveyed to society by furnishing the ignorant, the weak and foolish with a motive, bad though it be, for good conduct." Is it not perfectly

clear both to common sense and to philosophy that such an opinion totally destroys the balance of our judgment and leaves us floating in a sea of moral uncertainty and indifference? What Frazer says merely amounts to this, that the evil *may* serve the good. But surely this does not change the nature of the evil. The question we ought to ask ourselves is not whether an absence of any opinion or any belief would have been better than superstition, but whether a more accurate opinion and a deeper belief would not have been infinitely preferable. Superstition is mental blindness, and as such makes the exploitation of the blind easier by those who can see, and persuades people to close their eyes altogether to truths of which they might otherwise have had glimpses.

Frazer seems to recognize this truth, and defends superstition more frankly than other "evolutionists," just because it does place the destinies of the many in the hands of the few. He reminds us that among many peoples the task of government has been greatly facilitated by the superstition that the government belonged to a superior order of beings who possessed certain supernatural powers; so that in some countries, as in Melanesia, skepticism as to the prevailing superstition "tends to undermine the foundation of civil society." As if the undermining of a society that rested on such a basis would not in all probability lead ultimately to a better state! Speaking of the results in Melanesia, Frazer writes:

"The first blow at the power of the chiefs was struck unconsciously by the missionaries. Neither they nor the chiefs themselves realized how closely the government of the Fijians was bound up with their religion. No sooner had a missionary gained a foothold in a chief's village than the taboo was doomed, and on the taboo depended half the people's reverence for rank.

The taboo died hard, *as such institutions should do*. Thus taboo became a powerful instrument for strengthening the ties, perhaps our Socialist friends would say riveting the chains of private property. Indeed, some good authorities who were personally acquainted with the working of taboo in Polynesia have held that the system was originally devised for no other purpose." (See Chapter IX.)

No "evolutionary" theory should lead us to justify historic institutions if they are against the broadest principles of social morality; for example, if they are against the very social instincts which we share with many animals. And if we are going to justify war and slavery, despotism and superstition, in the past, we cannot refuse also to justify the typical evils of the present—like class rule, for instance. And we find, indeed, that ever since the first application of the theory of evolution to human affairs by Herbert Spencer and others, it has been used as an apology for nearly all existing institutions. Spencer recognizes repeatedly that class government and class rule exist, as in his "Study of Sociology," and acknowledges that the mass of wage-earners are held in "extreme subordination," but he apologizes for this condition on the ground that "the existing type of industrial organization, like the existing type of political organization, is about as good as existing human nature allows," which is as much as to say that, if things must not remain exactly as they are, they cannot be much altered. Spencer admits that class rule can be legitimately defended only if under this system "the lives of the people are on the average made more satisfactory than they would otherwise be," by which he means to suggest that, if the condition of the mass is better now, under the system of class rule, than it was before that system came into being, then that settles the question.

He does not seem to consider that this improvement might have come about, not because of class rule, but in spite of it.

Spencer has social democracy as an *ultimate* ideal, for he argues that "a decline of class power and a decrease of class distinction should be accompanied by improvement not only in the lives of the regulated classes, but in the lives of the regulating classes." This ideal is that of nearly all the social philosophers and Socialists of our time, but as far as one can observe, Spencer, like so many others, takes no account whatever of the question as to how much time may be required to reach this ideal. But the acceptance of the ideal means nothing for any practical purpose unless it gives us also a measure of the rate with which we are to approach it, and unless we are to reach it within a reasonable time. Merely to head the ship in the right direction means nothing unless there is enough power to move it faster than contrary wind and tide and to reach the destination within some specified period of time.

Or perhaps we should say that Spencer does have a practical standard and a completely reactionary one. If he does not say that what is must be, he does say that what is *at a given moment* must be *at that moment*.

"It is quite possible to hold," he writes, "that when, instead of devouring their captured enemies, men made slaves of them, the change was a step in advance; and to hold that this slavery, though absolutely bad, was relatively good—was the best thing practicable for the time being. It is quite possible also to hold that when slavery gave place to a serfdom under which certain personal rights were recognized, the new arrangement, though in the abstract an inequitable one, was more equitable than the old, and constituted as great an amelioration as men's natures then permitted. It is quite possible

to hold that when, instead of serfs, there came freemen working for wages, but held as a class in extreme subordination, this modified relation of employers and employed, though bad, was as good a one as could then be established.”

Another conception of evolution, as common as this optimistic fatalism, is that evolution must necessarily be very slow. The example of the evolution of the past or of the lower kinds of life (already mentioned) has had a very large influence in establishing this view, but it is also due in part to the necessary study by every evolutionist of all the steps and stages of development. It is true that no essential stage can be overleaped, but the stages often follow one another so rapidly that the term revolution is more applicable than evolution, while the acceleration is often so great that the influence of recent stages quite overshadows that of stages that went before. It is useless to argue the point of fact, for evolutionists have now generally accepted it, notably in the case of the De Vries mutations in biology and also in numerous other instances. Because stages of development must take place in due order, it is supposed that they were more or less mechanical and equal, like the tickings of a clock—which only means that people are still thinking in the terms of mechanics rather than in the terms either of animal or human life.

Though the most eminent observers nearly all acknowledge that its doom is sealed, this conception still predominates in the scientific world, and is almost universal in public discussions. Spencer, for instance, supposes that it will be a tremendously long period before we shall have attained a federation of the nations that will put an end to war, and suggests a long series of centuries or perhaps millenniums. But if we realize that Spencer calculates on the basis of the time that *has been*

required for revolutionary changes in semi-civilized society we need not be particularly influenced by his opinion, and we may even have good and practical grounds for hoping that revolutionary progress in the direction of peace will be made within a single generation. If we turn out to be right then Spencer will prove to have exaggerated by ten or a hundred fold.

No one has based his sociology more definitely or more exclusively on the enormous periods required for biological changes than John Morley:

"The great changes of history took up long periods of time," wrote Morley in 1877, "which, when measured by the little life of a man, are almost colossal, *like the vast changes of geology*. We know how long it takes before a species of plant or animal disappears in face of a better adapted species. Ideas and customs, beliefs and institutions, have *always* lingered *just as long* in face of their successors. . . . History, like geology, demands the use of the imagination, and in proportion as the exercise of the historic imagination is vigorously performed in thinking of the past, will be the breadth of our conception of the changes which the future has in store for us, as well as of *the length of time* and the magnitude of effort required for their perfect achievement."

I do not recall a more profoundly pessimistic, illogical and reactionary social theory. The vast changes of geology have usually taken millions or at least tens of thousands of years. Not one of the social changes of history of which we are aware has absorbed any such period. The inventions of gunpowder and printing have thoroughly revolutionized the world in five centuries. Steam and electricity have accomplished a revolution still more profound in a single century. To magnify so preposterously the length of time required for great

social changes is just exactly as reactionary, for every practical purpose, as to declare that these changes cannot be made at all and ought not to be attempted.

Morley undoubtedly represents the prevailing view. That of America is expressed by Roosevelt in the name of the great middle section of the nation, by Carnegie for a more conservative, and by Arthur Brisbane for a more radical element. In his essay on “The Two Americas” Roosevelt speaks of “problems which under Protean shapes are yet fundamentally the same for *all* nations and *all* times,” while in another passage he gives as his ground for supposing that the word “country” will continue to mean a great deal for two or three thousand years the fact that it has meant a great deal for two or three thousand years past. This language reminds us strongly of the prediction made by Burke over a century ago, that “England will *ever* preserve an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, *each in the degree to which it exists, and no greater.*” Burke’s denial of social evolution, made absurd by recent events in England, though more nearly applicable there than in other countries, was unconditional and absolute. Though Roosevelt does not deny social evolution absolutely, he restricts it to a limited field, and denies that even in that restricted area it is likely to be any more rapid in the future than it has been in the past, entirely ignoring the accelerating and cumulative influence of civilization and progress. A further reading of the passage quoted moreover, will show that Roosevelt believes that the field of human activity where problems remain fundamentally the same is far more important than the field where social evolution applies.

In his skepticism concerning the human kind of evolution Carnegie, like innumerable other public men, occu-

pies almost the same ground as that taken by Roosevelt. He suggests that it has taken us not two or three thousand years, but "hundreds of thousands of years" to arrive where we are, and scoffs at the idea that society can be fundamentally altered, since human nature is not likely to change for "countless ages to come." Not only is Carnegie embarrassed to find expressions strong enough to state his confidence in the extreme slowness of progress, but he finds that under present conditions we are already steadily approaching the ultimate ideal, and suggests very clearly that, as there is no hope of very greatly accelerating this pace, so also there is no particular reason why we should desire to do so.

Even more astounding, we find practically the same view shared by the most popular of American editors, often regarded not only as a radical democrat, but as a Socialist. In the *New York Journal*, of which Arthur Brisbane is editor, one naturally finds even stronger expressions than those used by Carnegie. After stating "that men will see on earth a race freed from anxiety and poverty," far from sharing the optimistic belief of the Chancellor of England, David Lloyd George, that we may go very far toward accomplishing this in our own generation, the writer says: "Fortunately there is plenty of time ahead of us. Men have been here a hundred thousand years at most. It is quite certain that the sun's light and heat and the present temperature of this planet, barring celestial collision, will endure for several millions of years at least."

It is scarcely possible that this eminent journalist meant definitely that the achievement of the cure of poverty would take such æons, but his statement, "that there is plenty of time ahead of us," is quite as unfortunate and reactionary in its necessary logical application as the ones previously quoted. If progress is to have any defi-

nite meaning at all, it can neither imply a movement indefinitely fast nor a movement indefinitely slow. The mere assumption that there is evolution without consideration of the *rate* of evolution should interest no reasoning or practical human being.

The English publicist, John A. Hobson, has pointed out how this idea of an indefinitely slow evolution has long been the rallying ground of reaction in England:

"Large synthetic schemes of thought and action were renounced as wildly, wastefully speculative: evolution was the new watchword, and its substitution for revolution meant the assertion, as a primary doctrine of general application, that progress must be slow. This doctrine was derived from scientific records in fields of inquiry where the ordered consciousness of man played no part; but once 'discovered' it was applied with easy confidence to human history."³

I have referred at the beginning of this chapter to the tendency of the evolutionists toward a sort of optimistic fatalism. Each step in human evolution is practically, though not always avowedly, defended, on the ground that it was superior to the step that went before, *though it is rarely condemned on the ground that it was inferior to the step that came after*—as intellectual honesty would require. In speaking of the Socialist ethics, I shall show how such an attitude means the complete *reversal* of the ethical standpoint. I want now to show the reader how this attitude is perfectly obviously based on a moral judgment, though claiming to rest on a conception of evolution as being non-moral. On the ground that moral judgments, *i. e.*, approval or disapproval, are out of place in speaking of evolution, Spencer apologizes at times even for the evils he most detests, such as militarism, slavery, but he makes one exception. He

is conscious that all societies in the past, since primitive times, have been governed by the rule of one or another social class which has usually legislated in such a way as to preserve "private interests" from injury whether "public interests" were injured or not. The period of capitalism and free competition, according to Spencer, is already putting an end to this class rule as fast as could be expected, but his *moral* judgment of disapproval at least remains applicable to the past. He admits that class rule, one of the essential features of *all history up to the period in which he was writing, is evil.*

How do logicians like Spencer and other "evolutionists" reconcile this shifting back and forth from a moral to a non-moral view? It is clear that, being men like the rest of us, they call non-moral the phases of evolution they wish to defend, and moral those phases they wish to criticize. But intellectual people always invent, consciously or unconsciously, some logical device to explain their inconsistencies. What is the device by which Spencer and the "evolutionists" deceive either themselves or others? It consists simply in the relative length of the period of the generalization they choose for discussion and of the period they choose to consider as containing it. If the generalization refers to all the past right up to the present, then we have not really a series of evolutionary steps, but only one step, and it seems logical, as I shall show, to approve or disapprove, that is to apply a moral judgment. So Spencer's "militarism" and "class rule" are supposed to be attributes of *all* the past of civilization. As civilization is the larger containing period *chosen* for discussion (for the conscious or unconscious purposes of the evolutionist), and there was no stage, *in civilization*, before militarism and class rule then, as far as *these particular phases* of civilization are concerned, it is impossible to ask the evolu-

tionist to apply his usual optimistic fatalism or to say that militarism and class rule were relatively good because they followed something worse (e. g., cannibalism and chaos—which came *before* civilization). And as the stage after militarism and class rule has not yet arrived and is the obvious object of our moral striving, it is impossible to ask him to apply to the present the exalted non-moral attitude that regards every stage of evolution as fitted to its time.

When, on the other hand, an “evolutionist” wishes to defend an institution or tendency, he only has to define it narrowly, so that there is a stage after, and a stage before. Slavery, for example, if very broadly defined (e. g., including slavery to a pater familias and to society), may be said to have existed as long as there were men and still to exist to-day; and, so defined, we can condemn it in all its forms, including chattel slavery, just as we condemn militarism or class rule. But Spencer wishes to *defend* chattel slavery, i. e., historically. So he chooses to discuss a particular phase of slavery and says that chattel slavery was better than the murder of captives that was the stage preceding it, is not to be morally condemned for the time when it existed, and is only relatively bad when compared with the stage that followed, the wage system.

Spencer also recognized that evolution *might* take place at a tremendous rate of speed. He realized that the “vast transformation” brought about by railways and telegraphs called for a completely new view of politics, that it amounted to a social revolution.

“Within a generation,” he wrote, “the social organism has passed from a stage like that of a cold-blooded creature with feeble circulation and rudimentary nerves, to a stage like that of a warm-blooded creature with efficient vascular system and a developed nervous apparatus.

To this more than to any other cause are due the great changes in habits, beliefs, and sentiments, characterizing our generation." ⁴

Why he should have denied that we might expect a similar revolution to-day is difficult to see. Spencer remarks that the industrial revolution he spoke of had been accompanied by a counter-revolutionary effect, because it had further centralized the social structure in such a way as to increase the danger of militarism. But this means only that the last industrial revolution happened to have a reactionary effect. May not other social revolutions be expected, according to Spencer's own logic, to work *entirely* in the progressive direction?

Present-day sociologists also, including both advocates and opponents of Spencer's individualism, take similar views on evolution. Lester F. Ward, for instance, considers that slavery was indispensable for human progress, and, since all countries of to-day have parties of reaction or order as well as parties of progress, he concludes that those who oppose progress help it just as much as do those who favor it.

No one has better exposed the reactionary nature of the larger part of the philosophy that bears the name of evolution to-day than Henry George. His bitter controversy with Spencer perhaps led him to see more clearly than his contemporaries. His objection to the theory of the struggle for existence is chiefly that it leads to the optimistic fatalism of which I have spoken. That is to say, he criticizes this theory especially because it established a foundation for the larger "evolutionary" theory.

"The practical outcome of this theory is in a sort of hopeful fatalism, of which current literature is full. In this view, progress is the result of forces which work slowly, steadily, and remorselessly, for the elevation of

man. War, slavery, tyranny, superstition, famine, and pestilence, the want and misery which fester in modern civilization, are the impelling causes which drive man on, by eliminating poorer types and extending the higher; and hereditary transmission is the power by which advances are fixed, and past advances made the footing for new advances. The individual is the result of changes thus impressed upon and perpetuated through a long series of past individuals, and the social organization takes its form from the individuals of which it is composed. Thus, while this theory is, as Herbert Spencer says—‘radical to a degree beyond anything which current radicalism conceives’; inasmuch as it looks for changes in the very nature of man; it is at the same time ‘conservative to a degree beyond anything conceived by current conservatism,’ inasmuch as it holds that no change can avail save these slow changes in men’s natures. Philosophers may teach that this does not lessen the duty of endeavoring to reform abuses, just as the theologians who taught predestinarianism insisted on the duty of all to struggle for salvation; but, as generally apprehended, the result is fatalism—‘do what we may, the mills of the gods grind on regardless either of our aid or our hindrance.’ ”⁵

To be sure, George rejects the evolutionary theory to return to the earlier and still more objectionable theory of the rise and fall of civilizations, the swinging back and forward of the pendulum of progress. But at least his aversion to the fatal progress implied by the evolutionary theory in its usual interpretation is unqualified; at least, he finds no *historical* apology even, for war and slavery.

“In that spirit of fatalism to which I have alluded as pervading current literature, it is the fashion to speak even of war and slavery as means of human progress. *But war, which is the opposite of association, can aid progress only when it prevents further war or breaks*

down anti-social barriers, which are themselves passive war.

"As for slavery, I cannot see how it could ever have aided in establishing freedom, and freedom, the synonym of equality, is, from the very rudest state in which man can be imagined, the stimulus and condition of progress. Auguste Comte's idea that the institution of slavery destroyed cannibalism is as fanciful as Elia's humorous notion of the way mankind acquired a taste for roast pig. It assumes that a propensity that has never been found developed in man save as the result of the most unnatural conditions—the direst want or the most brutalizing superstitions—is an original impulse, and that he, even in his lowest state the highest of all animals, has natural appetites which the nobler brutes do not show. And so of the idea that slavery began civilization by giving slave owners leisure for improvement.

"Slavery never did and never could aid improvement. Whether the community consist of a single master and a single slave, or of thousands of masters and millions of slaves, slavery necessarily involves a waste of human power; for not only is slave labor less productive than free labor, but the power of masters is likewise wasted in holding and watching their slaves, and is called away from directions in which real improvement lies. From first to last, slavery, like every other denial of the natural equality of men, has hampered and prevented progress. Just in proportion as slavery plays an important part in the social organization does improvement cease. That in the classical world slavery was so universal is undoubtedly the reason why the mental activity which so polished literature and refined art never hit on any of the great discoveries and inventions which distinguish modern civilization. No slave-holding people ever were an inventive people. In a slave-holding community the upper classes may become luxurious and polished; but never inventive. Whatever degrades the laborer and robs him of the fruits of his toil stifles the spirit of in-

vention and forbids the utilization of inventions and discoveries even when made." (My italics.) ⁶

In a word attention is centered not on the fact that war, slavery or feudalism, respectively, was in each case *worse than the condition that followed, but that each was better than the condition that preceded*. Indeed, this retrospective attitude of mind is considered to be the very essence of the "evolutionary" view. It would seem that it is only scientific to place ourselves at some given point of history and to look backward, and that to place ourselves at the same point and look forward is the essence of error. Apparently it seems it would not be just to a people to judge them in the light of their future; we must judge them in the light of their past. By this retrospective method we practically surrender the immeasurable advantage we have over previous generations in knowing the events that followed them, and make use only of what we consider to be our superior wisdom arising out of our superior knowledge of the events that preceded them. Roused by their ignorance of history and evolution, which is undeniable, we scarcely attach any importance to their lack of a stable society, or the material means supplied by modern science and popular education. Pragmatists, on the contrary, would attach comparatively little importance to our ancestors' ignorance of their own history, often finding that they had a remarkable instinctive grasp of their times and those that immediately preceded them; certainly the wiser of them knew much of their own lives of which we are ignorant. Socialists would say that the slowness of development and the attendant evils of any age were due primarily, not to its lack of wisdom, or of our history, but to its lack of our civilization.

Stirner has pointed out that many evolutionists are

just as absolute and dogmatic as other absolutists or dogmatists. Evolution as ordinarily conceived may view an institution or a system of ideas as relative—to be sure—but as relative only to the period in which it arises. That is, the evolutionary theory may be relative only as to time—and absolute in every other respect. Stirner says to such evolutionists: “You believe you have gone to the farthest length when you boldly affirm that there is no ‘absolute truth,’ because each time has its own truth. But with this you leave to each time its truth, and you really create a regular ‘absolute truth,’ a truth which no time is without, because every time, whatever its truth may be, still has a ‘truth.’”⁷ We have here the philosophic basis that necessarily leads mere evolutionists to shipwreck, unless their view of history finds some more definite hypothetical bottom. For everything that has been must be judged not only in connection with the period in which it existed, but must also be measured by numerous other standards—which standards can only be discovered as mankind evolves. That is, institutions and human beings must be judged undoubtedly by the time in which they appear, but they must also be judged according to the most discriminating standards of the judge’s period: not even an “evolutionary” interpretation of history can hope to stand the test of time.

IV

THE REIGN OF BIOLOGY

For the last two generations the theory of "the survival of the fittest" has played an even more important part in our thinking than the theory of evolution. Implying as it does that a very large part if not all of progress takes place through struggle, and through the defeat of the weak as much as through the victory of the strong, it is used almost as often as "evolutionism" to support reactionary ideas and proposals. Arguments drawn from biology have been employed in the words of John A. Hobson:

(1). "To defend the necessity and social utility of individual competition in industry,"

(2). "To prove the advantage of racial competition in war,"

(3). "The deep-rooted divergence of species, the strong dominion of heredity, the practical importance of chance individual variations as means of progress, are made to nourish theories of permanent racial and class ascendancy based on superiority and of individual genius and effort as the sole instruments of industrial betterment."

(4). "But the most impudent abuse of biology consists in the assumption . . . that animal evolution constitutes the whole essence of social evolution," (the assumption of many of the supporters of "Eugenics").¹

I have noted that competition, war, racial and class ascendancy have all been supported by a perversion of the evolution theory itself, without drawing on the so-called biological "law" of the "survival of the fittest."

The "survival of the fittest" cult has now passed its highest point, and is on its decline. Not because its adherents have been converted to any broader, deeper, and more human view, but because they have found new and more serviceable biological dogmas. The same circles that formerly based all their thinking on the relation of man to the animals are now giving themselves over with the same confident enthusiasm to the cult of man as an animal, to the revival of tribal feeling for family and race, to a new form of ancestor worship, and an attempt to resurrect those ideas about superior and inferior blood on which all aristocracies have been built, from the caste system of India to the Absolutisms of the Eighteenth Century, ideas against which the whole of our civilization is one long reaction.

As the era of commercial competition and of international and race wars draws to a close, and the era of "State Socialism" begins, the "struggle for existence" theory in biology, which owed its influence almost wholly to these social forms, passes gradually into the background. It arose when capitalism in England was just beginning to replace the squirearchy, reached its height when competition was in its glory, and is passing into a rapid decline with the coming of the trusts, international financial combinations, and government ownership. As the "State Socialists," who are the political expression of the new situation, pretend to consider society as an organic whole, the analogy of biological organisms, though the sociologists long ago exposed its fallacies, is again coming to the front. And, as they are actually building up a society of hereditary classes or

castes, the theory of inherited family and racial superiority is also being dug up from its ancient burying grounds—though of course it is presented to the world as a new discovery. As always social theories are merely after-thoughts justifying existing social facts.

The new idealization of the animal in man is even more reactionary in its effect than the idealization of man's past by "evolutionism," because all religions and philosophies from the dawn of civilization, no matter how retrogressive in other respects, have at least had the virtue of recognizing the gulf between man and the animals. To forget this again strongly suggests a reversion to the animal and devil worship of the savages.

The assumption that mankind is to be studied chiefly in his animal aspect is the extreme of the biological tendency; its usual form consists rather in an attempt to reason about men along *parallel* lines to our reasoning about animals, or as a continuation of the latter, after adding one or two new premises. It is assumed, not that man is actually governed by the laws that govern the animal, but rather that common laws rule both. J. R. MacDonald, for example (representing the "Socialism" of the British trade unionists), writes that "the laws governing the existence and growth of human Society could not be understood until biological science was sufficiently far advanced to explain with tolerable fullness of detail the laws which regulate life and its evolution," and again that "an accurate view of the meaning and the method of social progress could not precede the success of biology in explaining the meaning and method of organic evolution."² We see here the unmistakable and oft-repeated assumption that the laws of biology serve as the indispensable and even the chief basis for sociology. This is more than a mere biological analogy. It is held, not that the structure of society has developed

similarly to the organic structure of animals, but that humanity has developed exclusively out of the animal. In the biological analogy the individual man becomes dwarfed by being *compared* to a cell. In this view the individual man is not compared to a cell, but it is said that the cell and the individual man are held *as a matter of fact* to be governed by the same laws. It is evident that such a theory is more dangerous to individual liberty than any that could be propounded, and indeed it has already given origin to the most extreme form of authoritarian "State Socialism." This "ultra-organic" theory is an example of the misuse of biology, but it interests us even more as one of the bases of the most reactionary social theory of our times. (See Chapter VI.)

The leading sociologists deny the applicability of biological generalizations to social evolution. But the misuse of biology has gone so far that even biologists are beginning to protest. Prof. J. Arthur Thomson, in his "Heredity," feels it his duty to denounce the "materialism of pretending that sociology is merely a higher department of biology, and a human societary group no more than a crowd of mammals." When we pass from organism to human society, Thomson warns us that "the whole venue changes so much that we have to be very careful in our application of biological formulæ." The natural feeling of the biologist or any other scientist is in favor of applying his science as broadly as possible, so that Thomson's warning has a peculiar force. It means that misapplication of some of the most questioned of biological hypotheses to the whole field of human thinking has gone to such absurd lengths that biologists are beginning to fear that their own science will be discredited.

If there is a biological principle which dominates hu-

manity and society, it is neither the similarity of the evolution of men to that of animals, as we have been taught, nor the supreme importance of the merely animal side of man's nature as taught by this new doctrine, but the fact that humanity is held together and progress brought about not only by the formation of communities of neighbors, but by the blood relationship of men and our common racial origin and destiny. There was a time when this blood relationship was the sole basis of societies; and it still holds the family together, though we have forgotten the unity of the tribe.

H. G. Wells calculates that forty generations, or a little more than ten or twelve centuries ago, we had nearly two billion ancestors! Of course among these ancestors many must have given us their blood a hundred or even a thousand times, but it is still probable that most of us had millions of ancestors at that time. It is certain that all the races of Europe have been tremendously intermingled within the last two thousand years, and there is endless evidence that even the people of Europe, Asia and Africa were closely related not many millenniums ago: "A time will come in less than fifty generations when all the population of the world will have my blood and I and my worst enemy will not be able to say which child is his or mine."³ Wells calculates that a hundred generations ago everyone living who had descendants at all is probably among the ancestors of all of us. Anthropological evidence would suggest that this is probably true if we take a somewhat longer period than Wells chooses.

But even this theory of race solidarity, true and momentarily important as it is when kept within its proper limits, becomes retrogressive as soon as it is made a dogma. And those who set up biological "laws" to rule over us have not failed to seize also on this beneficent

principle and to pervert the great truth it contains. There is an ambiguity in the expression, "the evolution of the race." If it means the development of humanity, then we may well agree that consciously or unconsciously to further this evolution must be the purpose of all our striving. But the term "race" is being used more and more in its biological sense, so that the expression usually now means the *physiological evolution* of the race. And this is infinitely less important for all present human purposes, because it is so much slower, than the kind of human evolution that goes on exclusive of any physiological advance (other than a leveling up to the best existing human types), namely, the evolution and spread of civilization.

"The welfare of the race" may, indeed, become an even more popular and more plausible phrase with which to crush individual liberty than the "welfare of society" (see Chapter VI). And Wells is one of those who is most guilty of this abuse. For, after rejecting the theocratic biology of "individualism," he passes directly over to a theocratic biology of "State Socialism." If we need not take our "laws" from the *struggles* of *all* species, he contends, we must take them from the *solidarity* of *our* species, and urges Socialism as a "synthesis of the will and thought of the species."

"It is not the individual that reproduces himself," he says, "it is the species that reproduces through the individual and often in spite of his characteristics. The race flows through us, the race is the drama and we are the incidents. This is not any sort of poetical statement; it is a statement of fact. In so far as we are individuals, so far as to seek to follow merely individual ends, we are accidental, disconnected, without significance, the sport of chance. The great things of my life, love, faith, the intimation of beauty, the things most savoring of im-

mortality, are the things most general, the things most shared, and least distinctively me.”⁴

Even more reactionary than the Eugenist's tendency to look at the human race as merely animal, or the “State Socialist” tendency to over-emphasize racial solidarity as represented by Wells, is the opposite effort to revive theories of fundamental race differences and of the inherited superiority and inferiority of classes and individuals. It is actually sought to make such theories the basis of society, and there can be no doubt that much of the continued exploitation and persecution of one race by another and that revival of aristocracy and conscious attempt to build up new castes, which is to be noted in all modern countries, have been considerably intensified by this perversion of science.

After the essential oneness of the human race, the brotherhood of man, the greatest truth that biology has to teach mankind is unquestionably the preponderating influence of environment on the evolution of humanity and its various types—and both these truths are forgotten by this new theory of reaction. Humanity long ago began to conquer its environment, and it is this conquest which has done most, not only for the development of civilization, but for the actual physiological development of man. If the races of Europe, Asia, and Africa seem to have been closely connected in the past, there are great divergencies to-day. But it would seem that these divergencies are, beyond doubt, due to environment—and that enormous changes have been brought about within a few millenniums, perhaps even since primitive culture and the semi-civilized stages of society. And since civilization produces similar changes far more rapidly still, we may actually expect to see humanity considerably altered physiologically within comparatively

few generations. There has already been noted by Professor Frederick Starr and others the tendency to develop an American type, which cannot be accounted for merely by the mixture of races. More recently Professor Franz Boas of Columbia University has made an investigation of the Sicilians, European Jews, Bohemians, Hungarians, and Scotch among our recent immigrants. This report shows that where the change of environment, especially that due to better food, is sudden and great, sudden change takes place in the physiological measurements, and therefore no doubt in the psychic character of these races, *within a single generation*.

This epoch-making report of Boas shows that even children born within a few years after arrival of their parents in this country differ essentially from their progenitors. The environment would seem to have its greatest effect immediately before and immediately after birth—and it cannot be supposed that the new life of the parents before this time has had very much effect on the result. It is especially the shape of the head, supposed to be one of the most reliable and slowly changing features of race, which undergoes the most remarkable transformation. The children born in America of the long-headed Sicilians and of the round-headed East European Hebrews have very nearly the same head form—which is of course an intermediate one. The children of the long-headed Sicilians are more round-headed and the children of the round-headed Hebrews are longer-headed than their parents. Similar changes are traced in the development of the face. Nor is the life of the parent entirely without influence, for these changes increase, if only slightly, when the parents have been in this country many years.

“Evolutionary” or historical biology, which is necessarily full of pure speculation concerning the causes of

what has been, is not only the common origin of all these reactionary social dogmas, but its popularity has at the same time been the chief obstacle to the development of that constructive, creative, and pragmatic biology to which the future of the science and no small part of the destiny of humanity belong. Historical biology is necessarily metaphysical and sterile in both fields, because everything that makes no practical difference to us is bound to become metaphysical.

But the whole significance of the appearance of mankind on earth lies precisely in this—that we are in a position to revolutionize environment. The new biology asks that we should observe the dead past less and give our energies to improving life by improving environment. Instead of mere observation, we must give our chief energies to experiment. What can be done by man will doubtless prove a million fold more marvelous than what has been done by nature. And even if this were not so it is infinitely more man's function to do what he can to improve nature than merely to study what nature has done.

The duty of man is not to study how evolution creates, but to create evolution. Let us occupy ourselves with genuine biology and relegate the antiquated natural history to the background. The methods of man are already superior to those of nature and promise to excel them soon at every point. According to Darwin himself, nature does all possible experiments as long as possible, that is, until that species is extinct. But every experiment uses up vital energy and raw material, so that man limits his experiments to the minimum of crucial tests. These crucial tests are chosen to prove or disprove the practicability of certain definite purposes man wishes to accomplish. Instead of being governed by the laws of chance, like Darwin's fortuitous variations, most

scientific experiments reduce the element of chance to the minimum. Men may make in a single year ten thousand times as many crucial tests as Nature blunders upon in ten thousand years.

Judged by human standards, nature is often almost insane; for if we apply the word insane to animals we may apply the same word to nature. If there is such a force as "evolution," if nature really *accomplishes* anything, she does so only with infinite waste and infinite error. It is common to say that science neither praises nor criticizes nature. But this claim is scarcely ever lived up to. Natural scientists nearly all agree that nature is wonderful. We have an equal right to say, for the purpose of illustrating our thought, that nature is insane. It is true that she sometimes accomplishes her results by methods that are beyond the reach of the most constructive imagination. But she also commits errors of such a magnitude that the human mind can hardly force itself to dwell upon them, blunders beyond the reach of the most pessimistic imagination. According to Darwin's leading thought, nature was neither progressive nor insane, but rather infinite in every direction, infinite in the variety of her method and also infinite in her waste and failure. She was infinitely powerful, but blind. But nature has not been merely blind. She should be regarded rather as having been either stupid or weak. Instead of having had an infinitely varied history, life on earth should be held, for human purposes, as having been forced to proceed along the lines of an obstinately fixed and narrow environment.

The chief method of nature, adaptation to environment, is purely mechanical. The method of man is to surmount the difficulties due to immediate environment *by putting himself, or the life upon which he is operating into a larger environment.* This larger environment

we may obtain either by using forces from afar or by differentiating forces that are immediately around us; we may either use the rays that come to us from the sun, or we may work through chemical or bacteriological means. In either case we are not adapting ourselves to the environment, but escaping it. In a word, there is no better way to define the methods of present-day science than to say that they are diametrically opposite to those of natural evolution. Not only do we differ from scientists of Darwin's and the succeeding generation in our attitude toward nature, but we are proceeding in diametrically the opposite direction. But throughout the whole field of science the conservative and reactionary individuals and classes will continue to emphasize that evolution which nature has accomplished in the past, while all progressive and revolutionary classes and individuals will more and more center their thought around the evolution man can bring about in the future.

What Darwin tried to do was to set up a new authority over man, rather than to give man a new power. His motives for doing this are entirely comprehensible, and his views "survived" because they were serviceable to a competitive society. Moreover, aside from his invaluable and revolutionary work in accumulating data, and popularizing it, his life was particularly given over to an equally invaluable and revolutionary war against superstition. If, like Luther, he found that the easiest means to fight the old authority was to set up a new authority in its place, his achievement in overthrowing the older theocracy was nevertheless so great that we are almost inclined to forget the means he used to accomplish this purpose. But the time arrived long ago for us to reject the new authority just as positively as he did the old.

None of the new sciences have so enriched and deep-

ened modern thinking as biology. But if its results be taken in a dogmatic spirit instead of pragmatically, they will do more harm than good. By bridging to some degree the supposed gulf between men and animals, the biological method of thinking largely overcame the theoretical opposition between mind and matter, as well as the mechanical habits of thinking bequeathed to us by the physical science of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton and the philosophies erected upon this science. It is almost impossible to state in words what a complete revolution in all our thinking this means. When this revolution is completed, it will make obsolete all the philosophers and thinkers that preceded Darwin. For the prominence of biology and of evolutionary or post-evolutionary conceptions has made us see that the theory of evolution itself, and even philosophy, must evolve as soon as they begin to base themselves on scientific hypotheses. Höffding says of Darwin:

“He has shown us forces and tendencies in nature which make absolute systems impossible, at the same time that they give us new objects and problems. There is still a place for what Lessing called ‘the unceasing striving after truth,’ while ‘absolute truth’ (in the sense of a closed system) is unattainable so long as life and experience are going on.”⁵

And, above all, biology has given us entirely new tools of thought. Here lies its greatest service and its greatest danger. The individual and environment habit of thought has been so useful, and is so widely applied, that we no longer subject it to criticism. We forget that we are, after all, using an analogy, though in this case it is a purely *logical* and not a *concrete* one—like those above mentioned. The terms “function” and “organ” in such common use are also employed without criticism

either as to their general validity or their biological meaning. For even in biology the term "effective environment" has come into general use and indicates the fact that the evolution of the environment is just as important as the evolution of the organism itself. It is realized that the basic reality should not be viewed as being on the one side the changing organism, and on the other side a fixed environment, but "the-animal-functioning-in-its-environments." Anthropologists, psychologists, and other modern evolutionists are beginning to use new terms, which are far less ambiguous. Instead of the environment and the individual, organs and functions, they discuss situations and behaviors of the whole organism. The individual organism studied is no more important in "the situation" than is the environment, and "the behavior" of the individual organism is necessarily viewed as part and parcel of the totality of the conditions with which the individual has to deal.

But the larger part of the sociological discussion of the day is still based on the study of individuals or institutions or societies in relation to their present and past environment. We constantly forget that science and civilization are concerned with the future of the human race, and that we are striving to evolve an increasing adaptability for future uses rather than to adapt ourselves to any fixed environment or to fix ourselves in any given form, no matter how promising it may seem to be.

When Spencer spoke dogmatically of the *ideal* man in the *ideal* social state, of "the *final* stage of human evolution," and of "*perfect* adaptation," he urged the only logical and honest conclusion to which the individual-and-environment method of thinking can attain—but he abandoned the new and distinctively human feature mankind has introduced into evolution. The older "evolutionists," in a word, took the reverse of the anthropocen-

tric, humanist, or pragmatic point of view. Having lost sight of the central truth that all problems and solutions revolve about man, they based their thinking on external forces and ideals such as "laws" of nature or Spencer's Perfect Man. And most of the educated people of to-day, trained in the older habit of thought, still forget the complete contrast in the character of "evolution" before the interference of man and the character of the "evolution" created by man. In proportion as man takes control of nature, plays one "law" against the other, and develops a new environment and a new life, the historical performances of nature before man appeared gradually dwindle into insignificance. And the day will doubtless come when "historical" sciences will have no more influence on our daily thought than has the political and economic history of past generations on our public affairs.

We are chiefly interested, not in the "origin of species" in nature, but in the destiny of species under man, not in the "creative evolution" of nature, but in the infinitely more creative evolution of man. Our affair is not with the evolution of life and its adaptation to the natural environment, but with the evolution of man, and the adaptation of life to his purposes. And even the control of the life around us matters less than the control of our own lives, and the control of our physiological evolution less than that of our psychological evolution and of social progress.

V

THE ABUSE OF HISTORY

THERE is a complete contrast between the pragmatic treatment of history and the so-called evolutionary standpoint. Pragmatically, history should be studied, and is to be understood, only as a comparison of the aims toward which humanity is actually, though not always consciously, striving at the period written about with the aims of the period during which the writing is done. History can teach us much as to the psychological nature of men, but little as to the possibilities of human achievement. We can see what men were like under various conditions. But, in view of recent discoveries, most of these conditions are so utterly dissimilar to those of the present as to have no bearing whatever on present questions. We can learn something of the general nature of men, but very little of the nature of the problems of the men of to-day.

That history which is to have a practical value in the double sense that it not only throws light on human nature, but tells us something about how to act, must deal almost exclusively with very recent periods, or at least the historical perspective must increase very rapidly as we approach the present. It must give by far the largest part of its attention to the great revolution in civilization that has occurred since the general introduction of steam transportation a generation ago, and very much less attention to the two preceding generations,

when steam was merely applied to manufacture, less still to the four or five preceding centuries since the inventions of printing and gunpowder, and very little indeed to the previous history of civilization; and from this point of view the history of mankind before civilization, or the foundation of cities, has practically no value. We have, then, two functions of history from the pragmatic standpoint. The chief function is to show how men develop under the most varied conditions, for the most part utterly dissimilar to our own. Besides this, it may make men realize to some degree in which direction the greatest progress lies, by observing the course it has taken in very recent times, and projecting it into the future. The further back such history goes, the less reliable it is. Nor can it be called in any way a science, even when it concerns itself only with the immediate past and tries only to predict the immediate future. Its *aim*, however, is scientific in the sense of the definition by Ostwald, in which he contrasts genuine science with the pseudo-historical sciences. For genuine science, according to Ostwald, exists exclusively for the purpose of prophecy, and in science (and history as well) "we must seek to establish only such facts of the past as will be useful for prophecy." ¹

Professor J. B. Bury defines history, from the evolutionary or "genetic" standpoint, as consisting in "a continuous succession of changes, where each state arises causally out of the preceding," and he says that the business of historians is to trace this genetic process, to explain each change, and ultimately "to grasp the complete development of the life of humanity." He declares, further, that history should be viewed as a "causal process which contains within itself the explanation of the development of man from his primitive state to the point which he has reached," and claims that "such a

process necessarily becomes the object of *scientific* investigation," and that "the interest in it is *scientific* curiosity." In a word, history is to become a science:

"The conception of the history of man as a casual development meant the elevation of historical inquiry to the dignity of a science. Just as the study of bees cannot become scientific so long as the student's interest in them is only to procure honey or to derive moral lessons from the labors of 'the little busy bee,' so the history of human societies cannot become the object of pure scientific investigation so long as man estimates its value in pragmatistical scales. Nor can it become a science until it is conceived as lying entirely within a sphere in which the law of cause and effect has unreserved and unrestricted dominion." ²

Certainly history would not only be a science, but the science of sciences if it were possible that it could be mastered in this manner. But the proposal to "grasp the complete development of the life of humanity" is as ambitious and abstract as that of any theologian or metaphysician that ever existed, not even excepting Hegel, and the same may be said of the statement that history must contain "within itself" the explanation of the whole development of man.

What is really implied by the "genetic" view seems to be that the historian is to aim at omniscience, for the only simplification that is offered to him in his effort to swallow the universe is that he is to swallow it by stages. If he does not understand a certain period, he can always throw himself back on the period preceding. This procedure not only does away with the need of any scientific hypothesis, as we find necessary in the sciences, but it assumes that all the causes of any importance are visible in the preceding period.

Like the other "evolutionists," Bury rejects especially those very historians who have come the nearest to giving us a true pragmatic history. The Greeks and Romans, especially Thucydides, and also Macchiavelli, who applied the classical spirit to the history of Florence at the time of the Renaissance, were pragmatists in the truest sense of the word. If we do not gain very much from reading their works, this is because the periods of which they treat are now so distant (even Macchiavelli was relegated to utmost antiquity by the subsequent general introduction of printing) and because they were aristocrats writing about aristocracy for aristocratic readers. Yet Bury complains that these ancient pragmatists "never viewed the history of human societies as a phenomenon to be investigated for its own sake." This is exactly the feature of their work that appeals to the modern pragmatist. They knew the conscious aims of the men of their time, and even their unconscious motives, which to a very large measure they shared, and they described them from this most practical and vital standpoint. And we always gain more from a work undertaken for a definite purpose or definite purposes, if these purposes are not too narrow, than we do from any undertaking which rests merely on "intellectual curiosity," to use Bury's phrase.

The early pragmatic histories, however, lacked an absolutely vital feature of present-day pragmatism. Before the evolutionary hypothesis and genetic history, pragmatic writers confessed an individual interest in and a personal bias toward the periods of which they wrote. This is also a feature of present-day pragmatism. But the pragmatism that is apparently to succeed evolutionism has taken quite as much from the latter as from the earlier pragmatism. We now confess not only an individual bias, but the particular bias of the period in which

we write. And, further, we confess the bias of time and place in general. That is, we cannot write as fruitfully of the remote in time and place as we can of the near. Historical perspective demands not only that we should not be too near our subject, but that we should not be too far. And two or three generations, especially if marked by an industrial or social revolution, may be too far.

A good illustration of the early pragmatism may be found in the history of the English Commonwealth by the first of England's individualist philosophers, William Godwin—a work that appeared in 1824, not many years before the “evolutionary” epoch in science and history writing. Godwin denies that he is wholly “impartial,” and says that he wishes to be considered as “feeling as well as thinking.” He confesses “approbation of a cause” and “respect of persons,” and says that he is not indifferent to human rights, improvement, or happiness. His history is not to be inspired merely by intellectual curiosity. All of this is pragmatism. But if we go a little deeper we find Godwin moved exclusively by an absolutist philosophy. If he does not pretend to be coldly scientific, he does claim to be an impartial, moral judge, discriminating between the good and evil in men and events by some test of philanthropy and altruism which he does not concede will change with time and place. The only valid criticism he would admit would be that perhaps the absolute moral criterion of some other abler and more impartial individual might prove better than his. He does not desire to overcome his personal equation, but he does hope, on the contrary, that he is “wholly unaffected” by his environment and his relation to the period he describes:

“If the events of which I treat had preceded the Universal Deluge or passed in the remotest island of the South Sea, that ought to make me sober, deliberate, and

just in my decisions; it ought not to make me indifferent to human rights, improvement or happiness. The nearness or remoteness of the scene in respect of place or time, is a consideration of comparatively inferior magnitude: I wish to be wholly unaffected by the remembrance, that the events took place about a century previous to my birth and occurred on the very soil where my book is written." ³

This is the exact contrary to post-evolutionary pragmatism. In so far as Godwin's book has value, this is in proportion as he *was* affected by his nearness to the events in time and place—provided only enough time had elapsed to allow the sequels of events to show themselves, and that Godwin was reasonably familiar with countries with which the English Commonwealth was involved. No great industrial or social revolution had intervened—for the English "revolution" of 1688 merely registered the actual strength of the various forces that contended from 1640 to 1660, and the "industrial revolution" had not yet arrived even in its mid-career. But now a great industrial and social revolution *has* intervened, and while the present historian has the advantage of vast masses of new materials, he can neither understand the daily life of Cromwell's time as well as Godwin could nor can he care as much about it (assuming that their natural gifts are equal). The chief disqualification of Godwin is solely that he *tried* to imagine himself remote from the Commonwealth in time and place, and *endeavored* to ignore the special temporary and local interest of his own period in the period of which he wrote. In so far as he tried to write for all time, he cut down the duration of his work.

Evolutionary pragmatism agrees with Godwin only in rejecting "the dry light of science." Instead of accepting the personal equation, we would use every effort to

overcome it by *coöperation and discussion*; but we would frankly avow our limitation according to our time and even to our country.

When it is carried outside of its proper uses and its limitations denied, history is always reactionary. And it is because the justifiable use of history is so strictly limited that the overwhelming majority of historical writings are, to a greater or less degree, retrogressive.

"The historical sense," says Nordau, "is natural in all those who profit by respect for tradition; in others it is the artificial product of education and culture. There is good reason why the ruler exercising an authority created by the force of a strong ancestor, a nobility possessing riches, position, and power, originating in a more or less remote past, or the representatives of the numerous and varied interests that gather round a court and ruling class, should foster and glorify the recollection of their origin, and devote an honorable branch of every institution to the study of the past. It is to their advantage to do so, and they have the means to impress their point of view upon the multitude, for whom tradition represents nothing but repression, humiliation, and injury." ⁴

We must remember, then, that not only history itself, but all the sciences which are studied in the so-called historical manner, and all of the "evolutionary" sciences in the older sense of the term, as well as that sociology, anthropology, and philosophy, which are based on history, are apt to be more or less reactionary—though, of course, this is not necessarily the case in every instance.

Professor Robinson defines the conservative as the man who "still justifies existing conditions and ideals by standards of the past rather than by those of the present or future." It is possible to take the charitable view

that the conservative is honestly deceived in his loving interpretation of the past, but this is probably a fundamental error in most instances. Very few of our conservatives, either through family or culture, are closely tied to the past. The overwhelming majority of them have been recruited from among the new rich, who have dug up the past and taken up with its culture partly because this promoted their interests, and partly because it was the easiest and most natural thing for a leisure class to do.

Professor Robinson recognizes the reactionary character of the "historical sciences" which, therefore, compose nearly all of the subjects taught in our schools and colleges, and very aptly asks:

"What would happen if the teachers in our schools and colleges, our theological seminaries and law schools, should make it their business to emphasize the temporary and provisional character of the instruction that they offer, and urge the students to transcend it as fast as a progressive world permitted?"⁵

History is not only reactionary, but it is useful, in the form we usually give it, almost exclusively to that class in the community which produces nearly all the reactionaries. As Nordau says:

"The historical sense is an artificial product of the ruling classes, who use it as a means for investing the existing order, which is advantageous to themselves alone, with a mystic and poetic charm, for beautifying abuses by the glorification of their origin, and for casting a glamor of half-tender, half-reverential awe over institutions that have long lost any reasonable justification and become useless and meaningless. Its practical purpose, in a word, is to oppress and deceive the present with the assistance of the past."⁶

What a contrast between this frank exposé of the true character of most of our historical studies, and the claims made for history by some of the greatest men of the last century, such as Bancroft, who exclaimed: "History is a divine power that cannot be falsified by human interpolations," and Schelling, who sees in history as a whole "a continuous revelation of the absolute gradually accomplishing itself."⁷

History, on the contrary, depends necessarily upon the individual character of each individual historian, is a product of schools of historical writing, and is limited by the interests of the ruling class. The wish of the historian Ranke "to extinguish himself in order to display the naked reality of things" is, as Nordau says, not only impossible, but undesirable, since such a selfless person would have no human sympathy or understanding with which to interpret events.

But Nordau, like the typical "evolutionist" he is, dwells chiefly on the fact that the historian is limited by the general conceptions of his *time*. From this he reaches logically the ultra-pessimistic conclusion that *all* history is very largely invalidated. The true conclusion is that all history, like everything else, must necessarily evolve, that it is necessarily adapted by the historian to the uses of the time in which he writes. This does not make it untrue, however; it is true for the people of the period in which the *historian* is doing his work. The later historians will take an entirely different point of view, or, what is still more likely, will neglect almost completely the facts that seemed interesting to the previous generation. Far from being discouraging, the recognition that history can only be written in this way shows that we have lost the absolute and dogmatic habit of mind, and are in a condition to get the greatest possible benefit from it.

The only rigid limitation on history is the one I have previously expressed, that we should not endeavor to get too much practical use out of the history that passes back more than a generation or two. As to previous history, what we can chiefly get is that same literary inspiration that we secure from the more imaginative and psychological writers in their interpretation of individual lives. The conditions do not interest us; but we are inspired by the tremendous capacities and variability of men, by the efforts they put forth and not by the things they did.

We find the pragmatic philosophers, such as Dewey, thoroughly permeated with the pragmatic view of history:

"The ethical value of history teaching will be measured by the extent to which past events are made the means of understanding the present,—affording insight into what makes up the structure and working of society to-day." ⁸

Dewey, however, takes "genetic history" to correspond to "experimental science." On the contrary, genetic history, as represented by Bury and others, seems to correspond to historical science only, and the view of history which would correspond to experimental science is undoubtedly the pragmatic one, as I have explained it.

Robinson also realizes thoroughly the importance of preserving the pragmatic historical perspective, which does not mean that we are to give a greater regard to the past than we have, but very much less. Describing the recent industrial revolutions, he says:

"So it has come about that the tool has again come into its own as the agent and symbol of man's progress, and that the past one hundred and fifty years have seen *vastly greater* changes than the whole five thousand years that elapsed between the reign of King Menes of Egypt

and that of George III of England. Just as the use of a stick and a piece of flint began the intellectual development which slowly raised man above the ape in his habits of life, so a new method of operating his tools—the steam engine—ushered in an expansion of his activities, interests, and social and moral problems, the end of which is not yet.”⁹

Carrying out the same figure a little further, we might say that since the general adoption of steam transportation in the last half of the nineteenth century there has been more progress than in the whole of the century from 1750 to 1850, and consequently the larger part of our special historical studies (studies dealing with conditions as well as men) should be given almost exclusively to the last fifty or sixty years.

The history of the more distant past, conceived pragmatically, may also be valuable, not only for the insight it gives into human character and capacity, but also as a history of errors, of mere tradition, the pathology as it were, both of the human mind and of society. Such social errors, diseases and blind habits as come to us from the distant past, for the most part, have no longer any foundation in fact, and survive only in an attenuated form. Nevertheless, they do survive, if serving an entirely different function. For they are resuscitated, and given an artificial life—for reactionary purposes. To combat reactionary history, then, a sort of negative or pathological history is indispensable. In other words, it is worth a moderate amount of effort to know why we should *not* follow historical analogies or seek for specific precedents from the dead part of the past.

We can now trace the relation between this pragmatic view of history and the so-called materialistic interpretation of Karl Marx. Two hypotheses, which Kautsky calls “necessary laws,” constitute Marx’s chief contribu-

tions to history, the materialist interpretation and the class-struggle. It has commonly been asserted that, in his "materialist interpretation," Marx based history really on the evolution of machinery, and the following, among other passages, has been quoted in proof of this position: "The hand-mill produces a society with feudal lords, the steam-mill a society with industrial capitalists." In other words, the technical evolution of industry, apparently, is supposed to be the primary cause of all social changes. But closer examination shows that Marx, who was a most voluminous writer, used on innumerable occasions expressions of an altogether broader character. Some of these have been collected together by Heinrich Cunow, one of the editors of *Vorwaerts*, and published in the *Neue Zeit* in 1911.

Marx's interpretation of history did not take as the basis of all social changes the evolution of "technical forms of industry," but the evolution of "social economic systems," to use Cunow's expression. Marx spoke usually, not of technical production, but of "social production," of "economic methods," "economic structure," etc., and he defines this social production as "the material process of social life," as "the creation of social life," and as "the methods of production of material life." In all these cases it is evident that he is centering his attention on the whole social or life process and not merely on its mechanical side.

Kautsky's historical studies have included those of Marx and applied them to wider fields, and he has been a very devoted yet reasonably independent follower in Marx's footsteps. As he is also familiar with theories and facts of the period *since* Marx wrote, I shall discuss his views as the present day form of Marx's historical theory. Kautsky admits that the changes in evolution of the technique of weapons (e. g., the inven-

tion of gunpowder) and in the evolution of general education (e. g., the printing press) have had an importance far greater than most other economic changes. In other words, the history of warfare and coercion and the history of knowledge are of special importance in the history of production in general (e. g., that of agriculture, of commerce, etc.). It may be added that the development of transportation systems has a similarly exceptional significance; not only does it immensely further the evolution of industry and trade, but it constitutes the direct binding together of mankind through travel and communication—aside from these purely economic aspects—so that the greatest of industrial revolutions is undoubtedly the revolution of transportation that took place in the last half of the nineteenth century, while the inventions of gunpowder and printing ought perhaps to be put in the second rank. This relegates the application of steam to manufacture at the beginning of the eighteenth century; and the consequent increase of production at that time to a position of entirely subordinate importance. What is called *the* industrial revolution, in other words, is of less importance either than the later revolution in transportation or the earlier destruction of feudalism and establishment of merchant republics and landlord monarchies that followed after the invention of gunpowder and printing.

As Kautsky says:

“One must not interpret Engels’ polemic against the physical force theory (of history) as if he said that force plays only a subordinate rôle in the setting up and maintenance of servile conditions. That would be just as false as that conception of the materialist interpretation of history which says that it denies the effect of all psychical activity in history. Without mind and violence there is no history—but the endeavor as well as the

achievements of the mind and of force are economically conditioned." ¹⁰

Here certainly is a very modest statement of the materialist interpretation of history, one indeed that would justify us, it seems to me, in calling it the social or realistic rather than the economic interpretation as is so often done to-day. For if we give to the evolution of intelligence and of violence an equally important position to that of conditions of production or industry, we have a thoroughly realistic picture of society.

Still more recently Kautsky has given an interpretation of the materialist conception, which shows that it takes into account *objectively* every psychological factor in history, and is intended only to exclude or minimize the importance of abstract ideas, abstract moral principles, and abstract ideals.

"For Marxism the action of a given class does not depend upon its material *interests* alone but also on the material *conditions* in which it lives. These determine its material interests, but they also determine the way in which it recognizes them, the way in which it is conscious of them and tends to defend them, what its demands are, where it seeks its enemies, whether it fights against them and when and by what means. All these things may take on the most manifold and changing forms at different times within the same class having the same interests." ¹¹

As I have suggested, the phrase "concrete conditions" might be used instead of "material conditions" for it would more patently take into account objective psychological elements (though Kautsky's interpretations show that he tries to stretch the word "material" to cover this point). It is evident from this passage, at any rate,

that habits of action and of hostility, individual psychological development and capacity are given due weight.

So also we find that the Marxian theory that history has consisted in class struggles is given a very broad interpretation; indeed, it may amount to nothing more dogmatic than the assertion that a systematic parasitism always in evidence after a certain stage of culture has been reached—as we can see in Kautsky's views of slavery. Indeed, Vandervelde, the most prominent of Belgian Socialists, is the author of a well known work in which he classes all these phenomena together under the head of social parasitism. Nordau and the other critics of Socialism, then, are not at all justified when they claim that Socialists teach that the necessities of production account for all the various forms of society and institutions that humanity has evolved. On the contrary, the central object of Socialist striving is the desire that the form of society should in the future correspond to the necessities of social production and the economic needs of the whole population—and their greatest historical generalization is that this has *not* been so in the past.

Of course many others besides the Socialist writers have discussed social parasitism. The presentation of Nordau himself, for example, which teaches that inequality has been the fundamental fact, and that on this basis parasitism and exploitation were inevitable. Spencer's theory that history has consisted in progress from a military to an industrial society also implied that the history of the past has been the history of parasitism, though Spencer views the military system as having already passed into relative decay, and as being doomed to comparatively rapid extinction, while Nordau, on the contrary, shows that militarism and other forms of social parasitism are the very basis of present society.

From the pragmatic standpoint then the only objection to the Marxian hypotheses (the class-struggle and the materialistic conception) would be if it were attempted to get conclusions of *present* value by applying them to conditions that now belong wholly to the past. And it must be confessed that there has been a strong tendency among Socialist writers from the time of Marx to follow the intellectual fashion of the nineteenth century and appeal to history for "scientific laws." Marx himself, it is true, attached comparatively little importance to the period preceding the French Revolution, and if he gave a considerable place to that great event, it was not because he failed to realize that a momentous industrial revolution had since intervened, but because the ideas, the political institutions and the social forms of the Europe of the time when he did the most important part of his writing (1845-1870) were largely inherited from the former epoch.

But Marx's successors have failed fully to realize two absolutely vital facts: (1) that owing to the extremely important set of changes which were completed *during* Marx's lifetime the periods dealt with in his early and best known works have become ancient history to us and (2) that industrial and social evolution *since* Marx ceased to write have brought it about that even the period of his lifetime and of the birth of the international movement have very little practical bearing on our period. Yet the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 continue to play an extremely important rôle in Socialist literature, while the practical questions of the day are more likely than not to be discussed in the light of the old International which expired nearly forty years ago, the Paris Commune of 1871, the Gotha Congress that marked the formation of the German Party in 1875 or the British trade union history of the same period. The period

of our Civil War and the years immediately following it and under its influence would obviously be too far back for practical political and economic conclusions in this country, even for general purposes. But it is a double error for Socialists to go so far into the past. For above all industrial tendencies and the popular movements on which their reasoning is supposed to be based were in their early infancy at that time.

The so-called class-struggle and materialist conception are really views of present society and not of the past, and were largely so intended. That the latter was brought forth as a conception of history, however, indicates that history did have an undue influence on Socialist thought from the beginning and this influence has continued even since. If these Socialist hypotheses are to apply to history at all they should be applied to *contemporary* history—although it only creates confusion to use the term history in this connection. The Socialist (and pragmatic) view is nearer to Nietzsche's *anti-historical* standpoint.

The interpretations of history to which I have so far referred have been those of historians or philosophers of history. The views of a creative philosopher and master-mind like Nietzsche, though less accurate and systematic, are far broader and far more suggestive. For the philosopher of history, like the historian, must have the creative power, as Nietzsche has pointed out with his usual brilliancy:

“You can only explain the past by what is highest in the present. Only by straining the noblest qualities you have to their highest power will you find out what is greatest in the past, most worth knowing and preserving. Like by like! Otherwise you will draw the past to your own level. Do not believe any history that does not spring from the mind of a rare spirit.”¹²

The historian cannot be a cold and purely intellectual scientist, but must on the contrary be a many-sided and deep-feeling man of action, who can interpret the varied human motives with which he has to deal. Nietzsche has no words strong enough with which to denounce the conception of history as a mere science:

"Objectivity is so often merely a phrase. Instead of the quiet gaze of the artist that is lit by an inward flame, we have an affectation of tranquillity: just as a cold detachment may mask a lack of moral feeling. . . . Everything is favored that does not rouse emotion, and the driest phrase is the correct one. They go so far as to accept a man who is *not affected at all* by some particular moment in the past as the right man to describe it." ¹³

If we mean by history, as Nietzsche does here, the history of the whole past, and not merely of the last generation or two, this is especially true. The history that deals with human nature rather than human problems, with Plato and Dante, with the Chinese and the Egyptians, surely needs the very broadest outlook and the deepest insight.

Nietzsche agrees with pragmatism that history must not aim at mere generalization: "I hope history will not find its whole significance in general propositions, and regard them as its blossom and fruit." Among the generalizations he objects to is the one which attributes all changes to mere material processes: "It seems that all human actions and impulses are subordinate to the process of the material world, that works unnoticed, powerfully and irresistibly." His objection to this generalization is unique. He does not deny the basic importance of material changes, but, in a truly pragmatic manner, denies that this is the most interesting or important aspect of history simply because it is the most basic:

"For what opposition is there between human action and the process of the world? It seems to me that such historians cease to be instructive as soon as they begin to generalize. . . . If such generalizations as these are to stand as laws, the historian's labor is lost; for the residue of truth, after the obscure and insoluble part is removed, is nothing but the commonest knowledge. The smallest range of experience will teach it. But to worry whole peoples for the purpose, and spend many hard years of work on it, is like crowding one scientific experiment on another long after the law can be deduced from the results obtained." ¹⁴

The only fundamentally doubtful point in Nietzsche's view of history should be mentioned here. He makes a quotation from Emerson's essay on "Circles" which shows him as a believer in the possibility of very fundamental revolutions in history, but as a denier of the importance of material changes in a far different sense from that of the passages just quoted:

"Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet. Then all things are at risk. It is as when a conflagration has broken out in a great city, and no man knows what is safe, or where it will end. There is not a piece of science but its flank may be turned to-morrow; there is not any literary reputation, not the so-called eternal names of fame, that may not be revised and condemned. . . . The things which are dear to men at this hour are so on account of the ideas which have emerged on their mental horizon, and which cause the present order of things as a tree bears its apples. A new degree of culture would instantly revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits." (Emerson.)

Probably Nietzsche himself would admit that the last sentence could just as well be reversed. Surely a revolution in the system of human pursuits would instantly revolutionize the whole system of culture.

After his attack on history as a science, Nietzsche objects to history considered as something utterly past. This he calls "antiquarian," and he insists that history can be reliable and significant only in proportion as it is intimately related to the present:

"Antiquarian history degenerates from the moment that it no longer gives a soul and inspiration to the fresh life of the present." ¹⁵

History, conceived in this pragmatic spirit, must not only be relative to the present but it must be in close touch with the newest forces of the time:

"History regarded as pure knowledge and allowed to sway the intellect would mean for men the final balancing of the ledger of life. Historical study is only fruitful for the future if it follow a powerful life-giving influence, for example, a new system of culture; only, therefore, if it be guided and dominated by a higher force, and do not itself guide and dominate." ¹⁶

The attitude of the creative and up-to-date historian toward the past is therefore as remote as possible from reverence. To understand the past, he must be willing to use it:

"Man must have the strength to break up the past; and apply it, too, in order to live. He must bring the past to the bar of judgment, interrogate it remorselessly, and finally condemn it. Every past is worth condemning. . . . It is not justice that sits in judgment here; nor mercy that proclaims the verdict; but only life, the dim, driving force that insatiably desires—*itself*. Its sentence is always unmerciful, always unjust, as it never flows from a pure fountain of knowledge." ¹⁷

"The demand for history to be a science" proceeds from the need for some doctrine which shall master us; the creative historian is driven by the opposite mo-

tive of mastering something of which he may make use. Whenever the demand is made for history to be a science, Nietzsche says it proves that we are in a transition period, when the forces of life have grown weak:

"Life is no more dominant, and knowledge of the past no longer its thrall: boundary marks are overthrown and everything bursts its limits. The perspective of events is blurred, and the blur extends through their whole immeasurable course. No generation has seen such a panoramic comedy as is shown by the 'science of universal evolution,' history; that shows it with the dangerous audacity of its motto—'*fiat veritas, pereat vita.*' " ¹⁸

The result of the passive instead of the active cultivation of historical studies is that mankind is buried among the dry bones of knowledge:

"The modern man carries inside him an enormous heap of indigestible knowledge-stones that occasionally rattle together in his body, as the fairy-tale has it. And the rattle reveals the most striking characteristic of these modern men, the opposition of something inside them to which nothing external corresponds; and the reverse. The ancient nations knew nothing of this. Knowledge, taken in excess without hunger, even contrary to desire, has no more the effect of transforming the external life. . . . In other words, it is not a real culture but a kind of knowledge about culture, a complex of various thoughts and feelings about it, from which no decision as to its direction can come." ¹⁹

It is the combination of the antiquarian attitude towards history with this passive spirit that makes it the perfect tool of reactionary culture:

"The belief that one is a late-comer in the world is, anyhow, harmful and degrading: but it must appear frightful and devastating when it raises our late comer

to godhead, by a neat turn of the wheel, as the true meaning and object of all past creation, and his conscious misery is set up as the perfection of the world's history. Such a point of view has accustomed the Germans to talk of a 'world-process,' and justify their own time as its necessary result. And it has put history in the place of the other spiritual powers, art and religion, as the one sovereign; inasmuch as it is the 'Idea realizing itself,' the 'Dialectic of the spirit of the nations,' and the 'tribunal of the world.' " ²⁰

The terms and theories used in modern historical studies, such as "the world-process," and also the comparison of the history of man and of animals, intensify this passive and antiquarian spirit:

"For now the history of man is merely the continuation of that of animals and plants: the universal historian finds traces of himself even in the utter depths of the sea, in the living slime. He stands astounded in face of the enormous way that man has run, and his gaze quivers before the mightier wonder, the modern man who can see all this way! He stands proudly on the pyramid of the world-process: and while he lays the final stone of his knowledge, he seems to cry aloud to listening Nature: 'We are at the top, we are the top, we are the completion of Nature! O thou too proud European of the nineteenth century, art thou not mad? Thy knowledge does not complete Nature, it only kills thine own nature! Measure the height of what thou knowest by the depths of thy power to *do*.' " ²¹

" 'Ask thyself to tell what end thou art here, as an individual; and if no one can tell thee, try then to justify the meaning of thy existence *a posteriori*, by putting before thyself a high and noble end. Perish on that rock! ' " ²²

The talk about "laws" in history is but another illustration of the passive attitude:

"So far as there are laws in history, the laws are of no value and the history of no value either." ²³

In Nietzsche's view it is only those men who are in some degree participants in present history, who are in the current of life, who can understand the life of the past, and it is the failure to recognize this fact that has led to our unfruitful historical culture:

"The education of youth in Germany starts from this false and unfruitful idea of culture. Its aim, when faced squarely, is not to form the liberally educated man, but the professor, the man of science, who wants to be able to make use of his science as soon as possible, and stands on one side in order to see life clearly." ²⁴

But there are features in Nietzsche's essay on history that are still more revolutionary. As opposed to the historical culture of the day, he proposes an *unhistorical* culture:

"We may hold the capacity of feeling (to a certain extent) unhistorically, to be the more important and elemental, as providing the foundation of every sound and real growth, everything that is truly great and human.

"Forgetfulness is a property of all action; just as not only light but darkness is bound up with the life of every organism. One who wished to feel everything historically would be like a man forcing himself to refrain from sleep . . . there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of 'historical sense,' that injures and finally destroys the living thing, be it a man or a people or a system of culture." ²⁵

Nietzsche regards the whole culture of the Germany of his time, and there is certainly a large measure of truth in his attitude, as being historical; to attack history, then, is to attack all existing culture, and the sins of culture can be largely attributed to history. Nietzsche,

therefore, proceeds to accuse history of the responsibility for the weakening effects of the purely intellectual culture of the present period:

"Looking further, we see how the banishment of instinct by history has turned men to shades and abstractions: no one ventures to show a personality, but masks himself as a man of culture, a savant, poet or politician.

"Only perhaps if history suffer transformation into a pure work of art, can it preserve instincts or arouse them.

"Historical culture is really a kind of inherited grayness, and those who have borne its mark from childhood must believe instinctively in the old age of mankind. To old age belongs the old man's business of looking back and casting up his accounts, of seeking consolation in the memories of the past,—in historical culture." ²⁶

Even more significant to us than Nietzsche's profound and destructive criticism is his understanding that an "historical culture" is *necessarily* reactionary:

"The historical sense makes its servants passive and retrospective. Only in moments of forgetfulness, when that sense is dormant, does the man who is sick of the historical fever ever act; though he only analyzes his deed again after it is over (which prevents it from having any further consequences), and finally puts it on the dissecting table for the purposes of history. In this sense we are still living in the Middle Ages, and history is still a disguised theology. . . . What men formerly gave to the Church they give now, though in smaller measure, to science." ²⁷

To us, as to Nietzsche, the worship of history is only a part of the general metaphysical and pseudo-scientific thinking of the age. As Nietzsche says, the question is: "Must life dominate knowledge or knowledge life?" I have already shown the pragmatic answer to this ques-

tion, and shall deal with Nietzsche's discussion of it in a later chapter. I only wish here to indicate how he connects this tendency to make knowledge dominate life with the character and influence of present-day history. He denounces the historians as guilty of precisely the same limited and erroneous attitude of life as the scientists generally:

"The 'servants of truth' . . . possess neither the will nor the power to judge and have set before them the task of finding 'pure knowledge without reference to consequences,' knowledge, in plain terms, that comes to nothing. There are very many truths which are unimportant; problems that require no struggle to solve, to say nothing of sacrifice. And in this safe realm of indifference a man may very successfully become a 'cold demon of knowledge.' " ²⁸

Like Stirner, with whose writings he was apparently unfamiliar, Nietzsche can find nothing more condemnatory to say of science for science's sake than to apply to its practitioners their own proudest title, the "servants of the truth."

Pragmatism requires that historians, as well as scientists, shall be the masters not the servants of truth.

VI

SOCIETY AS GOD

SPENCER and Comte may be taken as the founders of sociology, which they hoped would introduce the scientific spirit into the most important of all fields of human endeavor and inaugurate a new epoch for the race. Progress that had been blind, contradictory, and accidental was to become intelligent, purposive, and organized. It was not a mere revolution in society that they had in mind, but something of far greater import, a revolution in social evolution for all subsequent time.

But in spite of the new social sciences, that have arisen in the last half century, it is almost as true to-day as it was in Spencer's time that even the scientifically trained mind refuses to depart from its prejudices in social questions—which touch the roots of every individual's life, including that of the scientist. Spencer shows that in judging social problems the scientifically trained neglect to go back into history, neglect to make an adequate study of analogous cases in contemporary societies, and especially fail to inquire "what will be the indirect actions and reactions of the proposed organization—how far it will retard other social agencies having like ends."

"Most important of all," Spencer continues, "is the fact that no allowance is made for the personal equation. In political observations and judgments the qualities of the individual, natural and acquired, are *by far the most important factors*. The bias of education, the

bias of *class* relationships, the bias of nationality, the political bias, the theological bias—these, added to the constitutional sympathies and antipathies, have much more influence in determining beliefs on social questions than has the small amount of evidence collected.” (My italics.) ¹

No words could be chosen to express better the present day attitude of representative Socialists towards the so-called social sciences, sociology, political science and political economy, of our time—which they believe to be profoundly and almost completely vitiated by the bias of class.

Spencer merely mentions the class bias as one of the causes of the collapse of the scientific spirit in the social sciences, but it is probably the underlying cause of all the deficiencies in our sociological thought of which he speaks. Socialism shows that this is so, pragmatism shows that it could not be otherwise. The new philosophy and psychology teach that we know as we act. A sound sociology then can only spring from a social movement, and the sociology that will last must owe its origin to the movement that works toward and ushers in the new period. Speculative social philosophy can no more lead anywhere than can dogmatic philosophy generally. Philosophy must take its root in applied science—sociology in the social movement.

While the early theoretical sociologists did not carry us very far, it must not be supposed that thoughtful Socialists are unappreciative of their work. There can be no question that Spencer and other social philosophers have furnished Socialism more food for thought, more suggestions, if not more accurate generalizations, than most Socialist writers.

Socialism, like sociology, is forced, first of all, to meet the great underlying question—how is the freest and

fullest development of the individual to be secured while society is doing more and more of the things which were formerly done by individuals?

Nordau gives an excellent summary of the position of leading social philosophers on this question of the relation between the individual and society. The one group, including Pascal, Comte, and such modern psychologists as Wundt and Mach, take the ultra social point of view. Pascal is quoted as saying in the preface of his "*Traité du Vide*": "We must look upon the continuity of the human race throughout the centuries as the continued existence and progressive experience of a single human being," Comte as saying in his "*Positive Philosophy*": "From the static or dynamic point of view, man is really and fundamentally an abstraction; reality belongs to humanity alone," while Mach, it is pointed out, conceives of humanity as a "polypus" whose members "have lost their organic relationship."

The other group, including Schopenhauer, Louis Blanc, Lotze and Maine, who recognizes individuals alone as being real, though going to the other extreme, is nearer to the majority of Socialists. Most interesting of the exponents of this view are the German sociologists, Simmel and Herbert Spencer. Simmel says:

"Nothing is real save the movements of the molecules and the laws that regulate them. No peculiar *law* can be assumed as governing the sum of such movements when grouped together in a totality." Spencer says the same thing: "A totality of men possesses the qualities that can be deduced from the qualities of the individuals. . . . The qualities of the units determine the qualities of the combinations." ²

Nordau also rejects the notion that regards the abstraction "humanity" as the reality, as being a theory that was handed down to us from the theologians and meta-

physicians, and says that "individual men alone, and not a totality of men, whether it be called people, class, society or humanity, represent reality for the natural history of man."

From the Socialist standpoint there is no reason why any true individualist should not develop, without losing any of his individualism, into an equally thoroughgoing Socialist, and indeed the tendency for individualists to become Socialists as well has existed from the very beginnings of modern individualism. One of the earliest and greatest of British individualists, William Godwin, wrote: "Equality of conditions or, in other terms, the equal admission of all to the means of perfection [the eighteenth century term for development] is the law that the voice of justice imposes rigorously on humanity. All other changes in society are good only if they are fragments of this ideal state and degrees for attaining it."³ No better expression of Socialism could be given and Godwin himself seems to understand perfectly that a highly organized and powerful society would be necessary for carrying this principle of equal opportunity into effect.

One of the most consistent, careful and enlightened individualists of the present time is John Morley, whose views often go so far as even to resemble those of the philosophical anarchist. But it is rare that even Morley's extreme individualism would give offence to the Socialist. He insists, for example, that the individual and the mass must be free to make their own mistakes. Not only is this the sole way in which they will learn, but if any too strenuous an effort is made to suppress these mistakes by depriving the people of liberty the remedy is likely to be worse than the disease. "For," he continues, "there are in the great seed plot of human nature a thousand rudimentary germs in wheat and in

tares, of whose properties we have not had a fair opportunity to assure ourselves; and if you are too eager to pluck up the tares you pluck up with them untried possibilities of human excellence." It is not the Socialists who are combating such principles as these but "State Socialist" statesmen, who have been the natural and inevitable reaction against the excesses of that *laissez-faire* theory of government, for which Morley and his school were largely responsible.

No Socialist could insist with more power than did Spencer on what is perhaps the most essential element of social evolution, namely, the demand that "plasticity," the fullest freedom for future development, be preserved at any cost. Moreover, the school of thought and political practice which is most feared by the Socialists to-day is the one that advocates that same Bismarckian "State Socialism" to which Spencer was so vigorously opposed—on the ground that it sacrificed plasticity and the future for immediate results.

"Beyond a certain point there cannot be further growth without further organization. Yet there is not a little reason for suspecting that beyond this point organization is indirectly repressive—increases the obstacles to those re-adjustments required for larger growth and more perfect structure . . . there is evidence that its type tends continually to become fixed, and that each addition to its structure is a step toward further fixation."

Indeed, does not social evolution mean just precisely the opposite of such fixation of society?

The very word Socialism, however, seems to imply that, where there appears to be a conflict between society and the individual, it is the individual that must give way. And some of the language used by Socialists would seem to justify this conclusion.

The social philosophy by which this "State Socialism" is usually supported has been formulated frequently in recent years, but nowhere more boldly or with greater political authority than in the works of J. R. MacDonald, M. P. His theory, which is typical of many others, makes no sharp distinction between society and the state, and in this resembles closely the worship of the state as we see it in Rousseau, Hegel, and many other political writers. MacDonald endorses Rousseau's principle that the problem of liberty is largely one of, "how the state can force the individual to be free."⁴ According to this philosophy the state must refuse to grant the individual a right of any kind except, as MacDonald says, "for promoting its ends."⁵

"In the eyes of the state, the individual is not an end in himself, but the means to 'that far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves.' Or, this thought may be translated into this form: The State does not concern itself primarily with man as a possessor of rights, but with man as the doer of duties."⁶

The individual is told to remember his duties and to forget his rights—the very language that has been used, again and again, by all the "benevolent" despots of the past.

The state is everything and the individual nothing: "The state represents the *political personality* of the whole. . . . *It thinks and feels for the whole.* The life of the whole is its life. It, therefore, is the best assessor of the result of individual action upon the whole and upon other individuals." (My italics.)⁷

The state is both the head and the heart of the social body; the people outside of the state are mere hands. If the organic theory is objectionable (as I shall show) because it considers the individual as merely

a specialized organ of society, what shall we say of a theory that regards the individual, not as a dependent organ of the body but merely as a cell, and that the cell of a subordinate part?

MacDonald says that Huxley realized *how small* are the so-called differences between society and organism and continues:

"The cells that are ultimately differentiated to become the nerve system of organisms are the ordinary cells which go to make up organic tissue, and they differ from muscular cells no more than a doctor differs from an agricultural laborer.

"Moreover, the work of organic nerve systems is paralleled in Society by political functions as a Socialist conceives them, the function of the nervous system is to co-ordinate the body to which it belongs, and enable it to respond to impressions and experiences received at any point. It can also originate movement itself. Evidently the individualist cannot admit any such differentiated organ in Society. But the Socialist, on the other hand, sees its necessity. *Some organ must enable other organs and the mass of Society to communicate impressions and experiences to a receiving center, must carry from that center impulses leading to action, must originate on its own initiative organic movements calculated to bring some benefit or pleasure to the organism. This is the Socialist view of the political organ on its legislative and administrative sides. It gathers up experience, carries it to a center which decides corresponding movements and then carries back to the parts affected the impulse of action.*" (My italics.)⁸

If the political organ gathers up experience, decides what is to be done, and sees that it is done, it is hard indeed to see what function is left to the "cells" of the other organs of the social body except to serve as mechanical means for carrying out the orders of the polit-

ical "cells", i. e., Members of Parliament and government officials.

Any other psychology than this ultra-organic one MacDonald calls individualism and he is at the greatest pains to show what a small rôle the individuals (except M. P.s and officials) play.

"An individualist psychology exaggerates *the free play of the human will*, and decides the organic type of Society mainly on the ground that each individual in Society has an independent will and consciousness of his own. In the organism, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the whole—the brain or nervous system; in Society consciousness is diffused throughout, and no specialized function of feeling can be created. This Spencer calls a cardinal difference. But upon examination the difference appears to be not nearly so great as it seems at first." ⁹

The reader will find the expression I have italicized especially worthy of consideration. In a theory which minimizes the free play of the human will, the state must indeed do the thinking and the feeling for the whole.

"In the Socialist state *all* political functions must be specialized, as the digestive function is in an animal organization, and cannot be diffused through the whole of the community," says MacDonald, and he evidently includes among such political functions that of a special ruling class. "What we need," he writes, "is the professional politician," and he leaves no doubt as to what he means:

"The politician does not express other people's opinions but his own. The electors and himself derive their intellectual being and social ideals from the Society in which they live, and, therefore, the relationship between them is not that of master and servant, but of two per-

sonalities deriving their life from the same source and agreeing or disagreeing regarding their common interests. . . . The representative represents Society, he is not the delegate of the majority which elected him. His responsibility is to the whole and not only to a part. He defines his opinions, he makes his points of view clear and he is accepted or rejected." ¹⁰

Here we see the member of Parliament first made of equal weight with the sum of his constituents, and then given authority over them on the implied ground that he represents the whole of the nation while they do not. In this philosophy, moreover, the elected person represents not only those citizens of other districts who did not vote for him and never heard of him, but also those who voted against him in his own district. "Minorities are always represented," he says. MacDonald's parliament is evidently an elective oligarchy. But, once the ultra-organic view is admitted, and once it is conceded that the government is and must be absolutely supreme over the individual, no other conclusion is possible.

John A. Hobson, speaking for the collectivist but non-socialist Radicals, gives us the same "State Socialist" view. In spirit he also is akin to Rousseau and Hegel:

"The individual's feeling, his will, his ends and interests are not entirely merged in or sacrificed to the public feeling, will and ends, but over a certain area they are fused and identified, and the common social life thus formed has *conscious interests and ends of its own* which are not merely instruments in forwarding the progress of the separate individual lives, but are directed primarily to secure the survival and psychical progress of the community regarded as a spiritual whole." (My italics.)

After laying this foundation, Mr. Hobson strives to show that Society does not weigh so heavily on the in-

dividual as it appears to do, for "even in the most highly developed organisms, such absolute and unchecked power is not entrusted to the expert government of the cerebral cells. The entire afferent nervous system attests the contrary: the individual organs and their cells are continuously engaged in transmitting information to the cerebral center and in offering suggestions. This information and these suggestions are chiefly if not wholly self-protective in their purport." At least it seems the cells are to have no very decided influence, for after all the individual is to have merely a right to complain or petition; the government is to command and he is to obey. "It is to this right and habit of complaint that we must look for what in social politics corresponds to the franchise. So far as the conscious polity of the animal organism is concerned, the direct work of government is highly centralized; a highly specialized portion of the nervous system issues the commands, it is the normal function of the several organs to obey, and in the ordinary course of nature they do so. They have had no separate voice in determining the organic policy or in issuing the order which they help to execute." ¹¹

Accordingly Hobson is forced definitely to reject the underlying principles of democracy, though, strange to say, he is in favor of a number of advanced democratic measures. He believes in efficiency more than he does in democracy, since he says that "political power ought to be distributed in proportion to ability to use it for the public good". Apparently he forgets that the world has never yet produced a benevolent oligarchy that could satisfy any community as well as a government of its own—a government which would allow it at least to make its own errors. Benevolent despots have, without exception, been forced on communities from above or from without, and, if accepted, this has only been as long as such superior forces continued to be present.

The organic theory of society, in a word, implies that the activities of the state are of infinitely greater moment than the self-development and self-government of citizens who use the state as their mere tool. To this Socialists might retort in the words of Nietzsche: "The state is the coldest of all monsters. And its lies are cold; and this lie creeps out of its mouth: I, the State, am the people."¹²

The idea that the state is society, and that society represents the best welfare of every individual, is not a new one, but a reaction to an older view. An early American publicist, Joel Barlow, almost as well known at the time as Thomas Paine, summed it up in a form in which it was once widely circulated in this country: "Every individual ought to be rendered as independent as possible of every other individual, and at the same time as dependent as possible on the whole community." The first principle arose from the effort of the French and American Revolutionists to rid themselves of a personal government and the tyranny of individuals, that is, of the monarchy and aristocracy. The second principle is that theory of Rousseau which dominated the French Revolution at the time of the Terror when, for a few months, Europe witnessed one of the worst tyrannies that it had seen for centuries, even though it was a tyranny that was supported at first by public opinion. From the very first, however, the Socialism of the continent of Europe, and that of America also, has been in the fullest reaction against this "State Socialism" of Rousseau and the Jacobins—and the Jacobins, on their side, had been as violently opposed to the early communists, like Babeuf, who were already appearing in their time.

In this matter, indeed, the French Revolutionists and their opponents were as one. Burke's view of the state

and society was as tyrannical as that of the Jacobins. The only difference was that the latter looked upon the new state as alone having the right to tyrannize over the individual, while the former gave this right to the traditional state, which was to be preserved intact forever: "an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and no greater." This "state" of Burke's would appear to have been very similar to the mediæval conception of the Church, for it was "a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all affection."¹³ It has been remarked that the French Jacobins also seemed to inherit the fanatic faith and spirit of persecution of the Church, which they merely replaced by their conception of "the republic one and indivisible." Burke's conception is obviously theocratic, and scarcely to be distinguished from the view of the New England theocrat, Cotton, who said that it was "a carnal and worldly, and, indeed, an ungodly imagination to confine the magistrates to the bodies and goods of the subjects and to exclude them from the care of their souls."

It is through comparing it with the older theocratic ideas from which it is in part descended that we obtain the clearest insight into the nature of "State Socialism" and the organic theory of society on which it rests. Though presented in new words, the theory is essentially the same, and all the more dangerous because it now claims science as its sanction. In the present conception it is not held that God has taken charge of society, but that society is God, or is soon to become God. Even this theory has a certain plausibility, for some of our profoundest and most subtle philosophers have argued that *humanity*, past and future, might indeed take the place of God in our thinking. But this

latter view, though probably to be taken more as poetry than as philosophy, is infinitely the less obnoxious of the two, for perhaps the larger part of humanity, and no doubt the more important part, is not yet born, and no earthly philosopher, priest, or scientist can reasonably claim to represent it. On the other hand, society is *existing* humanity, and the state can make a very plausible claim, indeed, to represent it.

It would seem, then, that Spencer's denunciation of what he called "Socialism" as being "the coming slavery" was justified; for he was evidently speaking of "State Socialism," which was already shaping itself in Great Britain long before his death, of "Socialism" as opposed, not to class rule, but to individualism. Spencer's views about this "Socialism" embody, better than those of any other social philosopher, both the good and the evil of the individualism he was defending, and, at the same time, show the strength as well as the weakness of the "State Socialism" he attacked.

The keynote to Spencer's idea of economic or social evolution was that we are living in an age of transition from the older militaristic society which has prevailed since primitive times to a new industrial society. He recognized that the railways and telegraphs were already introducing, at the time when he wrote, in the middle of the nineteenth century, an economic and social revolution of unequaled and unimagined magnitude, and that the completion of this revolution gave the best hope for social progress. But, like the Socialists, Spencer seemed to feel that this great economic revolution may work to a certain degree for retrogression as well as for progress. For anything that gives a new strength and force to militarism is, by Spencer's very definition, in so far, a retrogressive force. And he recognizes that, in the great industrial revolution, through

which we are passing, while "productive activities have been facilitated, there has been a furtherance of that centralizing, coercive social type required for offensive and defensive actions." ¹⁴ In other words, economic centralization, unified transportation systems, large industrial corporations, growing empires, and government regulation and ownership are bringing about a coercive centralization in society that makes not only for industrial progress but also for military organization.

Spencer showed that there is an intimate relation between the highly centralized industry and government which make for militarism and the powerful state desired by the "State Socialists." Such an increase of the power of the present state over all individuals and classes would not only facilitate war, but would in turn be facilitated by war:

"It would need but a war with an adjacent society or some internal discontent demanding forcible suppression, to at once transform a socialistic administration into a grinding tyranny like that of ancient Peru; under which the masses of the people, controlled by crews of officials, and leading lives that were inspected out of doors and in doors, labored for the support of the organization which regulated them, and were left with but a bare subsistence for themselves." ¹⁵ [Spencer should have added that the subsistence given would be sufficient to give the people the maximum efficiency *as laborers only*.]

Spencer's definition of the older military society as being one of "status" and compulsory coöperation, while the present industrial society is, very largely, one of "contract" and voluntary coöperation, is familiar. Few persons will question that he is correct in applying the former terms to the militaristic "State Socialism" of Bismarck. It is indeed noteworthy that, in this instance, Spencer himself employs the term "State So-

cialism," and that he never differentiates it from "Socialism," the term which he ordinarily uses.

"Well may Prince Bismarck display leanings toward State Socialism," says Spencer, since State Socialism means: "the despotism of a graduated and centralized officialism holding in its hand the resources of the community and having behind it whatever amount of force it finds requisite to carry out its decrees and maintain what it calls order." ¹⁶

State Socialism, according to Spencer's excellent definition, means the "re-institution of status not under individual masters, but under the community as master." The older "feudal Socialisms" of Peru and other countries went along with serfdom, or even slavery, and under "State Socialism" the individual is also, in a sense, to become the slave of the state. Spencer does not minimize the economic efficiency of this régime; it will undoubtedly be able "to do things." His question concerning it is precisely that of the Socialists, "Who is going to control the new *Super-State*?"

"Doubtless in the one case as in the other, multitudinous officers, grade over grade, having in their hands all authority and all means of coercion, would be able to curb that aggressive egoism which causes the failures of small socialistic bodies; idleness, carelessness, quarrels, violence would be prevented, and efficient work insisted upon. But when from regulation of the workers by the bureaucracy we turn to the bureaucracy itself and ask how it is to be regulated, there is no such satisfactory answer. There must arise a new aristocracy for the support of which the masses would toil; and which, being consolidated, would wield a power far beyond that of any past aristocracy." ¹⁷

This is also the Socialist view of "State Socialism"; the only difference being that the Socialist feels that this

new aristocracy is already in process of formation, and that the capitalist class will easily be transformed almost as a body into the bureaucratic masters of the new state. Socialists take nothing away from Spencer's generalizations, but only carry them out to a more definite conclusion, as he neglects to say where his new aristocracy is to come from.

Spencer says that this new "State Socialism" will make of each citizen the "creature of the community." From what I have said above concerning the organic theory of the state, which seems to dominate British Socialism and anti-Socialist Radicalism alike, is it not evident that Spencer is literally and scientifically correct?

Not only is the individual in danger of becoming the "creature of the community," but the existing social classes are in danger of becoming hereditary castes, and here once more Spencer has expressed so thoroughly and adequately the revolutionary Socialist view that his text can scarcely be improved upon. Moreover, history is justifying him in the most remarkable way, and no rulers are proving more ruthless in their suppression of popular revolutionary movements than State Socialists like Briand, Prime Minister in France.

"What will happen," asks Spencer, "when the various divisions of this vast army of officials united by interests common to officialism—the interests of the regulators versus those of the regulated—have at their command whatever force is useful to suppress insubordination and act as 'saviours of society'? Where will be the actual diggers and miners and smelters and weavers when those who order and superintend, everywhere arranged class above class, have come, after some generations, to intermarry with those of kindred grades, under feelings such as are operative in existing classes; and when all these, having everything in their own power, have arranged

modes of living for their own advantage, eventually forming a new aristocracy far more elaborate and better organized than the old?"¹⁸

Spencer has outlined as clearly as any Socialist the precise character of the new compulsory elements that are being strengthened as the state extends its functions. He had already foreseen that compulsory arbitration of wage questions which now prevails in New Zealand, and still more definitely in government employments in all countries, and he had realized that, without some revolutionary change in the social structure and the present tendencies of social evolution, an increase of coercion is not only probable but inevitable. "Where the regulative organization (the government) is anywhere made to undertake additional functions," he wrote half a century ago, "we shall expect that, after the phase of early activity has passed by, the plasticity of the new structure will rapidly diminish, the characteristic tendency toward rigidity will show itself."¹⁹ In an essay written thirty years later, in 1891, he gives a more definite illustration of what he means, referring here, as usual, to that Socialism with which he was familiar, namely, the "State Socialism" of Bismarck and the anti-individualist Socialism of Great Britain.

"Under the compulsory co-operation which Socialism would necessitate," wrote Spencer at this later date, "the regulators, pursuing their personal interests with no less selfishness, *could not be met by the combined resistance of free workers* [strikes] and their power, unchecked as now by refusals to work save on prescribed terms, would grow and ramify and consolidate till it became irresistible."²⁰

It appears from this paragraph that Spencer, precisely like the Socialists, leans on the ultimate right and

ability of the workers to strike as being the underlying basis of liberty and democracy.

Why was it, then, that the great individualist failed to realize the possibility of *democratic* Socialism—which in no way contradicts true individualism? For the Socialist movement existed and was quite advanced before his death. Why did he imply that “State Socialism” and Socialism were one and the same thing, and that the latter, like the former, involved slavery? The answer is two-fold. It is well known that Spencer believed that it would be possible to maintain commercial competition and to make it so fair that all would have an equal opportunity to compete, and that capitalism, purified from militarism, status, and privilege, would become the embodiment of “social justice.” In other words, he was a defender of capitalism. But it is not so commonly known that just as in economics he was a capitalist, so in politics, like all non-Socialists if we look deeply enough, he was opposed to democracy, except as an ultimate ideal—which means little or nothing.

He argued against democracy on the ground that every people has, after all, that form of government which it deserves, and that the improvement of political institutions can be of no use whatever. He took his data and conclusions, like most conservatives, from conditions that were rapidly passing, chiefly those of England, which at the time he wrote (1860-1890) was indeed the foremost nation economically and among the most advanced politically—though this advance indicated no great internal political development, but was for the most part a mere reflex of economic prosperity, other nations having gone much further in comparison to their economic opportunity. Spencer, therefore, was justified in reasoning from England, rather than another country—though not in assuming its conditions as lasting. And,

in England, it cannot be denied that the rule of the capitalist class was, and is still, based as much on the voluntary or moral subjection of the masses as on their political and economic impotence. We cannot deny the applicability of the following argument—to the England of 1884.

“If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves? If people by a plebiscite elect a man despot over them, do they remain free because the despotism was of their own making? Are the coercive edicts issued by him to be regarded as legitimate because they are the ultimate outcome of their own votes? As well might it be urged that the East African, who breaks a spear in another’s presence that he may so become bondsman to him, still retains his liberty because he freely chose his master.”²¹

It would indeed appear, not only from the case of the election of Napoleon III in France half a century ago, but also from the present tendency in America to place all party power in the hands of a single political leader, that in all countries under capitalism the middle classes and small farmers have very little appreciation of what democracy means. And Spencer shows in this and other passages that he is no democrat, for the essence of democracy is not that the people will necessarily rule well, but that it is indispensable that they should rule themselves, in order that they may learn to rule.

Spencer’s scepticism of democracy seems to be based on the unquestionable failure of the British masses to rely upon themselves alone, that is, the absence of what Socialists call the class struggle in politics.

“It is a self-evident truth that we may most safely trust those whose interests are identical with our own; and that it is very dangerous to trust those whose in-

terests are antagonistic to our own. All the legal securities we take in our transactions with one another are so many recognitions of this truth. We are not satisfied with professions. If another's position is such that he must be liable to motives at variance with the promises he makes, we take care, by introducing an artificial motive (the dread of legal penalties), to make it his interest to fulfill these promises. Down to the asking for a receipt, our daily business habits testify that, in consequence of the prevailing selfishness, it is extremely imprudent to expect men to regard the claims of others equally with their own; all asseverations of good faith notwithstanding." 22

We have here a principle which would justify every ultra-democratic measure, even the recall of judges. Spencer rightly pointed out that the British masses had shown a belief that "their interests will be as well cared for by members of the titled class as by members of their own class," since nearly half of the House of Commons were at that time either noblemen or connected with noblemen by *blood*, to say nothing of financial connections. Surely the same criticism applies equally to those employees who elect their employers to represent them to-day. In Great Britain there was ground when Spencer wrote for the profoundest distrust of a people which seemed incapable or unwilling to exert its manhood. But it does not follow that it will be so always, even in Great Britain, and it is certain that the working people of other countries have no such habit of respect for the ruling class.

The Socialists are in thorough accord with the great individualist when he objects to parliamentarism, and the despotic rule of mere majorities: "The assumed divine right of parliaments, and the divine right of majorities," as he says, "are superstitions. . . . Unre-

stricted power over subjects, rationally ascribed to the ruling man when he was held to be a deputy-god, is now ascribed to the ruling body, the deputy-godhood of which nobody asserts." ²³ But the only time when majorities need be feared is when they become permanent, when society tends to be divided into permanent classes, for otherwise the majority would be a shifting one on each important question, and people who are often in a minority hesitate to exercise their power despotically when they happen to be in a majority. And the very purpose of Socialism is to put an end to the stratification of society into classes, to what Spencer calls status, whether the old political status of militarism, which still survives, or the economic status of capitalism, which Spencer acknowledged but *practically* ignored.

Individualism, as presented by its chief spokesman, has many points in common with social-democracy, but it is lacking in two respects—it can neither imagine any economic order or any political order fundamentally different from our own, and it has, therefore, been unable to propose any way whatever out of present difficulties. It is true he recognized the evils of present society, and died with the gloomiest forebodings as to the future also. There was present in Spencer, however, as there is in the majority of individualists, and also of "State Socialists," a semi-conscious or sub-conscious toleration of class rule. This alone accounts for their repeatedly expressed horror of the possibility that the powers of government might be used for the purpose of interfering with the relations between class and class. To be sure, such interference, if undertaken by "State Socialists," would be for the worse, but why might it not be undertaken also for the purposes of liberty? Spencer expressed a fear lest the government should try "to interfere with any of the special relations between class and

class," or even to "undertake to bring home positive benefits to citizens." He believed that class rule had been maintained by militarist government *in the past*, and predicted that it might be forcibly maintained by "State Socialism" *in the future*. Why, then, might not the *present* class rule, which he by no means denied, be equally due, in part at least, to its possession of the powers of coercive government?—and how could this condition be removed except by the interference of a *democratic* government "with the special relations between class and class"?

Spencer's answer to this question shows that, like other anti-Socialist individualists, he both recognizes the class struggle and definitely takes the side of the ruling class. *For it appears that he stood for democratic government only in so far as the power of the government is restricted*, in so far, that is, as the government is impotent: "As fast as representation is extended, the sphere of government must be contracted," he wrote, of the extension of the suffrage. In other words, he was anti-collectivist for precisely the same reason that many capitalists are now becoming collectivists. As the power of the people over the government increased he wished to decrease the power of the government over industry. Similarly present-day capitalists, as they become more united and better organized, and secure a more and more firm control over the government, wish to extend its industrial functions.

Spencer saw that even the Radical, as well as the "State Socialist," was under the impression that "so long as he has a good end in view he is warranted in exercising over men all the coercion he is able," though he is "as prompted by class interests and the desire to maintain class power" as the Tory. But he seemingly had no glimpse of the coming of any genuinely social

and democratic movement which represented no class but the abolition of all classes.

We see, then, that individualism of the ordinary anti-democratic and capitalistic variety rests, in spite of the pretensions by which many of its exponents have doubtless deceived themselves as well as others, on a perfectly definite proposal to maintain class rule as against the rule of the people. Spencer is conscious that his defence of capitalism means a defence of class rule, and explains his position generally by that abstract supposition that the only possible or conceivable alternative is "State Socialism." But (in 1896), toward the end of his life, he threw down the mask that he had been almost unconsciously wearing. Finally he stepped out into the light and placed himself shoulder to shoulder with the other reactionaries of the time in a crude misapplication of the survival of the fittest theory, and spoke of the disappearance of free competition in industry and of the interference of the state, not as leading to possible tyranny, where every democrat may agree with him, but as being wrong because by this means modern peoples were "fostering their feebleness"; he argued against this state of society as one where "the superior, persistently burdened by the inferior, are hindered in rearing their own better offspring, so that the offspring of the inferior may be as efficiently cared for," and concluded that, from such a "Socialist" policy, "a gradual deterioration of the race must follow." We begin to feel in this disclosure of the underlying state of mind of the greatest exponent of anti-social individualism that this doctrine is not always accidentally anti-democratic, but is often inspired by a fierce and conscious hostility to so-called "inferiors."

We see that anti-individualist "Socialism" and anti-social individualism are at the bottom one. Both rest

outwardly on a demand for the absolute sovereignty of an abstract social principle. It matters not if that principle in one case makes a god of society and in the other insists upon the absolute abdication by the *majority*, composed of individuals, of any form whatever of genuine social control; the two principles are at the bottom one. To Spencer, as to the "State Socialists," society is organic, a sacred product of evolution, which the hands of mankind are too profane to touch. Both views rest upon a new dogmatism that supports itself upon a narrow conception of evolution and biology, both are in the most complete contradiction to the spirit and philosophy of modern science, and both have "survived" solely because of their utility to the ruling class.

It is now widely recognized that the only possible choice lies between social democracy and the class state. Dewey is only one among many of our leading sociologists who clearly grasp this truth. Both anti-social individualism and anti-individualist "Socialism" in opposing social democracy, or the control of society by the human units which compose it, are either maintaining the present system of class rule, or laying the foundation for some other similar system in the future. For, if we are to have any kind of class rule, it will no doubt grow up out of that which already exists; in fact, the irresistible tendency, under all conditions, is for class privileges to be passed down to children and for class rule to make itself permanent and develop into caste.

This does not mean that hereditary classes or castes are inconsistent with considerable social movement from one class to another or with a certain progress, as we saw even in the old China. Indeed, it is only by allowing this safety valve for the spirit of revolt that constantly grows up among the masses, and by absorbing a certain number of the strongest individuals from the

masses into the ruling class that caste has been able to maintain itself even in China. If this process is too rapid, the result would be, of course, that the ruling class would absorb more individuals from the masses than it was able to provide privileged positions for. But, if the absorption is too slow, then the ruling class is only weakened by its failure to add to itself and to take away from the masses these new forces that lie so ready at hand.

The widespread and general tendency, then, to increase the number of those individuals who are advanced into the ruling class and to secure their more rapid promotion, the increase of equality of opportunity, *up to a certain point*, only serves to weaken democracy and strengthen class rule. As this point has certainly not yet been reached, every measure which tends to select a few of the most able and to promote them rather than to secure equal opportunity for all of the unprivileged mass has a reactionary effect. *Improvements in the efficiency of class rule* do not at all imply its weakening, any more than the injection of a certain number of life peers into the House of Lords would, in itself, tend to make it a less powerful representation of hereditary and class interests.

The tendency of which I speak has not been very widely noted, but neither has it been altogether overlooked. Professor C. H. Cooley, for instance, observes:

"The dominant class in a competitive society, although unstable as to its individual membership, may well be more secure as a whole than the corresponding class under any other system—precisely because it continually draws into itself most of the natural ability from the other classes.

"It is increasingly the practice—perhaps in some degree the deliberate policy—of organized wealth to win over in this way the more promising leaders from the

side of labor; and this is the respect in which greater class-consciousness and loyalty on the part of the latter would add to its strength. Thus it is possible to have freedom to rise and yet have at the same time a miserable and perhaps degraded lower class." ²⁴

Professor Cooley very rightly concludes that an aristocracy so maintained, and kept vigorous at the same time by the gradual sloughing off of wholly useless and parasitical elements, is the strongest imaginable. But he fails to hold firmly to the real significance of this perpetual renovation of the governing class, for he defines this system as "a democratic aristocracy, that is, one whose members maintain their position in an open struggle," and he adds that this system of class rule is not a caste rule, and that, therefore, we shall never have a revolution. On the contrary, by far the larger proportion of such a ruling class, though it be true that they are able to maintain their position in an open struggle, can do so only because, having been born in this class, they have had unequal privilege and opportunity. The members born in the ruling class *maintain* their position in an open struggle, but they do not *gain* their position in this way, as do those among the masses who have been incorporated in the ruling class. Such a "democratic" aristocracy as ours is, indeed, the most dangerous and powerful preventive for democracy that can be imagined.

A caste-ruled society by no means implies government by ability; for, as Bernard Shaw has pointed out, not only must we accept those who are able to maintain their position only by having an unfair start, but we must also accept certain types of supposed ability, which are defined as such either by a semi-hereditary ruling caste or by the perverted public opinion of the society they so largely dominate. Professor Lester F. Ward has shown at length that our heroes, "military chief-

tains, diplomats, statesmen, etc., are not the true agents of civilization," but "the products of their time and the mere instruments of society in the accomplishment of its ends." They are not really creative; in other words, they do not belong to that type of man which will have the greatest influence in an enlightened society. Ward points out also that those who, like Galton, try to show that the ruling class consists of the most able, not only on account of those it incorporates into itself in each generation, but also on the ground that ability is largely inherited, are reasoning on the falsest assumption, classing as exceptionally able such types as I have spoken of and including even judges, whose "greatness," as Ward says, is due almost wholly to their exceptional advantages.

Socialism demands that every individual born into the world be given equal opportunity and a function in society corresponding to his native abilities. *The present caste system, due to the inheritance of wealth and educational and occupational privilege, means that the children of the privileged hold their hereditary advantage, and that ability is developed in other classes and given opportunity only as it helps to maintain this system.*

VII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE NEW SOCIETY—AS SEEN BY MAX STIRNER

MAX STIRNER is still comparatively little known outside of Germany. But his philosophy is almost completely pragmatic on its psychological side, and his work, "Der Einsige und sein Eigentum," propounds some principles in philosophy, and especially in social philosophy, as far-reaching and revolutionary as anything that has come from the pragmatists of to-day—particularly as to the position of the individual in the new society.

Stirner wishes every individual to understand, above all things, that his thought must serve him, and that he must not serve his thought. If an idea exists in his brain without being mastered, then necessarily he has taken it from some one else, and it is in a sense his master. If one has the thoughts only of Mankind, or of Man, then one is thoughtless as an individual, for the thoughts are not really one's own :

"He who cannot rid himself of a thought is, in so far, merely man, a slave of speech, that treasury of man's thoughts. Speech, or the word, tyrannizes over us the worst of all, because it leads up against us a whole army of fixed ideas. Watch yourself once in your reflection, and you will find that really progress exists for you only if you are every moment free of thought and speech. You are not only *thoughtless* and *speechless* in sleep, but also in your deepest reflection, yes, more so then than at any other time. And only through this *thoughtless-*

ness, this unacknowledged freedom from thought, are you in possession of yourself. Only from this point of view do you succeed in using speech as your property.

"If the thinking is not my thinking, then it is merely a spun out thought, a word of slavery or a servant's word. For my thought the beginning is not a thought, but I, and in this way I am its goal, and its whole course is only the course of my enjoyment of myself." . . .

"If there is even one truth to which man must dedicate his life and his strength because he is Man, then he is subjected to a rule, to an overlordship, to law, and so forth; that is, he is a servant. Man, Humanity, Freedom, and so forth, are supposed to be such truths."

If there is a single sovereign truth, in a word, all men are its slaves:

"But the power of thoughts and ideas, the rule of theories and principles, the sovereign rule of the spirit [one of the most tyrannous of abstractions according to Stirner], in a word a hierarchy, will last as long as the priests, that is, the theologians, philosophers, statesmen, philistines, liberals, schoolmasters, servants, parents, children, married people, Prudhomme, George Sand, Bluntschli, and so forth, supply the big words; the hierarchy will last as long as one believes in principles, thinks of them, or even criticizes them; for even the most bitter criticism, which undermines all existing principles, at the bottom believes in principle."

To Stirner truths or principles exist, but are relative to the individual, while truth or principle in general is non-existent. He insists, in a seeming paradox, that criticism in general is good only when there is *not* any generally accepted criterion of the good or the true.

"The 'right' criterion is sought after. This right criterion is the first presupposition. The critic starts out from a principle, a truth, a belief. This is not a creation

of the critic but of the dogmatist. Yes, it is ordinarily taken right out of the culture of the time, without further ado, as, for example, 'freedom,' 'humanness.' . . .

"The secret of the critic is some kind of a 'Truth.' This is its energizing mystery.

"But I distinguish between a serviceable critic and an individual critic. If I criticize with the presupposition of a higher Something, then my criticism serves this Something, and is carried on on its account; if, for example, I am obsessed by the belief in a 'free state,' then I criticize everything from the point of view that is suited to this state. For I love this state."

To Stirner as to pragmatism, a truth in itself is worthless, for "truth is a *creation*."

"Just as you produce countless things through your activity, yes, even re-shape the face of the earth and everywhere erect the works of man, so you may be able to bring about countless truths through your thinking. And we will rejoice in them. But just as I may not surrender myself to serve your newly discovered machines in a machine-like manner, but only help to set them in operation for my own use, so I will only use your truths without allowing myself to be used for your requirements.

"All truths under me are dear to me; a truth over me, a truth according to which I must govern myself, I do not recognize. For me there is no truth, because nothing goes before me, not even my nature, not even the nature of man goes before me."

Stirner was by no means ready to accept the superficialities of evolutionism, for, although biological evolution was not so clearly or generally recognized in his time as it is in ours, social evolution was. He shows, however, that the evolutionists of his day, as of ours, had not made any very radical changes in their antiquated methods and habit of thought:

"You believe you have done your utmost if you boldly affirm that there is no 'absolute truth,' because every time has its own truth. But by this you leave to every time its truth just the same, and create in this way in reality an 'absolute truth.' Truth is lacking in no period, because every period, whatever its truth, may still have a 'truth.'"

And finally, Stirner leads us to a formulation of pragmatism which is certainly as broad and deep as any we have had. For to every free critic before Stirner's time some idea or other was a criterion. But for the point of view he bespeaks, which he calls individual criticism, the I is the criterion:

"I, the inexpressible, and by no means merely a thing thought; for the thing thought is always expressible, because the word and the thought come together. . . . I am the criterion of truth, and I am no idea, but more than an idea, that is, inexpressible. My criticism is no free criticism, it is not free from me, and it is not serviceable criticism, it is not in the service of an idea, but it is an individual thing."

The logic, in other words, which is to govern criticism, philosophy and thought, is the logic of the human organism itself. Those individuals who have assimilated the most experience and are most developed will be freest themselves, and they will do the best work when they do not bind themselves to any fixed principle or truth, but at every moment express as much as possible of their whole nature, and of their whole experience as it reacts against the particular question under discussion. In a word, Stirner's logic is the inherent logic of the organism—and its assimilated experience. "If I conceive the idea as *my* idea," he says, "then it is already realized, because I am its reality: its reality consists in this, that I, the embodied one, have it."

"It is said that the idea of freedom realizes itself in the history of the world [Hegel]. On the contrary, this idea is real in so far as a man thinks it. And it is real in that measure as it is my idea, that is, as I think; but men develop themselves, and in this self-development naturally also develop their thinking.

"In a word, the critic is not yet an independent individuality as long as he fights with ideas as with mighty forces, as Christ was not independent of his 'evil temptations' as long as he had to fight them. For him who strives against sin, sin exists.

"Whether what I think and do is Christian, what do I care? Whether it is human, manlike, liberal, or unmanlike, illiberal, inhuman, what difference does this make to me? If it accomplishes what I want, if I find satisfaction in it, then you can belabor it with predicates as much as you please. It does not matter to me.

"And perhaps, too, I may in the very next moment turn myself against my previous thoughts; perhaps, too, I will suddenly change my behavior, but not because it does not correspond to Christianity, not because it conflicts with the everlasting Rights of Man, not because it strikes in the face the idea of mankind or humanity—but because I no longer quite agree with it, because it no longer gives me full enjoyment, because I doubt the previous thoughts, or because the behavior I have just practiced no longer suits me."

Here we have in the fewest possible words the very essence of pragmatic psychology: when a man acts in each given moment according to the dictates of his whole personality and his whole experience, he acts more effectively than he could possibly do by mastering and following the most perfect logics or philosophies the human race has developed.

It is true that Stirner has used as his weapon against

abstractions what might seem to be an abstraction, after all, the concept, I, or You. And, undeniably, these have no more an absolute value than any other abstractions. You and I are embodied parts of larger wholes. But Stirner uses these terms for a literary and not for a philosophic purpose. He does not attack ideas, it must be remembered, but only insists that ideas must serve men. "Society" and "the race," for example, are also realities, but they are not absolute realities. They mean something different in relation to the thinking and needs of each individual.

The great service of Stirner is that after showing why abstractions must be reduced to the minimum, he shows how this may be accomplished. He is not only a pragmatist, but his work is perhaps the greatest illustration of what the pragmatic spirit can do. For nothing could be more profoundly revolutionary than his proposed reversal of the currents that have hitherto governed human thought. Certainly there are comparatively few philosophers, moralists, or sociologists who do not make use of the abstract expression, "Truth" or "truth." But Stirner completely repudiates it, as, for example, in the following passage, where his ironical statement of the prevailing view alternates with his own opinion:

"Truth is something which is free from you, which is not your own, which is not in your power. But truth is also fully independent, impersonal, unreal and unbeloved; truth cannot take a stand, as you take a stand, cannot move, cannot change, cannot develop; truth expects and receives everything from you, and even exists only through you; for it exists only—in your head. You concede that truth is only a thought, but say that every thought is not a true one. Or, as you may also express it, not every thought is truly and really a thought.

Then how do you measure and recognize a thought? By your powerlessness, that is, by the fact that you cannot get any further hold on it. If it overpowers you, enthuses you and drives you along, then you hold it for true. Its lordship over you demonstrates its truth to you, and when it possesses you and you are possessed by it, then in it you have truly found—your lord and master. As you seek the truth, what is your heart really longing for now? For a master. You are not looking after your power, but after some other power, and want to elevate some other powerful one.” (“Raise up the Lord our God.”) . . .

“As long as you believe in truth, you do not believe in yourself, and are a servant, a religious man. You alone are the truth, or rather you are more than the truth, which was nothing before you. At any rate, you inquire after truth, at any rate you criticize, but you do not ask any further for a higher truth, a truth, that is, which is higher than you; you do not criticize according to such a criterion.”

Stirner says that every abstraction, whether “truth,” “humanity,” or any other, serves only its own purpose, and not that of individual men. “Each represents some definite and limited ‘cause.’ ”

“How is it with mankind, whose cause we are supposed to make our own? Is its cause by any chance that of any other, and does mankind serve some higher cause? No, mankind only regards itself, mankind only wishes to further mankind; mankind is its own cause. So that it may develop it allows peoples and individuals to torture themselves in its service, and when they have done what mankind needs, then for gratitude they are thrown upon the dungheap of history. Is not the cause of mankind a ‘purely egoistic cause?’ ”

“I do not need to indicate to every one who would like to impose his cause on us that he is concerned only

with himself, not with us, only with his welfare, not with ours. Only glance at the others. Do truth, freedom, humanity, justice long for anything else than that you should become enthusiastic over them and serve them?"

Abstractions are used by the selfish to deceive the weak. In his opposition, therefore, to all the parties and factions of his time, Stirner calls on men not to accept any abstraction, not to leave their cause out of their own hands:

"God and mankind have not trusted their cause to anything but themselves. Let me also put my cause on nothing but myself. . . . The divine is God's cause, the human the cause of men. My cause is neither divine, nor human, is neither the true, the good, the right, the free, etc., but only mine, and it is not a general cause, but is unique as I am unique. For me nothing stands higher than myself. . . . What do I care for the general welfare? The general welfare as such is not my affair, but the extreme height of self-denial. . . .

"How can I be my own if my capacities can only develop 'so far as they do not disturb the harmony of Society?' [Weitling.]

"As long as a single institution still exists which the individual cannot dissolve, my individuality and my possession of myself are still far away."

Stirner's objection to the abstract goal of communism—social solidarity, or "the good of all," he expresses in the following question: "Have all one and the same good? Is it well with all in one and the same way? If this is so, then we are speaking of 'the true good.' Do we not in this way come to the same point where religion [which is anathema to Stirner] begins its domination?" In other words, even "the good of all" is an abstraction which can only become an acceptable reality when it is

interpreted differently by each and every individual.

Stirner, in a word, objects to any *conclusive* generalization whatever, and his views are like those of the modern scientists and pragmatists who believe that science and philosophy exist only to render concrete service to men, and not for the purpose of directing them. We need accept no generalizations as in any way authoritative. At most, they may further the growing control of the science over nature, and stimulate the thinking and imagination of men.

It might be supposed at first that the concept "freedom" would satisfy Stirner's very destructive criticism. But even this abstraction is not excepted from his attack:

"Free from what? The yoke of serfdom, the overlordship of aristocracy and princes, the domination of the desires and passions; yes, even the domination of one's own will, of one's will to be oneself, the fullest self-abnegation, is nothing but freedom; freedom, that is, from self-determination, from one's own self, and the striving for freedom as for something absolute, worth any price. This put an end to our individuality, this created self-denial. . . . The striving for freedom turned in every period into the longing for some certain form of freedom, for example, freedom of belief, that is, the believing man wanted to become free and independent. From what? From belief? No! But from the inquisitors of belief. So now political or civil freedom. The citizen wishes to be free not from citizenship, but from officialdom; the arbitrariness of princes and the like. . . .

"The striving for a certain kind of freedom always directs attention to a new kind of domination, just as the Revolution could show its defenders that it could give the elevated feeling that it was fighting for freedom, while in truth it was fighting for a certain limited

freedom, which took its point of departure from a new domination, 'the reign of law.'

"You all of you want freedom; freedom wants you. Why then do you bargain for more or less? Freedom can only be complete freedom; a piece of freedom is not freedom. You doubt if complete freedom, the freedom from everything, is to be won; yes, you hold it for madness even to wish it. Well, stop hunting after the phantom then and spend your strength on something better than—the unattainable."

Here we see Stirner ready completely to abandon the concept of freedom itself—though he rather leaves it than rejects it, for freedom is the negative term corresponding to positive self expression:

"Who is to be free? You, I, we. Free from what? Answer, from everything which is not you, I, we. So I am the seed which is to be freed from all wrappings, from all narrowing shells. What remains over when I am freed from everything that is not I? Only I and nothing but I. To this I, even freedom has nothing to offer. What shall further happen after I am free? On this question freedom is silent, just as our governments let out prisoners after the time of their sentence has passed, and shove them out into destitution."

It is only when we come to analyze Stirner's position toward society and its individual members, however, that we see the full value of his philosophy. Useful as his thinking is as an expression of modern pragmatism in science and philosophy, it is far more useful in clarifying the conception which must lie at the base of sociology and ethics. Stirner, like Nietzsche, though an extreme individualist, is a moral philosopher. Far from denying the importance of the relations between individuals and the institutions and culture they have erected through coöperation and struggle, it is with these rela-

tions rather than with individual types as such that Stirner is chiefly concerned.

The most radical of all individualists, Stirner is undoubtedly the least tainted with the commercial individualism of free competition and private property, or with any of the philosophy, economics, or politics of the ruling class. His opposition to "State Socialism" is accordingly more thorough and profound than that of any other generally known social philosopher.

Stirner rejects the concept "society" as a basis for sociology, for the same reason that he rejects "social duty" as a basis for ethics:

"That society is not an entity that can give, lend or guarantee, but an instrument or means from which we can get a certain use, that we have no social duties but only social interests in the pursuits of which society must serve us, that we owe society no sacrifice, but if we are to sacrifice anything, we must sacrifice it to ourselves; of all this the social reformers and Socialists do not think, because they—as Liberals—are caught in the religious principle, and are zealously looking for a holy society, just as the state was formerly a holy state."

"If the community is in need of a man, and if he finds his aims furthered through it, then it very soon prescribes its laws to him, because it has become his principle, namely, the laws of society. The principle of men soon raises itself to a sovereign power over them, becomes their highest nature, their God, and as such their legislator. Communism gives to this principle its furthest application, and Christianity is the religion of society, for love is, as Feuerbach truly says, although he did not intend it, the nature of men, that is, the nature of society or of social (that is communistic) men."

Stirner is here discussing not so much the institutions of communism as its teachings. What he is attacking is

the principle of love, as the bond that is supposed to hold society together, as opposed to enlightened self-interest.

Stirner regards society, which in the French and German manner he often refers to as the state, as being a machine:

"Through the state, too, nothing takes place in common, any more than one could say that a fabric is the common work of all the individual parts of the machine; it is rather the work of the whole machine as a unit, its machine work. In the same way, everything happens through the state machine, since it moves the wheels of the individual minds, of which not a single one follows his own impulses."

The product of a machine is naturally something artificial, something made by the machine rather than a result of natural growth.

"The state tends to make something out of men; therefore there live in it only made men; everyone who wants to be himself is its enemy and is nothing. 'He is nothing' is as much as to say, the state does not use him, leaves to him no position, no office, no occupation, etc."

Stirner by no means denies the possibility that all men may become mere parts of the social machine, but he believes that in the process they would lose all their more important and valuable qualities as men.

As opposed to such a society or "state," Stirner advocates a free type of social organization, which he calls a union:

"Our societies and states exist without our making them; they are unified but they are not our union; they are predestined, and have a particular independent existence of their own; they are against us egoists, an indissoluble entity. . . . The independent existence of the state demands my dependence, its natural develop-

ment, its organization demands that my nature shall not develop freely, but shall be cut to fit it; in order that it shall develop itself naturally, it lays on me the shears of 'culture,' and gives me a training and education suited to it, not to me, and teaches me, for example, to respect laws, to abstain from the infringement of state property (that is, private property), to honor highnesses, divine and earthly, etc. . . .

"The nature of culture and education consists in that which the state is able to give me; it educates me to become a serviceable tool, a serviceable member of society."

Stirner is rather a social philosopher than a political scientist or political economist, but he also gives in a general way the economic principle that he would have guide the free unions of the future, and it is a thoroughly Socialistic one. The organization is to proceed on the basis of the needs of the individual rather than on that of the needs of society. Those who eat bread are to organize a bakers' association, and to come to terms with the bakers, etc.:

"To have bread is my affair, my wish and my need, and yet the matter is left in the hands of bakers."

Here is a principle apparently diametrically opposed to that of the "State Socialists," who wish the state to organize production, or to those syndicalist Socialists who wish to leave the organization of production to the individuals in each industry. There need be no conflict with the latter, however, as some form of organization of producers would certainly follow in any freely organized society, even if the point of departure were the organization of consumers, as Stirner proposes, and the organization of producers followed as a necessary consequence from the first.

Stirner is so thorough in his opposition to the view

that regards society as god, or as an absolute sovereign, that he even rejects mere revolution as being insufficient, on the ground that it merely aims to constitute a new society. Instead of revolution, he advocates the spirit of revolt:

“Revolutions and revolts cannot be viewed as equivalent. The former consists in a reversal of condition, of the existing condition or status, of the state of society, and is therefore a political or social action; the latter has, indeed, a transformation of conditions as its unavoidable result, but it does not take its departure from this, but from the dissatisfaction of men with themselves. It is not a raising of a banner, but the raising of individuals, an uprising without regard to institutions which spring out of it. The revolution aims at new institutions, the revolt leads us to the point of not allowing anything to be instituted any longer, but of instituting ourselves, and sets no very great hope on institutions.”

Though Stirner sets no very great hope on institutions, he does attach some value to them, which is admitted in his statement that political and social changes must follow from revolt. It is evident that he does not deny the importance of institutions, but merely objects to their being considered as basic. They are never to take precedence over the individual:

“As long as a single institution continues to exist which the individual does not dare to dissolve, my individuality and my possession of myself are still far off.”

Stirner is as much opposed to instituting a religion of the human race as he is to instituting a religion of society. He even objects to the saying of Feuerbach: “The highest thing to men is Man.” For here the abstract “Man,” with its various philosophical interpretations,

may become a new means of establishing outside authority over individuals:

"Who does the Liberal look upon as his equal? Man! Only be man—and that you certainly are—and the Liberal calls you his brother. He asks very little as to your private opinions and private stupidities if he can only catch sight of the man in you.

"As he gives very little heed, however, to what you privately are, and indeed, in the strict logic of his principle gives no importance whatever to this, he sees in you not yourself but the race, not Hans nor Kunz, but the man, not the real individual one, but your nature or your concept; not the possessor of the body, but the soul.

"As Hans you would not be equal, because he is Kunz, and so not Hans; as man you are the same as he is. And as you are as good as non-existent for him as Hans, that is, so far as he is liberal and not an unconscious egoist, he has evidently taken brotherly love very lightly; he does not love Hans in you, of which he knows nothing, and he will hear of nothing but the man."

Far from viewing the individual as belonging in any sense to the race, Stirner claims that the race belongs to the individual. He contrasts this new view with the opposite Christian outlook:

"That the individual is a world history for himself and possesses the rest of the world's history as his property, this passes beyond Christianity. To the Christians (Stirner takes the Christian as the type of all thinkers before him) the history of the world is the higher because it is the history of Christ or of man; to the egoist only his history has any value because he only wishes to develop himself, not the idea of mankind, not the plan of God, not the intentions of Providence, not freedom, etc. He does not see himself as a tool of the idea, or as a vessel of God, he recognizes no calling, he does not cherish the illusion that he exists

for the further development of mankind, and that he must contribute his mite to it, but he lives himself out, untroubled about the question whether mankind is thereby faring well or badly."

It is evident that such a radical conception of society and of the individual's relation toward it necessitates an entirely new conception of the individual and of morality, and this new conception might be called the constructive side of Stirner's work. He starts out with Rousseau's principle, that the natural instincts and impulses of the individual are in no way anti-social, even though they ignore all the conscious formulations of "social laws" that he is told he must follow. Stirner contrasts this view of men's impulses with the opposite and traditional opinion by portraying the answer that is given by the ordinary and "super-socialized" individual when asked what he is:

"What am I? So every one of you asks himself. A gulf of unregulated and lawless impulses, instincts, desires, wishes, passions, a chaos without light or guiding star! How shall I give a right answer if I only ask myself without reference to the commands of God or to the duties which morality prescribes, without reference to the voices of reason which in the course of history and of the bitter experiences of the best and wisest have been raised to law? My passions would forthwith give me the maddest advice."

Stirner then replies to this supposed confession:

"So each one regards himself then as—a devil—for in so far as he is not troubled with religion he regards himself only as an animal. He would easily find that the animal, which only follows its instincts, which are similar to its reason, does not counsel and impel itself to the maddest actions, but takes very correct steps."

But while Stirner justifies the instincts, desires, wishes, and passions, as against "morality," "reason," and so forth, and does not find that the so-called lower impulses lead to erroneous conduct, neither does he wish to have human beings held together by love, even though it is to be regarded as merely a higher and more complex development of the lower social instincts. For love, having been conceived and recommended to mankind as a duty, has *become* an abstraction:

"I would prefer to rely upon the selfishness of men rather than on their 'loving service,' their kindness, pity, and so forth. The former demands mutuality (as you from me and I from you), does nothing for nothing, and lets itself be won and—bought. But with what do I purchase loving service? It happens only occasionally that I have to do with a loving one. The service of love allows itself only to be of help to my misery, my—suffering. What can I offer the other for his help? Nothing. I must receive it as a gift. Love is not purchasable, or rather love can be bought but only through mutual love. ('One good turn deserves another.')

The attitude of the normal individual or enlightened egoist toward another is not that of "brotherly love."

"It is true that it makes my joy and happiness to live in his joy and happiness. But myself I do not sacrifice to him. On the contrary, I remain an egoist and—enjoy him. . . .

"If I see the loved one suffer, I suffer with him and have no peace until I have tried everything to console and cheer him; if I see him glad, then I am glad on account of his happiness. It does not follow from this that the same causes bring about suffering or joy in me which call forth these effects in him."

Stirner proposes, instead of the command, "Love one another," the command, "Use one another." We are

not to have the same feeling toward all individuals, because all are not only different, but so different that they are actually incommensurable. It is not true that individuals are unequal, for they are altogether more dissimilar than that would imply—since there is no common measure which can be applied to all or even to any two persons. Thus the highest and most fruitful relation between any two individuals is something which can never be put down in general terms. What is “moral” varies with each individual, and as a system morality disappears entirely. Human relationships and behavior from this point of view become more important than ever. But ethics and morality in the ordinary sense disappear—unless we want to retain these old expressions for an absolutely new thing:

“I am a man and you are a man, but ‘man’ is only a thought, a generality; neither I nor you are expressible; we are inexpressible because only thoughts can be expressed and they consist in expression.

“Let us therefore center our attention not on the common, but on the particular. Let us not seek the most extended community, ‘human society,’ but let us seek in others only the means and organs which we use as our own property. Just as we do not see our equals in trees and animals, so the presupposition that others are like us is hypocrisy. No one is my kind, but I regard him, like all other creatures, as my property. Against this I am told that I should be a man among my fellow men, that I should respect in them the fellow man. Nobody is for me a person to be respected, not even the fellow man, but every one is like all other creatures, an object in which I have or have not a share, an interesting or an uninteresting object, a useful or a useless subject.

“And if I can use him, I come to an understanding and unite with him, in order to increase my strength in the union, and through our common power to perform

more than single individuals could accomplish. In this community, I see nothing else than a multiplication of my strength, and only so long as it multiplies my strength do I hold to it. But then it is merely a [free] union.

"Neither a natural nor a spiritual bond holds the union together, and it is not natural or spiritual association; not a common blood, not a common belief, brings it together, and it is no natural or spiritual association; in a stock, a nation, or mankind individuals have value only as an example of the same species or race; in the spiritual union, like a community or church, the individual means only a member of the same spirit. What in both cases you are as an individual, that must be suppressed. As an individual you could only affirm yourself in a free union because the union does not possess you, but you possess it, or put it to your uses."

Stirner proposes to replace the old command, "Know thyself," by the new one, "Price thyself," or "Give thyself thy value." He proposes that everyone should regard himself only as his own property, to be used up, and that one should behave toward this property as one's own:

"I enjoy myself according to my pleasure. I am not anxious about life, but spend it."

Here we have the pragmatic psychology carried to its last conclusion. The individual is to use the world, to use life, and even to use—himself:

"From now on the question is not how man can earn his life, but how he can spend it, enjoy it; not how one can find the true self, but how one has to solve oneself, in order to live oneself out."

The individual of Stirner not only relies upon his instincts and intuitions, but views the whole universe from that individualist standpoint: "Everything sacred

is a bond, a chain." Indeed, the fact that a certain institution or idea is regarded as holy gives the egoist a key to his attitude towards it:

"Just because you regard something as holy, so I turn my scorn on you, and even if I respected everything in you, your holiness I do not respect."

In other words, Stirner is fighting against the effort of one man to make another bow down to him, on whatever pretext. He objects even to regarding any given division of labor as *necessary*, though it may be useful in so far as the individual finds it not too costly. He protests against the individual becoming, as it were, part and parcel of any institution. He may join it and participate in it, but he does not belong to it: "The individual will not stand being regarded as a mere part, a part of society, because he is more. His individuality rejects, excludes this limited conception."

Stirner does not conceive the free individual, however, as being merely passive and seeking to escape the evils of the past. On the contrary, he objects to the very idea of emancipation or liberation. Liberty cannot be given to the true egoist. He does not seek emancipation, but frees himself by living his own life and refusing to live that imposed on him by others. His principle is the pragmatic one: "What I need I must have, and I will create for myself." So Stirner advises him:

"Cast about and take what you need! With this the war of all against all is declared. I alone decide what I must have."

Stirner imagines the objector replying to this:

"Why that is certainly no new wisdom, for all self-seekers have thought that in all times."

To this he answers :

"Only when I expect neither from individuals nor from the whole what I can give myself, only then do I escape from the bonds of love; the mob ceases to be a mob, only when it takes hold. Only the fear of taking hold and of the corresponding punishment makes it a mob. . . .

"If men succeed in losing respect for property, then every one will have property, as all slaves become free men as soon as they no longer regard masters as masters.

"All efforts of the mob after happiness and all fraternising of swans must fail, for they spring out of the principle of love. Only from the principle of egoism can the mob get aid, and it must give this aid to itself, and will give it to itself. If it does not allow itself to be forced by fear, then it is a power. . . .

"In a word, the property question cannot be solved so kindly as the Socialists, and even the communists, dream. It can only be solved by the war of all against all. The poor will only become free and property owners if they revolt, rise up. Give them ever so much, they will always want more; for they will want nothing less than that they shall be given nothing more."

If Stirner insists on speaking of a war of all against all and recommends this as the only solution of the social problem, he insists still more strongly that not a single individual should be willing to remain in a position where he is forced to accept anything as a gift. And in this he is as far as possible from Nietzsche, who applies his egoistic principles to the few only.

Stirner preaches his egoism as a "social" philosophy. It is addressed to individuals, but it is to become the guiding principle of *all* individuals, or of as many as may be, and so is to be the basis of the new society. And this social philosophy, when analyzed, becomes iden-

tical with that of the pragmatists and Socialists. With both *men and women* are made the center of all striving and thinking, whether in religion, philosophy, science, history or sociology.

VIII

THE SOCIALIST VIEW OF MORALITY

NAPOLEON wanted the State to "supervise moral and political opinions." The day for such direct State control of thought and speech, if it was ever possible, has passed. But the desire of rulers for an indirect or moral control is the explanation of all our ethical codes and systems. If the ruling classes, through their statesmen, universities, editors, and writers, can center public attention on futile social and moral theories, they can bring about this control negatively. For example, in so far as they succeed in polarizing public discussion around a supposed opposition between "society" and "the individual," they distract attention from real issues. And it is just this abstract issue which lies at the root of the so-called "social" ethics which is the morality corresponding to "State Socialism" in politics, to the conception of society as God in sociology, and to the religion of evolutionism in philosophy and science.

When Marx formulated the basis of Socialist morality he avoided both the abstraction, "society," and the abstraction, "the individual," and pointed out that social emancipation will not be accomplished "until the real individual man discards the abstract citizen of the state and realizes that he, as an individual, in his actual life, his individual work, his individual relations, is a generic being."

Men are to realize that they are related to society and

the race, but they are to realize this great basic truth *as individuals*. This is far from regarding men as mere parts of a whole, mere members of society or the race. Instead of looking upon society as basic or supreme, Marx takes his point of departure from the individual, and asks him to become conscious of *himself* in his social and racial relations.

Since the general acceptance of the evolutionary and organic theories of society, another new view of ethics, in no necessary contradiction with the "social" theory, has been current. If we are told that the moral problems of the individual are all subordinated to the problems of society, i. e., that all ethics are social, we are told with equal frequency that to each period of social evolution and each set of geographical or economic conditions will necessarily correspond a different moral code, i. e., that all ethics are "relative."

But if ethics are relative to societies, they are equally relative to individuals, and, as no general or social code can take into account the profound differences of individuals, this can mean only that no *general code* is justifiable. This implies a revolution in morality so profound that we are unable to grasp more than the smallest part of its effects. For it practically sweeps away all previous moral philosophy.

The relativity of ethics to changing social conditions, on the one hand, and to individuals, on the other, leads us to an interpretation of human actions the direct opposite of that which has been taught to us by all the ethical systems of the past and of the present day. The question is: Does this radical *relativity* give us the last word in ethics; does it promise to satisfy the requirements of a Socialist society?

Boas, paraphrasing Westermarck, shows how even murder must be regarded in this radically *relative* light:

"The person who slays an enemy in revenge for wrongs done, a youth who kills his father before he gets decrepit in order to enable him to continue a vigorous life in the world to come, a father who kills his child as a sacrifice for the welfare of his people, act from such entirely different motives, that psychologically a comparison of their activities does not seem permissible. It would seem much more proper to compare the murder of an enemy in revenge with destruction of his property for the same purpose, or to compare the sacrifice of a child on behalf of the tribe with any other action performed on account of strong altruistic motives, than to base our comparison on the common concept of murder." (Westermarck.)¹

But this wholly relative view of ethics, which is now accepted by most scientists, historians, and philosophers, is by no means that demanded by the most modern philosophy of all, pragmatism. We are here treading on very similar ground to that which we went over in treating of the interpretation of history or of the evolution theory. The relative moralists forget the limitations of morality itself, due to the fact that it deals primarily with individuals and individuals' motives of conduct. In explaining and weighing individual *motives*, everything that the relative school of ethics claims is justified. But there is no reason why, in the course of our analysis, we should stop at this point. The motive of the individual, it is true, is to be explained only as these scientific moralists explain it. The social and economic system accounts for the moral code. But this does not prevent us from seeing that, *from the point in social evolution which we have now attained*, a moral code may itself be judged as morally superior or inferior, together with the social system and the corresponding types, with which it forms a single whole. We may say, then, *from the*

standpoint of our time (and as creatures of our time, we can have no other standpoint) that a given system of ethics under given conditions may be bad, and that its effect on the individual and society may be bad.

In other words, we may judge the moral value of a code of morals by its evil effects on societies and individuals. The mere fact that this code has in turn a further explanation, which aids us to understand it, does not prevent us from so judging it. We gain nothing by trying to take an eternal view of the problems of all societies. We gain everything by firmly placing ourselves at the point of view of our own times, or as far ahead of our times as we can see without mere speculation. We can understand the relation of our times to others without forgetting that it is *our* business to maintain and defend *our* outlook and to look at everything from the point of view of our own problems—after we have made our own problems as broad and our view as far-sighted as we are capable of doing.

From the pragmatic and Socialist standpoint morality can be neither wholly absolute nor wholly relative. Moral generalizations, like all others, are relative to time, place and human beings. But to a given human being or group of human beings at a given time and place a moral decision may be all but absolute.

And, moreover, we must apply the widest and broadest moral standards we have attained to—as far as the different social and economic conditions and individual capacities allow—to other societies and other times than our own.

At least we must go as far toward an absolute ethics as the zoölogists and ethnologists of our time, who are teaching us that primitive races and even animals are guided to some extent by social instincts. Kautsky argues that “what is specifically human in morality (as dis-

tinct from the social instinct which we share with animals), the moral codes, is subject to conditional change." ² But he also says that "only the lack of these social impulses and virtues which man has inherited from the social animals is to be regarded as absolute immorality." ³

To Kautsky the absence of consciousness in an action seems to imply an inferior degree of morality or immorality. It is certainly true that the lack of a complicated state of society among even primitive communities, and the corresponding absence of clearly conscious moral ideas, means a lesser moral as well as a lesser intellectual development. But if the morality involved in the *social impulse* is not so highly developed as *conscious* morality is, it is deeper and more nearly involves the whole personality. While an inability to grasp subtle and complex moral truths implies only crudity or simplicity or perversion in the deficient individual, provided he has been properly educated, the lack of social instincts indicates nothing less than inherent moral backwardness. The individual whose *unconscious* morality only is sound may not have risen above the animal, but he whose morality is wholly *conscious* or taught, and who is lacking in the animal instincts, both social and egoistic, would be as far removed from the essentially human as animals themselves—though on the other side. As long as moral impulses and moral ideas are not in harmony, something is wrong. Either man has not risen above the animal, or he has lost those moral virtues which even the animals possess.

Kautsky objects to the position of those who declare that morality is wholly relative, on two grounds: first, because the moral instinct which we inherit from the animals and savages is an absolutely indispensable part of human nature, and, second, because moral tenets,

which are derived in part from these instincts and in part from economic and social conditions of a given stage of society, also have a high degree of permanence. Morals are not to be judged as relative exclusively to the stage of social development, or as relative exclusively to individuals. For Kautsky, like most other Socialists, insists that "despite all social differences, the main outlines of class rule in human society have always been the same."⁴ The moral ideals of all historic periods and countries have partaken, in varying degrees, of the same wrong. Kautsky admits that there is no moral law independent of time and place. But all through the written history of mankind certain problems have continued the same, and the same moral ideals have been the result.

The tendency to look upon ethics as so wholly relative as to lead to a non-moral view of history has become almost universal among the educated, and has even led some Socialists into accepting a doctrine which would wholly undermine their position. The Socialist view may be that of Kautsky, that the present moral code is similar in some respects to that of all the historical civilizations, even those of thousands of years ago, only because there has always been *class rule*. But to recognize no common moral principle at all that can be applied to both past and present would be to remove the bond of human sympathy that alone gives history any value. It is one thing to take a non-partizan view, it is quite another to take a non-human one; and to live without moral feeling is to live without human feeling.

It might seem that the "evolutionary" justification of the past, so common to-day, arises not out of too little but out of too great sympathy. Formerly we were unable to see the surrounding and underlying causes that now help us to understand war, slavery, feudalism, and despotism. And now that we understand these earlier

stages of society better it might be concluded that our feeling toward them has become more deeply sympathetic than it was. But if, in our new understanding of conditions, we go so far as actually to justify without discrimination, then our attitude is no better than the old one of indiscriminate blame. For we are now inclined to forgive the most profound and essential weakness of earlier times.

But the chief assumption of the ethical culturists and other typically advanced "social" moralists of our time, that the human race is to be conceived as God, is the reverse of relative. For, while all actions are valued relatively to the supposedly firmly established laws of *social* evolution, John Stuart Mill's principle, which demanded that ethics should be relative to the development of every *individual*, is entirely disregarded.

It is assumed very simply that, since society is more important than the single individual, it is also more important than all individuals, and that all individual problems can be disposed of by taking the social standpoint. But, according to a profounder social philosophy, society also needs every individual, and every individual if well developed should have something new and distinct to contribute to society. And in order to give the best service to society the individual must develop himself, for every individual differs so profoundly from every other that not even all society can solve his problems.

Indeed the difficulties of this new *social* simplification of all the problems of life are as insuperable as were those of *altruism*. If "the welfare of society," or "the evolution of humanity" is to guide us, who is to say what society or humanity really require? Evidently some persons will develop a greater capacity and a greater authority in this matter than any others, and if the new "sociocratic" moral code is accepted they will be its

priests. And is there sufficient ground for supposing that they will be altogether different from the priests who have guided the theocratic oligarchies of the past? Moreover, is it not inevitable that a great number of individuals will always have advanced beyond society as a whole so that society will have more to learn from their ethical code than they from the code of society? And if we cannot foresee the great and inspiring creative works of individual genius, how can we expect to lay down rules for the far greater creative work of general human progress?

Sociocratic ethics have usually been rejected by Socialists. Kautsky shows that this social principle, far from being advanced, was the one followed by primitive men in their hard and fast morality of custom, and even by animals. Kautsky reasons that since the social impulse upon which such morality is based is instinctive and not intelligent it may lead to an excessive obedience as well as a desirable devotion to the common interest—"the moral law in us could lead our intellect astray just as any other impulse (could); in itself it is neither a product of wisdom nor does it produce wisdom."⁵ He points out that impulses are not necessarily to be followed simply because they are natural, since even the most natural and social impulses interfere with one another, and he will not allow the unconscious social impulse to become automatically a conscious and absolute moral law.

The German Socialist writers, like Kautsky, oppose the sociocratic view, but the general opinion of the day is clearly developing along sociocratic lines, and includes many so-called Socialists. J. R. MacDonald, for instance, represents a view very widespread among English Socialists when in his "Socialism and Government" he practically inverts the proposition of Kant, that the in-

dividual is not a means but an end and says that "in the eyes of the state the individual is but a means to that far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."⁶ If the individual is a means here is a fine opportunity for a new sociocratic priesthood to tell us what the far-off goal of humanity is and to apply it to the individual whether he likes it or not. And already this tendency is rapidly developing. "The state does not concern itself primarily with man as a possessor of rights," says MacDonald, "but with man as a doer of duties."⁷ And he makes himself perfectly explicit when he says that even the franchise should only be granted for purposes of state, an old teaching of the "benevolent despotisms" of the eighteenth century.

Another widespread idea which shows the popularity of sociocracy is the use of "efficiency" as a standard of morals. The general idea seems to be that while altruism or some other idealistic principle may hold in some matters "efficiency" should be supreme in others. But Professors Dewey and Tufts point out that the word "efficiency," on the whole, means nothing less than "personal success, wealth, power obtained in competitive victory."⁸ It is not an ideal of what ought to be at all, but merely an idealization of what is.

Sociocratic ethics is the moral system of "State Socialism." Instead of demanding greater scope for the individual it urges more coercive laws. But the best opinion of the age as well as that of the Socialists is that laws are already too coercive. Dewey and Tufts, for example, urge that *compulsory* legislation should limit itself to protective measures, to the establishment of standards below which it will not allow the anti-social individual to fall, that the purpose of such laws should not be to advance society, which should be left entirely to the free will of the individual, but merely to protect it:

"If the vice of the criminal and of the coarsely selfish man is to disturb the aims and the good of others; if the vice of the ordinary egoist, and of every man, upon his egoistic side, is to neglect the interests of others; the vice of the social leader, of the reformer, of the philanthropist and the specialist in every worthy cause of science, of art, of politics is to seek ends which promote the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the active interest and co-operation of others. The conception of conferring the good upon others, or at least of attaining it for them, which is our inheritance from the aristocratic civilizations of the past, is so deeply embodied in religious, political and charitable institutions and in moral teachings, that it dies hard. Many a man, feeling himself justified by the social character of his ultimate aim (it may be economic, or educational, or political), is genuinely confused or exasperated by the increasing antagonism and resentment which he evokes because he has not enlisted in his pursuit of the 'common' end the freely co-operative activities of others. This co-operation must be the root principle of the morals of democracy. It must be, however, confessed that it has as yet made little progress." ⁹

If "moral democracy" demands free coöperation and the minimum of coercive legislation, social democracy is still more insistent in this demand. The ethics of social democracy do not teach, like the ethics of "State Socialism" or sociocracy, that individuals are mere parts of one greater whole, or that society is held together by a merely mechanical solidarity. They hold rather, with that very spiritual statement attributed to Christ, that "we are all members of one body *and of one another.*" If we are merely parts of a whole then indeed our functions must be merely to submit to the higher authority. But if we are equally parts of one another there can be no higher authority than ourselves.

We are not interrelated merely as separate cogs of a great machine or as the separate cells and organs of the body. We are organically united in an even deeper sense, for our personalities are actually created and molded by others and by the humanity of the past, while we find our only possible expression by extending our own influence in the same way. We are bound together in an infinitely more intimate and at the same time an infinitely freer way than merely by the subdivision of labor.

Maeterlinck, a firm believer in a free society, quotes the sociocrat as saying to the democrat :

"Do not believe that the multitude is right, that a lie stated by a hundred mouths ceases to be a lie, that an error proclaimed by a band of blind men becomes a truth which nature will sanction. Do not believe either that by setting yourselves to the number of ten thousand who do not know against one who knows, you will come to anything, or that you will compel the humblest of the eternal laws to follow you, to abandon him who recognized it. No, the law will remain in its place, with the wise man who discovered it, and so much the worse for you if you go away without accepting it! You will one day come across it on your road, and all that you have done while you thought that you were avoiding it will turn and rise up against you!"

For the democrat Maeterlinck replies :

"Such words as these, addressed to the crowd, are very true; but it is not less true that all this becomes efficacious only after it has been experienced and lived through. In those problems in which all life's enigmas converge, the crowd which is wrong is almost always justified as against the wise man who is right. It refuses to believe him on his word. It feels dimly that behind the most evident abstract truths there are numberless living truths

which no brain can foresee, for they need time, reality and men's passions to develop their work. That is why, whatever warning we may give it, the crowd insists before all that the experiment shall be tried. Can we say that in cases where the crowd has obtained the experiment it was wrong to insist upon it?"¹⁰

Maeterlinck concludes that democracy would be justified "even if it had done no more than to create, as in America and France, that sense of real equality which is there breathed as a more human and purer atmosphere and which seems new and almost prodigious to those who come from elsewhere." No amount of wisdom is justified if it proposes, as sociocracy does, to substitute itself in any way for actual living or the free development of the individual according to his own ideas and desires. If wisdom can reach the individual, can save him any waste of life in needless and costly experiments, then it is well, but he gains nothing from coercion from above, even at the hands of the wisest and most benevolent of "supermen."

Socialism objects to the separation of the individual and society even for the purpose of discussion—unless under the most thorough precautions. The individual implies society, and society implies the individual. Both may indeed be considered as parts of a larger whole, humanity; but even in speaking of humanity we must remember that this new generalization is merely a convenience of speech. Stirner warned us more than half a century ago against giving any reality to our generalizations no matter how broad they may be, and the pragmatism of to-day would insist that the generalization, "humanity," like all others, has *more or less* validity according to how it is used.

As H. G. Wells says: "We cannot put Humanity into a museum or dry it for examination; our one single still

living specimen is all history, all anthropology, and the fluctuating world of men. There is no satisfactory means of dividing it and nothing else in the real world with which to compare it. We have only the remotest ideas of its 'life cycle' and a few relics of its origin and dreams of its destiny." ¹¹ The use of the phrase "fluctuating world of men" shows that Wells is not subordinating the word Humanity to the visible reality on which his eyes are fixed. And this habit of actual vision is the scientific attitude, which alone gives us any realistic view of social and moral problems.

The pedantic division of life between the "individual" and "society" or "humanity" is no mere accident or natural error of the mind. It is a result of the radical division of society into the two classes, the rulers and the ruled, the former well-to-do, educated and in the possession of practically all of the political power, the latter comparatively poor, comparatively ignorant, and politically almost powerless. The highest philosophical and ethical authorities of the time, like Professors Dewey and Tufts, recognize this as clearly as do the Socialists themselves.

"Spiritual resources," they write, "are practically as much the possession of a special class, in spite of educational advance, as are material resources. This fact reacts upon the chief educative agencies—science, art and religion. Knowledge in its ideas, language, and appeals is forced into corners; it is over specialized, technical and esoteric because of its isolation. Its lack of intimate connection with social practice leads to an intense and elaborate over-training which increases its own remoteness. Only when science and philosophy are one with literature, the art of successful communication, and vivid intercourse are they liberal in effect." ¹²

A good illustration of the class character of "socio-

cratic" and "evolutionary" ethics is to be found in the writings of Professor William James, for example in his essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War." Taking the biological view that the characteristics of men are to a very large degree inherited, James says that the man of to-day inherits "all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors," and that "our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years won't breed it out of us." I have dealt with the fallacy that lies in this biological and social theory of the inheritance of traits which are visibly bred into individuals by their early training and social environment. James, however, uses this false assumption as the very foundation for proposed institutions which would practically amount to a reorganization of society in the form of "State Socialism."

James himself gives the true and widely different explanation of militarism in this same essay, that in the times when war was almost continuous, "a pure pugnacity and love of glory came to mingle with the more fundamental appetite for plunder."

"It was this more fundamental appetite for plunder," he continues, "which was confined in large measure to those classes which were in a position to plunder and to profit by it, that accounts for war, *and not any inherited traits whatever*. The conditions, as I have already shown, invited plunder, and the lack of any stable society permitted it. These conditions existed from generation to generation, and the same opportunities and temptations were open to the descendants as had been open to their ancestors.

"Every up-to-date dictionary should say that 'peace' and 'war' mean the same thing, now *in posse*, now *in actu*. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that, the battles

are only a sort of public verification of the military mastery gained during the 'peace' interval." (My italics.)

The so-called pugnacious instincts, love of glory, and so forth, are kept alive and even artificially revived and stimulated by the profits that are to be obtained from war. This explanation is purely economic and social, and in no way biological.

But let us note now what a complete State Socialist structure James erects on the assumption of an *inherited* pugnacity. He makes it the foundation for a theory of human nature which practically leads to nothing less than a military state. The very title to his essay, "A Moral *Equivalent* of War," shows that he is thoroughly conscious of the essentially military character of his proposed society, even though he wants war itself to be abolished: "War has been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and, until an equivalent discipline is organized, I believe that war will have its way." But, from the point of view of Socialism, military discipline is infinitely a greater evil than war itself, for it obviously means the knell of individual freedom.

James then proceeds to construct a society of the future, which is to be a kind of a benevolent God, taking care of the individual, *while preserving and strengthening class-rule*. Its psychological basis is shown in the following passages:

"All the qualities of a man acquire dignity when he knows that the service of the collectivity that *owns* him needs them. . . . In the more or less socialistic future toward which mankind seems to be drifting, we must still subject ourselves collectively to those severities that answer to our real position upon this only partly hospitable globe. . . . Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, sur-

render of private interest, *obedience to command*, must still remain the rock upon which conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against nature. . . . To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our *gilded youths* be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, *done their part* in the immemorial human warfare against nature." (James' "The Moral Equivalent of War"; my italics.)

James also quotes the arguments of H. G. Wells in favor of the order and discipline of military training: "Here, at least, a man is supposed to win a promotion by self-forgetfulness, and not by self-seeking." There is no doubt that loyalty to the military purpose, as against all other purposes of humanity, and all the infinite possibilities of individual self-expression and development, is inherent in militarism. But the very "self-forgetfulness" of militarism is its deepest evil. Cruelty and brutality are merely superficial defects; the annihilation of individual freedom and development, whether voluntary, as for most officers, or compulsory as for most privates, is its essential feature. The "universal military duty" that Wells and James favor is a return to the most primitive conception of customary or tribal morality and also to the absolute ethics implied in the "categorical imperative" of Kant. But there is no doubt that James here voices one of the most powerful tendencies of our time, and that something similar to universal conscription may prevail in the "State Socialist" society that lies between us and Socialism.

Our "evolutionary" and "social" moralists fully appreciate the differences between the ethics corresponding to the economic systems of various epochs, but not the differing ethics of the various economic classes that have hitherto existed within every epoch. They forget that there never has been any generally applicable social ethics, and cannot be to-day, for the simple reason that the divisions between the various social classes are too profound to allow them to be governed by a single code. Even class ethics fail to fit the individual, though in contrast to social ethics they have evolved into more or less consistent codes based on definite social policies—like that of the military organization just referred to.

The relativity of ethics to the individual is recognized by James when he says that there must be novelty in the ideal, and that ideals are relative to the lives that entertain them. In other words, ideals of conduct must have regard, both to the present conditions of the individual and to his past experience. Yet, in this same volume, James ignores the relativity of ethics to social classes, when he says that only the performance of good actions is to be taught, and not the non-performance of evil actions, and that the individual ought to guard himself from inferior temptations:

"It is clear that in general we ought, whenever we can, to employ the method of inhibition by substitution. He whose life is based on the word 'no,' who tells the truth because a lie is wicked, and who has constantly to grapple with his envious and cowardly and mean propensities, is in an inferior situation in every respect to what he would be if the love of truth and magnanimity positively possessed him from the outset, and he felt no *inferior temptations*." ¹³

This will become a truth of the utmost importance in a society without classes. But to-day such "inferior situ-

ations" are notoriously increased by poverty, disease, and other inferior *conditions*. James even admits that the ideal he has in mind is that of the "born gentleman." And so we find with nearly all the teachers of "social" and "evolutionary" morality.

The morality of Socialism is equally opposed to the moral system of individualistic capitalism and that of "State Socialism." Both are descended from a long chain of similar systems, and have usually existed side by side. Ethical individualism has existed throughout history in what Spencer calls the religion of enmity, became dominant in the idealization of free competition, was embodied in "science" after Darwin's "survival of the fittest" hypothesis, and reached its most general form in the theory of the complete relativity of ethics. The ethics of "State Socialism" were formulated at least as early as Plato's Republic, were repeated by Paul, Luther, Calvin, and all those for whom society and the existing social system were sacred, and reached their most general form in the absolute ethics of Kant. All altruism, in denying existing class lines, was simply "State Socialist" morality in a negative form. Where the two systems could conveniently be taught together the first was reserved for the upper classes, the second for the masses. Where a single system was demanded the "ethics of amity" were taught, but they bore with unequal weight on the two classes on account of the inequality of their conditions.

Socrates and the disciples through whom he has come to us may, perhaps, be taken as the originators of this accepted moral philosophy. Or, to speak more accurately, the age when mankind was first organizing the use of the Mediterranean as a natural means of communication and commerce marked the beginning of our present civilization, and therefore of our present morals,

A number of the pupils of Socrates, such as Alcibiades and Critias, were inspired by the same worldly motives which had governed the pupils of his predecessors, the Sophists. Such pupils had wanted "to become renowned in the city," and Plato adds that they came to Socrates to prepare them for that purpose. It has been generally admitted that the Sophists obeyed the wishes of these pupils and taught what was expected of them; it has not generally been seen that Socrates did the same thing. Both were governed largely by political motives. Plato was confessedly in complete opposition to the plutocratic element of Athenian society called the democracy, and in favor of the older land-owning aristocracy. But the day of commercial plutocracy had arrived for Athens, and the land-owning aristocracy could regain control, even for a moment, only by a very aggressive and constructive policy. Plato, with such an aristocratic policy in view, sought for either a benevolent despot or benevolent oligarchs, who alone could carry it out without concessions to the middle classes, and he finally succeeded in finding the despot in Dionysius, of Syracuse. Plato despised the greatest of Athenian statesmen, Themistocles and Pericles, as "mere servants of the city, supplying Athens with docks, harbors, walls, and such like follies, but making no provision for the *moral* improvement of the citizens." It was his function to supply this morality—of a kind to satisfy any far-sighted ambitious tyrant or oligarch.

When Socrates interpreted the precept inscribed in the temple of Delphos, "Know thyself," as meaning "Know what sort of a man thou art, and what are thy capacities in reference to human use," he provided a basis for an ethical system perhaps more modern than the best known teachings of the Old and New Testaments. "Well doing consisted," says Grote, of Socrates' ethics, "in doing

a thing well after having learned it and practiced it." "The best man and the most beloved by the Gods," says Socrates, "is he who as a husbandman performs well the duties of husbandry, as a surgeon, those of medical art, . . . in political life, his duty toward the commonwealth. But the man who does nothing well is never useful—nor agreeable to the gods." ¹⁴ Is this not an altogether more positive, instructive, and modern precept than those which are usually drawn from the prevailing religious teachings?

But Socrates' limitations were such as to make his teachings invaluable also for class purposes. For while he taught this thoroughly practical basis of ethics, at the same time he did superstition the enormous service of separating philosophy entirely from physical science. To be sure, ethics and physics had been entangled and both of them thereby confused, but Socrates went to the extreme of teaching that physics was an inscrutable and divine mystery to be understood only by the gods. In his hands, this revolutionary step did not do as much harm as it did later, since he still made man (physical and psychic) the center of the universe. But in Plato's handling this ignoring of the physical universe resulted in building up an absolute philosophy and an absolute ethics completely disconnected with the material world, and with time and place, i. e., with evolution. If he could overlook material change through this philosophy, he could easily overlook all change, for psychic evolution is less obvious. Now the result of such an absolute ethics is always a tendency toward theocracy or some kind of absolutism, either a society governed by priests or one governed by irresponsible philosophers and benevolent despots. For it is evident, if there is a wisdom which gives a key to the universe, which applies for all places and all times and to all men, that those few who are in

possession of this wisdom owe it as a duty to men to govern them with or without their consent.

Plato's prestige is due largely to the utility of most of his ideas to rulers. The Sophists had taught upper class youths how to succeed in *Athens* and under the conditions that prevailed there. Plato and his successors taught a universal art of plausible philosophical reasoning that has appealed to the most varied peoples under the most varied conditions. This philosophy was so subtle and so complex that any member of the ruling class mastering it could without difficulty adapt it to his purposes anywhere. Like the individualistic Protestant creeds of the last four centuries it lent itself easily to any and all uses, on account of the fact that it was not connected with any particular form of hierarchy in government or any particular form of church.

It might be said that *any* discipline would result in the advantage of the class that had first mastered it. This is true, and it is one of the facts on which class rule is based, but the philosophy of Plato and Socrates were peculiarly adapted to the purpose.

The Greek philosophers separated morality from life so as to be able to mould it more conveniently for the purposes of the ruling classes. Christian ethics served the ruling classes even better by teaching a social ethics that were addressed to all alike, and were inevitably more effective in making the weak weaker than in restraining those in power. The morality of Plato was in danger of being understood some day by the people; the morality of Paul, intended in the first place to make the people better slaves, was, on the contrary, all the more efficacious when the time came when it could reach them directly, through the printing press.

It might seem at first that no rational being unless under the influence of some anti-social theory could take

exception to Christ's command: "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Nor is anyone likely to question the truth that lies in that principle. But to Socialists it is not the whole truth, i. e., it is negatively false. The age in which this principle was first announced, whether the time of Christ, of the Prophet Hillel, or of Confucius, was one in which a large part of the population was occupied by primitive pastoral or agricultural pursuits, which meant that the overwhelming majority of the people were not yet thrown into those social classes the very existence of which contradicts such a principle. And since modern transportation had not developed, the questions, "Who is my neighbor?" or "How shall I love him as myself?" could not occur. The neighbor was he among the undifferentiated mass with which one had most to do, that is, he who lived nearest, and this individual's situation and needs were those of practically all other individuals, including oneself. In modern city life and in modern conditions generally, those with whom we have most to do, and with whom, by any standard of morals or common sense, we ought to have the most to do, are often by no means our neighbors; the types of individuals are infinitely more differentiated, and those who are our neighbors physically may really be the most remote from us, especially when members of the ruling class.

Every individual on whom we do bestow our sympathy, or what we formerly termed our "neighborliness" must be treated differently. The rule that we should love others as we do ourselves becomes in most cases wholly insufficient. Others' needs are not only different from our own, but so different that one of the first principles of ethics is that we should often respect them even when we are unable to sympathize with them.

Then the biblical saying implies that we love ourselves, and it follows that in order to do full justice to

others it is necessary that we should love ourselves. Yet altruism and devotion to the principle of indiscriminate brotherly love seems to make people almost selfless. How can such persons be in full sympathy with those who are driven or inspired in life by the deepest and most passionate desires?

If we are to stand for brotherly love, we must know in what sense we use the word "love." Stirner says:

"I love men, too, not only some, but all. But I love them with a consciousness of egoism; I love them because love makes *me* happy. I love because loving is natural to me, because it pleases me. I know no 'command of love.'"

Altruism translated into the political sphere and taught to the masses becomes the doctrine of submission, obedience, and servility to rulers. This doctrine was among the teachings of Paul (as I have noted); it was the foundation of the power of the organized church; it was strengthened rather than weakened by Luther and Calvin during the Reformation; it was held to by the great philosopher of the French Revolution, who taught that the citizen of his ideal state who preached against it should be punished by death, a teaching most influential during the Reign of Terror; and finally the same dogma reappeared almost intact, though in a slightly different form, in the teachings of the great German philosophers during the half century that followed the Revolution.

The philosopher who has the greatest influence on all the philosophy and ethics of our time, Emanuel Kant, was as anti-democratic as Plato or Paul or Luther or Calvin. According to his view, the people have the duty of standing even the most intolerable misuse of power

by the supreme authority. Kant actually forbids subjects to reason about the origin of the supreme power or to doubt its right to his obedience. His categorical imperative in the hands of the royalist philosophers of Germany was as useful to rulers as any religious dogma in the hands of ministers or priests.

Under the present system both altruistic and egoistic behavior are still indispensable. But neither is as profound a need as coöperation in building up a society in which neither shall be necessary. And it is certainly too late to erect either into a moral system.

"The chief advantage that would result from the establishment of Socialism," says Oscar Wilde, "is undoubtedly the fact that Socialism would relieve us from that sordid necessity of living for others which, in the present condition of things, presses so hardly upon almost everybody." Under present conditions altruism is often a desirable and indispensable virtue, but the conditions that necessitate altruism cramp and limit the development of man. Wilde points out that "it is much more easy to have sympathy with suffering than it is to have sympathy with thought."¹⁵ So that we find in our time a tremendous development of pity and a great readiness to protest against extreme outrages and cruelty, but only a very slight development or understanding of those inspired and creative spirits who would point the way in a new society where unnecessary suffering will disappear. The best men and women of the time have thus been forced to waste their strength, without much result as yet, in rebellion, and rebellion, however necessary, does not produce the highest types of man: "Most personalities have been obliged to be rebels. Half their strength has been wasted in friction." Byron and Shelley are Wilde's examples.

In the society of the future instead of asking people

to be alike, as every moral system tends to do, we will like them "because they are different." "The soul of man under Socialism" will look forward into the possibilities of future development instead of turning back to the past, and it will need no moral code: "For it will not worry itself about the past, nor care whether things happened or did not happen. Nor will it admit any laws but its own laws; nor any authority but its own authority. Yet it will love those who sought to intensify it, and speak often of them. And of these Christ was one." ¹⁵

In working toward a free society the individual does not secure as full self-development as he will when working in a free society. But in neither case does he either sacrifice himself for others (or for society) nor sacrifice others (or society) for himself.

Morality will some day consist not in refraining from doing this or that, nor even in doing positive acts in accord with moral precepts, but in doing one's work, and doing it well, with all such incidental life and activity as naturally grow out of it.

"To assume right functional relation to society," says Mrs. Gilman, "is to assume right functional relation to one another. Not charity, not philanthropy, not benevolence, not self-immolation or self-sacrifice or self anything; but simply to find and hold our proper place in the work in which and by which we live. To do one's right work involves all the virtues." ¹⁶

It is unquestionably the rule among Socialists to look at social and individual problems, whenever possible, in this wholly constructive spirit and to center discussion entirely around proposed social changes rather than mere negative judgments as to right and wrong.

Democracy means, according to Dewey and Tufts,

"the effective embodiment of the moral ideal" and "the development of all the social capacities of every individual member of society." From the pragmatic and Socialist standpoint there is and can be no separate science of ethics aside from the general movement of social progress. As Dewey said in a recent address :

"There is no separate body of moral rules ; no separate system of motive powers ; no separate subject-matter of moral knowledge, and hence no such thing as an isolated ethical science. If the business of morals is not to speculate upon man's final end and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man, his organic powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for the one separate moral motive, it is to concentrate all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, of education, economics and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot."

The problem of ethics involves the whole problem of social evolution, and it is therefore impossible to construct any general ethical system except on a basis so broad that omniscience would be required to give it any scientific validity :

"There is no separate body of moral rules ; no separate system of motive powers ; no separate subject matter of moral knowledge, and hence no such thing as an isolated ethical science."

Dewey reaches this conclusion by showing inductively the intimate relation of ethics with all other human problems. But he also deduces it from his pluralistic conception of the universe :

"The proper business of intelligence is discrimination of multiple and present goods and of the varied im-

mediate means of their realization; not search for the one remote aim. The progress of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside power presiding supremely but statically over the desires and efforts of man, but that it is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations. . . . Theory having learned what it cannot do, is made responsible for the better performance of *what needs to be done*, and what only a broadly equipped intelligence can do; to study the conditions out of which come the obstacles and the resources of adequate life, and to develop and test the ideas which, as working hypotheses, may be used to diminish the causes of evil and buttress and expand the sources of good. This program is indeed vague, but only unfamiliarity with it could lead one to the conclusion that it is less vague than the idea that there is a *single* moral ideal and a *single* moral motive force." (My italics.) ¹⁷

We must note in this passage the use of the plural in each case. Dewey speaks not of the general good, but of present *goods* adapted to specific *situations*, not of human nature, but of human nature under certain special *conditions*. Only that act has moral worth "which comes through holding powers concentrated upon a positive end." This positive end must always consist of some participation in the progress of humanity, so that the problem of the value of each individual act becomes the problem of its relation to social progress in general:

"Our conceptions of moral education have been too narrow, too formal, and too pathological. We have associated the term ethical with certain special acts which are labeled virtues and are set off from the mass of other acts, and are still more divorced from the habitual images and motives of the children performing them. Moral instruction is thus associated with teaching about

these particular virtues, or with instilling certain sentiments in regard to them. The moral has been conceived in too goody-goody a way. Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence—the power of observing and comprehending social situations—and social power—trained capacities of control—at work in the service of social interest and aims.”¹⁸

In adapting this radically relative view, Dewey by no means becomes an “evolutionary” fatalist and apologist for the ethical systems of the past and present, but points out that they have not even fitted the societies which have evolved them. All ethics since the beginning of written history have been class ethics. This fact is used by Dewey to show the impossibility of an abstract or universal ethical *system*, even of *temporary* validity:

“The most generously imaginative soul of all philosophy could not far outrun the institutional practices of his people and his times. This might have warned his successors of the danger of deserting the sober path of a critical discernment of the better and the worse within contemporary life for the more exciting adventure of a final determination of absolute good and evil. It might have taught the probability that some brute residuum or unrationalized social habit would be erected into an apotheosis of pure reason.”¹⁹

Not only have the ethical systems of the past been strictly limited by the interests of those who conceived them, but the same thing is true to-day:

“The conscious articulation of genuine modern tendencies has yet to come, and until it comes the ethic of our own life must remain undeveloped.”

Such an ethic Dewey says would be experimental, would not be a system, but simply a constant study of in-

dividual and social problems, in the light of human evolution, with a constant reformulation of conclusions as society progressed.

"A people perishes when it confounds its duty with the general concept of duty," says Nietzsche. "Nothing ruins more profoundly or more intrinsically than their impersonal duty or their sacrifice before the Moloch of abstraction. . . . I wonder that Kant's categorical imperative has not been felt as dangerous to *life*." Socialists, too, feel the danger of the exaltation of any moral code, even of the broadest and most philosophical, even the "evolutionary" criticism or the "social" code of to-day. They insist that morality rises out of and has its end in social progress; that it cannot be utilized or understood by those who are out of relation with the social activities and the social movement of the times.

"The general duty of a man, his existence being secured," says H. G. Wells, "is to educate and chiefly to educate and develop himself. It is his duty to live, to make all he can out of himself and life, to get full experience, to make himself fine and perceiving and expressive, to render his experience and perceptions honestly and helpfully to others. And in particular he has to educate himself and others with himself in Socialism. He has to make and keep this idea of synthetic human effort and of conscious constructive effort clear first to himself and then clear in the general mind.

"Correlated with one's own intellectual activity, part of it and growing out of it for almost everyone, is intellectual work with and upon others. By teaching we learn. Not to communicate one's thoughts to others, to keep one's thoughts to oneself as people say, is either cowardice or pride. It is a form of sin. It is a duty to talk, teach, explain, write, lecture, read and listen. Every truly religious man, every good Socialist, is a propagandist." ²⁰

Socialists say to the individual, not that he *ought* to serve society, but that the meaning and object of his existence is consciously or unconsciously to serve society, and that he can express and develop himself in no other way.

IX

NIETZSCHE AND THE NEW MORALITY

NONE but the great writers have ever succeeded in formulating humanity's ideals, and it cannot be otherwise when these ideals become Socialistic. Until the creative writer with the "new imagination" and prophetic vision required for this great task appears, Socialist ideals will remain vague and scattered. The Socialist society may be half established and the Socialist philosophy may be accepted in many directions before Socialist ideals are given any generally accepted expression.

For the philosophy that directs our lives, as distinct from our philosophy of the universe, for our vision of the future man toward whom we strive, we are dependent on literature. The great writer cannot arbitrarily force any new ideal upon us, but he is great largely because he is more sensitive than others to the deeper forces in the men of his time and has a greater mastery over their import and meaning; his ideal is our ideal—of which we had not yet become conscious.

Many great Socialists have been able writers, and many great writers have been thoroughgoing Socialists, but we still await the great Socialist-writer. Maurice Maeterlinck, Maxim Gorky, William Morris and Anatole France no more satisfy this requirement than did Karl Marx. The writer we are awaiting need not have Marx's mastery of politics, economics, philosophy, and history, but he must have Marx's prophetic vision—and he must

have even greater literary power. If he is not a poet, he must have the poet's gifts: inspiration, the most catholic human sympathy, passionate devotion to his mission, complete abandon—all carrying him beyond the possibility of merely logical formulas.

In the meanwhile this writer has not arrived, and it might seem that we are reduced to piecing together our Socialist ideals from the great Socialists who can write and the great writers who are Socialists. But there is a better way. What we are seeking is prophetic inspiration, and the best way to proceed is to follow this type of literature in its evolution *toward* Socialism, even though the prophets of to-day are not yet wholly Socialist. A broad and intensive study of Tolstoy, remote as he is from Socialism, would bring us far toward our goal. Ibsen's destructive criticism of individual ideals has in it the germs of a Socialist idealism. But Tolstoy's world of peasants and nobility keeps him nearer to India and China than to European civilization. And Ibsen lived almost entirely in the middle classes of private capitalism.

In view of the new philosophy and the modern social movement which subordinates everything to humanity, the great and central question to be asked is: What kind of man ought to be cultivated, willed, or created—for it is possible for us practically to create human character if we know what we want. No one has more clearly seized and expressed this problem than Friedrich Nietzsche, who realized, it will be seen, that it has nothing to do with the pitiful fallacy on which Eugenics is based but opens up infinitely larger horizons.

"The problem which I here put," says Nietzsche, "is not what is to replace mankind in the chain of beings (man is an *end*), but what type of man we are to *cultivate*, we are to *will*, as the more valuable, the

more worthy of life, the more certain of the future.

"This more valuable type has often enough existed already, but as a happy accident, as an exception, never as *willed*. It has rather just been the most feared; it has hitherto been almost *the* terror—and out of that terror, the reverse type has been willed, cultivated, *attained*; the domestic animal, the herding animal, the sickly animal. . . ." (Nietzsche's italics throughout all this chapter.)

It is indeed a reversal of the older standards that is demanded; instead of individuals that conform to a rule, individuals who vary most widely; instead of individuals who fit easily into social grooves, individuals who require and compel the largest and most rapid development of society; instead of individuals who repress themselves, individuals who assert themselves, though of course in the largest and deepest sense.

Unfortunately Nietzsche still appears to the greater part of the English-speaking world, including the Socialists, chiefly as the defender of war and slavery, the opponent of woman's advance, and the eulogist of Napoleon and Cesare Borgia. It is needless to say that no Socialist can share such views. But we need not consider them as being fundamental in Nietzsche's outlook on life. Nor are his most abstract doctrines, such as that of "the superman," "the will to power," or "the perpetual return," by any means the most important part of his message.

In studying Nietzsche we must keep to the pragmatic method. His doctrines are undoubtedly the conclusion of his thinking, but from the pragmatic standpoint the conclusion of a chain of thought is no more its most important element than are the last days of a life or the finishing strokes of a picture.

Nietzsche himself, as an artist in the largest sense of

the word, was not working primarily toward any conclusion. Undoubtedly his life and work as a whole had as much unity as that of other great writers, but it also had more unity in its smallest divisions. Nietzsche's power was not only that of a great intellect, but also that of a tremendously strong temperament. Nearly all of his moods contain him more or less completely; and it was no accident that he selected the aphorism as his chief mode of writing.

As we are not interested primarily in the conclusions of Nietzsche's work and life any more than he was himself, so also we are not specially concerned with its origins. Undoubtedly Nietzsche's family and education, the Franco-Prussian war, the recent history of Europe, Darwinism, Lutheranism, German metaphysics and the poetry and theology and sociology of his time, all had a visible influence on his thought. He subjected himself also, with some degree of conscious purpose, to the special influence of certain historic periods like that of early Greece and the Renaissance, but, since this was connected with his work in philology and with his early associations, it is not to be taken as an altogether deliberate choice. It is by no means difficult to discount most of these influences, as well as that of his doctrines when he was drawing near to their complete formulation.

What concerns us is Nietzsche's actual work—that is, not the finished product but the activity itself. Almost the whole of his life he concerned himself with all the questions centering about the problem of "morality," though he was neither a moralist, non-moralist, nor anti-moralist. Morality was only the aspect under which he considered civilizations and types of individuals, an aspect which he broadened to such a degree that the very word "morality" gains an entirely new meaning in his hands.

Nietzsche's views were not those of a mere reactionary, as is usually thought. Because he came finally to admire certain caste systems, like that of India, or, rather, because he used them as a literary illustration of his thought, it is sometimes supposed that he stood definitely for that sum of all reaction, caste. On the contrary, his whole philosophy was directed against caste, that is, until the very last of his writings.

In Nietzsche's profoundly revolutionary and epoch-making view, morality consists fundamentally not in determining the best relations between individuals, but in determining which are the best individuals. The problem of morality is the problem of individual development. But this does not mean that there is to be no morality. For our judgment of the relative worth of individuals determines what types of individuals society will produce, what types will survive, what will be the relations between them, what form of society will prevail, to what activities humanity will devote itself, and what kind of culture and civilization will result.

It cannot be claimed that Nietzsche is in complete accord with the pragmatic philosophy. But it would be impossible to deny that the main current of his work and his most fundamental habit of thought are thoroughly pragmatic. We might indeed be listening to any modern pragmatist when we read that "the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the instinctive functions." Nietzsche, like the pragmatists, judges even the philosophers by their environment and interprets their philosophy accordingly. The philosopher is chiefly influenced by his instincts:

"And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life."¹

Nietzsche goes as far as James, and may even have suggested the thought to James, when he says that the falseness of an opinion does not necessarily take anything away from its value—though Nietzsche's criterion of value is not whether the opinion accomplishes something for the individual who owns it, but the far wider criterion whether it is life-furthering and species-preserving. His view, it may be seen, is at least social, or, as Nietzsche himself would say, moral:

“The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it; it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing; and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments *a priori* belong) are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely *imagined* world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live—that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. *To recognize untruth as a condition of life*; that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil.”²

Whenever Nietzsche, then, examines the philosopher's opinions in the light of his environment, he does not necessarily condemn him, but merely points to the relative value of his “truth”:

“They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk

of 'inspiration') ; whereas, in fact, a prejudicial proposition, idea, or 'suggestion,' which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and defined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders also of their prejudices, which they dub 'truth.' " 3

Not only does Nietzsche agree with the pragmatists that physiology underlies logic, but he is similarly suspicious of the tendency to generalization. And, like Bergson, he believes that the senses, on the other hand, if properly understood, do not deceive at all:

"What we *make* out of their testimony, that is what introduces falsehood; for example, the falsehood of unity, the falsehoods of materiality, of substance, of permanence." 4

Indeed the thought is here so similar to that of Bergson that it is almost impossible to suppose that the French philosopher did not take something from his German predecessor.

Nietzsche is similarly critical of the unconscious metaphysics of modern science until it is given some kind of a conscious philosophical basis:

"There is, strictly judging, no such thing as an 'unconditioned' science; the very thought of such a thing is unthinkable, paralogical. . . . Indeed there is no doubt—and here my 'Joyful Science' may do the speaking (cf. book v, aph. 344): 'He who is veritable in that daring and ultimate sense, as is presupposed by the belief in science, *in so believing be-yeas another world* than the world of life, nature and history; and in so far as he be-yeas this "other world"—what? must he not even thereby be-nay its counterpart, this world, *our world*? It is still a *metaphysical belief* which underlies our belief in science.' " 5

He shares completely the pragmatist's aversion to science for science's sake:

" 'Knowledge for its own sake'—that is the last snare laid by morality; we are thereby completely entangled in morals once more.

"He who is a thorough teacher takes things seriously—and even himself—only in relation to his pupils." ⁶

While Nietzsche demands that science be guided by philosophy, his conception of philosophy is strictly scientific and humanistic. No pragmatist is more opposed to centering discussion on the ultimate:

"Every philosophy which puts peace higher than war, every ethic with a negative grasp of the idea of happiness, every metaphysic and physic that knows a *finale*, an ultimate condition of any kind whatever, every predominating, esthetic or religious longing for an aside, a beyond, an outside, an above—all these permit one to ask whether sickness has not been the motive which inspired the philosopher." ⁷

He even pushes his aversion to the ultimate to the point not only of evaluating opinions according to the periods or the persons that hold them, but even according to moods and stages of individual development:

"Something now appears to thee as an error which thou formerly lovedst as a truth, or as a probability: thou pushest it from thee and imaginest that thy reason has there gained a victory. But perhaps that error was then, when thou wast still another person—thou art always another person—just as necessary to thee as all thy present 'truths,' like a skin, as it were, which concealed and veiled from thee much which thou still mayst not see. Thy new life, and not thy reason, has slain that opinion for thee: *thou dost not require it any longer*, and now it breaks down of its own accord, and the irrationality crawls out of it as a worm into the light." ⁸

He is equally opposed to the "evolutionary" and ante-pragmatic habit of judging existing problems according to mere origins, for these are no more decisive than conclusions:

"The farther we trace the origin the less we feel concerned about our interests; nay, all our valuations and interestedness in things begin to lose their meaning the further we retrocede in our knowledge and the nearer we approach the things themselves. The insignificance of the origin increases in proportion to our insight into the origin; whereas the things nearest to, around and within ourselves gradually begin to display colors and beauty, puzzles and riches of greater importance than the older humanity ever dreamt of." ⁹

Indeed Nietzsche regarded the philosophies which preceded the present pragmatic habit of mind as being not only reactionary but the last stronghold of reaction. After all manner of tyranny had given way the last tyranny is the expectation that some philosopher or intellectual Messiah will come along and save the human race. The tyrants of the intellect, he says, are the worst:

"In our days the advancement of science is no longer thwarted by the casual fact that man attains an age of about seventy years, as was the case for too long a time. Formerly a man wanted to attain the sum total of knowledge during this short period, and according to this general desire people valued the methods of knowledge. The minor individual questions and experiments were considered contemptible; people wanted the shortest cut, believing that since everything in the world seemed adapted to man, even the acquirement of knowledge was regulated in conformity with the limits of human life. To solve everything with one blow, with one word—this was the secret wish. The task was pictured in the

metaphor of the Gordian knot or the egg of Columbus; no one doubted but that it was possible to reach the goal, even of knowledge, in the manner of Alexander or Columbus, and to satisfy all questions by one answer. 'There is a mystery to be solved,' appeared to be the goal of life in the eyes of the philosopher; first of all the mystery had to be discovered and the problem of the world to be compressed into the simplest enigmatical form. The unbounded ambition and delight of being the 'unraveller of the world' filled the dreams of the thinker, nothing seemed to him worth any trouble but the means of bringing everything to a satisfactory conclusion. Hence philosophy was a kind of last struggle for the tyrannical sway of the intellect. The fact that such a sway was reserved for some very happy, noble, ingenious, bold, powerful person—a peerless one—was doubted by nobody." ¹⁰

Nietzsche's view of psychology is as thoroughly pragmatic as his view of philosophy. Especially interesting as a foreshadowing is his radical belief that all consciousness is social.

Of course when Nietzsche speaks of anything as "social" or conscious he does not mean to give it the highest value. He believes with modern psychology that our actions are very largely governed by unconscious processes. The purpose of consciousness, he holds, is chiefly for communication, and it develops in proportion to the capacity and necessity for communication. He contends, in a word, that consciousness has been necessary only as between man and man:

"Man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it; the thinking which is becoming *conscious of itself* is only the smallest part thereof, we may say, the most superficial part, the worst part—for this conscious thinking alone *is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of*

which the origin of consciousness is revealed. . . . It is only as a social animal that man has learned to become conscious of himself—he is doing so still, and doing so more and more. As is obvious, my idea is that consciousness does not properly belong to the individual existence of man, but rather to the social and gregarious nature in him; that, as follows therefrom, it is only in relation to communal and gregarious utility that it is finely developed; and that consequently each of us, in spite of the best intention of *understanding* himself as individually as possible, and of ‘knowing himself’ will always just call into consciousness the non-individual in him, namely, his ‘averageness’—that our thought itself is continuously as it were *outvoted* by the character of consciousness—by the imperious ‘genius of the species’ therein—and is translated back into the perspective of the herd. Fundamentally our actions are in an incomparable manner altogether personal, unique and absolutely individual—there is no doubt about it; but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they *do not appear so any longer*. . . . The world of which we can become conscious is only a superficial and symbolic world, a generalized and vulgarized world; that everything which becomes conscious *becomes* just thereby shallow, meager, relatively stupid—a generalization, a symbol, a characteristic of the herd; that with the evolving of consciousness there is always combined a great, radical perversion, falsification, superficialization and generalization.”¹¹

Finally, Nietzsche concludes that we do not have any organ at all for *knowing* or for “truth.” He agrees with the other pragmatists that “we know,” or believe, or fancy, just as much as may be of *use*, but of use, he thinks, only to “the human herd, the species”:

“And even what is here called ‘usefulness’ is ultimately only a belief, a fancy, and perhaps precisely the

most fatal stupidity by which we shall one day be ruined.”¹¹

To Nietzsche the fact that consciousness is social means only that the individual has to be always on guard against it to protect what is most individual in himself, namely, his sub-conscious self:

“The known, that is to say, what we are accustomed to, so that we no longer marvel at it, the commonplace, any kind of rule to which we are habituated, all and everything in which we know ourselves to be at home—what? is not our need of knowing just this need of the known? the will to discover in everything strange, unusual, or questionable, something which no longer disquiets us?

“For ‘what is known is understood,’ they are unanimous as to that. Even the most circumspect among them think that the known is at least *more easily understood* than the strange; that, for example, it is methodically ordered to proceed outward from the ‘inner world,’ from ‘the facts of consciousness,’ because it is the world which is *better known to us!* Error of errors! The known is the accustomed, and the accustomed is the most difficult of all to ‘understand,’ that is to say, to perceive as a problem, to perceive as strange, distant, ‘outside of us.’”¹²

One of Nietzsche’s leading thoughts, which is with him always, is that Socrates and his followers are responsible for this exaggeration of the importance of the conscious or rationalistic elements:

“Reason—virtue—happiness means merely that we have to imitate Socrates, and put a permanent *day-light* in opposition to the obscure desires—the daylight of reason. We have to be rational, clear and distinct at any price; every yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads *downwards*. . . . Socrates was a misunder-

standing, *the whole of improving morality, including Christian morality, has been a misunderstanding.*

. . . The fiercest day-light, rationality at any price, the life clear, cold, prudent, conscious, without instincts, in opposition to instincts; this itself was only an infirmity, another infirmity, and not at all a way of return to 'virtue,' to 'health,' or to happiness. To *have to* combat the instincts—that is the formula for *decadence*; as long as life *ascends*, happiness is identical with instinct." ¹⁴

Nietzsche believes that during the whole course of our historic evolution the intellect has been developed out of all proportion to our strength and the exercise of our strength. Otherwise we should have known that "we can understand only that which we can do"—certainly the very essence of pragmatism. Nietzsche criticizes our "intellectualism" somewhat too strongly, however, as not only the intellect but *any* function that is valuable will *necessarily* be developed occasionally and even frequently in more or less excess of what we can do with it, and this apparently useless *exercise* will have a certain utility, just as play or sport has.

"The intellect is proud of knowing more, of running faster, and of reaching the goal almost instantaneously; so the realm of thoughts in comparison with the realms of action, of volition, and experience, appears to be a realm of freedom, while, as previously stated, it is but a realm of superficiality and sufficiency." ¹⁵

"Thoughts are the shadows of our sentiments, always, however, obscurer, emptier, simpler." Not only does Nietzsche give the intellect as such a subordinate position, but he analyzes the will also into other elements of consciousness, just as modern psychology does. A will or conscious aim is of secondary value, he says, when compared with deep sub-conscious impulses—which may

either appear in early youth, or come into consciousness after the consciously willed has been fully expressed and exhausted:

"Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question, 'what hast thou up to now truly loved, what has drawn thy soul upward, mastered it and blessed it, too?' Set up these things that thou hast honoured before thee, and maybe they will show thee in their being and their order a law which is the fundamental law of thine own self." ¹⁶

"The ignoble nature is distinguished by the fact that it keeps its advantage steadily in view, and that this thought of the end and advantage is even stronger than its strongest impulse; not to be tempted to inexpedient action by its impulses—that is, its wisdom and inspiration. In comparison with the ignoble nature the higher nature is *more irrational*, for the noble, magnanimous and self-sacrificing person succumbs in fact to his impulses, and in his best moments his reason *lapses* altogether." ¹⁷

And again the governing of the will by conscious motives is regarded not only as an inferior mode of life but as dangerous:

"In itself every high degree of circumspection in conclusions, every skeptical inclination, is a great danger to life. No living being would have been preserved unless the contrary inclination—to affirm rather than suspend judgment, to mistake and fabricate rather than wait, to assent rather than deny, to decide rather than be in the right—had been cultivated with extraordinary assiduity." ¹⁸

It must be said here that the mere fact that we must seize only as much, in a given situation, as we can embody in ourselves and our actions does not interfere with our taking into account *later* those elements which we

cannot immediately assimilate. As so often happens with the literary man, Nietzsche makes a mystery where it is possible to take a perfectly clear position. In this and many other instances he says we must choose all or nothing, and that we must either trust our impulses entirely or our reason. A pragmatist would agree that the impulses play an equally important rôle with reason and demand first consideration, but it is not necessary to exclude reason at any point.

While Nietzsche's error in this respect sometimes seems fatal, I believe that on the whole he takes the broader view. Certainly he is not an anti-intellectualist, for he sees that the problem of man is to make over his knowledge into instinct:

"It is still an entirely new *problem* just dawning on the human eye and hardly yet plainly recognizable; *to embody knowledge in ourselves* and make it instinctive—a problem which is only seen by those who have grasped the fact that hitherto our *errors* alone have been embodied in us, and that all our consciousness is relative to errors!"¹⁹

If, now, we glance briefly at Nietzsche's view of science or nature, we shall have covered the philosophic basis of his reasoning. He is far from having been captured by the prevailing evolution worship, and is especially critical of the struggle-for-existence hypothesis.

"To seek self-preservation merely is the expression of a state of distress, or of limitation of the true, fundamental instinct of life which aims at the *extension of power*, and with this in view often enough calls in question self-preservation and sacrifices it. . . . Over the whole of English Darwinism there hovers something of the suffocating air of over-crowded England, something of the odor of humble people in need and in straits. But as an investigator of nature, a person

ought to emerge from his paltry human nook; and in nature the state of stress does not *prevail*, but superfluity, even prodigality to the extent of folly. The struggle for existence is only an *exception*, a temporary restriction of the will to live; the struggle, be it great or small, turns everywhere on predominance, on increase and expansion, on power, in conformity to the will to power, which is just the will to live." ²⁰

And again in one of his last volumes he returns to the same question:

"As regards the celebrated 'struggle for life,' it seems to me in the meantime to be more asserted than proved. It occurs, but only as an exception; the general aspect of life is *not* a state of want or hunger; it is rather a state of opulence, luxuriance, and even absurd prodigality—where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for *power*." ²¹

Nietzsche regards natural evolution, then, as by no means understood or comprehended in modern scientific formulas. He is willing to regard human nature as continuous with that of the lower forms of life, he is permeated through and through with the idea of evolution, but he does not accept the prevailing scientific interpretation of evolution. His disagreement on this point, moreover, is absolutely fundamental to all his thinking. He is thoroughly anthropocentric in the sense in which I have employed this expression in previous chapters, and absolutely opposed both to the mechanistic view and to the doctrine of free will.

He complains of the reigning instinct and modern taste "which would rather reconcile itself to the absolute fortuitousness and even mechanistical nonsensicalness of all 'happening' than to the theory of a *will to power* as manifesting itself in all happening":

"The democratic idiosyncrasy against all that sways, or will to sway, modern *misarchism* (to coin a bad word for a bad cause) has gradually become merged to such an extent into, and so taken on the guise of, spirituality, keenest spirituality, that to-day it forces, and *is allowed* to force its way, step by step, into the exactest and seemingly most objective sciences; in fact, it seems to me to have already succeeded in usurping the entire science of physiology and biology, much to its disadvantage, as is self-evident, for it has eliminated from this science a fundamental notion, the notion of functional *activity*. Laboring under this idiosyncrasy, 'adaptation,' that is to say, a second-rate activity, in fact, a mere reactivity, is pushed into the foreground, and indeed, life itself has even been defined as 'a continuous better adjustment of internal relations to external relations' (Herbert Spencer). But this is to mistake the true nature and function of life, which is *will to power*. It is to overlook the principal priority which the spontaneous, aggressive, transgressive, new-interpretative and new-directive forces possess, from the result of which 'adaptation' follows. It is to deny the sovereign office of the highest functionaries in the organism, in which functionaries the will to life appears as an active and formative principle." ²²

Nietzsche's treatment of "morality," or civilization, which is the center about which his thought revolves, may be considered under several heads. His first object is to destroy the foundations of all social ethics. His next is to *invert* or *reverse* this social ethics, that is to bring about a complete moral revolution. And finally he reaches an attitude toward all we have hitherto known as morality that seems very nearly non-moral, though we shall find that he is not in reality taking a stand against morality but rather wishes to pass beyond it and to look behind it.

One of the briefest and best summaries of his view of the history of all moral systems up to the present is contained in the following expression:

"At a certain point in the development of a nation, its most circumspect class (i. e., the most retrospective and prospective) declares the experience to be closed according to which people are to live—i. e., according to which they *can live*. Its aim is to bring home from the times of experiment and *unfortunate* experience the richest and completest harvest possible. Consequently, what is above all to be avoided is the continuation of experimenting, the continuation of the fluid condition of values, testing, choosing and criticising of values *in infinitum*." ²³

In other words, the morality of the societies of the past and present has been founded on the very opposite belief to that of the modern pragmatism. It has wished to put an end to experimenting; pragmatism wishes to experiment. But in so far as experience is closed for society social evolution has ceased.

Social ethics, restricted to what has been gained from the past experience of a given society, limit the development of the society, but what is even more serious, from Nietzsche's point of view, is that they destroy the individual. As he expresses it, the motives of society are egoistic. For its own ends it is willing to annihilate the individual:

"The virtues of a man are called *good*, not in respect of the results they have for himself, but in respect of the results which we expect therefrom for ourselves and for society; we have all along had very little unselfishness, very little 'non-egoism' in our praise of the virtues! . . . If you have a virtue, an actual, perfect virtue (and not merely a kind of impulse toward virtue!), you are its *victim*! But your neighbor praises your virtue precisely on that account! . . . In short,

what is praised is the unreason in the virtues, in consequence of which the individual allows himself to be transformed into a function of the whole. The praise of the virtues is the praise of something which is privately injurious to the individual; it is praise of impulses which deprive man of his noblest self-love, and the power to take the best care of himself. . . . Education proceeds in this manner throughout; it endeavors, by a series of enticements and advantages, to determine the individual to a certain mode of thinking and acting, which, when it has become habit, impulse, and passion, rules in him and over him *in opposition to his ultimate advantage*, but 'for the general good.' . . . The praise of the unselfish, self-sacrificing, virtuous person . . . this praise has in any case not originated out of the spirit of unselfishness! The 'neighbor' praises unselfishness because *he profits by it!* . . . The fundamental contradiction in that morality which at present stands in high honor is here indicated; the *motives* to such a morality are in antithesis to its *principle!* That with which this morality wishes to prove itself refutes it out of its criterion of what is moral!"²⁴

Here we have an example not only of the substance of Nietzsche's thought but of his method. He wishes to pierce motives to the bottom and is never willing to accept the explanation for an action that lies in the consciousness of the actor himself.

In his antagonism to past systems of morality, education, and culture, Nietzsche is nothing less than passionate. For he feels that these moral systems and the civilizations they supported have actually succeeded in killing off most of the individuality in the world. Far from saying, as the old moralists do, that we have too much egoism, he complains that egoism is practically dead and that only pseudo-egoism is alive:

"The great majority—whatever they may think and

say about their 'selfishness'—as long as they live do nothing for their ego, but only for the phantom of this ego, which has grown up in the heads of their friends and been transmitted to them; consequently they all live in a mist of impersonal, half-personal opinions, and of arbitrary, so to speak poetic valuations, the one for ever in the head of somebody else, and this one again in other heads: an old world of phantasms, which knows how to give itself a matter-of-fact appearance!" ²⁶

The attack on egoism has been a peculiarity not only of Christianity or other moral codes known as altruistic but of all moral codes. By the very fact that they are "social" they must preach self-denial to the individual, who would otherwise express himself independently of the code:

"Self-denial is exacted, not because of its useful consequences for the individual, but in order that custom or observance, despite all individual countertendencies and advantages, may appear to rule supreme. The individual must sacrifice himself—such is the commandment of the morality of custom. . . . It is incalculable how much suffering just the rarer, choicer, and more original minds must have undergone in the course of history owing to their ever being looked upon, nay, their looking upon themselves as the evil and dangerous. Originality of every kind has acquired a bad conscience under the supreme rule of the morality of custom." ²⁶

But Nietzsche does not forget the leading principle of his psychology. Men's actions are largely instinctive and if morality engulfs individuals it is not because a moral code has been "consciously" evolved, but because it is the expression of the "herd instinct" in the individual. The time is arriving, if it has not already arrived, when a new morality and a demand for its expression are gradually to conquer the "herd instinct." But

existing moral systems have come down to us from the past when this herd instinct—which, when conscious, becomes social ethics—was entirely dominant:

“Throughout the longest period in the life of mankind there was nothing more terrible to a person than to feel himself independent. To be alone, to feel independent, neither to obey nor to rule, to represent an individual—that was no pleasure to a person then, but a punishment; he was condemned ‘to be an individual.’ ” ²⁷

It might seem that Nietzsche’s *inversion* of ethics is as negative as his attack against it. But on second thought it will be seen that this inversion means the establishment of a positive principle, that responsibility to others, which is the deepest essence of morality, is only secured through responsibility to self.

The feature of modern morality which is most offensive to Nietzsche is its tolerance, which is only another name for weakness, and in reaction from this he swings into the most positive positions:

“We were ill from *that* modernism,—from lazy peace, from cowardly compromise, from the whole virtuous uncleanness of the modern yea and nay. That tolerance and *largeur* of heart which ‘forgives’ all because it ‘understands’ all is Sirocco to us. Better to live in the ice than among modern virtues and other south winds!” ²⁸

Nietzsche is not guilty of this weakness, and his enormous influence is undoubtedly due to the fact that he preserves all the intensity, power and value of the morality of the past without retaining the least of its substance, without compromising with it to the smallest degree, or remaining undecided and “tolerant” in any single important issue. He does not hesitate to attack our most cherished ideals, joy, innocence, pity, and love, *and to*

advocate their opposites in their stead—an attitude which at first appears like mere paradox and does occasionally lead Nietzsche into weak and indefensible positions. But it is nevertheless the very secret of his strength and of his irresistible appeal to all modern minds, even to those who do not accept him.

“One must not *will* to enjoy!

“For joy and innocence are the most shamefaced things. Both *will* not to be sought. One should *have* them—but one should rather seek even sin and suffering.” (My italics.) ²⁹

It is difficult to see how any comment could shed light on this passage, other than a due emphasis on the words I have italicized. Let us take up other points at which Nietzsche touches upon sin and suffering. What makes man revolt against suffering is not suffering as such, but the senselessness of suffering:

“Man, the animal bravest and best accustomed to pain, does *not* be-nay suffering in itself: he *wills* to suffer; he even seeks for suffering, provided that he is shown a *significance*, a *therefore* of suffering. The senselessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse which so far lay upon mankind. *And the ascetic ideal offered to mankind a significance.* It was so far the only significance; any significance is better than no significance at all.” ³⁰

Here we have Nietzsche's explanation why all systems of morality, which have agreed in preaching self-denial, appealed to man. The endless effort of the race either to escape suffering or to find an explanation for it has led to the conception that it was sin in the individual, when he sought to live without suffering: and also to the religion of pity, the effort to relieve others

of suffering, even though they had invited it as an inevitable incident of their development.

Both this sense of personal sin in oneself and this pity for the sufferings of others are simply hindrances to the free development of personality:

“Everywhere, however, where we are *noticed* as sufferers, our suffering is interpreted in a shallow way; it belongs to the nature of the emotion of pity to *divest* unfamiliar suffering of its properly personal character:—our ‘benefactors’ lower our value and volition more than our enemies. In most benefits which are conferred on the unfortunate there is something shocking in the intellectual levity with which the compassionate person plays the rôle of fate: he knows nothing of all the inner consequences and complications which are called misfortune for *me* or for *you*! The entire economy of my soul and its adjustment by ‘misfortune,’ the uprising of new sources and needs, the closing up of old wounds, the repudiation of whole periods of the past—none of these things which may be connected with misfortune preoccupy the dear sympathizer. . . . Indeed there is even a secret seduction in all this awakening of compassion and calling for help: our ‘own way’ is a thing too hard and insistent, and too far removed from the love and gratitude of others,—we escape from it and from our most personal conscience, not at all unwillingly, and, seeking security in the conscience of others, we take refuge in the lovely temple of the ‘religion of pity.’ ”³¹

In opposition to the religion of pity or sympathy Nietzsche offers the following:

“Thou wilt also want to help, but only those whose distress thou entirely *understandest*, because they have *one* hope in common with thee—thy *friends*: and only in *the* way that thou helpst thyself:—I want to make them more courageous, more enduring, more simple,

more joyful! I want to teach them that which at present so few understand, and the preachers of fellowship in sorrow least of all:—namely, *fellowship in joy!*"³²

Strange to say, Balzac (whom Nietzsche so much admires) attacks as the egoist the very being Nietzsche attacks as the altruist: "A species which would like to keep the universe under lock and key and allow nothing to be done without their permission. They are unhappy if others are happy; they forgive nothing but vices, infirmities, and failures. Aristocrats by nature, they make themselves democrats in spite, and choose to consort with inferiors as equals." The true egoist whom Nietzsche recommends is evidently the same "fellow in joy and understanding" that Balzac would call the true altruist.

The conception of duty has been attacked by many modern writers, but none, perhaps, have made so thorough and brilliant an onslaught as Nietzsche; and none have come so near to offering an acceptable substitute. Instead of attacking duty and altruism directly, as so many have done, Nietzsche attacks them chiefly in the form of conscience and pity. He is not concerned with moral principles but with moral feelings—that is, the principles embodied in flesh and blood. How much more effective and profound is his criticism of pity than the ordinary criticism of altruism:

"Should a person just once experimentally and intentionally make the occasions for pity in practical life the object of his attention for a while, and again and again picture to his mind all the misery he may meet with in his surroundings, he will assuredly grow ill and despondent. But should he wish to serve mankind in any sense of the word as a physician, he will have to be very cautious, else it might paralyze him in all critical

moments, cramp his knowledge and unnerve his helpful, delicate hand." ³³

It is through self-development that we can mean most to others rather than through the relatively petty occasions for pity and for interfering as "benefactors" in other people's lives. This is true to-day and it will be still more true in the better organized society of the future.

Most revolutionary is Nietzsche's criticism of love and his praise for the opposite feeling—opposite, of course, not in the conventional sense, but in Nietzsche's thinking. He asks for love for the farthest in place of love for the neighbor—"Do not spare him who is nearest to you." Nietzsche says this just as he would say, "Do not spare yourself":

"Conquer yourself in him who is nearest: and do not let yourself be given a right that you can conquer for yourself. . . .

"Thus will the race of noble souls have it: they will have nothing for nothing, least of all love.

"But he who is of the mob wishes to live without paying: while we others to whom life gave itself,—we are always thinking of what we can best give in exchange for it. . . .

"One should not wish to enjoy where one does not give enjoyment." ³⁴

Here we have the command to give joy as against the old command to love, for to give joy in Nietzsche's conception means that neither oneself nor one's neighbor is spared. Undoubtedly the essence of Christian morality, as it originally was and as it is again to-day, rests on a religion of pity, and this Nietzsche rejects absolutely:

"Should the nature of true morality be this, that after considering the most direct and immediate consequences

which our actions would have for another person, we bend our purpose accordingly? These are but narrow-minded and petty morals, though morals they may be: but it seems to me a loftier and more liberal view to glance aside from these immediate effects upon others and, under circumstances, to further even more distant purposes by the sorrow of others—so, for instance, when we promote knowledge, despite the certainty that first and immediately our freethinking will plunge them into doubt, grief, and worse afflictions. May we not at least deal with our neighbor just as we deal with ourselves? And if, with regard to ourselves, we have no such narrow-minded and petty view of the immediate consequences and sufferings, why should we entertain it with regard to him?" ³⁵

It might be said, then, that Nietzsche praises one kind of love, a love which only certain individuals can give, those who have something left over after satisfying their most personal needs, those who are strong enough so that they must seek to live in large part through others and the influence they can exert over others. On the other hand the love which either demands pity on the one side or gives it on the other he considers only as a sign of weakness or of decadence:

"One person may be empty and wanting to be sated; the other may be gluttoned and wishing to be unburdened—both are prompted to look for an individual that may serve their purposes. And this process, as understood in its highest sense, is, in both instances, denoted by the same word: Love—well? should love be something unselfish?" ³⁶

Nietzsche goes on from the advocacy of "selfishness," understood in this sense, to the advocacy of "evil" itself. It is the very individuality that people have called evil that seems to him to contain the highest value for

humanity—though sometimes, Nietzsche admits, in a perverted form. Of course he does not preach selfishness or evil as ordinarily understood, but he feels that these words come nearer to expressing his truth than do their opposites, “unselfishness” and “good”:

“We also are to grow and blossom out of ourselves, free and fearless, in innocent selfishness! And so, on the contemplation of such a man, these thoughts still ring in my ears to-day as formerly: ‘That passion is better than stoicism or hypocrisy; that straightforwardness, even in evil, is better than losing oneself in trying to observe traditional morality; that the free man is just as able to be good as evil, but that the unemancipated man is a disgrace to nature, and has no share in heavenly or earthly bliss; finally, that *all who wish to be free must become so through themselves*, and that freedom falls to nobody’s lot as a gift from Heaven.’”³⁷

To all actions that have hitherto been called moral Nietzsche prefers on the whole those which have been called selfish, that is, in so far as these latter have been involuntary actions. He does not propose to invert values absolutely, but predicts that for a long time “moral” actions will become less and less frequent and selfish and involuntary actions more frequent.

“An ‘altruistic’ morality, a morality which causes selfishness to *languish*, is, under all circumstances, a bad sign. This is true of the individual, it is especially true of peoples. The best is wanting when selfishness begins to be deficient. To choose instinctively what is *self-injurious*, to be *allured* by ‘disinterested’ motives, furnishes almost the formula for decadence. . . . Instead of naïvely saying, ‘I am no longer of any account,’ the moral falsehood in the mouth of the decadent says, ‘nothing is of any account,—life is of no account.’”³⁸

Nietzsche does not fail to give concrete examples of this principle. If he believes in a healthy selfishness he also believes consistently in exploitation of one person by another, and any philosophical sociologist would be likely to agree with him:

“People now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which ‘the exploitation character’ is to be absent:—that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. Exploitation does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the *nature* of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power which is precisely the Will to Life.”³⁹

The exploitation that revolutionists object to is quite another thing, the exploitation by a more or less hereditary ruling class. When individuals have equal opportunities unquestionably some of the most serviceable groupings to society and to all the individuals involved will be those where the initiative obviously comes from a few who are freely aided by others who have the virtue of appreciating the enterprise without the capacity to direct it themselves.

“Never until now was there the least doubt or hesitation to set down ‘the good man’ as of higher value than ‘the evil man,’—of higher value in the sense of furtherance, utility, prosperity as regards *man* in general (the future of man included). What if the reverse were true? What if in the ‘good one’ also a symptom of decline were contained, and a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic by which the present might live at *the expense of the future*? Perhaps more comfortably, less dangerously, but also in humbler style,—more meanly? . . . So that just morality were to blame, if

a *highest mightiness and splendor* of the type of man—possible in itself—were never attained? And that, therefore, morality itself would be the danger of dangers?"⁴⁰

This idea of Nietzsche's, like so many others, can only be understood with reference to conditions of the future, though, inevitably, he himself is often tempted to use misleading illustrations from the past (Cesare Borgia!). While it is true that the evil spirits of the past were strong enough, like Napoleon, to conquer most of the moral and religious codes of their time (when they did not use them), it is also true that the backward condition of society in the past furnished these evil spirits with sheep, the shearing of which was a relatively easy and brutal process such as evidenced no very high qualities. Nietzsche wants such servile masses to serve their masters, and even a Socialist, when reading of such a mob proletariat as that of the ancient city of Rome, can share his feelings. But the strong man of the future must develop entirely different and greater qualities, *if there are no such sheep to shear*—as the Socialists hope—and nothing that Nietzsche has said suggests that he thinks that humanity should be provided forever with servile natures. It is not the actual character of Napoleon, perverted by this parasitism, that attracts Nietzsche, so much as the latent energy and capacity of the man. Nietzsche condemns as strongly as anyone the tendency to tyrannize. It would have been sufficient for his purposes to say that in the "evil" Napoleon could have been found more qualities of value to mankind than in the "best" men of his period.

Nietzsche shows just what type of man he really aims at when he praises the evil nature, by his reference to the strong man as the most "responsible," responsible first to himself and so also to the race. The sovereign

individual is the most responsible individual because he is "delivered from the morality of custom, autonomous, super-moral":

"This freed one, who is really allowed to promise, this master of a *free will*, this sovereign—surely he cannot be ignorant of what a superiority over everything he is given by such a will, a will which is not allowed to promise and pledge for itself; how much confidence, how much fear, how much reverence he creates (he *deserves* all three); and how, with this mastery over his self, he has also been intrusted with the mastery over circumstances, nature, and all creatures possessed of a shorter will and less trustworthy than himself. . . . The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of *responsibility*, the consciousness of this rare freedom, of this power over self and fate, has penetrated into the inmost depth of his personality and become instinct, dominating instinct:—by what name will he call it, this dominating instinct, supposing that he personally needs a word for it? But there can be no doubt this sovereign man will call it his *conscience*." ⁴¹

The sovereign individual has a conscience, but this conscience is a responsibility solely to himself: "For what is freedom? To have the will to be responsible to oneself, to keep the distance which supports us . . . to be ready to sacrifice men for one's cause, oneself not excepted."

It might seem to many that in preaching the sovereign individual Nietzsche has reached non-morality, and it is true that some of the things he says would lead to this conclusion, but this is very far from his real conception. Moral systems he is willing to destroy, but the intensity of moral feelings is to him the chief motive force in the advance of the human race. And he rejects absolutely the supposition that because different moral valuations

necessarily prevail with different people there is no binding morality at all:

"Of course I shall not deny—except that I be a fool—that many actions which are called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted; and that many which are called moral ought to be done and encouraged—but I am of opinion that both should take place from motives other than have hitherto prevailed." ⁴²

As illustrations of this attitude are Nietzsche's firm belief in the value of benevolence while insisting that this benevolence must be selfish and his corresponding belief in the altruism of certain kinds of selfishness:

"Meanwhile even that question remains unanswered, whether we are of greater use to others by constantly and immediately relieving and helping them—which, at most, can be done only in a very superficial way, so as not to grow into a tyrannical meddling and transforming—or by transforming our own selves." ⁴³

In inverting the conventional morality, then, he by no means rejects morality altogether. What he rejects is the "social" element in morality. If formerly people had a horror of deviating from custom he wishes them in the future to have a horror of following it:

"'My opinion is *my* opinion: another person has not easily a right to it'—such a philosopher of the future will say, perhaps. One must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people. 'Good' is no longer good when one's neighbor takes it into his mouth." ⁴⁴

But his attitude to morality is still better expressed in his discussion of the means of looking behind it and passing beyond it:

"We ought also to *be able* to stand *above* morality, and not only stand with the painful stiffness of one who

every moment fears to slip and fall, but we should also be able to soar and play above it!" ⁴⁵

He wishes to look not only behind acts but behind the conscious intentions that lie behind acts:

"The suspicion arises that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in that which is *not intentional*, and that all its intentionality, all that is seen, sensible, or 'sensed' in it, belongs to its surface or skin—which, like every skin, betrays something, but *conceals* still more."⁴⁶

"With his principles a man seeks either to dominate, or justify, or honor, or reproach, or conceal his habits: two men with the same principles probably seek fundamentally different ends therewith."⁴⁷

No matter what the moral code may be and no matter what the reason is that causes the individual to submit to it, his submission is nothing moral in itself, but requires further examination; and Nietzsche's test is: do the action and the motive of the action spring from a developing or from a degenerating personality, from an advancing or from a retrogressive mood?

"The submission to morals may be either slavish or vain, self-interested, resigned, gloomily fantastic, thoughtless, or an act of despair, like the submission to a prince: but it is nothing moral in itself."⁴⁸

The individual acts from an egoistic motive, and he and his action are to be judged only in their relation to the evolution of the individual and the race:

"If he represent descending development, decay, chronic degeneration, or sickening (diseases, taken on the whole, are phenomena which result from decay already present, they are *not* the causes of it), he has little worth, and the greatest fairness would have him *take away* as little as possible from the well-constituted. He is no more than their parasite then."⁴⁹

The whole conception of Nietzsche's "superman" is an effort to portray by hyperbole the characteristics of an *ascending* individual and an *ascending* race.

What, then, does Nietzsche give us of the man of the future?

First of all, the sovereign and responsible individuals of the future are to be free to experiment with life, free from any restriction of a moral code beyond their own deep and strong feelings:

"Numerous new experiments shall be made in life and society; an enormous incubus of bad conscience shall be removed from the world—these are the general aims which ought to be recognized and furthered by all honest and truthseeking people." ⁵⁰

These experiments, Nietzsche believes, have not been foreshadowed in any of the ideals of past writers, because these ideals were too abstract, and were even less attractive than the reality of the past:

"How much more worthy is actual man, compared with any merely wished, dreamt, or shamelessly falsified man! compared with any *ideal* man whatsoever. It is only ideal man that is distasteful to the philosopher." ⁵¹

We are to receive our inspiration, then, not from the paltry ideals that have been presented to us, but from the magnificent reality—magnificent rather, of course, in its obvious possibilities than in what has been achieved. And the developed individual of the future is to realize that, being freed from the oppression of society, even in the form of "ideals," he has only to follow his own deepest impulses in order to go beyond every ideal that has yet been imagined:

"Let us consider in the last place what naïveté it manifests to say, 'Man *ought* to be so and so!' Reality ex-

hibits to us an enchanting wealth of types, the luxuriance of a prodigality of forms and transformations; and some paltry hod-man of a moralist says with regard to it, 'No! man ought to be different!' He even knows *how* man ought to be, this parasite and bigot: he paints himself on the wall and says, 'Ecce homo!' But even if the moralist directs himself merely to the individual and says, 'You ought to be so and so,' he still continues to make himself ridiculous. The individual, in his antecedents and in his consequents, is a piece of fate, an additional law, an additional necessity for all that now takes place and will take place in the future. To say to him, 'Alter thyself,' is to require everything to alter itself, and backward, too." ⁵²

The men of the future are not to impose limits on themselves either by the high degree of specialization in work that prevails to-day or by narrow devotion to any so-called ideal. Nietzsche holds that the conception of greatness should rest precisely in comprehensiveness, multifariousness and all-roundness, in opposition to the prevailing specialization. The superior man of the future would take rank precisely according to the amount and variety of that which he could bear and take upon himself, "according to the *extent* to which a man could stretch his responsibility."

The individual is to fight for breadth at every cost. Here are Nietzsche's rules for this moral struggle:

"Not to cleave to any person, be it even the dearest—every person is a prison and also a recess. Not to cleave to a fatherland, be it even the most suffering and necessitous—it is even less difficult to detach one's heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to cleave to a sympathy, be it even for higher men, into whose peculiar torture and helplessness chance has given us an insight. Not to cleave to a science, though it tempt one with the most valuable discoveries, apparently specially reserved for *us*.

Not to cleave to one's own liberation, to the voluptuous distance and remoteness of the bird, which always flies further aloft in order to see more under it—the danger of the flier. Not to cleave to our own virtues, nor become as a whole a victim to any of our specialties, to our 'hospitality' for instance, which is the danger of dangers for highly developed and wealthy souls, who deal prodigally, almost indifferently, with themselves, and push the virtue of liberality so far that it becomes a vice. One must know how *to conserve oneself*—the best test of independence." ⁵³

Much of this passage reminds us of Stirner. Nietzsche rises, perhaps, to an even greater height, in warning us not to cleave to our *own* virtues or our *own* liberation or our *own* liberality—though a similarity to Stirner may be seen even here.

In Nietzsche's references to Kant and Schopenhauer we see the quality that he insists upon for the philosopher, that is for his ideal. Kant's limitations, he says, were due to the fact that his experiences were not great, and by experiences Nietzsche means "the vicissitudes and convulsions which occur in the most solitary and quiet life which has leisure and burns with the passion for thinking." Schopenhauer, on the other hand, lacked "evolution" in his life and in his thought. Nietzsche values, and expects to develop in the future, passion for thinking, with all its consequent vicissitudes and even convulsions, but he insists equally on constant evolution from the beginning to the end. In both points his future philosopher is distinguished absolutely from the philosopher of the past. For the man of intellect was formerly concerned not in endless development but in settling things once and for all, not in passionate but in dispassionate thought.

The chief aim of man is creation. Nietzsche wants

to know of all human activity whether it is building for permanence or building for change, and he expects us in the future to build for change. Either hunger or superfluity, he says, may create. But the creation of superfluity has an infinitely higher value. The great test is "whether the desire for rigidity, for perpetuation, for *being* is the cause of the creating, or [whether the cause is] the desire for destruction, for change, for the new, for the future—for *becoming*." ⁵⁴

Here is the old world that Nietzsche fights against:

"This hatred of what is human; still more, of what is animal; still more, of what is material; this horror of the senses, of reason itself; this fear of happiness and beauty; this longing away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, desire, longing itself—all this implies (let us dare to comprehend it!) a *will to Nothingness*, a horror of life, an insurrection against the most fundamental presuppositions of life." ⁵⁵

And here is the morality of the new world:

"What is happiness?—The feeling that power *increases*,—that a resistance is overcome.

"*Not* contentedness, but more power; *not* peace at any price, but warfare; *not* virtue, but capacity." ⁵⁶

This last word, "capacity," expresses Nietzsche's essential thought better than the word "power" or the favorite phrase of his later writings, "the will to power." Capacity implies that men are to cease endeavoring to lay down laws for other men or obeying laws made by other men, and are to develop the powers that lie in themselves, which will force them to assume infinitely varied relations to others. The will to power implies that the chief end of man is to use other men *with or without their knowledge or consent*. But the key to Nietzsche's thought is rather that the individual shall

develop free from all external pressure on the part of organized society or other individuals.

Nietzsche's central idea was not the "will to power," but that for the individual to develop his capacity it is necessary for him to use others and to be used by others; not the will to obtain power by whatever means, but the willingness to use over others that beneficent [though not benevolent] power that is naturally given us by our capacity—a complete reversal, in proportion as human capacity is developed, of Kant's principle that we should always regard others as ends and never as means, and so the most momentous revolution of morality in history.

Once the new moral principle is accepted by the masses and not merely by the superior few to whom alone Nietzsche appealed, there will be no falsehood by which they can be any longer deceived, no power by which they can any longer be held in subjection or prevented from bringing to completion that revolution in civilization which alone can assure the maximum development of the race.

X

THE SOCIALIST EXPLANATION OF RELIGION

THE view that religion is a force operating against progress has been held by leading Socialists from the beginning of the movement. Karl Marx wrote concerning the United States:

“When we see that in a country of complete political emancipation religion not only exists but keeps all its strength, there is no need of other proofs, I hope, that the existence of religion is not incompatible with the full *political* maturity of the state. But if religion exists it is in consequence of a defective *social* organization whose cause must be looked for in the very essence of the state itself. . . . For us religion is no longer the cause of social imperfection but its effect. So we explain the religious servitude of citizens politically enfranchised by their social servitude. *We do not claim that they ought to shake off their religious chains in order to make their social chains fall; we say, on the contrary, that they will break their religious chains by getting rid of their social chains.*” (My italics.)

The founders of the present Socialist theory, then, besides attacking the church, attacked religion itself, though they counseled against any waste of energy against an institution they considered as a by-product.

But their hostility to all religion did not mean that they accepted the atheism and free-thinking of the bourgeois liberals and radicals. Anyone familiar with

the radical views of the early Socialists, as well as the foremost living representatives of the movement, must realize instantly that it would follow as a matter of course that they must reject the religion of the present as they did all other social institutions and ideas (see Appendix B). But it follows with equal logic that they must reject the atheism and agnosticism of the present ruling class (see Appendix A). And the Socialists' criticism, in a word, is along the same lines as the present scientific studies of religion, but somewhat more advanced.

For religion continues to exist as a more or less important factor in society. No matter how ignorant it was in its origin or how retrogressive it may be in its effect to-day, it has been present in one form or another in almost every society and every age. Whether it is viewed as a good or an evil, whether it is taken as a normal or as a pathological feature of civilizations, it is impossible to understand the past or the present without knowing something of the present nature and past history of religion and without having some idea of just what functions it fills and has filled. It must be confessed that no final Socialist answer has been given to these questions, but at least some definite progress has been made and we can point out the lines that Socialist thought is beginning to follow.

We can best approach the Socialist and pragmatic view by beginning with a brief review of the present status of the scientific study of religion by the "evolutionary" school—and proceeding from this "evolutionary" view to the broader and more practical standpoint Socialists and pragmatists believe will grow out of it.

One of the chief contributions of the modern "evolutionary" school to the study of religion has been the standpoint—in accord with pragmatic psychology—that

religion has always consisted as much in practices as in ideas and feelings:

“Religion always contains two factors. First, a theoretical factor, what a man *thinks* about the unseen—his theology, or, if we prefer so to call it, his mythology. Second, what he *does* in relation to this unseen—his ritual. These factors rarely if ever occur in complete separation; they are blended in very varying proportions. Religion we have seen was in the last century regarded mainly in its theoretical aspect as a doctrine. Greek religion, for example, meant to most educated persons Greek mythology. Yet even a cursory examination shows that neither Greek nor Roman had any creed or dogma, any hard and fast formulation of belief. In the Greek Mysteries only we find what we should call a *Confiteor*, and this is not a confession of faith but an avowal of rites performed. When the religion of primitive peoples came to be examined it was speedily seen that though vague beliefs necessarily abound, definite creeds are practically non-existent. Ritual is dominant and imperative. . . . Popular belief says, I think, therefore I act; modern scientific psychology says, I act (or rather, *react* to outside stimulus), and so I come to think. Thus there is set going a recurrent series: act and thought become in their turn stimuli to fresh acts and thoughts.”¹

The modern study of religions has also come to see that in the psychology and the life of primitive man, and also of early civilizations, the field of religion is not to be marked off from the other practical and psychical activities. The whole habit of thought and all the customs of early man had as a rule a religious aspect and were influenced by religion, so that what we are concerned with at every point in this study is primitive psychology itself.

This primitive psychology, like that of our own time,

was shaped primarily by the active life of the period, and it is this that the later evolutionists emphasize, as opposed to the earlier and also to the preëvolutionary writers on religion, to whom the whole question was one of theology and not at all of social customs or of psychology in general:

“Herbert Spencer argued that when a savage has a dream he seeks to account for it, and in so doing invents a spirit world. The mistake here lies in the ‘seeks to account for it.’ Man is at first too busy *living* to have any time for disinterested *thinking*. He dreams a dream and it is real for him. He does not seek to account for it any more than for his hands and feet. He cannot distinguish between a *conception* and a *perception*, that is all. . . . Ghosts and sprites, ancestor worship, the soul, oracles, prophecy; all these elements of the primitive supersensuous world we willingly admit to be the proper material of religion, but other elements are more surprising, such are class-names, abstract ideas, numbers, geometrical figures. We do not nowadays think of these as of religious content, but to primitive men they were all part of the furniture of his supernatural world.”²

The modern student of religion recognizes that it is still the conception of religion as theology that prevails in the mind of the public, or at best the modified form of this conception as seen in Spencer and the early evolutionists:

“Man, we imagine, believes in a god or gods and then worships. The real order seems to be that, in a sense presently to be explained, he worships, he feels and acts, and out of his feeling and action, projected into his confused thinking, he develops a god. . . . We expect to see ‘The heathen in his blindness bow down to wood and stone,’ but the facts that actually confront us are startlingly dissimilar. Bowing down to wood and stone is an occupation that exists mainly in the minds

of hymn-writers. The real savage is more actively engaged. Instead of asking a god to do what he wants done, he does or tries to do it himself; instead of prayers he utters spells. In a word he is busy practicing magic, and above all, he is strenuously engaged in dancing magical dances. When the savage wants rain or wind or sunshine he does not go to church; he summons his tribe and they dance a rain-dance or wind-dance or sun-dance. When a savage goes to war we must not picture his wife at home praying for the absent; instead we must picture her dancing the whole night long; not for mere joy of heart or to pass the weary hours; she is dancing his war-dance to bring him victory.”³

Here it might appear that the later “evolutionary” students of religion were absorbing the pragmatic standpoint completely and applying it consistently to their whole subject. This might seem all the more probable because William James’ interpretation of pragmatism was especially adapted to religion by James himself. And it is undoubtedly true that the following passages, where the interpretation of the evolution of religion given in the above quotations is continued, do embody the pragmatic spirit, *as far as they go*:

“Dancing then is to the savage working, doing, and the dance is in its origin an imitation or perhaps rather an intensification of processes of work. Repetition, regular and frequent, constitutes rhythm, and rhythm *heightens the sense of will-power in action*. Rhythmical action may even, as seen in the dances of Dervishes, produce a condition of ecstasy. Ecstasy among primitive peoples is a condition much valued; it is often, though not always, enhanced by the use of intoxicants. *Psychologically the savage starts from the sense of his own will-power, he stimulates it by every means at his command*. Feeling his will strongly and knowing nothing of natural law he recognizes no limits to his own

power; he feels himself a magician, a god; he does not pray, he wills. Moreover, he wills collectively, reinforced by the will and action of his whole tribe. . . . As in the world of dreams and ghosts, so in the world of *mana*, space and time offer no obstacles; with magic all things are possible. In the one world what you imagine is real; in the other what you desire is *ipso facto* accomplished. Both worlds are egocentric, megalomaniac, filled to the full with unbridled human will and desire." (My italics.) ⁴

These quotations are thoroughly representative, but to make the "evolutionary" standpoint more definite I shall refer also, though only in a few words, to the works of Levy-Bruhl and Irving King.

Levy-Bruhl does not so much regard the primitive intellect as being subordinate to the feelings and unconscious or habitual activities as consisting in entirely different methods of thought. But as these methods are non-rational to the last degree his view also fits in with the pragmatic standpoint. The title of his chief work is significant: "The Mental Functions of Inferior Societies." ⁵ He concludes that the primitive mind is "impermeable to experience" and that its mentality is "pre-logical." This does not mean that early men are wholly irrational in their thinking, but that their mental processes are not guided by our logic, or perhaps by any logic. They reason very little at all, but their memories are extraordinarily developed, and are filled chiefly with images of the traditional activities of the tribe, that is, with social experience and with social habits of self-expression, and not with the experience of the individual, which may contradict the wisdom of the tribe at nearly every point.

Levy-Bruhl illustrates the point by the fact that "the medicine man always has the last word." If anything

goes wrong with his predictions the tribe always comes to him again for an explanation, and he is never lacking in one. Thus the beliefs of the tribe continue to grow according to social necessity, and nothing that can happen to individuals can teach them any objective truth. The "collective images" of the tribe are thus of a mystical character, and Levy-Bruhl even goes so far as to say that there is "no conception of space," that, on the contrary, there is "a law of participation" by which the savage is able to believe that he actually *is* an animal and even a vegetable—the same conclusion as that of Dr. Harrison, though reached by a somewhat different process of reasoning.

The "evolutionists" are more or less pragmatic, but all fail to make a thorough-going application of their pragmatism. They are all influenced by their study to an ultra-sympathetic attitude toward the primitive or religious state of mind, to that degree that they find this state useful and defensible even in modern society. With James, King believes that the religious state of mind represents a very important part of the unconscious functioning of the mind, not only in primitive man, but *at all times*, though not in all individuals. And as all pragmatists agree that "the action of the sub-conscious is indispensable to the most adequate functioning of consciousness," this gives to the religious type of mind an indispensable rôle in every society. King says:

"The religious mind *does* have a view of reality that is closed to one whose mental processes are organized from a rigidly rationalistic point of view, not, however, because the former has any influx or inspiration from a supernatural world, but because its point of view is appreciative rather than aggressive and rational." ⁶

It is not necessary for the pragmatist to accept this

conclusion. Unconscious, intuitive, and instinctive elements in our psychic nature must be recognized as being of equal importance with the conscious, but there is no reason, as I shall show, for calling any of these elements, when found in developed personalities, religious.

The pragmatist may agree with King that all of our science and thinking errs not so much in being too extended as in being too limited :

"Inasmuch as the universe, as we have already said, will probably always offer possibilities of experience beyond any actual attainment, it will usually be found to be true, in the light of more extended dealing with things, that our formulas and symbols err, not in overstating the possibilities of experience, but rather in narrowing down these possibilities and tending to limit them for all time." ⁷

But again there is no reason for calling such a point of view religious. It is simply a recognition of the importance of the imagination.

Levy-Bruhl reaches a similar conclusion to King and, as to the permanent place in life to be filled by religion, concludes that certain states of mind, which reach beyond the conscious or logical, will always be dependent upon religious feeling—just as much in modern times, apparently, as in the primitive times with which he is chiefly concerned.

William James' views are generally known. Starting out from the widely accepted theological agnosticism, he assumed the same compromising, negative, agnostic attitude to all supernaturalism and religion, and from this point his transition is easy to a creed which is after all sufficient to class him as being a religionist. The following phrases are typical: "I find myself believing that there is 'something in' these never-

ending reports of psychical phenomena, although I haven't yet the least positive notion of the something. It becomes to my mind simply a very worthy problem for investigation." After expressing his belief that there is something in a thing of which he has not even the least positive notion, James states his further belief in "real supernormal knowledge," by which he says he means knowledge that cannot be traced to the ordinary sources of information—the senses namely; and then he goes on to define how he conceives the state of mind of the automatist or medium of this supernormal knowledge:

"My own dramatic sense tends instinctively to picture the situation as an interaction between slumbering faculties in the automatist's mind and a cosmic environment of other consciousness of some sort which is able to work upon them. If there were in the universe a lot of diffuse soul-stuff, unable of itself to get into consistent personal form, or to take permanent possession of an organism, yet always craving to do so, it might get its head into the air, parasitically so to speak, by profiting by weak spots in the armor of human minds, and slipping in and stirring up there the sleeping tendency to personate." ⁸

James is here using in close connection terms taken from religious philosophy and terms taken from the science of the day, so that it becomes very difficult to say which preponderates. His supposition of "a cosmic environment of other consciousness of some sort" is at once concrete and sufficiently "spiritual" to satisfy even the Brahmin or theosophist. At the same time he repeatedly makes such statements as these: "I personally am as yet neither a convinced believer in parasitic demons, nor a spiritist, nor a scientist, but still remain a psychical researcher waiting for more facts before concluding."

Whether he was an agnostic or whether he built up a new religious system of his own, he refused to assume a wholly scientific attitude toward religion and practically reverted to a position similar, in many respects, to many of the German philosophers of half a century ago (such as Fechner, whom he ardently admired).

Let us assume that James is merely an agnostic. This agnosticism admits not only a tolerant but even a sympathetic attitude toward every reversion to religious crudity that appears, for what else are the ghosts and clairvoyants, the raps and messages from spirits, but the modern counterpart of the performances of the early priests and medicine men—a connection, indeed, which he would scarcely have denied. James himself says of all these “phenomena” that they “are always seeming to exist and can never be fully explained away” though “they also can never be susceptible of full corroboration.” But for all practical purposes his expectantly waiting attitude had and was intended to have precisely the same effect on the public mind as a partial corroboration. He was so fascinated even by the repeatedly exposed Paladina that he argued, especially from this case, that “even here the balance of testimony seemed to be inclining toward admitting the supernatural view.”

James’ study of religion did not pretend to be evolutionary. But the so-called evolutionists have reached equally unscientific conclusions. Though they may admit the evolution of religious tastes, they do not admit their evolution into anything radically different: namely, their development from the primitive practices and states of consciousness above described to the intuition or imagination of the men of a scientific age, which are removed as far as conceivable from the “collective images” of the primitives (to use a phrase of Levy-Bruhl’s) or that

traditional thinking which is the very essence of all that is properly called religion.

In failing to recognize that a new stage in men's attitude toward religion has appeared, and in failing to see that pragmatism requires this new standpoint, which is the very opposite of the "evolutionism" of Spencer and Haeckel, the semi-pragmatic and later evolutionary schools of religious study are neither evolutionary nor pragmatic. No psychological habit is permanent in the human race, not even the religious form of our subconscious states; and no thoroughly modern man can have any "religious experience." His intuition and his imagination must necessarily take other forms. If he calls these states religious, only two explanations are possible: Either he is a survival and belongs in a former generation, or else he misnames himself religious because he does not understand enough of the economic and social side of history to know what religion is. This last is the case of the "evolutionists."

Dr. Harrison's chief criticism of the school of religious study that preceded her (Spencer's) is that it failed to recognize that anthropomorphism is not the last stage in the development of religion, but lies at its very beginning:

"We are all of us born in sin, in that sin which is to science 'the seventh and deadliest,' anthropomorphism; we are egocentric, ego-projective. Hence necessarily we make our gods in our own image. Anthropomorphism is often spoken of in books on religion and mythology as if it were a last climax, a splendid final achievement in religious thought. First, we are told we have the lifeless object as god (fetichism), then the plant or animal (phytomorphism, theriomorphism), and last God is incarnate in the human form, divine. This way of putting things is misleading. Anthropomorph-

ism lies at the very beginning of our consciousness." 9

This is certainly an important truth, but it should be immediately supplemented by the still greater pragmatic truth. If man's early thinking, including his religion, was *anthropomorphic*, and if, in reaction from this mode of thinking, the mechanical science of the middle of the nineteenth century, for example that of Spencer and Haeckel, allotted to man an entirely inferior place in the universe, pragmatism, differing completely from both, is *anthropocentric*. It does not imagine that man has been placed in the center of the universe, but it states that he must place himself at the center so far as nature allows (see Chapter I).

Dr. Harrison divides the first or anthropomorphic period of religious evolution into two stages. [While she does not use the nomenclature I am about to adopt it will be seen to be perfectly applicable.] The first stage of religious growth may be called the stage of custom. It is the stage of the tribe rather than of early city civilization. Only a few chiefs, medicine men or priests are differentiated in their thinking from the rest of the tribe. These chiefly build up the prevailing customs, in accord of course with conditions and with their private interests, and they are themselves to a greater or lesser degree the dupes of their own imaginations or of those of their predecessors.

This earlier stage, according to the term employed by the prevailing school of religious study, is rather given over to practices of magic than to those of religion proper:

"In practice the transition from magic to religion, from spell to prayer, has always been found easy. So long as *mana* remains impersonal you order it about; when it is personified and bulks to the shape of an overgrown man, you drop the imperative and cringe before

it. *My will be done* is magic, *Thy will be done* is the last word in religion. The moral discipline involved in the second is momentous, the intellectual advance not striking." ¹⁰

The second stage is when society has been well differentiated into two or more classes, that is when the nomadic stage has ceased and cities have begun to appear. This is the stage of class rule. Both of these stages are anthropomorphic as far as the process of thought is concerned, but religious thinking and religious practices have come, in the second stage, to fulfill an utterly different function. The part they play in early society has been sufficiently described in the passages already quoted. Students of religion, being for the most part psychologists rather than sociologists, rarely understand at all and never fully understand the rôle religious institutions, religious thinking and religions play in this second period. Magic may fulfill what might be called a perverted social function; religion in the stricter sense of "*Thy will be done*" means simply the subjection of the masses to the ruling classes by means of religious impositions of which the latter are either fully or very largely conscious. Dr. Harrison's conclusion, then, as to the value of the *moral* discipline of this second period is a colossal error. Certainly there is discipline, but it is the discipline of social servitude. Dr. Harrison herself sees that the *intellectual* advance implied in the change from magic to religion is small. And indeed the condition of the peasant is very often even inferior to that of the primitive, intellectually and morally. Such culture as there was in primitive times was more or less equally shared among all the members of the tribe. Servitude was exceptional and existed only in the case of some specially powerful and tyrannical chief or the momentary victory of one tribe over another. When para-

sitism ceases to be casual and becomes organized, and society is divided into two or more classes, the condition of the lower class will often, though not always, actually be inferior to what it was before. An illustration is the condition of the slaves in Greece and Rome, that is of all those slaves who were taken not from other civilizations but from primitive conditions. It is obvious that the slaves taken from captured cities were forced into a lower position physically and psychically; this must usually have been the case also with many of the more primitive captives, e. g., those who were worked in the mines and in the galleys.

According to the "evolutionary" school present society, in the third and last stage in social evolution, is the opposite of anthropomorphic in its thinking and feeling. Religion, under these conditions, is supposed to have ceased to be a social sub-conscious state, to become an individual sub-conscious state. This point of view evidently fits in with the period of individualism through which we have just passed. It is also suited to the "State Socialism" into which we are entering. For "State Socialism" defends the social repression of the individual's economic freedom by the supposition that it is making him that much freer in his psychic life—though history shows no period in which men have been unfree in one respect and not in the other.

The reality is that neither individualism nor "State Socialism" propose to encourage real freedom of thought. While religious thinking, like its counterpart, purely mechanical thinking, is encouraged, realistic scientific thinking or pragmatism is discouraged. I have dealt with the mechanical conception elsewhere (in Chapter I). The religious state of mind has the definite practical value to the ruling class, whether under private capital-

ism (individualism) or "State Socialism," of inhibiting thought in the masses:

"The very elements in ritual on which Dr. Beck lays such stress, imitation, repetition, uniformity and social collectivity have been found by the experience of all time to have a two-fold influence—they inhibit the intellect, they stimulate and suggest emotion, ecstasy, trance. The Church of Rome knows what she is about when she prescribes the telling of the rosary. Mystery cults and sacraments, the lineal descendants of magic, all contain rites charged with suggestion, with symbols, with gestures, with half-understood formularies, with all the apparatus of appeal to emotion and will—the more unintelligible they are the better they serve their purpose of inhibiting thought. Thus ritual deadens the intellect and stimulates will, desire, emotion. . . . It is this personal *experience*, this exaltation, this sense of immediate, non-intellectual revelation of mystical oneness with all things that again and again rehabilitates a ritual otherwise moribund." ¹¹

I do not imply that the ruling classes or their leaders have ever been able deliberately to manufacture a religion for their purposes. But among the various religions and forms and shades of religion that are constantly arising and competing with one another they have had the deciding voice as to which is to survive. And so it happens that every form of religion from the earliest times to the present has had its utility as a means of class rule. And if certain extraordinary and all but pathological states are dignified by the name of "religious experiences," this is done consciously or unconsciously to extend the domain of such religion.

Certain psychic states undoubtedly exist that are called by those who feel them "religious experiences." But most of the scientific psychologists view the states that

usually go under this name either as suggestions from without, especially from religious traditions, or as auto-suggestions due to some physiological abnormality or exceptional strain. Though an evidence of the crushing or disintegration of the personality, such states may, of course, result in some incidental good. A mystical resignation, for example, may be a good to one about to suffer tortures, though avoidance of tortures is better. And rites of magic may indeed give a "magical" power of sacrifice and performance to savages, but civilization will give them infinitely more.

The pragmatist and Socialist appreciates as deeply as any the enormous potential value to society of many incommunicable psychic conditions or "soul states." But he objects to calling such perfectly normal states religious—not only because this is untrue, but also because it is a danger to society. If an individual is dimly conscious of a temperament or a mood through which he is able to inspire his fellow men, nothing but good may come of it; to give this condition a name which furnishes him an excuse for *preaching* to his fellow men from some "supernormal" standpoint is likely to make an intellectual autocrat of the preacher and intellectual slaves of those who follow him.

These so-called religious states, moreover, are no longer essentially religious (whatever they may be called) because they are not social manifestations at all—whether for good or evil. Ostwald very well remarks concerning the God of which such religious experiences speak:

"The certainty of the existence of such a God had to be placed in personal feelings. Feeling is everything. It follows at once from this that a God felt purely personally can exercise no social function, for from the God

of one man there is no communication to the God of another." ¹²

This conception of God, or rather this feeling of God, is therefore absolutely lacking on the side which is the most important to modern man. Ostwald notes, moreover, that the splitting up of religions into more and more sects, until finally it becomes a purely individual or personal matter, is the very opposite process from that of social advance. Science is becoming stronger and stronger because its various parts become more and more inter-related and integrated. Religion, on the contrary, is disintegrating and its direct social influence diminishing. And as religion ceases to be social it loses even its etymological significance, the "tying together" of men; just as morality, which is derived from the word *mores* (custom), once it becomes thoroughly individual, is no longer morality.

"The subject matter of the psychology of religion," says King, "consists not only of the states of consciousness called religion [though apparently this is the theory of Professor James], but also of all objective expression of those states as seen in rituals." From the evolutionary view adopted by King and others, religion is wrapped up with other concrete social activities at every point. There is, for instance, no such thing as any "innate" religious feeling or instinct any more than there is anything else "innate." Everything is to be accounted for by what went before. With Professor W. I. Thomas, King argues that the individual's psychic life is more or less a direct counterpart of the organization of the world about him, that intelligence itself arises from civilization. Therefore, religious practices and ideas correspond at every point with the state of civilization and with the stage of individual development which mankind

has reached, and there is no part of the life of a given society that does not help to explain its religion; in other words, religion is, as Marx said, a social product.

Fortunately we have in France a prominent Socialist who is at the same time an authority of high standing on the history of religion and who has expressed the Socialist view for us even more clearly. Like King, he is totally opposed to James' treatment of religion not as a social product but as the result merely of individual psychology. "As to theologians, philosophers impregnated with theology like M. James," say Professor Mauss and his collaborator, Professor Hubert, "we are not surprised that they speak of religious sentiment as a specific thing. Religious sentiment, they say, is religious experience, experience of God, and the latter corresponds to a special sense, a sixth sense, that of the divine persons, which we will not discuss here. It is no longer a question of fact but of faith." ¹³

These writers object strongly to those students of religion who seek to look upon it as being a single historic whole, independent of all other features of the environment: "They go straight to similarities and search everywhere only the human, common, in a word the commonplace. We stop methodically, on the contrary, at the characteristic differences of *environment*; and it is through these characteristics that we hope to catch glimpses of laws." From this modern standpoint the basis of the study of religion must be, not any general or preconceived ideas as to just which elements in any religious practice or system should be taken as essentially religious, but rather the state of society out of which religion grows.

This pragmatic method and attitude of Professors Hubert and Mauss is profoundly social. They show, for instance, that all early religions consist in elements

that are thoroughly contradictory to one another, but they do not altogether condemn them on that account:

"These contradictions are as inevitable as they are useful. For example, in order that a charm can be conceived of as acting at once at a distance and through contact, it was necessary to constitute the idea of a *mana* at once extended and not extended. The dead man is at once in another world and in his tomb where he is worshiped. Such notions, vicious for us, are an indispensable synthesis where sentiments and sensations, equally necessary, but at the same time contradictory, balance one another. The contradictions come from the richness of content of these notions and do not stop them at all from containing for believers the characteristics both of the empirical and of the rational. This is why religions and systems of magic have held together and have continually and everywhere developed into science, philosophy, technical arts, on the one side, into laws and myths on the other. They have thus powerfully aided in the formation, in the maturing of the human mind." ¹⁴

Religion, in a word, has been a sort of matrix in which the germs of truth and error were inextricably intertangled—a view that is at once scientific, pragmatic, and Socialistic.

Religion is social both in its effects and in its causes.

"The manner of thinking which has held religious sentiments together and has constantly developed them arises out of social forces, tradition and language which practically impose such methods of thinking on the average individual." ¹⁵

The illustration used by Hubert and Mauss makes still more clear the fundamentally and essentially social character of religion, from whatever angle it is viewed:

"Jupiter is at once a man and heaven, without mentioning diverse animals. The juxtaposition is contra-

dictory, but the *raison d'être* of a notion, like that of God, is precisely to reconcile in the mind of the believer ideas and sentiments which conflict with one another, and of which he does not wish to abandon anything. Thus from the beginning collective ideas developed into myths just as the general idea in the individual mind cannot be thought of without concrete images." ¹⁶

Surely this and the passage above quoted show that the modern evolutionist and the Socialist view attribute an enormous importance to religion. Socialists, at least, are no less disposed than the religious to recognize the important rôle religion has played—for good and for ill—in the past.

As soon as we study the history of religions from a thoroughly social standpoint, that is when we regard religion as a product of the evolution of society, we get out of the quagmire of interested or unclear thought in which the non-evolutionists and early evolutionists were involved. A truly evolutionary study of religious thinking is, in one word, a study of the evolution of society: "Different religious forms go back to different social situations rather than to preceding religious forms" (King). And there is nothing whatever in the constitution of modern society or of modern science which gives religious thinking the slightest theoretical foothold, leaves any place for religious practices, or gives any lasting value to religious states of soul.

The scientific defenders of religion themselves admit that in the primitive man's life "the social organization is practically the universe." Religion was then even from the earliest times merely a reflex of social forms:

"The religious acts and ideas are themselves an organic part of the activities of the social body. They are, in fact, social acts. Under certain circumstances customs become religious or acquire religious values. . . .

Thus a god could not be conceived as a father where marriage was so unstable that fatherhood was no recognized feature of the social structure, nor as a king among people into whose experience the institution of kingship had never entered. . . . But we may go even farther than this and maintain that religious beliefs and practices are not merely *modeled* upon the analogy of a people's economic and social life. The religious life *is* this social life in one of its phases. It is an organic part of the activity of the social body, not merely something built upon it. . . . The religions of all the peoples of antiquity were inseparable from their political organization, a fact particularly true of the ancient Egyptians and of the Israelites."¹⁷

A more detailed explanation of the effect of the social organization of the Israelites on their religion may be found in Louis Wallis' "Sociology of the Bible," or his "Examination of Society from the Standpoint of Evolution," where he shows that even the most brilliant of the writers of the Old Testament, namely the prophets or the individuals who wrote concerning them, represented the smaller aristocracy of Israel as against the ruling class. The gods of the ruling class had been taken bodily from Babylon, Tyre and other city civilizations and were then adapted to the agriculturists of Palestine, that is were used as the props of tyranny. But the small aristocracy or gentry, both in Palestine and elsewhere, created a new religion in Christianity, which, while adapted to their purposes, was equally tyrannical, as far as the rest of the population was concerned. The religion of Jesus, as Wallis says, suggested individual rights, but those rights were not secured unless the individual was worthy: "The individual in the abstract had rights, but only some individuals got rights in the concrete." As Wallis convincingly demonstrates:

"No straining of points can extract a properly social organic doctrine from his teaching."

Paul followed along the same road on which Jesus had set out, as we may see in the following well-known passages:

"Slaves, be obedient to them that according to the flesh are your lords, knowing that whatsoever good things each one doeth, the same shall he receive again from the Lord, whether he be a slave or a freeman." (Ephesians, 6:5, 8.)

"Slaves, obey in all things them that are your lords according to the flesh." (Colossians, 3:22.)

"Let as many as are slaves under the yoke count their masters worthy of all honor." (1 Timothy, 6:1.)

"Exhort slaves to be in subjection to their own masters, and to be well pleasing in all things, not gainsaying, not purloining, but showing all good fidelity." (Titus, 2:9.)

All these passages exhort slaves to honor and obey their masters. And it is also to be noted that Paul took slave-holders into the church without insisting that they liberate their slaves, for he only recommends mild treatment—and a great many pagans had gone that far.

Anyone who has fully grasped the social explanation of the religions of the past will explain in the same way the religions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and even the "individual religious experiences" of the present.

If the pragmatist must deny the continued necessity at the present time for the existence of religion in any form, even that of the entirely mystical and purely individual "religious experience," he denies still more strongly all the ordinary doctrines that have usually gone with religion, for not only are most of these denied even by James and by the "evolutionary" students

of religion but most of them are rejected also by advanced religionists, such as Dr. Charles W. Eliot.

It is necessary to distinguish sharply, however, the grounds on which the pragmatist rejects religious dogmas from the grounds even of the broadest religionist or non-pragmatic evolutionist. Such typically modern (but non-pragmatic) writers as Maeterlinck and Henry James criticize the doctrine of immortality of the soul very brilliantly, but from the standpoint that we do not want to give such a high attribute as immortality to such an insignificant thing as a human soul. Both of course are far from belittling humanity in the purely pessimistic spirit of a Schopenhauer, but to both man appears to be very small in comparison with the universe. Pragmatism, on the contrary, instead of denying such a high attribute as immortality to such a small entity as the human soul, would deny the value and even the conceivability of such an attribute as immortality, although insisting on giving some of the highest attributes that are conceivable to the human soul. Thus the pragmatist dismisses the whole controversy in its ancient form, just as he avoids all historic controversies, by displacing old questions for new ones. If he does not desire and cannot even conceive immortality, then of course he is not interested at all in the question whether it is an attribute of the human soul or not.

It must be remembered that even Emerson, a thinker most widely separated from Socialism, renounced this doctrine as crude and unspiritual, long before modern pragmatism had appeared. He reminded us that Jesus himself never "uttered a syllable concerning the duration of the soul":

"It was left to his disciples to sever duration from moral elements and to teach the immortality of the soul as a doctrine and maintain it by evidence. The moment

the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is separately taught man is already fallen. In the flowing of love, in the adoration of humility there is no question of continuance. For the soul is true to itself and the man in whom it is shed abroad cannot wander from the present which is infinite to a future which would be infinite." ¹⁸

Indeed, Mrs. Gilman has pointed out that the demand for an immortal soul is due to ultra-individualistic instincts:

"There was evidently no room for the soul—no explanation for the soul—in one human life as we see it before us, but still, said we, if we make a human life long enough there will be room for the soul. That will give us time to understand it and to justify these quenchless aspirations, these boundless desires. *It did not occur to us that if we made it wide enough it would have the same effect.* Our illimitable egoism, being unable to satisfy its own demands by an earthly means, has postulated an eternal ego with whole ranges of planetary systems to feed in, and hopes in course of eternity, time not being enough to satisfy itself." ¹⁹

Immortality, in the light of pragmatism, could only mean spiritual death, and the longing for immortality can only come from the dead or dying part of ourselves. To preserve a human being as he is would be to destroy all the meaning he ever had. Nor can any individual wholly intelligent and alive and who knows what we know to-day desire "personal immortality" any more than he could desire the present age to continue forever. To yearn to perpetuate the present or any part of the present is evidently to fear the growth and development of the future, and to fear growth can only mean that to the degree of our fear we have ceased to grow.

Nor can pragmatists take up the agnostic's attitude

of intellectual renunciation on this or any other dogma. Horace Traubel quotes Ingersoll, for example, as having said to him in a personal conversation: "The idea of immortality is no more unreasonable than reasonable," thus taking what might be called the agnostic's compromise toward it. To this Traubel remarks:

"I don't say I know all the forewords and afterpieces of creation. But I have learned not to drop curtains and acknowledge frontiers." ²⁰

No pragmatist can take exception to this statement, but the burden of proof is on those who assert immortality or any other theory, and if they prove nothing it does not leave the honors even, but is just as if the idea had never been suggested. A confession of our ignorance of the totality of the universe, such as Traubel makes, helps the defenders of immortality no more than it helps the defenders of all other dogmas no matter how unlikely or fantastic they may be.

So also with the concept God. The Socialist and pragmatist can be neither an atheist nor an agnostic. As he does not admit the importance or human interest in the question, Is there or is there not a God? he neither agrees with the atheist in taking the negative of this proposition nor with the agnostic in considering that the affirmative has as much chance of being right as the negative (for this is agnosticism in its commonly accepted form).

I have pointed out that the mechanistic and the religious standpoints appear as equally retrogressive to the pragmatist. Aside from the inherent weakness of the mechanical view, the conversion of many of its chief adherents into believers in some kind of God bears out my statement. For example, a critic (Hopps, in the *Contemporary Review*) says of Haeckel—in reviewing

his "Scientific Confession of Faith"—that he now seems "almost nervously anxious to get God into his monism":

"Ever more clearly," says Haeckel, "we are compelled by reflection to recognize that God is not to be placed over against the material world as an external being, but must be placed as a 'divine power' or 'moving spirit' within the cosmos itself."

But some of the leading scientists of England have become still more openly reactionary. Not only Sir Oliver Lodge, but even the "Socialist," Alfred Russell Wallace, are engaged in building up new religious systems. In "The World of Life" Wallace assumes a "mind-developing power from all eternity," and from this assumption he very easily comes to the conclusion that at all periods "beings of infinite power, what we should call Gods, must have resulted":

"Long ages before the first rudiment of life appeared on the earth, long before all the suns we see had become suns, the infinite development had been at work and must have produced gods of infinite degrees of power, any one of whom would presumably be quite capable of starting such a solar system as ours, or one immensely larger and better, and of so determining the material constitution of an 'earth' as to initiate and guide a course of development which would have resulted in a far higher being than man . . . a body of what we may term organizing spirits who would be charged with the duty of so influencing the myriads of cell-souls as to carry out automatically *their* part of the work with accuracy and certainty. . . . The vast whole is therefore a manifestation of His power—perhaps of His very self—but by the agency of His ministering angels through many descending grades of intelligence and power." ("The World of Life; a Manifestation of Creative Power, Directive Mind and Ultimate Purpose.")

It has long been common in English-speaking countries for scientific exponents of evolution in some other field to fail totally to apply the evolutionary standpoint to religion. Take for example the following quotation from Herbert Spencer's "First Principles." Certainly Spencer was one of the first to propose that religion should be studied as being in the process of evolution. Yet his views of religion were dogmatic and the opposite of evolutionary:

"The consciousness of an inscrutable power, manifested to us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer, and must ultimately be freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty toward which intelligence has from the first been progressing. To this conclusion science inevitably arrives as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion religion is irresistibly driven by criticism." ²¹

What could be less evolutionary than the assumption that our ideas on these subjects would some day reach "perfection," unless it is Spencer's attempt to tell us what this perfection will be?

James' idea is "that there *is* a God but that he is finite either in power or knowledge, or in both at once," and that "these are the terms in which common men have carried on their active commerce with God." This is precisely the reverse of the attitude of Spencer, and far more reactionary, as James is interested solely in the very crudest conceptions, or rather uses, of the idea of God, while Spencer is for attenuating it even beyond the point of the most advanced theological speculations. Spencer's creed would unintentionally further the evolution of religion toward philosophy among the more educated and thoughtful, while it would take away

whatever human interest and value there is in religion for the ordinary man. James' creed would have exactly the opposite effect in both cases. Few educated persons would care for a "finite" God, and James' unconscious patronizing of the beliefs of "common men" could only have the effect of keeping them in their superstition and ignorance.

It may be that this new respect for the supernatural flourishes and grows because the upper classes feel, in a spirit of sincere patronage, that there is a need for some kind of religion for the masses. It may be that other persons of these classes subconsciously feel the truth that some religion must be taught even if it is necessary for this purpose to tell the people the "magnificent lie" recommended by Plato. Or it may be that there is no such motive, even an unconscious one, and that the explanation of this extraordinary reversion is to be traced not to any moral relapse but rather to a mental confusion. There can be no doubt that the refusal of many of the most cultured and educated fully to recognize, or their inability fully to grasp, the great central truths of our time, those of evolution and Socialism, lead necessarily to a general confusion in their thinking. Whichever of these explanations is the correct one there can be no doubt that the tendency to revert to supernaturalism is to be traced to the separation of the ruling classes from the rest of society either in interest or in mental attitude.

"There are other fields in life more important than the healing of pain," says Dr. H. R. Marshall: "In the long run it will be better for the race to risk the tendency of some suffering among weaklings which magic can wholly relieve, rather than to curtail clear thinking among the common people." ²²

Men of science have already recognized the reaction-

ary effect of such views as those of James on philosophy and in the intellectual world. Professor Witmer of the University of Pennsylvania writes that "such teachings and their popularity must be viewed as a craze which, spreading from some academic walls like a psychic contagion among the laity, is rapidly reducing the mentality of the American people to a mediæval and even pagan obscurantism or imbecility." He argues, and doubtless the majority of the scientifically educated would agree with him, that James practically "opened a campaign for occultism." ²³

Speaking of James in connection with other professors of philosophy at Harvard, Professor Perrin of Columbia University writes: "Better scholars or more productive personalities than these men it would be difficult to find, and yet the metaphysics they teach is unreal, and as it has the effect of crippling the minds of our American youth it should be exposed. Philosophy is not a thing apart from scientific cause and effect." Professor Perrin addresses the aristocracy of learning. The Socialist would remind him that this aristocracy is bound up with that of wealth and privilege, and that the effort to found a religion or a philosophy more or less independent of fact is as old as the world, and is likely to continue as long as society is divided into classes. For as long as it is practicable to keep supernaturalism and metaphysics alive they will be used by the ruling class as a foundation on which to build up a body of doctrine for maintaining the masses in ignorance, and for furnishing some makeshift that will serve in their own minds as a defence of the iniquities of class rule.

XI

THE NEW EDUCATION AND THE OLD

PUBLIC education in Germany and France, and the other countries where Socialism is most developed, is so backward that the Socialists of those countries have not yet fully evolved their educational ideal. The principal German Socialist book on public schools,¹ as well as Bebel's references to it in his "Woman," and the discussion one reads in the German Socialist press, are concerned primarily with raising the German level up to that of the United States and freeing the German system from evils we have already largely overcome. This does not mean that Continental Socialists have no distinctively Socialist educational ideals, but only that they realize that an intermediate stage of "State Socialist" school reform lies between them and the first steps in the establishment of a Socialist school system.

The Socialist philosophy necessarily leads to an entirely revolutionary attitude toward education in all its phases, and if we have no works of the first importance devoted exclusively to education, this arises not only from the cause just mentioned, but also from the fact that several of the best known writers on educational questions are exceptionally radical, and even Socialistic, and between them have gone to the full length of what Socialism requires. If we take for example those writers who are having the greatest influence on the American public to-day, we find that their ideals, when broadly

interpreted, somewhat expanded, and related together, form a complete Socialistic whole.

The most suggestive and Socialistic feature of Montessori's method, for example, is her "real social enterprises," in which the children are taught at the very earliest years to wait on the table, to clean house, etc. The *activity* of the children is the point of departure, as in Froebel's kindergartens, but this activity is made still more social by concerning itself, as far as possible, with realities, with work the utility of which the child can understand. The Montessori method has also become intensely realistic and social at another point, for the chief and earliest application of the trained senses is to teach the very small child, from two and a half to five years of age, to write and to read. And far from being a merely formal exercise, which writing and reading are in the ordinary education, Montessori has found that they both answer to a real need in the very small child's life. Almost as soon as speech is at all well developed this need, she has discovered, appears. And it seems that the objection to teaching children to read or write too early, which was so strongly felt by Dewey and others, was due more to the immense difficulties met in the older system than to the absence of a sufficiently intense interest and need upon the part of the children. The real social activities prepare the children immediately for life itself. The teaching of reading and of writing in the kindergarten years also prepare the child for its child life, but to a still greater degree they prepare it for taking up all the later school activities, in proportion as the child becomes ripe for them, and as these later activities are also a part of child life, this means a revolutionary step in integrating the child's whole development.

One of the most eloquent, philosophic, and Socialistic

of Montessori's passages is that in which she shows the complete revolution in school material and equipment and the enormously increased expenditure that her system, as well as common sense, necessitates:

"The tendency toward social liberty is most evident, and manifests itself on every hand. The leaders of the people make it their slogan, the laboring masses repeat the cry, scientific and socialistic publications voice the same movement, our journals are full of it. The underfed workman does not ask for a tonic, but for better economic conditions which shall prevent malnutrition. The miner who, through the stooping position maintained during many hours of the day, is subject to inguinal rupture, does not ask for an abdominal support, but demands shorter hours and better working conditions in order that he may be able to lead a healthy life like other men.

"And when, during this same social epoch, we find that the children in our schoolrooms are working amid unhygienic conditions, so poorly adapted to normal development that even the skeleton becomes deformed, our response to this terrible revelation is an orthopedic bench. It is much as if we offered to the miner the abdominal brace, or arsenic to the underfed workman.

"It behooves us to think what may happen to the *spirit* of the child who is condemned to grow in conditions so artificial that his very bones may become deformed. When we speak of the redemption of the workingman, it is always understood that beneath the most apparent form of suffering, such as poverty of the blood, or ruptures, there exists that other wound from which the soul of the man who is subjected to any form of slavery must suffer. It is at this deeper wrong that we aim when we say that the workman must be redeemed through liberty. We know only too well that when a man's very blood has been consumed or his intestines wasted away through his work, his soul must have lain oppressed

in darkness, rendered insensible, or it may be killed within him. The *moral* degradation of the slave is, above all things, the weight that opposes the progress of humanity—humanity striving to rise and held back by this great burden. The cry of redemption speaks far more clearly for the souls of men than for their bodies.

“What shall we say then, when the question before us is that of *educating children*?

“We know only too well the sorry spectacle of the teacher who, in the ordinary schoolroom, must pour certain cut and dried facts into the heads of the scholars. In order to succeed in this barren task she finds it necessary to discipline her pupils into immobility and to force their attention. Prizes and punishments are ever ready and efficient aids to the master who must force into a given attitude of mind and body those who are condemned to be his listeners.”²

Just as Montessori moves directly against mental servitude by prohibiting the teacher all kinds of undue interference with the spontaneous activities of the child, so she attempts, by scientific methods, by an elaborate equipment, and by a sufficiency of highly trained and thoroughly qualified teachers, to free them from that servitude to material things to which every untrained being is subject. This is the way she explains the necessity for real social enterprises, such as dressing, washing, waiting on the table, etc. Of the child who has not been taught to do these things she says:

“He is still dependent, since he is not yet able to walk, and cannot wash and dress himself, and since he is not yet able to ask for things in a language which is clear and easily understood. He is still in this period to a great extent the slave of everyone. By the age of three, however, the child should have been able to render himself to a great extent independent and free. That

we have not yet thoroughly assimilated the highest concept of the term independence is due to the fact that the social form in which we live is still servile. In an age of civilization where servants exist the concept of that form of life which is independence cannot take root or develop freely. Even so in the time of slavery the concept of liberty was distorted and darkened. Our servants are not our dependents, rather it is we who are dependent upon them.”³

Both in her insistence on the importance of the influence of material surroundings and of the necessity of mastering them, and in her fundamental and persistent protest against servants, Montessori is a thoroughgoing Socialist. She continues:

“Any nation that accepts the idea of servitude and believes that it is an advantage for man to be served by man admits servility as an instinct, and indeed we all too easily lend ourselves to obsequious service, giving to it such complimentary names as courtesy, politeness, charity.

“In reality, he who is served is limited in his independence. This concept will be the foundation of the dignity of the man of the future: ‘I do not wish to be served because I am not an impotent.’ And this idea must be gained before men can feel themselves to be really free. . . .

“We habitually serve children; and this is not only an act of servility toward them, but it is dangerous, since it tends to suffocate their useful spontaneous activity. We are inclined to believe that children are like puppets, and we wash them and feed them as if they were dolls.

“The peril of servilism and dependence lies not only in that ‘useless consuming of life,’ which leads to helplessness, but in the development of individual traits which indicate all too plainly a regrettable perversion and de-

generation of the normal man. I refer to the domineering and tyrannical behavior with examples of which we are all only too familiar. The domineering habit develops side by side with helplessness. It is the outward sign of the state of feeling of him who conquers through the work of others. Thus it often happens that the master is a tyrant toward his servant. It is the spirit of the task-master toward the slave.”⁴

This to be sure is a mere repetition, as far as the *language* is concerned, of some of the passages of Rousseau. But Rousseau was not a Socialist and did not represent the point of view of the propertyless masses. While arguing against servitude he never remotely hinted at the possibility of doing away with servants either for the child or for the man—and indeed we may easily understand why that possibility was scarcely conceivable before the age of steam.

Finally Montessori realizes of education both on its material and spiritual sides that it must concern itself equally with the school and the home. Her combination of school and model tenements, which she calls “The Child’s House,” is undoubtedly a long step toward a collective home—and, as the home has been a purely individualistic and an ultra-individualistic institution, this means practically its disappearance and absorption into a higher social form (see Chapter XIII). Montessori does not subject the school to the home or the home to the school, but brings them together in a common collective plan:

“We have put *the school within the home*; and this is not all. We have placed it within the home as the *property of the collectivity*, leaving under the eyes of the parents the whole life of the teacher in the accomplishment of her mission.

"This idea of the collective ownership of the school is new and very beautiful and profoundly educational.

"Another advance made by the 'Children's Houses' as an institution is related to scientific pedagogy. This branch of pedagogy, heretofore, being based upon the anthropological study of the pupil it is to educate, has touched only a few of the positive questions which tend to transform education. For a man is not only a biological but a social product, and the social environment of individuals in the process of education is the home." ⁵

Montessori is conscious that her educational plan works toward a collective and even toward a communistic form of home (see quotation in Chapter XIII). Undoubtedly the most serious limitation in the present education of children is outside of the school and not in it, undeveloped and stunted as the schools are.

In spite of some apparent contradictions, the application of Dewey's principles to primary education follows perfectly after the use of the Montessori methods in the kindergarten years. If Dewey objected to the early teaching of writing and reading, even at the age it is ordinarily done in the public schools, this was when writing was taught by a laborious method that required years, and when reading was not acquired, as in the Montessori method, in connection with writing and as a part of social games. And while the early reading and writing of Montessori would not necessarily conflict with Dewey's "social occupations," even if both were used together, as they may be, it is obvious that the Montessori system is by its nature more adapted to the earlier, and the Dewey system to the later, period. Montessori's "real social activities" are limited in scope, though they could easily be extended to include, during the primary years, cooking, sewing, housekeep-

ing and an elementary introduction to all domestic science, art, and economy. On the other hand, Dewey's idea of introducing, as the basis of education, the co-operative work of the children in primitive or simplified industries is limited in the kindergarten period by the fact that very few such occupations or industries can be found that are adapted to very small children. On the other hand, it can be imagined how much interest would be added to the Dewey system if the children were already able to read, for instance, illustrated books dealing with the stories (history and geography) of the various occupations practiced—and doubtless both reading and writing could be used in innumerable other ways.

Let me review the general principles upon which Dewey's system rests before dealing with its concrete activities. For, unlike Montessori, Dewey is interested in the whole problem of education, though his interest seems to center chiefly on its intermediate stages. First of all he regards it as the function of education not only to shape the individual, but equally to shape society itself. And there is little doubt that this critical and active attitude toward present society, which is basic and must certainly be introduced at some stage in education, should begin to be taught as soon as reading and writing have been mastered:

“Education has not only to safeguard an individual against the besetting erroneous tendencies of his own mind—its rashness, presumption and preference of what chimes with self-interest to objective evidence—but also to undermine and destroy the accumulated and self-perpetuating prejudices of long ages. When social life in general has become more reasonable, more imbued with rational conviction, and less moved by stiff authority and blind passion, educational agencies will work in

harmony with the educative influence exercised willy-nilly by other social surroundings upon an individual's habits of thought and belief. At present the work of teaching must not only transform natural tendencies into trained habits of thought, but must also fortify the mind against irrational tendencies current in the social environment and help displace erroneous habits already produced." ⁶

This element in Dewey's system is, I believe, the most fundamental of all, as evidently it is the most Socialistic. The training of the child for participation in social life and at the same time to control social life is the key to his whole system. And aside from this purpose he points out that education should have no moral end or aim:

"The child must be educated for the society of his generation. The society of which the child is to be a member is, in the United States, a democratic and progressive society. *The child must be educated for leadership as well as for obedience.* He must have power of self-direction and power of directing others, power of administration, ability to assume positions of responsibility. This necessity of educating for leadership is as great on the industrial as on the political side. [How contradictory to the employers' conception of industrial education!]

"New inventions, new machines, new methods of transportation and intercourse are making over the whole scene of action year by year. It is an impossibility to educate the child for any fixed station in life. So far as education is conducted unconsciously or consciously on this basis it results in fitting the future citizen for no station in life, but makes him a drone, a hanger-on, or an actual retarding influence in the onward movement. Instead of caring for himself and for others, he becomes one who has himself to be cared for. Here,

too, the ethical responsibility of the school on the social side must be interpreted in the broadest and freest spirit; it is equivalent to that training of the child which will give him such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only adapt himself to the changes that are going on, but have power to shape and direct them.

"Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end or aim. As long as we confine ourself to the school as an isolated institution, we have no directing principles, because we have no object. For example, the end of education is said to be the harmonious development of all the powers of the individual. Here no reference to social life or membership is apparent, and yet many think we have in it an adequate and thorough-going definition of the goal of education. But if this definition be taken independently of social relationship we have no way of telling what is meant by any one of the terms employed. We do not know what a power is; we do not know what development is; we do not know what harmony is. A power is a power only with reference to the use to which it is put, the function it has to serve. . . .

"The child ought to have the same motives for right doing and to be judged by the same standards in the school as the adult in the wider social life to which he belongs. Interest in community welfare, an interest that is intellectual and practical, as well as emotional—an interest, that is to say, in carrying these principles into execution—is the moral habit to which all the special school habits must be related if they are to be animated by the breadth of life." (*My italics.*) ⁷

The most noteworthy thing in these passages is that the child is to be trained not only to have interest in the community welfare but to re-shape and remodel the community. The child is not taught to regard even society or the human race as authorities which stand

above him, but as things over which he will have a voice and some control.

Of course this puts Dewey in complete antagonism to existing systems of public instruction, which even in their ideals propose no more than to shape the child to the needs of society. His words remind us of those of the martyred Spanish educator, Francisco Ferrer:

"Let us not fear to say that we want men capable of evolving without stopping, capable of destroying and renewing their environments without cessation, of renewing themselves also; men whose intellectual independence will be their greatest force, who will attach themselves to nothing; always ready to accept what is best, happy in the triumph of new ideas, aspiring to live multiple lives in one life. Society fears such men; we must not hope then it will ever want an education able to give them to us."

Certainly we must all recognize that the ideal of the ruling classes which everywhere control our schools is not to produce independent and fearless men of this type, but merely the industrious and serviceable. *The forces that control society do not desire to produce human beings who promise to further progress to such a degree as to threaten their domination.* Their method is either to shorten the curriculum or to limit its extension to "practical" subjects and those that are in the interest of the government and industry as they are, rather than that of the child and of the society that is to be.

As opposed to these and all other reactionary tendencies, Dewey advocates "*the development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science,*" and the "transformation of all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in harmony with these ideas." Until we have gone further along this line, "it is better that our schools should do nothing than that they should

do wrong things. It is better for them to confine themselves to their obviously urgent tasks than that they should, under the name of spiritual culture, form habits of mind which are at war with those of democracy and science. It is not laziness or cynicism which calls for this *laissez-faire* policy, it is honesty, courage, sobriety, and faith." ⁸

It is not alone the all-pervasive influence of class rule against which Dewey contends, but also the reigning educational philosophy of the day which, even when inspired by no reactionary motive, suffers, as a rule, from the complete absence of a scientific, democratic, and social standpoint.

"The school practice of to-day has a definite psychological basis," says Dewey, "the greatest obstacle to the introduction of certain educational reforms is precisely the permeating persistence of the underlying psychological creed." This creed is, in a word, the individualistic and, at the bottom, non-evolutionary psychology of the day, in which the individual's psychical life is analyzed apart from his social environment and apart from the history of civilization and especially of its later scientific, democratic, and social phase.

While laying greater emphasis than others do on the difference between the child and the adult, Dewey would also have us learn more than we do as to the correct way of dealing with the child from practical adult life—where the individualistic and non-evolutionary psychology that dominates our education has no effect:

"No one seriously questions that with an adult, power and control are obtained through realization of personal ends and problems, through personal selection of means and materials that are relevant, and through personal adaptation and application of what is thus selected, together with whatever of experimentation and of testing

is involved in this effort. Practically every one of these conditions of increase in power for the adult is denied for the child. For him problems and aims are determined by another mind. And upon the whole there is such an attempt to teach him a ready-made method for applying his material to the solution of his problems, or the reaching of his ends, that the factor of experimentation is reduced to a minimum. With the adult we unquestionably assume that an attitude of personal inquiry, based upon the possession of a problem which interests and absorbs, is a necessary precondition of mental growth. With the child we assume that the precondition is rather the willing disposition which makes him ready to submit to any problem and material presented from without. Alertness is our ideal in the one case; docility in the other.”⁹

In other words, the very essence of the pragmatic psychology, which is taught us by actual living, is forgotten in our educational work, and we assume that we are such masters of the child's psychology that we can play the part of omnipotence and practically replace life itself by artificial methods. We do this no doubt because docile and artificially formed human beings fit best into the lower levels of our present social system.

Dewey says, on the contrary, that “since the ethical personality” of the child is not formed but forming, the function of the teacher is to provide “stimuli leading to the equipment of personality with active habits and interests.”¹⁰ The teacher, that is, must lead the child to life rather than mold him according to a preconceived plan. The last thing that the teacher, who comes into contact with living personalities, should do is to assume the attitude of the psychological analyst, as so often happens to-day. If he does this he “reduces persons to objects and thereby distorts, or rather destroys, the ethical relationship which is the vital nerve of instruction.”¹¹

The teacher and the pupils are to be regarded as parts rather of a little democratic society than of a hierarchy composed of two grades, the teacher and the taught, and this little society is to be made like the larger society and life as a whole by occupying itself with activities as nearly like the activities of adults as may be—making allowances for the child's inferior development, but not for his status as pupil. The simplest industrial processes, beginning with those of primitive man, are not only to be taught, as in the so-called system of industrial education, but are to furnish the very basis of instruction, underlying even reading, writing, and arithmetic. With subjects of instruction like this, with the absence of any regimentation, even that inherent in the ordinary school *task*, with small classes and sufficient means, the teacher of the new education will be able to live up to Dewey's standard as he could scarcely hope to do under present conditions:

“The teacher is, indeed, a person occupied with other persons. He lives in a social sphere, he is a member and organ of social life. His aims are social aims; the development of individuals taking ever more responsible positions in a circle of social activities continually increasing in radius and in complexity. What ever he as a teacher effectively does, he does as a person; and he does with and toward persons. His methods, like his aims, when actively in operation, are practical, are social, are ethical, are anything you please save merely psychical. In comparison with this, the material and the data, the standpoint and the methods of psychology, are abstract. They transform specific acts and relations of individuals into a flow of processes in consciousness; and these processes can be adequately identified and related only through reference to a biological organism.”¹²

Here is an attitude exactly the reverse of that which often grows out of the present non-social psychology,

which is also non-evolutionary because it does not take *social* evolution into account. For according to this psychology the child is considered in large part as a young animal slowly developing one human attribute after another. With Dewey, on the contrary, he is a personality and a member of society from the outset. It is not that present-day educators fail altogether to recognize the existence of personality from the beginning, but Dewey complains that their pedagogical philosophy makes them view this personality as a mysterious thing which there are no definite means of seizing:

“Upon the whole, the best efforts of teachers at present are partly paralyzed, partly distorted, and partly rendered futile precisely from the fact that they are in such immediate contact with sheer, unanalyzed personality. The relation is such a purely ethical and personal one [i. e., not merely ‘psychological’] that the teacher [educated to this psychological view] cannot get enough outside the situation to handle it intelligently and effectively.”¹³

Only when the child's life is filled by activities in the school which call out his personality and give it full and free play will the teacher be able to see where each individual child stands and how he can be reached. It is not alone false theories on the teacher's part that make it impossible for him to obtain that intimate relation with the child that he needs in order to draw out its fullest powers, but also false relations created by the present system in the school. Dewey, then, has a two-fold criticism of the present education—even at its best, first as to its individualistic psychological theory, and, second, as to its attempt to make good the deficiency of this theory by a sheer effort to contrive a personal relationship without any adequate means of knowing the child or of sharing its life.

He says that educators commonly suppose that "by some influence of pure personality upon pure personality, conjoined with a knowledge of rules formulated by an educational theorist," an effective education can be contrived. But he points out that this is nothing more than "an appeal to magic, plus dependence upon servile routine."¹⁴ This condition, Dewey believes, is partly due to the fact that the teacher accepts as valid certain pedagogical generalizations which he has not drawn and could never draw from his actual experience as a teacher, that his position toward the great educational theories is that merely of a soldier waiting orders from a general—an inevitable condition until the establishment of social democracy secures for the teacher some independence from the business interests that now control the schools, or at least check their development through control of the purse strings and the higher institutions of learning. And certainly the art of education cannot be mastered like the military art.

Having discussed Dewey's criticism of our present education, we can now appreciate his constructive program, for Dewey advocates, under the name of occupational education, a total revolution in our school system. It is not education *for* occupation, but education *through* occupation that he has in view. And it is precisely in this difference of emphasis that the whole contrast between the present system and Socialist education lies. The Socialist would educate every individual for the highest occupation of which he is capable, and make it possible for him to compete with others on equal terms for any position for which he chooses to strive; the capitalist would train every individual for a single occupation very early in life—unless the parents are well-to-do or the child extremely exceptional. Dewey favors industrial education; what usually goes by that name is industrial

training. Education through industrial processes for the general participation in the industrial and economic life of the community, and education, during these same primary or secondary years, for certain special and inferior industrial functions are opposed to one another at every point.

Dewey insists on a basic principle in education, which is acknowledged by the overwhelming majority of educators, namely, that the full and free growth of the child requires that he should *not* be specialized early:

"He is engaged in forming habits rather than in definitely utilizing those already formed. Consequently he is absorbed in getting that all-round contact with persons and things, that range of acquaintance with the physical and ideal factors of life, which shall afford the background and material for the specialized aims and pursuits of life. He is, or should be, busy in the formation of a flexible variety of habits whose sole immediate criterion is their relation to full growth, rather than acquiring certain skills whose value is measured by their reference to specialized technical accomplishments."¹⁵

Instead of demanding an abbreviation and perversion even of such beginnings of a democratic educational system as we now have, Dewey stands for their extension and fulfillment. Instead of fitting the individual of the future for the lower ranks in industry and neglecting to train all his latent capacities for parenthood and citizenship, Dewey proposes to fit him to fill any function in society for which, at a later period of education, he may show the capacity, and to carry out his general duties as a citizen in the only concrete and practical way they can be carried out, namely, in relation to the general problems of industry.

Dewey conceives of the school as the *only* place where we can work freely for the formation of a higher human

type of a "social personality, with a certain attitude and equipment of working powers." For "in idea, at least, no other purpose restricts or compromises the dominance of the school purpose," and this is not the case "in business, politics and the professions."¹⁶ He wishes us to take advantage of this superior freedom of the school, which we can do only if we refuse to allow the child to become a specialized worker in society until his education is complete. Industrial education as now preached goes in exactly the opposite direction, and, instead of working to change the world through the school, allows the one-sided development and worldliness of business, politics and the professions to pervert the normal development of the schools.

Dewey explains his plan of education through occupations as follows:

"The education of the human race, on the whole, has been gained through the occupations which it has pursued and developed. The vocations, the professions, the lines of activity which have been socially evolved, have furnished the social stimuli of knowledge and the centers about which it has been organized. If occupations were made fundamental in education, school work would conform to the natural principles of social and mental development. The beginnings of this reform have already been introduced. Froebel got a glimpse of this conception in his scheme of education for infancy, though his policy was too romantic and symbolic to permit the idea to get adequate expression. Engineering and technical schools, in which the sciences are pursued in reference to their social uses, illustrate, at the upper end of the school ladder, another aspect of the same principle. The increasing emphasis upon gardening, horticulture, cooking, weaving, shop-work in wood and metal in the elementary and secondary schools is another symptom of the same movement. The ultimate value and (let us

hope) destiny of the present movement toward industrial education will depend upon whether it becomes switched off into a method of class-education—in *which case it would be better for it to perish immediately*—or whether it recognizes the fundamental importance of training in typical and continuous lines of activity which are of social value for everybody.” (My italics.)¹⁷

Dewey wishes to bring the school into closer relation to life, but to the life of humanity as a whole, to all the life of the future, not to the restricted present-day life of the masses whose children attend our public schools. He wants the school to lose “the special code of ethics and moral training which must characterize it as long as it is isolated [from the rest of life].” But far from standing for any lower class schools, like the advocates of the so-called industrial education, he supports his proposed system on exactly the opposite ground. “Occupations bring people naturally together in groups, develop a group consciousness and power to divide and yet to coöperate harmoniously. Knowledge, scholastic attainments, æsthetic culture, pursued, as at present, with only personal ends in view, tend to egoism, *social stratification* and antagonisms.” (My italics.)¹⁸

The school furnishes the *environment* to the child between the home and the world at large, and partakes of the features of both to a varying degree. It is evident that the child cannot remain definitely in the home:

“There comes a time when a richer, fuller and more carefully selected and arranged environment is required to afford the stimuli and conditions of the most educative activity, an environment more varied than that of the ordinary home, and yet one not so varied and disorderly, overpowering and overspecialized as that of social life in general.

“Conscious education begins at this point. If it were

what it ought to be and what it may become, it would consist in the selection and arrangement of an environment of material and tools, with models of the best artistic achievement of such a nature as to call out and exercise the child's life functions—to suggest to him, in other words, things worth doing and to keep him engaged in doing them. Teachers would be present fellow-workers and fellow-players-comrades in carrying on the scheme of play and work activities, and in building up, along with the children, a miniature world as the obvious result and reward of their joint activities.”¹⁹

What should be taught in the schools above all else, Dewey thinks, should be neither facts, nor ability to do this or that thing, but the scientific or experimental habit of mind, the ability to find out facts and to use them, the ability to apply the most valuable and practical truths to practical purposes:

“Instructions carried on upon this basis would teach the mind that all ideas, truths, theories, etc., are of the nature of working hypotheses. One of the chief obstacles to the progress of the race has been the dogmatic habit of mind, the belief that some principles and ideas have such a value and authority that they are to be accepted without question and without revision. The experimental habit of mind, that which regards ideas and principles as tentative methods of solving problems and organizing data, is very recent. An education based upon the pragmatic conception would inevitably turn out persons who were alive to the necessity of continually testing their ideas and beliefs by putting them into practical application, and of revising their beliefs on the basis of the results of such application.”²⁶

The child is to be stimulated from the first to demand more activities and new activities. Life itself is to furnish him its opportunities and incidentally its discipline.

But life, if truly presented, will not tie him to any hard and fast "facts" or "laws."

"It is true, is it not," asks Dewey, "that the universe is really a wonderful place, and that history is a record of all the absorbing struggles, failures and successes of human aspiration and endeavor? If this be true, are we doing quite the fair thing by either world of nature or of history, or the child, the newcomer into this wonderful world, when we manage to present all this to him as if it constituted just so many lessons which for no very obvious and vital reason have to be learned?"²¹

Whether the child is coerced by punishment or persuaded by rewards to swallow down intellectualized "lessons," the chief burden of which is to tell him what he cannot do, the result is equally nefarious. Everyone is familiar, for instance, with the school girl who is absolutely under the dominion of the teacher through the persuasive means the latter has used, praise, kindness, etc. What is needed is not any such reward or punishment, but companionship and the stimulation of the child to independent efforts for their own sake. "In case either rewards, of however subtle a kind, or punishment, however humane, are used," says Dewey, "the children are getting set in external habits or moralities, and are learning to find their center of intellectual gravity outside their own selves." And it is only a system of education that satisfies, to the full, all the need of activity and possibility of self-expression there is in the child that will succeed in making such external devices unnecessary. By mere lessons and drill of any kind, even writing, reading and arithmetic, before the desire to read or to write or to calculate has been developed, children are necessarily bored, not at all because of any deficiency

in themselves, but because there are other bodily or mental activities which their natures crave.

"The only final educative force in the world," says Dewey, "is participation in the realities of life." In the pragmatic educational philosophy it is not the teacher that acts, but the child. The child acts, and nature reacts; experience, sympathy and friendship are found to be the best teachers, and the schoolmaster is rather arranging a many-sided environment for the child to choose from than acting on him directly. Not only commands, but even precepts are out of place, and the only rules that are permissible are those which the child himself, in his better moments, can see are necessary, rules which grow directly out of the particular situation and not out of generalities. The child's experience from the first must be with life itself, that is, with productive and social activities; and from the first these activities must be to some degree similar to those of adults—and more and more so as the child develops, since this is the type of all real experience. This experience is from the first social, since no kind of manual training in actual industrial processes can take place without a certain amount of coöperation, division of labor, and real social life. The child falls into definite and complex and natural relations with other children, as well as with the teacher, from the very beginning of his school life. And without this social division of labor there develops emulation and rivalry, just because all are doing the same work—and competition is considered undesirable and unnecessary both by Dewey and other social thinkers.

And finally it is only the social occupations that actually teach the child to do something which he feels to be of immediate value instead of preparing him for a remote future, an objection which lies even against that kindergarten work which is made pleasant by some

artificial scheme rather than by the inherent quality of the activity itself. Dewey regards social occupations as being not only play to the children but also work in the truest sense of the word. The kindergarten education of the past, he contends, has been too largely mere play, while the activity of the higher grades has been work in the sense of toil rather than work in its broader meaning, and has had practically no element of play at all.

Dewey believes in the value of work as well as play and insists that work rightly selected and taught is actually play to the child:

"To the child the homely activities going on about him are not utilitarian devices for accomplishing physical ends; they exemplify a wonderful world, the depths of which he has not sounded, a world full of the mystery and promise that attend all the doings of the grown-ups whom he admires." ²⁵

Dewey reaches the important conclusion not only that play and work must be combined but that all those educational methods, however interesting to the child, which appeal to its fancy rather than to anything that is actually connected with its life, are not only wasteful but actually dangerous—that is, capable of filling its mind with false tastes and values. The imagination, in a word, should be healthy and realistic—which would certainly eliminate ninety-nine per cent of the so-called literature of childhood, especially the folk-lore.

Indeed it is worth while to interject a further consideration of this point. Not only is children's literature unadapted to children, but the literature of youth is, for the same reason, unadapted to youth, and similarly the classical literature with which we supply our young men and women in the universities is, for the

same reason, in very large measure fanciful, remote and dangerous. One of the prime objects of education should undoubtedly be to restrict the reading of the student to what is nearest to him until his education is complete—without any coercion, of course. The child, the youth, and the young man should have his life so filled with fruitful and interesting activity that a very small amount of literature would be required. This literature should above all be ultra-modern—which is by no means as much as to say that the average modern book is superior to the average book of some previous periods. If the system of education is to be revolutionized then the first step should be to see that new education is not completely counteracted at every point by the overwhelming influence of antiquated and reactionary literature. Of course some works of extraordinary power and brilliance may be accepted in spite of their tremendous danger—which is increased in proportion to the genius of the writer—but even such works should be introduced into education only at a late stage and with the most careful preparation. Shakespeare, for instance, might be retained, but should be used only in the last years of the university with elaborate preparation and infinite care.

Dewey as well as Montessori at the same time rejects the new fad of *underestimating* the importance of language—that is for the children of the masses:

“Taken literally, the maxim, ‘Teach things, not words,’ or ‘Teach things before words,’ would be the negation of education; it would reduce mental life to mere physical and sensible adjustments. Learning, in the proper sense, is not learning things, but the *meaning* of things, and this process involves the use of signs, or language in its generic sense. In like fashion, the warfare of some educational reformers against symbols (in-

cluding words) is pushed to extremes, involves the destruction of the intellectual life, since this lives, moves and has its being in those processes of definition, abstraction, generalization and classification that are made possible by symbols alone. Nevertheless, these contentions of educational reformers have been needed. The liability of a thing to abuse is in proportion to the value of its right use.”²⁶

The real point in Dewey’s mind is that language is not a danger in itself, but that words *separated* from things are a danger:

“Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that whenever there is a definite word or form of speech there is also a definite idea; while, as a matter of fact, adults and children alike are capable of using even precise verbal formulæ with only the vaguest and most confused sense of what they mean. Genuine ignorance is more profitable because likely to be accompanied by humility, curiosity and open-mindedness, while ability to repeat catch-phrases, cant terms, familiar propositions gives the conceit of learning and coats the mind with a varnish waterproof to new ideas.”²⁷

While, therefore, Dewey attaches the greatest importance to the study of words in coördination with the study of things, no one is more fundamentally opposed to linguistic studies by themselves:

“The use of linguistic studies and methods to halt the human mind on the level of the attainments of the past, to prevent new inquiry and discovery, to put the authority of tradition in place of the authority of natural facts and laws, to reduce the individual to a parasite living on the second-hand experience of others—these things have been the source of the reformers’ protest against the pre-eminence assigned to language in schools.”²⁸

In order to distinguish more sharply between the education by industrial occupations proposed by Dewey and the industrial education that really amounts to no more than vocational training, let us take up briefly some of the propositions of Professor Frederick G. Bonsor of the Teachers College of Columbia University. For the specialists in education and pedagogy are standing more and more with Dewey. Professor Bonsor's theses are all stated in a way to show what genuine industrial education is *not*, as well as what it is:

"I. For the elementary school, industrial arts should be tested by the same standards that are applied to other school subjects:

"(a) A body of thought and experience of fundamental and universal usefulness.

"(b) Susceptibility of treatment appealing to interests and capacities of children, and practical possibilities of school children."

The first proposition (a) throws out as unsuitable for real education in the primary school any subject or method that specializes the child for one kind of usefulness, in other words it eliminates vocational training. The education must be of *universal* usefulness, though it may be specialized and adapted to the individuality.

It is obvious that all real education must appeal to the interest and capacity of the child, which again eliminates vocational training. This statement that it must also be adapted to practical possibilities of school instruction reminds us of one of the deepest sources of opposition to real industrial education as against mere vocational training, namely, that to adapt school buildings and equipment for the larger purpose would necessarily be manyfold more expensive than for the smaller.

"Large units of industrial subject matter and specific projects should be selected which most typically illustrate industrial methods and industrial life."

Vocational training must select specialized tasks like operating the sewing-machine. Industrial education keeps always in view the complex whole of our industrial life. It wishes to illustrate the industrial system, and to prepare the student not to become a particular cog, but to find his place in the whole, and even this purpose is secondary, for the first object is to use industry to develop the child, and so later to develop industry. Vocational training in primary grades, by adapting the child to industry as it is, does little for either purpose.

"The projects in hand work should serve as points of departure for opening up the study of the industries in all of their larger relationships, social as well as material and technical."

By this method we have a natural and sound approach to all economic, and political and social questions, which, in their broader aspects, may be taught successfully at a much earlier period than that at which unsuccessful attempts are made to teach them to-day.

"Industrial arts should function in the child's life even more specifically in the direction of cultivating his intelligence as a consumer, home maker, and citizen than as a producer."

Dewey gives more attention to the child as a prospective producer than as a prospective *consumer*. It is more difficult, however, to relate the child to industry than to relate him to the home as the center of consumption, and as the home side is equally important it should be developed first in point of time. The needs

of individuals as consumers are much more uniform than their work as producers. The home may be a small model society in so far as it represents true co-operation in consumption; and the nation is well viewed as only a larger home in this sense of the word. But it must always be remembered that the larger society, because of the greater possibility of division of labor and the better chance it gives to every individual to find a function more nearly adapted to his nature, is a superior educator in every way. The education and organization of adult consumers on a society instead of a mere home basis is perhaps an even greater problem than the education and organization of producers. But cooking and sewing and other home work are only beginnings of the larger domestic art, science and economy that go beyond the home. The great department store, for example, may be viewed as being essentially the provider for homes and so furnishes a vast field for study. It becomes, as it were, the material basis and matrix for every conceivable home. Then the home must be especially adapted to another great outside institution, the school. The child should be taught that the home exists chiefly for him and should be interested in homes of the past and foreign homes of the present. And finally children should be taught a great deal about schools. They should not only be interested in schools of other countries and of the past, in relation to the homes and industries of the place and period, but they should teach one another, and occasionally younger children also—and opportunities for this, which are lacking now, are plentiful in occupational education.

“The study of industrial arts should develop primarily industrial intelligence, insight and appreciation, subordinating skill in manipulation to thought content.”

This proposition cautions against the excesses of those who consider the child a little animal, and emphasize either muscular or sense training. The muscles or senses are not to be trained in themselves, but only as means to stimulate the intelligence. A high degree of skill means muscular or sense *specialization*, which is to be *avoided*.

"Industrial arts as a subject should incorporate all of the values of manual training, domestic art, domestic science and drawing appropriate to the elementary school and should add a rich body of thought giving them social meaning and real value."

Even the broader industrial subjects and methods already found in many schools (and not by any means to be classified as vocational) do not, when added together mechanically, make industrial education. They must be related organically—and not only with one another, but with all other subjects of the curriculum:

"Industrial arts together with other subjects of the curriculum should provide adequate motivation for all of the fine arts work which can function in the child's life."

The industrial arts, etc., must in the same way provide the motives for all the scientific work as well as the fine arts work in the child's life:

"Industrial arts should provide a means for more intelligence in the selection of a vocation than is now provided by all other means taken together."

It is obvious, as I have pointed out, that mere vocational training has the opposite effect. Instead of fitting for the broadest possible selection of a vocation, it nails the child down to a single vocation or at most to a strictly limited group of vocations. To train for

selection of a vocation means to keep *as far as possible* from vocational training.

The last stage of school education—that which corresponds to the universities and colleges—is that in which Dewey's principle that the child must be taught that he is to shape society as well as to adapt himself to it, has the widest application. Indeed it was largely by the application of this principle that Professor Boris Sidis succeeded in making his son proficient in many of the courses at Harvard University, usually studied by youth of from eighteen to twenty-two, when he was little more than half this age.

The keynote to Sidis' system is undoubtedly his successful effort to give the child a sympathetic understanding of the adult life of the times and even to inculcate an enthusiastic interest in it—an attitude very similar to that of Montaigne, except of course that Sidis has the vast advantage of modern culture and the methods of teaching it has involved. But more important by far is the economic aspect of Sidis' system. He has practically been a tutor to his boy, and not only a tutor but a very expensive one. The case is similar to that of John Stuart Mill, and shows what may be accomplished with sufficient expenditure of time, energy, and intelligence. If Sidis' suggestions have not been more widely followed and are not likely to be generally adopted in the near future this is due far more to their cost than to any inherent difficulty. If every child could have even a fraction of the attention given to the Sidis child, there is little doubt that the progress in education at this later stage would be just as surprising and revolutionary as that accomplished by Montessori from three to six. It is true that there seems to be a break between Sidis' methods, which are predominantly intellectual, and those of Dewey, but Dewey

clearly and repeatedly asserts that the intellectual element becomes more and more important relatively with the development of the child. And on the other hand it cannot be doubted that even in the final stage of general education—preceding the specialization of technical schools—a large part of the curriculum must still be reserved to subjects corresponding to Dewey's social occupations, though at a higher stage of development. Many aspects of domestic science and housekeeping, for example, become especially interesting and valuable about this time—if we remember that we might expect, with the application of the new system, that children would reach this educational stage by the age of fourteen or earlier instead of eighteen as at the present time. But a vast amount of experiment is needed, though not necessarily a very long time, before the kindergarten and primary school methods, such as the social occupations, can be elaborated to the point that they also serve the later stages of education. And in the meanwhile Sidis' intellectual system is undoubtedly sound as far as it goes, with the proviso that enough time must be left to be filled in with practical or occupational activities as fast as they are sufficiently developed.

Sidis assumes toward the intellect of the child the same attitude taken by Dewey and Montessori toward all its activities. He assumes that the child's brain becomes very active at a relatively early age, and that we really have no choice in the question as to whether we will allow it to develop or not. There is a general fear that the child's brain may be strained. On the contrary, as Sidis points out, if you do not direct his mental energies in the right direction the child will waste them in the wrong direction, and he refers as illustrations to foolish games, fantastic and false fic-

tion, etc., that are now so general. In cultivating the child's intellect, then, at a very early age, and to its full capacity, Sidis by no means intends to fill the child's mind with information, useful or useless, nor to settle him into fixed habits of thought or fixed habits of life of any kind. On the contrary, his purpose is to preserve the child's freedom and to protect him as far as possible against the formation of habits—which he believes can only be accomplished by strengthening his intelligence in all directions.

Sidis says: "Do not let the best of habits harden beyond the point of further modification. . . . Fixed adaptations tend to inhibit the output of reserve energy. . . . Cultivate variability. . . . The important principle in education is not so much the formation of habits as the power of their reformation." ²⁸ What Sidis pleads for as basic is "a cultivation of the principle of habit disintegration"—that is to say, he wishes not only to protect the child from directing his energies in the wrong direction, or from wasting them, but also from all habits, so that they may not become ingrained before the child's natural character and individuality have been matured.

But the power of breaking down habits depends upon the strength of "the *aqua fortis* of the intellect," since it is only the logical and critical activities that prevent the subconscious elements of the personality from predominating over the conscious. Sidis wishes to protect the child from becoming the slave of sub-conscious impressions and still more of sub-conscious habits, as Freud shows to have been the case in so many instances of nervous and mental weakness or breakdown. It is not to be supposed that Sidis would go so far as to hope or to desire that the sub-conscious life should be crushed altogether or reduced to a minimum. Doubt-

less he recognizes, with most of the psychologists of our time, the indispensable and important rôle played by the sub-conscious, but he wishes the conscious to dominate and he wants the developed personality, shaped largely by conscious effort, to be the vehicle of those sub-conscious forces that remain. Not only will these sub-conscious forces be counterbalanced when deleterious, but the character of all of them will undoubtedly be fundamentally altered, by conscious life and thought. For it is entirely against every principle of scientific psychology to suppose that there is any hard and fast line between the conscious and the sub-conscious, any more than there is between will, thought, and feeling.

While Sidis regards the child as having a very strong inherent tendency toward mental development in one direction or another at a very early age, he views present-day society as tempting it along innumerable false and evil paths. All the backwardness of society in whatever direction becomes especially dangerous when forced upon the attention of the impressionable child. "We must guard the child against all evil fears, superstitions, prejudices and credulity" and "form an anti-toxin for the neutralization of the virulent toxins produced by mental microbes."²⁹ That is, only as we develop the child's mental capacities to their maximum can we be sure that it is not being perverted and poisoned by the innumerable false and evil ideas and suggestions that surround it. Against all the outer authority of such ideas, which necessarily hypnotize the immature mind, against all the mystic and misty beatific visions which are offered to the child by various forms of literature as soon as it is able to read and get at literature, the only remedy is an all-round strengthening of the intellect on every subject that can by any means be brought into the child's range of comprehension.

Here again we see the revolutionary character of Sidis' education. Far from wanting to preserve the innocence of ignorance, Sidis wishes to destroy it at the earliest possible moment. Not only is the child to be taught everything it can learn and understand, but it is to be taught to recognize and to fight against evil:

"The recognition of evil under all its guises is at the basis of the true education of man.

"Open the eyes of your children so that they shall see, understand and face courageously the evils of life.

"Encourage the scrutinizing of whatever interests the child—e. g. fallacies, sophisms, ugliness, deformity, prejudice, superstition, vice, depravity." ³⁰

In other words, Sidis would encourage the child to be interested in those very things from which, since the dawn of civilization, it has been more or less "protected." He carries the essential principle of all modern educational theories to their logical conclusion. *Not only must the teacher see to it that whatever the child is taught should interest the child, but he must see to it that whatever interests the child should be taught.*

Here is a principle which has either been denied or only half recognized, not because it lay out of the road of modern educational thought, but merely because it would obviously make it necessary to increase manyfold the energies and money expended on the education of children. As a rule the great educational innovators and radicals even before Rousseau (Montaigne, Rabelais and others) have been accepted merely as idealists, and if their principles have not been applied the excuse has always been, at the bottom, that they

were too expensive. But another still more serious evil must inevitably result sooner or later from this false economy (the inevitable result of a class society), namely that educational ideals and thinking will themselves be cut down or relegated to the dust-heap, even as ideals, by the obvious fact that they are not going to be applied under existing forms of society. This is undoubtedly the reason, for example, that we have not seen that the accepted principle that education should interest the child involves also the principle that whatever interests the child should be recognized in its education.

If we bear Sidis' principles in mind and his brilliantly successful application of these principles to the ordinary curriculum, we can imagine what results they might produce with a child who had spent three or four years under Montessori and six or eight under Dewey. Sidis had no such preparation for his boy. Moreover, he was limited by his situation as individual tutor; he could not introduce elaborate new machinery nor secure the benefit of the influence of one child on another, and it was for this reason that he could introduce comparatively few new subjects, unless in an incidental way. But children so prepared in their earlier years and then taught by Sidis' method might well be introduced to a whole new series of subjects. From a general knowledge of industrial processes, they could pass, for example, to a series of biographies of inventors and industrial organizers, to economic history, including class wars and wars between nations. Beginning with earlier and simpler economic communities they could be brought within a year or two as far as the time when the age of railroads began to introduce the complexities of modern civilization. They could then take up the biography of leaders and types of the various social

classes of the past. And before the secondary years were over a basis would thus be laid in which even the ideas and ideals of the past as embodied in literatures, religions, and philosophies might be explained in relation to the social systems, the cultures, and the civilizations that produced them. Contemporaneous civilizations and lower cultures could be treated in the same way, on the basis of the physiography and industrial geography that had already been taught in the primary grades. The human interest in all this could only come with a free treatment of every topic and by giving the same weight to the evils that hold man back as to the progressive tendencies that carry him forward. Indeed unless this method is followed and the critical faculties developed, not only does the interest flag, but the child gets a completely false impression. Even the most inspired poem, if it belongs to a former period, however recent that period may be, bears the marks of the time, and with its inspiration may often carry into the child's sub-consciousness the germs of retrogressive and dangerous suggestion.

It is also necessary at this period of education to allow the freest treatment of every topic when it naturally impinges on any sex question. Fatal and unreal as it would be to overemphasize sex by giving it any separate treatment, it is far more fatal to try to suppress its discussion in the right connections. The sexual element in biology would have been grasped in the earlier nature studies and to some degree in the practical study of physiology of the intermediate period, a study which could only be brought to completion, however, in the third period. But the relations between the sexes would also be repeatedly touched upon in any honest and free treatment of history and literature. The only phases that should be excepted are those that

are less important and out of the way, however important these may later appear to be to the special student of the subject. For such matters as sexual customs which are so outgrown that we call them perverted, or individual manifestations that we class in the same way, are only to be understood by the fully matured. And for the same reason the highly wrought idealizations of sexual love often found in literature may be avoided. But to attempt to repress all reference to sex matters is not only to misrepresent life generally, to leave young people unprotected against mistaken impressions, and to drive them to strange courses; it is also to deprive education of the keenest impulse that urges human beings to learning and all activity, especially at this age. That is why G. Stanley Hall wants to make sex *the very foundation* of the adolescent's education:

"If sex is fundamental and all-conditioning for human well-being, as nearly all eminent experts now claim, it follows that it must be made correspondingly central in education in a way to unite its chief topics into an organic whole that fits the successive stages of human development *so as to utilize the intense and unique interest that now goes to waste.*"³¹

After dealing with sex in botany and biology and physiology from the age of eight or ten, the history of woman, the family, marriage and the home, says Hall, should be suitably dealt with; and finally, in college, should come a treatment of the hygiene of wedlock, and "something rather specific concerning the virtues of fatherhood and motherhood before and after childbirth." In college should also be studied prostitution, divorce and the psychology of sex and love, together with its history and meaning. The relation between

sex and religion, and sex and the imagination and feelings would be thoroughly discussed. There should be "some hint" of sex "in its grosser forms" and "something should be taught concerning the forms of temptation and the modes of resisting it":

"Sex is a great quickener of mind, intelligence and especially of the imagination and the higher sentiments. If there is excess or defect, it is self-respect, will, mind-power that will suffer. The individual becomes solitary rather than social. . . . Thus the sex organs have two functions; the first is reproduction and the other is to give force and energy to all other parts and to the character generally. . . .

"It has not entered into the heart of man to conceive the amount of genuine scientific knowledge that a deep interest in sex could carry and vitalize. No other apperception organ has such power to learn and assimilate. The acquisition of knowledge which this zest could effect—and that naturally and without fatigue—is probably quite incredible. Thus the plea for such a new curriculum might rest its claims solely upon mental economy, and find here a new noetic faculty not yet brought into action in the educational field." ³²

In a word, we must see to the normal development and education of the sex impulse as well as its restraint. If powerful counter-forces are needed when this new life force has first begun to grow, they may easily be found—and in many different directions, a number of which are mentioned in this and the following chapters. But such counter-forces need not be destructive of the forces of life. Assume, for example, that we should decide to teach all young people, as prospective parents, the first steps, at least in handling and teaching little children. Nothing could bring the children of the future into young people's consciousness like this, nothing could so

counteract the tendency to the partial expression of sex, and nothing is so valuable for general educational purposes. Indeed a normal school education for everybody is indispensable in view of the great social transformation that is impending. Parents will soon have more opportunity to develop their children, and more will be expected of them by the schools and by society. Of course it will be a new and revolutionized normal education, for it will be based on the principle that only those who have the vision to foresee something of future social developments can hope to teach the teachers and parents of the future generation.

XII

SOCIALISM AND THE NEW EDUCATION

THE public school question is at bottom economic. Even in Prussia, the classic land of universal and compulsory instruction, the development of the public schools is being stunted in every direction for lack of funds, and it is common in some parts of the country to have only one teacher to more than a hundred pupils. Bebel reminds us that even in the army not more than eight or ten men are given to a corporal to train and suggests that under Socialism a teacher will be provided for every eight or ten pupils, while Ex-President Eliot of Harvard proposes the ratio of one to ten or fifteen. To carry out this reform, even in America, would require the expenditure of two or three times the sums now given to the public schools. The increased need of material appliances would amount to nearly as much, while the maintenance of school children during the whole educational period by the state, as demanded by the German Party, would require an even greater sum. The estimate that Socialist standards of education would mean a fivefold increase in present educational expenditures is a moderate one. In the meanwhile it would require a revolution to bring about the doubling of the sum expended on education, except for that vocational training demanded by employers.

Educational reform will undoubtedly make considerable progress during the period of State Capitalism

or "State Socialism" that lies between us and Socialism. Along certain specified lines the sum spent on education may even be increased several fold. Dr. Eliot, for example, demands an increase of from four to six fold. The "progress" made, however, will probably not be in the direction even of the educational ideals of social democracy, but will rather be as reactionary in one direction as it is progressive in another.

The ruling classes will never pay to educate the children of the masses to develop all that is in them or to fit them to fill those of the higher positions in society for which they show the requisite capacity—that is, they will never voluntarily pay to give the children of the masses an equal educational opportunity and an equal chance to compete with their own children. They will oppose the maintenance by the state of any more than a very small proportion of school children, enough to fill those higher positions in industry and government that are left over after their own children have been provided for.

In the opinion of Socialists, a number of teachers corresponding to those in use in model private institutions will never be provided for the public schools with the consent of the ruling classes unless there is an immediate menace of social revolution, and finally that material equipment only will be furnished which is for physical education and industrial training in the narrowest sense. On the other hand, besides admitting more selected children of the people than at present to the opportunities of upper class children, our progressive capitalists will undoubtedly make some large improvements in popular education. Everything will be done to give the children of the people the maximum of physical and industrial efficiency in those occupations consigned to them by the ruling classes.

These, in a word, are the rigid limitations which

every educational reformer confronts. This is why all the great educators from Montaigne and Rousseau to Spencer and Tolstoy are now regarded as mere idealists, and why the educational thought of our time, making a virtue of a necessity, is beginning to idealize exclusively those lines of educational advance that lie immediately before us and will be permitted and required by a paternalistic capitalist state.

This educational ideal of State Capitalism is very well characterized by Stirner:

“The independent existence of the state demands my dependence. Its growth according to nature, its organism, demands that my nature should not grow freely but should be cut to suit it. In order that it may be able to unfold itself naturally it lays upon me the shears of culture. It gives me a bringing up and an education suited to it not to me. . . . This is the kind of education and culture which the state is able to give me. It trains me up to ‘a useful tool,’ ‘a useful member of society.’”¹

Stirner recognizes that the State Capitalist society does not represent the welfare of all individuals, because it is the product of a class and of the submission of the masses to that class.

Tolstoy reaches the same conclusion as Stirner, that our education is a class education throughout. He says that the ruling class have perverted education in adapting it to the narrow class standpoint, either by making it religious in a sectarian sense, or by using the schools for governmental purposes, and shaping them, in so far as higher education is open to the masses, to furnish suitable “helpers, abettors and accomplices” of the ruling class (“Education and Culture”).

But the narrowest limitation is that the schools are necessarily constructed for the convenience of over-worked and underpaid teachers, and here Tolstoy recognizes a truth which is overlooked by most of the educational idealists from Rousseau to Montessori, that the children's questions and conversation, and even their noise are valuable and are only to be limited by the strict necessities of the schoolroom—which may mean very little restriction at all where there are enough teachers of the right kind :

“School is established, not in order that it should be convenient for the children to study, but that the teachers should be able to teach in comfort. The children's conversation, motion and merriment, which are their necessary conditions of study, are not convenient for the teacher, and so in the schools which are built on the plan of prisons, questions, conversation and motion are prohibited.”²

Tolstoy points out that our schools, instead of answering the questions put by life, and instead of calling forth these questions, answer an entirely different set which have been put by humanity several centuries back, such as geographical and historical problems which are entirely remote from the child's life and have no more than a secondary interest for adults.

Even the streets as they are to-day teach more than the school :

“It is enough to look at one and the same child at home, in the street, or at school ; now you see a vivacious, curious child with a smile in his eyes and on his lips seeking instruction in everything as he would seek pleasure, clearly and frequently strongly expressing his thoughts in his own words ; now again you see a worn-out, retiring being, with an expression of fatigue, terror

and ennui, repeating with the lips only strange words in a strange language—a being whose soul has, like a snail, retreated into its house. It is enough to look at these two conditions in order to decide which of the two is more advantageous for the child's development.

"That strange psychological condition which I will call the scholastic condition of the soul, and which all of us unfortunately know too well, consists in that all the higher faculties, imagination, creativeness, inventiveness, give way to other semi-animal faculties which consist in pronouncing sounds independently from any concept, in counting numbers in succession, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, in perceiving words without allowing imagination to substitute images for these sounds, in short in developing a faculty for crushing all higher faculties so that only those might be evolved which coincide with the scholastic condition of fear and of straining memory and attention.

"Every pupil is so long an anomaly at school as he has not fallen into the rut of this semi-animal condition. The moment the child has reached that state and has lost all his independence and originality, the moment there appear in him various symptoms of disease—hypocrisy, aimless lying, dullness, and so forth—he no longer is an anomaly; he has fallen into the rut, and the teacher begins to be satisfied with him. Then there happen those by no means accidental and frequently repeated phenomena that the dullest boy becomes the best pupil, and the most intelligent the worst." ³

While traveling in London, Paris, Marseilles and elsewhere Tolstoy noted that what the people were really learning in the life of the streets, though entirely contrary to what they had learned in school and unrelated to it, was making bright men and women. He felt, therefore, that the school education of the masses is farther behind their general culture to-day than it ever was in history *and is falling more and more behind all*

the time: "The more a nation has progressed in general education the more that education has passed away from school life, making the contents of the school meaningless." The invention of the art of printing alone, he remarks, has made the amount of education that the school could afford in comparison with life almost insignificant. Tolstoy wishes, then, that we may learn from the actual life of the masses to introduce into the schoolroom the same method by which they learn after leaving school. He does not seem to realize, however, that neither this nor any of his other principles will be carried out by any chance until the masses themselves control the schools.

Tolstoy combats especially the dogmatism that necessarily governs every school system as long as sufficient means are not at hand to carry on those educational experiments needed to adapt the schools to what the more interested parents and teachers require. Every bureaucratic and "State Socialist" system is necessarily permeated by dogma. For it is only by dogmas that teachers can be driven to the unnatural and strained efforts demanded by large classes, that the people can be partly blinded as to what is being done, or the system itself defended even among its own supporters. While Tolstoy himself does not seem to see clearly the source of these dogmas, no one has criticized them better; for he points out just why the pseudo-science in the name of which our educational systems are *fixed* is an entirely insufficient basis on which to shape the future generation:

"All the pedagogues of this school, especially the Germans, the founders of the school, start with the false idea that those philosophical questions which have remained as questions for all the philosophers from Plato to Kant have been definitely settled by them. They are settled so definitely that the process of the acquisition by man of impressions, sensations, concepts, ratiocina-

tions, has been analyzed by them down to its minutest details, and the component parts of what we call the soul or the essence of man have been dissected and divided into parts by them, and that, too, in such a thorough manner that on this firm basis can go up the faultless structure of the science of pedagogy. This fancy is so strange that I do not regard it as necessary to contradict it.”⁴

Far from being satisfied that this particular generation has achieved the final truth as to educational theory, or a truth sufficiently final to justify an artificial system in the schoolroom in place of life itself, Tolstoy feels that no generation is justified in putting intellectual shackles on the generation that is to succeed it. The culture of our own generation is only too apt to influence the next; what we have to look out for is to see that it does *not* bind our children, and on the contrary that they are left free for further development:

“Every thinker expresses only that which has been consciously perceived by his epoch, consequently the education of the younger generation in the sense of this consciousness is quite superfluous; this consciousness is already inherent in the living generation.”⁵

Tolstoy’s final question is: “Shall we say frankly and honestly to ourselves that we do not know and cannot know what the future generations may need, but that we feel ourselves obliged to study these wants and that we wish to do so?” This is merely a way of saying that just as there are no “laws” of nature that mankind is bound to respect, so there are no pedagogical “laws” that can be allowed to hamper the almost infinite possibilities of individual development—and I believe that all the greatest educators are in accord with this principle. All

would probably accept Tolstoy's generalization that "education as a premeditated formation of men according to certain patterns is *sterile, unlawful, and impossible*."

Tolstoy wishes the child's freedom to be recognized from the first, though he agrees that this freedom must be subject to the wishes, that is, the freedom, of the parent. "The only criterion of pedagogy is freedom—the only method experience":

"In the popular school the right to determine what the child shall learn, no matter from what standpoint we may consider this question, belongs just as much to the parents who send the children to school, and so the answer to the question what the children are to be taught in a popular school can be got only from the masses. But perhaps we shall say that we, as highly cultured people, must not submit to the demands of the rude masses and that we must teach the masses what to wish. Thus many think, but to that I can give this one answer: give us a firm, incontrovertible foundation why this or that is chosen by you; show me a society in which the two diametrically opposed views on education do not exist among the highly cultured people; where it is not eternally repeated that if education falls into the hands of the clergy, the masses are educated in one sense, and if education falls into the hands of the progressists, the people are educated in another sense—show me a state of society where that does not exist and I will agree with you. So long as this does not exist there is no criterion except the freedom of the learner, and in matters of the popular school the place of the learning children is taken by their parents, that is, by the needs of the masses." ⁶

Tolstoy, like Dewey, is opposed not only to religious instruction in the public schools, but to all moral education whatever in the ordinary sense of the term. It is needless to note that he believes both in religious and

moral instruction; but he will not trust governments or the ruling classes to say what this instruction shall be. His strictures are directed mainly against governmental *religious* instruction, but it will be seen that they apply also to moral teaching:

“The government, the rulers, the ruling classes need this deception; with it their power is inseparably connected, and so the ruling classes always want this deception to be practiced upon the children and maintained over the adults by means of an increased hypnotization, but the people who do not wish for the maintenance of the false social order, but on the contrary, for its change and who, above all else, wish for the good of those children with whom they enter into communion, must, with all their strength, try to save their children from this terrible deception. And so a complete indifference of the children to religious questions and the rejection of all religious forms is still incomparably better than the Judæo-ecclesiastic instruction, even though in the most perfected forms.” ⁷

We can well realize that as long as the modern capitalistic state continues to exist lessons in patriotism, and in morality verging on the accepted religions, will continue to be taught. Here as elsewhere, Tolstoy's limitation is that of all non-Socialists, no matter how radical, namely, that he does not see that our class society must be abolished before any great revolutionary advance can be made in any direction.

The martyred Francisco Ferrer of Spain has stated very ably the Socialist attitude toward the present educational system. The founder of over a hundred free schools with some seventy thousand pupils and the partial inspirer of several hundred others, he was a man of large educational experience. The mere fact that he was feared by the Church in Spain as its chief

enemy shows that, whatever his value as an educator, he was, at least, practical and successful, while the recognition of his schools by the present Spanish government indicates that his education was also of a progressive character. It was Ferrer's belief that the leading governments of the world, not only that of Spain, are endeavoring to use the public school systems for their own purposes. He felt that even in progressive countries like France, with which he was familiar, the public schools were far from creating that type of thought and action which is required for the most rapid advance of humanity:

"We perceive the utter uselessness of this learning acquired in the schools by the systems of education at present in practice; we see that we waited and hoped in vain. For the organization of the school, far from spreading the ideal which we imagined, has made education the most powerful means of enslavement in the hands of the governing powers of to-day. Their teachers are only the conscious or unconscious instruments of these powers; modeled moreover according to their principles, they have from their youth up, and more than any one else, been subjected to the discipline of the authorities; few indeed are those who have escaped the influence of this domination, and these remain powerless, because the school organization constrains them so strongly that they cannot but obey it. It is not my purpose here to examine the nature of this organization. It is sufficiently well known for me to characterize it in one word: constraint. The school imprisons children physically, intellectually and morally in order to direct the development of their faculties in the paths desired. It deprives them of contact with nature in order to model them after its own pattern. And this is the explanation of all which I have here to set forth: The care which governments have taken to direct the education

of the people and the bankruptcy of the hopes of believers in liberty. The education of to-day is nothing more than drill. I refuse to believe that the systems employed have been constructed with any definite design for bringing about the results desired. That would suppose genius. But things take place precisely as if this education responded to some vast unified conception. It could not have been better done. What accomplished this was simply that the leading inspiration was the principle of discipline and of authority which guides social organizers at all times. They have but one clearly defined idea, one will, viz.: Children must be accustomed to obey, to believe, to think, according to the social dogmas which govern us. Hence, education cannot be other than such as it is to-day. It is not a matter of seconding the spontaneous development of the faculties of the child, of leaving it free to satisfy its physical, intellectual and moral needs; it is a matter of imposing ready made ideas upon it; a matter even of preventing it from ever thinking otherwise than is willed for the maintenance of the institutions of this society; it is a matter of making it an individual strictly adapted to the social mechanism."

Our worst sin is by no means our failure to apply our own accepted educational ideals or to listen to the call of present-day science and democracy. For there are in evidence in educational thought since Herbart, Fröbel, Spencer, and Tolstoy, new and positively reactionary tendencies—aside from the negative evils due to the starvation of the public schools and the limitation of their further development to the single line of industrial and physical training, as already mentioned. Our class society, about to pass over from individualistic, competitive, and private capitalism to "State Socialism," has developed new retrogressive social theories which have an obvious and direct educational applica-

tion. Not only are the schools to be limited and restricted on financial and industrial grounds, but the whole system is to be based on a new dogma.

Professor Lester F. Ward, for example, has evolved a theory which he calls sociocracy, under which society is to assume rational control and direction of itself through a new and higher politics and is to use education to this purpose. This view almost inevitably leads not to educating individuals to re-shape society but to educating them to fit into the work which society lays out for them.

In the theories of "State Socialism" the public school takes the place held by the church in former times. As Monroe remarks, this indirect means of control over beliefs and ideas is more economical than the direct means (the church), "since it depends so largely on mere suggestion exercised by teachers rather than upon a force which arouses opposition":

"As education in the hands of the parent sought to control the child for the sake of his practical success in life, and the education of the church to control him for the sake of the organization and for his own eternal salvation, so the education of the state seeks to control the child for the sake of the welfare of society which includes the individual and his fellows as well. Thus as a form of control, education is merely an instrument of society similar to law, to opinion, and to various institutional customs and traditions. But as such it operates in a peculiar way, not directly by force, but indirectly through the suggestive power of ideas and through the impartation of knowledge, not immediately upon the adult, but through the medium of a coming generation."⁸

The state church, which was the great means of shaping the individual to "social" or ruling class purposes

under the landlord absolutisms of the Eighteenth Century and the first half of the Nineteenth, has lost its force, so that even individualistic capitalism already felt the need of some institution to replace it. But the theory and nature of individualistic capitalism did not allow any elaborate and complete system of state education—while the ultra-individualist like Spencer even opposed state education altogether. “State Socialism” has no such scruples or limitations. Public education is now to fulfill the identical rôle formerly fulfilled by the church.

Sometimes this “sociocratic” view of education is expressed in rather a subtle and plausible form. For example, Monroe says: “It is the *power* of adjustment to a changing environment, not the fixed adjustment in itself, that modern education seeks to secure for the individual as its highest product.”⁹ This expression is rather unclear, but, according to every modern psychology, the *power* of adjustment can only be acquired by the *habit* of adjustment. “State Socialism” then undertakes *more* than merely to adjust the individual to existing society. It undertakes to make him adjustable to any society, so that he may still be more serviceable to the ruling classes than if he were merely fitted to serve their purposes at the present moment. Here we have the very reverse of the principle of Sidis, that the individual is to be kept free from all habits, and of the principle of Dewey that the individual is not to be adapted to society at all, but is to learn how to re-shape and reform it.

Nevertheless we may expect not only that the *advance* of our public schools, until Socialists begin to control, will be limited largely to the line of industrial training, but also that our whole educational thought will be recast in this “State Socialist” mold, so far as this is

practicable. This will be most undeniably in evidence in the universities, where the "State Socialist" theories in philosophy, science, history, sociology, psychology, ethics, etc., more or less as I have outlined them, are already sweeping everything before them. The same theories will be applied, in more subtle ways, throughout the whole public school system.

Even some of the more advanced of our leading educators, to say nothing of the reactionaries that preside over some of the higher institutions, are now advocating anti-democratic class schools. Ex-President Eliot of Harvard, who wants four or six times as much money expended on our public schools, and shows that this expenditure is necessary even to bring them up to existing standards,¹⁰ advocates a three-class school system, one kind of school for the upper class, another kind for the middle class and a third kind for the masses of the people. He strangely believes that this is "democratic," provided the advance of the child from one system to the other is made "easy."¹¹ Of course if this transition was made really "easy," and every child was given an equal opportunity to be advanced according to his individual merits alone there would be no three-fold division of the schools for upper, lower and middle classes, but a unified system. What Dr. Eliot means by "easy" promotion can only be that a certain percentage of lower and middle class children may be given the opportunities enjoyed by all upper class children—and the percentage of the lower class must be very small, as his calculations for the public schools make no allowances at all for scholarships, and the masses are either unable in 98 cases out of 100 (as school statistics show) to keep their children in school long enough to secure a higher education, or else deny, usually with good reason, that the schools are

good enough to justify the expenditure and time required. Moreover, this small proportion, as I have pointed out, merely strengthens upper class conservatism by absorbing the cream of the working class, and makes further democratic advance all the more difficult.

The views of President Hadley of Yale are equally typical and anti-democratic. He warmly commends some of the most reactionary features of the German secondary school system. The German secondary schools, though maintained largely at public expense, charge a tuition fee. President Hadley says that the object is not financial but to restrict high school education "to those who are willing to pay for it," whereas it is obvious that it tends also to restrict these schools to those who are *able* to pay. He says that this fee helps the Germans to give an education satisfactory to "business men," which we need not doubt. The German government further favors the graduates of these schools by allowing them to be freed from two years of barracks. President Hadley finds that this is an advantage *for middle class children*, but that military training is good for *the great bulk of the people*:

"If you fail to pass the examination, you have at least two years in barracks, amid surroundings which are inevitably disagreeable and oppressive *to the man who has been brought up* in comfortable surroundings.

"For those who do not pass the test—for *the great bulk of the people* who cannot afford the time and expense incidental to a full high school course—the two years of military service teach lessons which are just as valuable in peace as in war." ¹²

Here the eminent educator admits that the masses miss the high school education, not because they are

unwilling, but because they are unable, to pay for it. Far from considering this an intolerable evil he wants to create further class distinctions. The barracks teach hygiene and physical training, as he says, but the question is, do they teach these things as well as they can be taught outside the barracks? Indeed President Hadley shows unintentionally that they do not and that he admires some of their reactionary features. He praises the "discipline and good order" of the barracks, and says, against all evidence, that the treatment of the recruit is "humane" and that the "isolated cases of brutality" that occur are "comparatively rare exceptions," until we might believe that we were listening to the most ardent German advocate of militarism. He says that the majority of intelligent and "patriotic" Germans agree with him. Of course if the four million Socialists are to be eliminated as not being "patriots," this is true. He says that the army has been growing in popularity since 1871, failing to note that the Socialists, who would wipe the army off the map, have increased at least ten-fold in that period.

At the bottom, President Hadley's admiration of the German educational system is obviously due to its supposedly superior "discipline" in preparing the young for "the general duties of the citizen." We know that militarism, even more in Germany than elsewhere, produces servility and crushes the individual. If, however, "his efficiency as a laborer is better" on account of such discipline, as Hadley says it is, we may confess that it fulfills the object of every ruling-class education.

Without multiplying illustrations, let us note the recommendations of President G. Stanley Hall of Clark University to the New York school board, for he is perhaps our leading pedagogical specialist. President Hall favors flogging to inspire discipline, the teaching

of religion to inspire docility, and also vocational training—fortunately he does not disguise it under the name of education, industrial or otherwise. He objects especially to what he calls paternalism, which is the only policy, as I have shown, which can secure even that limited progress in the schools which is possible under capitalism. "Paternalism" includes, according to Hall, also such radical and effective advances of the schools toward the people as free medical service, free lunches, free transportation, and, above all, such a bill as that which came near passing the Wisconsin legislature, appropriating \$17,000,000 to give every girl and boy in that state the means to go through high school, college and university.

With such leaders as these, we cannot be surprised when we see teachers' organizations occasionally taking reactionary positions also. There is a rather wide tendency to apply to all the working classes some such educational principle as that so bluntly recommended for the negro by the Southern Educational Association, when it declared (at its 1911 meeting) that the negro's education should be "industrial" and *not* literary or "cultural," and explained that the practical industries it proposes, such as agriculture and cooking, aim at his "physical welfare." This is undoubtedly the motive, usually not so frankly expressed, of most of the advocates of the so-called industrial education for the children of workingmen.

The general tendency of this industrial education is directly the opposite to what modern civilization requires:

"The individual of the immediate future, whether he be a business man, a professional man, or a manual worker, must have a broad educational foundation so he may be able to readily adapt himself to shifting

industrial scenes and conditions. 'The future,' writes Professor Giddings, 'belongs to the adaptable man,' and it will be the function of the schools of the future to produce this adaptable, pliable man. . . . The classic educational edifice which was revered a generation ago, built upon the foundation of a purely intellectual, professional, business or trade training, is now crumbling and cracking under the unyielding pressure of modern complex civilization." ¹³

The natural tendency, that is, is *away* from that emphasis on occupational and trade training demanded by business men (for other people's children, whom they wish to employ) and also unfortunately by some short-sighted mechanics, who hope their children will have a monopoly of this special training—which is not at all the business men's intention, as they propose to open the doors of *this kind* of education to the children of the unskilled also, and so to make skilled employees plentiful and cheap.

While the demand of the people and of most educators is for a broader education than we now have, the demand of the business men is for a narrower one. The interest of the masses requires two kinds of educational progress, an improvement and extension of general education for all, and *after this* a special occupational or vocational training. The business community, who are also taxpayers, want less of the former kind of education and more of the latter. But it would be unpopular to confess this policy, so they merely demand more industrial education, while resisting any considerable *increase* in expenditures for any other kind of education. Thus the normal growth of *general* education is automatically but effectively checked; there is some improvement, but only a small fraction of what is required and what the community can well afford:

"In the name of two principles, 'industrial education' and 'business methods,' the public schools are being commercialized. Commercialization means reduced wages for the teacher, fewer educational 'fads' or improvements, in short reduced expense per pupil [and where it does not go this far it means checking normal development in all these directions]. The antithesis is finance vs. education; the taxpayer vs. the child; special interests vs. society." ¹⁴

The "special interests" are not only the taxpayers, but the employers and capitalists. And the antithesis does not always mean an actual decrease in present expenditures. Carlton himself points out that a large part of the \$400,000,000 or \$600,000,000 spent on criminals might be saved to the taxpayer by better schools. If this is true the taxpayers, when better enlightened and organized, will not object to a certain increase of taxes for schools. Better schools might save equally large sums in better health, and as only \$450,000,000 are now spent on the common schools, the taxpayers may ultimately consent to very considerably increased expenditures.

But this is only a small part of the possibilities. Most of the taxes are paid by capitalists or employers. If the industrial efficiency of employees can be sufficiently increased by schools, they might consent to allow several times as much money to be expended on them as at present. But there is a rigid limit somewhere to all increased expenditure that would bring a margin of profit to taxpayer or employer. It is when his limit is reached that we shall see the antithesis of "the taxpayer vs. the child" and "special interests vs. society" in its naked ugliness. The conflict exists to-day and is holding school progress back when compared to what it would be were taxpayers and employers given no

special consideration. But because there is a certain limited progress, and because these interests require this degree of progress, their reactionary influence is somewhat cloaked and escapes full exposure.

In discussing economic and political Socialism (in "Socialism As It Is") I have shown how a revolutionary change in education, which would be more costly perhaps than all other reforms put together, is therefore less likely than any other reform to be carried out before we have democratic Socialism. Indeed I made educational reform a crucial test, for the demand for special advantages for one's own children is perhaps the last which any privileged class will abandon. If they give way here, then indeed the establishment of a social democracy is certain—even without the long revolutionary period that may otherwise be necessary.

Under these conditions, how are the nation's public schools advancing? We are told that the expenditures on common schools increased from \$220,000,000 in 1900 to \$425,000,000 in 1910. This sounds like an enormous increase. But we must remember that the increase of the number of pupils was 15 per cent. Then we must remember that it took about \$1.25 in 1910 to purchase the same goods that cost \$1.00 in 1900. In the meanwhile other governmental expenditures aside from schools, for example on army and navy, were increasing far more rapidly.

When we try to find an accurate financial measure for what each child is getting we must ask first of all how many teachers there are in proportion to the pupils, or what fraction of a teacher each pupil secures? While the number of pupils has increased fifteen per cent., the number of teachers has increased only twenty per cent. If we take ex-President Eliot's standard that the size of classes should be reduced from forty or

fifty, as at present, to ten or fifteen, this means that we need three or four times as many teachers. At the above rate of progress, it may be seen, this object would be attained in about one thousand years!

The amount expended on the public schools, \$450,000,000, looks large, but it is not. It amounts to less than \$5 per capita. We expend an equal sum on militarism (army, navy and pensions), and immensely greater amounts on several forms of luxury. The annual bill for alcoholic liquors is \$2,000,000,000 and for tobacco \$1,200,000,000. Jewelry and plate take \$800,000,000 and automobiles \$500,000,000, not to mention innumerable other luxuries which, when added together, would make a total of billions. Moreover our consumption in many of these lines is increasing *faster* than the growth of the public schools. What satisfaction can we have, then, either in this rate of development or the insignificant total of expenditure now reached. If we can afford \$4,000,000,000 for three luxuries alone can we not afford that sum to mould the human race of the next generation? Ten times the present amount expended, or \$4,500,000,000, which would be only one-seventh of our national income, would scarcely be too much. Of course this sum would include the maintenance at public expense of all children who showed any aptitude for the higher courses, and there would be a corresponding saving to parents. So that after all only about a tenth, perhaps, of the nation's income would be going to children—which is surely not excessive. Part of the money needed could come from a heavy tax on ground rent, part from heavily graduated income taxes, and part from heavy taxes on luxuries such as those mentioned, tobacco, alcoholic drinks, jewelry, etc.

This extraordinary backwardness of the public schools

when compared to the progress of the rest of our civilization is world-wide. In none of the great nations is it worse than in Prussia, which has long been held up as a world's model. For in Prussia, as elsewhere, the schools for the people are dominated by the upper classes. In the debate in the Prussian Landtag (March 16, 1912) it was shown that in seventy schools there were as many as one hundred and seventy pupils to a teacher, while the *majority* of the children were in schools that were either ungraded or had only two classes. In the towns even, where much more money is expended, only \$20 falls to each child instructed. The towns furnish ninety per cent. of this sum, while the Prussian government provides less than ten per cent. or seven marks per child (\$1.75). Yet this same government contributes 900 marks (\$225), or more than one hundred times as much, to each university student.

The leading organ of the German Socialists, in commenting on the debate in the Landtag, where these facts were brought out, summed up the Socialist position. First of all, it pointed out that "the educational ideals of the great educators, which are accepted by the great majority of teachers, are not to be realized except through great social transformations." Second: "The majority of the German teachers have long demanded, for example, the *unified* school. This means that the people's school shall not be, as to-day, a proletarian and pauper school, but a stage in the education of *all* pupils. The higher educational institutions are to be organically connected with this common school for all, so that everyone who is capable can pass through the higher schools, without regard to his birth, his social position, or the property of his parents."¹⁵ It will be noticed that here again the Socialists are moving exactly in the opposite direction to the prevailing tendency to

separate our preparatory schools and courses from those which are destined to give the child his final schooling—and thus to make *class* schools. They have such schools now in Germany and the Socialists claim that even the teachers, from among whom the government continually weeds out all Socialists, are seeking to abolish them.

Finally it is shown why no great improvement is to be expected: "The ruling reactionaries are only too well aware that giving the right of education to the capable children of the working classes means nothing less than a general breach in the economic and political privileges of our ruling classes."¹⁶ And if, as has happened in several other countries, the capitalist "progressives" come into power instead of the "reactionaries" there will be no fundamental change. Indeed the prevailing educational tendencies I have mentioned are almost exclusively those of the so-called progressive element.

If economic and class restrictions were removed, on the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that the public schools would not be susceptible of revolutionary development in every direction. In the previous chapter I have summarized the hopes and plans of several of our most able and practical educators. But the possibility of the removal of such restrictions suggests immediately several other lines of equally promising and radical advance.

Only part of the child's life can be in the school even in the reorganized society of the future. The individual instruction that now occupies such a large part of the school hours will be taken up by parents and others outside of the school, and the school will be devoted almost exclusively to activities that require either a large material equipment or groups of chil-

dren or both. Parents will have the time, intelligence and even the normal school training to do a great deal of this instruction, including nearly all book knowledge. Lecture courses, with moving pictures, phonographs, etc., will be open to children in the same way that higher courses are open to young people; nearly every subject will be embraced; the children will attend voluntarily, and they will not only learn, they will be moulded; life will be made interesting to them at every point, they will be inspired. The correspondence schools that are now so successful in giving so many kinds of secondary technical instruction will be taken up by educational authorities and extended to every subject in which the child is interested. Children's publications will be improved and will extend their question boxes, so that, with the aid of parents, every purely intellectual need of the child will be attended to outside the school.

If the child's whole life is to be filled we must and will have a new children's world. Mrs. Gilman has shown how even that institution that is nearest the child, the home, is totally unadapted to its needs, that the child has only begun to be considered in the building of houses, and that only in those of the rich. And the child's life has a still better prospect of growing up around the schools of the future, where thousands may be gathered together. Now that school concentration is being applied in the country, why should it not be applied in the cities also? Why should not the large cities provide "children's universities" and technical schools, groups of buildings, workshops, gymnasiums, libraries, playgrounds, where both equipment and teachers could be more highly specialized and the opportunities presented to children multiplied many fold? Such centers, which might still better be called "children's cities," would take care of all lectures, amuse-

ments, clubs, and functions now attempted by social settlements.

In the unearned ground rents of cities alone, to say nothing of graduated income taxes, the cities have ample funds with which to carry out this work, and it is certain that every citizen whose children attend the public schools would find such expenditures justified. Only the rich and well-to-do, who pay the bulk of the taxes and send their children to private schools, are in the way.

Present-day educators, so often hopeless as to any far-reaching remedy for the evils of capitalist society and hoping for so little advance even within the school, naturally despair of shaping the child's *whole* environment to correspond with their educational ideal. But the Socialist educator feels no such necessity for compromise or surrender. He proposes that the child's entire life shall be arranged for its best benefit and believes that this can be accomplished within a generation if Socialism has its way.

XIII

MAN, WOMAN, AND SOCIALISM

ANYONE who has ever read the most influential and widely circulated book ever written on woman must realize how intimately this question is interwoven with Socialism. It is no mere coincidence that the author of this book, August Bebel, is at the same time the most influential of all living Socialists.

Bebel's "Woman" is undoubtedly more important than all the other Socialist writings on the subject put together. But it was first written a generation ago, and the great German statesman has been too much occupied with other matters to fundamentally change his early standpoint, even if he had desired to do so. Bebel's book, therefore, is based in part on the materialism of many of the earlier German Socialists and is limited at other points by the science and philosophy of the time when he wrote. While he has been followed very largely by the later writers, they have the immense advantage over him of having before them the modern woman's movement which had scarcely begun when Bebel first wrote—and women themselves may surely be expected to contribute more to this subject, on some sides, than men. Certainly a literature written by men alone could not compare with a literature written by women as well as men.

The leading women writers on this subject to-day are Socialists, but they have gone far deeper into the subject than Bebel, and it is only necessary to mention a few of his positions to show how far we have progressed since he first wrote. We shall then be able to see from a brief study of these modern writers how much more intimately the subject is involved with Socialism than even Bebel imagined.

Bebel recognizes that the physical and mental sides of our nature are closely bound together. But he unquestionably considers the physical as the more basic:

"If the human organism is to develop normally and healthfully it is essential that no portion of the human body should be neglected, and that no natural impulse should be denied its normal satisfaction. Every organ should perform the functions which it has been destined by nature to perform unless the whole organism is to suffer. The laws of the physical development of man must be studied and observed as well as the laws of mental development. The mental activity of a human being depends upon the physiological condition of his organs. Physical and mental vigor are closely linked. An injury to one has a detrimental effect upon the other. The so-called animal instincts are not inferior to mental requirements. Both are products of the same organism and are mutually interdependent. . . .

"Such being the intensity of sexual impulse, it is not to be wondered at that with both men and women sexual abstinence frequently leads to serious disorders of the nervous system, and in some cases even to insanity and suicide."¹

Undoubtedly the last remark is true, but later writers have shown that it is equally true that sexual abstinence as frequently leads to no serious physical disorders of any kind.

Bebel denies that the sexual impulse is weaker among women than among men, a statement which in this unqualified form is surely misleading. The impulse is radically different in women, weaker at some points and stronger at others. It is only by overlooking its complexities that we can make any quantitative comparison of the whole sex development of women and men.

Bebel says that "where the sexual contrast has not been realized the full height of existence of the human being is not developed." The supposition here is that there is a more or less definite amount of sexual expression which constitutes the minimum demanded by nature. On the contrary, the extent of this expression required by nature varies tremendously in every normal human being. While full development is certainly impossible without some sexual life, and equally impossible if it dominates everything, the question remains whether such sexual life should be kept at the maximum or at the minimum that a sanely balanced existence permits or at some intermediate point. The general tone of Bebel's work would suggest the opinion that the sexual impulses should be expressed to the fullest degree consistent with physical and mental health.

Bebel says that man is entitled to the normal satisfaction of his desires, and that the sexual impulse is simply natural like hunger and thirst. The modern women writers deny that the attraction of the sexes is in any way comparable with hunger, or that it is even remotely correct to speak of the "satisfaction" of the sex impulse, and still less of its "normal satisfaction."

In his later editions Bebel quotes with approval from Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell's essay on "The Moral Education of the Young in Relation to Sex":

"Sexual impulse exists as an inevitable condition of life and the foundation of society. It is the greatest power in human nature. . . . While undeveloped it is not an object of the thoughts, but it remains nevertheless *the central force of life.*"

This is an expression of the view, now very widely held among medical men, and especially by the followers of Freud, but it is not accepted by the modern woman. That sex is *a* central force of life is undeniable, and it is of the utmost importance that this should be fully recognized. That it is *the* central force of life, or that any element whatever can be denominated as *the* central force of life, is in contradiction to modern thought and modern science.

Finally the Socialists and radicals of the day will agree with Bebel that the sexual relation is a private concern and that "no one is accountable to anyone else and no third person has a right to interfere." But that no one has a right to interfere does not mean that it is a matter of indifference to others whether individuals are developing or degenerating in their private lives. And the various kinds of "satisfaction of sexual impulse" differ so profoundly in their effect on the individual, and therefore on society and the race, that the effort to discriminate between them is more important perhaps than any other subject to which men can give their attention.

In spite of such limitations as these Bebel has probably had more influence than all his successors put together in demanding, in the relation between men and women, absolute freedom both from moral coercion and legal restraint. He quotes a woman writer, Matilde Reichhardt-Stromberg, as demanding for every woman the right, whenever she sees fit, to form relations with men, "in order to preserve her equilibrium, just as they do."

After quoting a passage in which this writer refers with approval to the lives of Goethe and George Sand, Bebel says:

"But why should only 'great souls' lay claim to this right, and not also the others who are no great souls? If a Goethe and a George Sand—to select only these two from among the many who have done and are doing likewise—could follow the inclinations of their hearts, if, on Goethe's love affairs especially, entire libraries are published that are devoured in a sort of reverent ecstasy by his admirers, why should we condemn in others what becomes an object of admiration in the case of a Goethe or a George Sand? . . .

"In 'Jacques,' George Sand depicts a husband who judges the illicit relation of his wife with another man in the following manner: 'no human being can command love, and none is guilty if he feels or goes without it. What degrades the woman is the lie; what constitutes the adultery is not the hour she grants to her lover, but the night that she thereupon spends with her husband.' " ²

The larger part of Bebel's work, however, is taken up with the economic aspects of the woman question, matters which have now become more or less familiar to the whole reading public, and in this field he is at his best—though both his fundamental assumptions and his conclusions differ widely from those of to-day.

Of the leaders of present-day opinion on woman and related subjects, marriage, love, sex, and the home, the most influential with the general public are undoubtedly Ellen Key and Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Both are unjustly regarded as mere specialists on such questions, but aside from their specialty both are undeniably writers and sociologists of the first rank, while Ellen Key is also a profound student of modern literature and philosophy, and Mrs. Gilman an adept of

political economy and the philosophy of biology in its social application.

Ellen Key, Mrs. Gilman, Olive Schreiner, and all the best known writers on these questions are still permeated to some degree by the philosophy of the generation now beginning to pass away. To some extent all three are under the influence of "evolutionism," both in the broad and narrow senses of the term; but all are to a still higher degree pragmatists and Socialists, subconsciously nearly always and often in their conscious principles also. All three agree, not only that Socialism is necessary to establish social and economic justice, but that it is absolutely indispensable for the solution of all the deeper problems connected with women, sex, love, marriage, children, and the home.

Ellen Key is most nearly emancipated from the evolution fetish. Yet even she imagines that, with other "evolutionists," she is considering the practical problems of the day under the aspect of the centuries—though she does not go so far as to speak continually of millions of years and of æons, as Mrs. Gilman does. For example, she says that to-day the confusion of thought is to such an extent aggravated by the confusion of the feelings that "it may take centuries for new ideas of justice to work a change," and that love as the basis for the relation between man and woman, having long been proscribed almost as a crime, "probably will be still treated about the year 2000 as a culpable error." These are excellent examples of the tendency of evolutionists to set maximum limits for the rate of progress that they consider to be possible. Yet who shall say that within a generation or two the revolution in these matters may not go even farther than Ellen Key has ever been able to imagine?

Ellen Key is, as a rule however, a thorough-going

and conscious pragmatist. The point of departure in her thinking is always human needs:

"An increasing civilization means a more and more perfect satisfaction of increasingly complicated and higher needs. . . . It is our needs that set us in motion. . . .

"By his power of creating ideals and the ever increasing demand for happiness which results, man has deepened his instinct of spiritual needs." ³

The adjective "spiritual" in this last expression is unfortunate, but it need cause no misgiving as to Key's fundamental thought. Her effort, even if not always successful, is to consider the soul and the body as absolutely one. For her all good lies in "an increasingly soulful sensuousness or an increasingly sensuous soulfulness," and woman is not happy when she "has not even had her senses satisfied" or when "the soul received nothing from the senses and gave nothing." Undoubtedly it would be preferable if the antiquated terms soul and body, so long and so deeply ingrained in our consciousness as separate entities, could both be dropped altogether, but this involves a literary problem of the first magnitude and perhaps one that is still insoluble.

Key's psychology is as pragmatic as her philosophy. The original impulses are to be harmonized not by the intellect but by one another:

"No obstructing of appetites, but only their release in other directions can really purify them. Passions can be curbed only by stronger passions." ⁴

Resting on this view of psychology, according to which the human being is a highly organized, and a highly, though not completely, unified whole, morality consists in always taking the broader as against the narrower view. "It sees things as a whole." Indeed

Key takes a standpoint as broad as that of either Stirner or Nietzsche, by both of whom she is doubtless influenced:

"Because the means of life must never eclipse the meaning of life—which is to live with one's whole being and thus to be able to impart an ever greater fullness of life—it is immoral to live solely either for sanctity or for work, fatherland or humanity, or even love, for man is to live by all these. His exclusion from one of these means of full humanity can never be compensated by his participation in any of the others, just as little as one of his senses can be replaced by another, even though the latter be perfected under the necessity of serving in the place of the last one. And the resignation which prematurely contents itself with part of the rights of its human nature instead of aspiring to the whole, such resignation is a falling to sleep in the snow. It is undeniably a calmer state than that of keeping one's soul on the stretch for new experiences, for in that case one must also be prepared for new wounds, and he who keeps his suffering awake can be sure of more pain than he who puts it to sleep with an opiate. But no criterion is meaner than that of suffering or not suffering. The question is only what a man suffers from and what he becomes—for himself and others—or does not become as the result of his pain." ⁵

The great duty of man, to himself and to others, negatively, is not to limit his development in any direction, and positively, to pursue that development to the utmost. All crimes then become crimes against oneself, as, for example, the failure to love in the fullest way:

"To drift into relations where one has not the hundredth part of the consent of one's innermost ego is not proving but wasting one's personality, for every action which is less than ourselves degrades our personality." ⁶

Indeed the only true religion is that of love—that is, of the fullest self-development, which takes place only through love:

“Those emotional needs and powers of the soul which formerly were nourished by and directed towards religion have been nourished by and directed towards love.”⁷

Religion itself is rejected by Key, not on critical grounds, but because of its inferiority, for developing the personality when compared with love.

Key is far from considering either present-day society or the human race as God. The fullest personal development, as seen especially in love, is more important than all other considerations, both to the individual and to the race:

“Personal love, as now developed by civilization, has become so complicated, comprehensive and involved that *not only does it constitute in itself* (independently of its mission to the race) *a great asset in life, but it also raises or lowers the value of all else.* . . .

*“The happiness of the individual is the most important condition also for the enhancement of the race.”*⁸

While keeping individuals as the basis of all her thinking, Key by no means reverts to any theories of natural rights. The full development of the individual is not a right that society ought to recognize, but a duty of the individual to himself and others that society must recognize for the sake of the common good, and that the individual must insist upon at any cost:

“As soon as it is recognized that the individual is also an end in himself, with the right and duty of satisfying in the first place his own demands according to his nature, then it must remain the private affair of the

individual whether he will either leave altogether unfulfilled his mission as a member of the race, or whether he will limit its fulfillment.”⁹

As a last resort, that individual who does not feel that society is granting him his rights has the duty to himself and to the race to refuse to propagate the species. If “State Socialism” were to go to the length of interfering to the slightest degree with love or marriage, and led to conditions the individual felt as unacceptable, then we must agree with Key that this would indeed be the only sensible resource:

“When existence is made up of beings with starved hearts, frozen souls, obliterated characteristics—what materials will these afford for constructing the society of which they will form a part? Will they even care to produce children as raw material for the human factories or the necessities for the maintenance of that life in which the elements of personal happiness are wanting?”¹⁰

We see that while Key is an evolutionist and a Socialist she is at the same time a profound individualist—though not, of course, in the commercial sense of standing for capitalistic or property rights.

“The believers in life are everywhere distinguished by their determination to give to every relation the value of the unique, the stamp of the exceptional, that which has never been before and will never come again.”¹¹

This social individualism not only insists on the infinite importance of unique individuals, but, like that of Ibsen, opposes all abstract ideals as possible dangers.

“The developed personality ought not even to desire in the future the sole authority of *his own* ideal—since a descent from the diverse to the uniform would be a

retrogressive development—the effort of society to press into a single ideal form life's infinite multitude of different cases under the same circumstances or of the same cases under different circumstances, the same influences on different personalities or the same personalities under different influences.”¹²

Evolutionist as she is, Key even rejects, in the name of this social individualism, “the idea of the family” and “judicial considerations of the ‘historical origin’ of marriage”:

“When every life is regarded as an end in itself from the point of view that it can never be lived again; that it must, therefore, be lived as completely and greatly as possible; when every personality is valued as an asset in life that has never existed before and will never occur again, then also the erotic happiness or unhappiness of a human being will be treated as of greater importance, and not to himself alone. No, it will be so also to the whole community—through the life and the work his happiness may give the race or his unhappiness deprive it of.”¹³

Key agrees with Nietzsche in many aspects of her ethics. Individuals who circumscribe their lives in any way are doing far more harm to themselves and others, as a rule, than those who merely perform some positively “evil” action:

“A youth with large blinkers shunning the delights of the senses, the varied joy of life, the mobility of the fancy; a youth devoid of all spiritual adventure—such, with all its ‘purity,’ would be a dead asset in life.

“Those on the other hand who preserve but control the wealth of suggestion of the sexual life will be—even though their control has not always been complete—of infinitely greater service to existence.”¹⁴

The chief duty of man is not merely to develop himself consciously in every direction but to give a large play to his deepest unconscious impulses:

"For in order to attain to the true tragic greatness a man must be prepared to surrender himself unconditionally to, and to suffer through, what is greatest in his nature, his innermost ego." ¹⁵

Still more strikingly Nietzschean is Key's insistence not only that morality must be cut differently to fit every individual, but that certain broad classifications can be made—each of which requires a different ethic. There is one code of conduct which is in every way better for stronger natures to follow, and another that is better for the weaker. For example: "Great love, like great genius, can never be a duty; both are life's gracious gifts to its elect."

If the weaker class tries to adopt the ideas and standards which are only adapted to the stronger, then the result may be disastrous, for it may happen that "their powers of loving were small, while their ideas of love were great."

Indeed Key fearlessly and definitely combats the whole Christian ethical view, as, for example, when it opposes free divorce. And in opposing that view she at the same rejects altruism generally:

"It is unfortunate when a Christian ethical view stands in the way of serious and genuine chances of so renewing life that it may be more valuable to the community as well as to the individual himself. People who are equipped with rich possibilities still allow themselves to be decided by unconditional consideration for others' feelings. . . .

"That the race not only needs people willing to lose their lives in order to gain them, but also people with

courage to sacrifice others in order to win their own—this is a truth which nevertheless must be indissolubly bound up with an evolutionist view of life, to which the will to preserve and enhance one's own existence is a duty as undeniable as that of preserving and enhancing the lives of others by self-sacrifice.”¹⁶

Not only may “a ‘transgression’ be right for one nature and not for another,” but “the same sacrifice may be sublime at one period of our lives and shameful at another.” That is, we must have a distinct morality not only for each individual, but for each new stage in each individual's development. Key's basic thought is the same as that of Nietzsche, that what we need is not to cut our lives down negatively by any kind of morality whatever, but a civilization and a society which shall increase the amount and variety of life:

“A great and healthy will to live is what our time needs in the matter of the erotic emotions and claims.”¹⁷

I have up to this point concerned myself chiefly with Key's philosophy, using her conclusions as to love and sex only as illustrations. Let me now review these latter views briefly on their own account. It is evident that if her logic is sound, which it usually is, these conclusions also cannot fail to be in accord with pragmatism and Socialism.

Ellen Key's feeling about *the supreme importance of love* is not entirely an outgrowth of her general philosophy, but with this feeling as an additional and more or less independent basis of her thought we have now all the fundamental principles upon which she builds.

Love, she holds, is beginning to set its stamp on the whole spirit of the age, and moreover it is rapidly

taking shape in the consciousness of the many instead of being clearly recognized and acted upon only by the few, as was the case a few generations ago. Already women value their whole personality according to their love experiences rather than by their life-work, and the time may certainly come when men will do the same:

“Woman in her heart values herself—and wishes to be valued—according to her love. Not until this is fully appreciated and working for happiness does she feel her own worth.”¹⁸

The full development of love, as of the personality generally, demands as complete a recognition of the physical as of the psychic side of our nature. Love, therefore, is not physical attraction plus friendship, but a complete fusion of these two into something utterly different from either or from both. The two elements, moreover, must be present in the right proportions. Not only must the proportions be right, but there must be a whole science and art of love, both on the physical and the psychical side:

“Every developed modern woman wishes to be loved not *en mâle*, but *en artiste*. Only a man whom she feels to possess an artist’s joy in her, and who shows this joy in discreet and delicate contact with her soul as with her body, can retain the love of the modern woman. She will belong only to a man who longs for her always, even when he holds her in his arms. And when such a woman exclaims: ‘You desire me, but you cannot caress, you cannot listen . . .’ then that man is doomed.”¹⁹

This means practically that you can never be sure that you wholly possess a person or a person’s love, for there is always more to be had. You should then

always want more and demand more of the other and you must always see that the other has more and more of you, and if your love is neither undeveloped nor exhausted, you will both succeed in always getting more of one another.

This appreciation of the infinite stages of development of love is carried to the point that not only is love viewed as fundamentally different in the case of every couple—for "life never shows us 'marriage,' but countless different marriages; never 'love,' but countless lovers"—but as different at every moment of every love:

"Whenever a woman has captivated a man with a life-long fascination, the secret has been that he has never exhausted her; that she 'has not been one but a thousand' (G. Heiberg); not a more or less beautiful variation on the theme of the female sex, but a music in which he has found the wealth of inexhaustibility, the enticement of impenetrability, while she has given him an incomparable happiness of the senses. The more the modern woman acquires courage for a love as rich in the senses as in the soul . . . the more will she obtain that power which is now only the fortunate advantage of the exceptional." ²⁰

It is an inevitable conclusion from this that it is just as possible that a person's capacity to love may develop through several relationships as that it may fail to develop in a single relationship, however wonderful and complete this relationship may have been at the beginning. Key acknowledges that a woman who has only had a single lover may suffer if her lover has had other relations previously, but does not stop at this point:

"But all these sufferings do not bring her to regard the beloved as morally sunken, because before her he has been the husband of another woman. And the same

must hold good of earlier relations of love. The man may have developed, through a former marriage or free connection, his powers of giving a personal love, or he may, in the same way, have lost them. If no baseness is connected with these earlier experiences, if he has not degraded himself to voluntary division of his erotic nature—and bought love is always such a degradation—or to contemptible duplicity; if he has not treated any woman as a means, but received and given personality, then he does not enter 'impure' into his marriage, even if he has not evidence of abstinence." ²¹

The art of love, then, is not only offered as desirable for all, but it is especially necessary to the woman who has only had a single love, for it is only when she is an artist in love that such a woman may humanize the man who has loved in a mistaken and incomplete way before. And indeed it will be only an exceptional case where this earlier love has been all that could be demanded of it, though the cases will be many where there was no actual degradation. Key continues:

"For only by herself loving better will she gradually humanize man's passion and liberate it from the blind force of the blood." ²²

This passage brings us to the general problem of sexual morality, which requires an analysis of man's morality as well as that knowledge of women and that appreciation of love in which Key is so preëminent. And at this point her discussion is inadequate and must be supplemented. We cannot agree with her that the sheer "force of the blood," which has doubtless accounted for many of man's actions in the past, or at least has accounted for them to a larger measure than it should, is necessarily blind to-day. In modern civilized man it is,

on the contrary, to the highest degree cultivated, as Key herself recognizes:

“It is incontestable that premature erotic claims are less the result of the needs of the organism than of the influence of the imagination upon it. Only a new healthiness and beauty in the method of treating erotic questions will gradually refashion the now over-excited imagination, calm erotic curiosity, and strengthen the sense of responsibility towards self and towards the new generation so that premature sexual life may lose its attraction for the young.”²³

This is undoubtedly the truth. While the sexual impulse underlies all it may be reduced to a fraction of its former power by methods of control or expanded indefinitely by the imagination. It is the very essence of Key's position, and that of all the emancipated writers, since the age when the few could undertake successfully to regulate the lives of the many, that control should not be extended too far, but that the instincts ought to be developed, expanded, and at the same time transformed by the imagination. This will apply especially, according to Key's own statements, to women—whose sex development is altogether too latent until after marriage and sometimes to the end. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of young men are undoubtedly overstimulated in many ways, especially by certain forms of literature and art. A more realistic treatment of woman would make the impulse itself more discriminating. There would be less feeling for young women generally, including all those with even the slightest degree of physical attraction, and more feeling for those who, for any reason, physical, psychic, or both together, made a special appeal to the individual. An abstract and generalized

"ideal" has the effect of appealing to the purely generalized or physical impulses in man. On the contrary, individualized ideals in literature and art, where both sensuous beauty and the rest of reality are given an equally free treatment, would have at once a stimulating and a sobering effect, would lead in the overwhelming majority of cases both to self-expression and self-control, would concentrate and strengthen the sexual impulse when it ought to be irresistible and weaken it at other times.

While the sex side of our natures should be individualized by this true realism or true romance, it should also be diffused throughout our whole being by the development of all other sides of our selves in their naturally intimate relation with sex, and by the corresponding development of sex in connection with every activity in life. Our sex feeling must be narrowed (individualized) and intensified in its power to attract us to others; it must be broadened and diffused within our own personalities. Our physical and mental activities, our esthetic and moral feelings should be permeated with sex throughout, and in turn should lead back to sex and develop it; on the other hand our sex feeling should always lead out into the rest of our lives, and by diffusing itself everywhere cease to be a thing apart. We can only have less of sex as an obsession, as an essentially physical passion, as a perversion of, or an interference with the rest of our life, by opening the doors and permeating all of our life with sex.

And if we do consciously develop our sex impulses every highly evolved personality will have a new motive, as well as new means, for developing more energy and more passion in the other sides of life. The developed personalities of the future will not allow their sex natures to be cramped, crowded out, or crushed,

even by all the rest of life put together, because they will realize that the whole of man is involved at every moment with his sex development.

The greatest stimulus insuring the full and harmonious development of sex is an equal and coördinated development of man and woman. President G. Stanley Hall says of the sexual nature of the present-day woman, as compared with the present-day man, that, "she became apathetic and slow in sex as he grew precipitate because [for the very reason that] she was not heated to the degree of fusion." Thus, we have a vicious circle, each sex being driven to the opposite extreme by the other. Hall attributes this disharmony to the relatively greater interference of will and intellect in man in the sexual relationship. This is half the truth. The reason why the man's mind and will interfere with the normal instinctive union is because they have been trained to do so. That is, in will and mind, if not in body, man is oversexed. But it is the same cause, the interference of will and mind, that brings about the apathy in woman, because, by training, she has been undersexed, as Key has so ably pointed out. As long as the relation is not psychically perfect, it cannot be physically perfect, as Hall says. And, until unions physically and psychically complete are more common than they now are, we can never know how much experience is best either for man or woman. All we can say now is that man needs more than he now has of one kind of experience and less of another, while the case is reversed with woman. Undoubtedly, an excessive development of sex will always be *possible*, even in relatively perfect unions, though at what point we cannot tell. At any rate excess is caused in large part to-day by a reaction from incomplete unions and subnormal sex life, and will naturally be lessened in large measure as these unions become more perfect.

But, if unions are to be more complete, and if sex life is to be normally developed, the double standard of morals and education must be revolutionized on the man's side also. And there is no reason to suppose that, with the aid of the new woman, and the new relation between men and women that she is bringing about, there will be any insuperable difficulty to accomplishing this—as is commonly supposed. This revolution in morals is already occurring among the masses of our cities, and will doubtless become general in proportion as they control. But, first of all, the attitude of our professional moralists and of our "official" public opinion must be reversed.

In trying to bring about a reasonable degree of restraint of the sexual impulse the moralists of the day have rightly sought to show the actual cost, the waste, and the danger, of promiscuity and excess. But even in this practical purpose they have been subject to the vices of present-day morality. Influenced by the ethics bequeathed to us by the believers in a theological hell, they have made the double error of appealing to fear rather than to common sense and self-respect, and of grossly exaggerating the thing to be feared (disease). Influenced by our crude materialism, they have supposed that the only prudential motive that could be appealed to in young men was what might happen to themselves and not what might happen to the woman involved.

The recent sensational discoveries of effective cures of the most threatening sexual diseases may be viewed as having wreaked poetic justice on this hybrid of Calvinism and materialism. There is now no further choice, and in our customary discussion of this question we will be *forced* to take higher ground. There are no more blood-curdling dangers to be faced, but only the psychological dangers which have always been of a far deeper

and larger import. Indeed, the physical dangers and costs to men promise soon to be reduced to zero. Are we to be confined, then, to arguments pointing to the intellectual waste and æsthetic degeneration involved in loose and wild living, together with possible injury to the future generation? By no means.

It is only the criminal and semi-criminal, the excessively brutal and pathological type of men, that ever totally disregard the woman in the case—even with our present woefully deficient education on this side of life. If it is a commercial relation he enters into, the man tells himself that there is no other way the woman can get what she needs; if it is a casual affair of the heart, he says to himself that the making and breaking of intimacies, or of this particular intimacy, does the woman more good than harm. If he has no respect for women generally, he knows that even the men of his acquaintance demand some plausible reason; if he respects women, he requires grounds that would satisfy his sister or his women friends. With another kind of education and a more frank association of the young of the two sexes, there is no reason to suppose that men's consideration for women would, as a general rule, lack so much as it does now, either in sincerity or in intelligence.

The question, then, becomes no longer what young men may have to fear, but what young women inevitably have to suffer. We do not need to suppress a single one of the poets' or artists' idealizations of women or of physical love, even the most sensuous, provided they have artistic merit, but we should add to them a realistic treatment also, and a scientific familiarity with every physiological detail of woman's life cycle—and bring about a full realization of what her relation to men means. At present all this is almost deliberately withheld from young men, to such a degree that even the most intelli-

gent middle-aged man can scarcely grasp woman's view of life. And, worse still, a very considerable proportion of women have actually been perverted and robbed of their own sound impulses by the influence of such ignorant men—whether ascetics or advocates of “free love.”

Even a better knowledge of the more serious physiological aspects of the single woman's life would have a steadying effect. Still more important is the knowledge of the inevitable incidents of marriage and child-bearing. But most indispensable of all is the knowledge of the significance to woman's organism of the physiological relation itself. For even if child birth and gestation are cured of all the *worst* of their terrors, as they well may be some day, they remain most momentous in woman's life. Even if the physiological effect of an artificial and childless life on the special organs is reduced to the minimum, the physiological effect on the nervous system will remain of the most colossal import—at least, as important as the effect of celibacy; that is, while there is no danger that the individual's life will be ruined or destroyed either by celibacy or by an unrestrainedly artificial mode of living, either of these modes of life is certainly utterly different from and markedly inferior to a more normal existence, and only if the fuller and more natural life is in some way cut off is the individual justified in living the life that is next best.

There can be no question that these are the views of our most developed women. Is there any question that with a different education and an enlightened public opinion, both of which will become practicable in a social democratic society, they would become the views of men also? Assume for a moment that all young men were given something more than a verbal and literary instruction, that they were admitted to enough medical clinics to demonstrate to them realistically the reverse side of

the poet's and the artist's dream—though this dream is also true as far as it goes. Suppose that their lives were so full and normal, including their sex life, that they never felt tempted to become so intoxicated by alcohol as to forget all their standards of conduct (which is the usual cause of their fall), and suppose that men and women alike were in an economic situation to form serious, long-continued, or permanent unions as soon as they felt strongly enough impelled to do so. Would not man's consideration for women under these circumstances act as one of the very strongest deterrents, not only against promiscuity and excess, but even against the very origination of the impulse in an excessive or merely physical form?

While Ellen Key's moral system is somewhat deficient as relating to men, it contains very little that is inconsistent with these considerations, and is constructive and even creative throughout. For she not only insists on love and freedom of action, but she gives new ideas and new feelings about what love is, and what it can become, besides showing its immeasurable value to society—a value that can never be utilized until society gives freedom and real opportunity to every individual.

Key believes in the *right* of every individual of "serving the community with his love according to his own choice, and of using the freedom of his love under his own responsibility." And those who do not serve the community with love, but, on the contrary, oppose its development, she says, are immoral from the standpoint of the "religion of life." She refers to Tolstoy as an illustration, for however exalted may be his grounds for opposition to the full development of love, such opposition is the very basis of all immorality:

"Whether the haters of sexual life belong to the exhausted or to the excluded, to the sterile or to the im-

mature, the withered or the poisoned, they may doubtless be entitled individually to more or less leniency; their doctrine of morality, however, must, for the reasons we have given, be rejected as entirely worthless." ²⁴

Sexual morality, in her view, not only requires unity between the sensual and the spiritual sides of life, and the development of love in spite of any institutions and codes that stand in the way, but also its development *to the full extent of which the individual is capable*.

I have already spoken of her monistic view of the soul and senses. She applies this philosophy to sexual morality, not as an apology for the unconventional behavior of true lovers, but as a *demand* upon every individual who is capable of true love:

"The monist in these questions does not ask whether a sexual relationship is the first and only one before he acknowledges its morality. He only wishes to know whether it was such that it did not exclude the personality of the lovers; whether it was *a union in which 'neither the soul betrayed the senses nor the senses the soul.'*" In these words George Sand gave the idea of the new chastity." ²⁵

Consistently with this view, Key does not fail to denounce any love relation which is lacking in the full development of the sensual element. Under present conditions the majority of young men who are fully developed on the physical side, she says, have some experiences before marriage. Those who do not may have avoided these experiences from the highest reasons, but the chances are far greater that there is some temperamental coldness or physical limitation in their natures:

"Thus it is possible in one case out of ten that the love for which a young man has kept himself pure until marriage really is personal love. In the other nine cases

it is not so, but on the contrary the most impersonal of all love." ²⁶

The love of such a young man, in a word, is likely to be impersonal and inferior because lacking on the physical side, just as it would be impersonal and inferior if he had married through an exclusively physical attraction. In the one case the love is cold, in the other brutal.

She advocates sexual self-control because she believes that it is necessary for the happiness of the individual, and incidentally for the happiness of the race. She recommends no asceticism, but only a limitation in the use of stimulants, more work, more recreation, and more art. She is opposed to a too free satisfaction of the sexual impulse primarily because it interferes with the development of the individual.

She is especially indignant over the comparison of the sex desire with hunger. In fact, she does not favor the satisfaction of the sexual impulse for its own sake, but only in so far as it enhances life generally. She refuses to believe that even the most complete love should be an end in itself:

"It must give life; if not new living beings then new values; it must enrich the lovers themselves and through them mankind." ²⁷

Obviously there can be no duty to complete love on the part of those who are incapable of such love. Key does not wish to confine such persons to celibacy, but believes that marriage without love may be the best that life offers them, and that they have a right, in the absence of love, at least to enjoy the lesser benefits of home and parenthood. But the new morality does not permit to that individual who does embody its principle, and

who is capable of personal love, the right to marry or to form any sexual union without it:

"It will be severe with those who, having had experience or intuition of love, have entered without it into a marriage which will certainly impoverish and perhaps ruin more lives than their own." ²⁸

However, human beings are by no means to be thrown into two classes alone. On the contrary, each case is individual, and that to a high degree:

"Only cohabitation can decide the morality of a particular case—in other words, its power to enhance the life of the individuals who are living together and that of the race. Thus sanction can never be granted in advance nor—with certain exceptions relating to children—can it be denied to any matrimonial relationship. Each fresh couple, whatever form they may choose for their cohabitation, must themselves prove its moral claim." ²⁹

In other words, there is no such thing as a sentence to be passed by society against the individual before the individual has had every opportunity to find out for himself what course he will finally choose, and even then there is to be no interference of any kind—except where something must be done for the children.

Not only does the new morality demand the most complete freedom for every individual to develop according to his needs, or what he believes to be his needs, but it rejects every item of the present-day moral code which stands in the way. The individual, according to Key, has a right in some cases to love more than once, in others to love before marriage, to love without marriage, and to live for love even before living for children. The only test is whether the love is actually gen-

uine. And she contends that there is an infallible test to find out when this is the case :

“By its fruits love is known. Nothing is truer than that ‘there is no such thing as local demoralization.’ A person who in all his other doings is healthy and genuine, who continues strong and sound in his work, is in most cases moral also in sexual matters according to his conscience—even if this does not harmonize with the doctrine of monogamy.” ³⁰

As long as this test is followed and the individual is developing his whole personality, and therefore proving his value to himself and others, love is not only a right, but a duty, including the right and duty, whenever a new love is greater than the old, to follow this new love.

Similarly there are many cases where the individual will choose to live with another without marriage, and Key gives a number of examples of such cases among women :

“There is a gulf, deep as the center of the earth, fixed between this unmarried woman, who presents her child to the race, and the unmarried woman who ‘has a child.’

“Beyond all doubt the first-named would have considered it the ideal of happiness to be able to bring up her child together with its father. The circumstances which prevent her may be many. The man’s liberty, for instance, may be limited by earlier duties or feelings which bind him against his will or not. The conditions of life or of work of one of them may prevent a complete union. So may the experience that the personality of one of them is fettered through marriage. Or again, love itself was not what it had promised to be, and the woman was proud enough not to consider herself fallen and in need of being rehabilitated by a marriage which, on the contrary, would under these circumstances be a fall.

“But it may also be for other reasons that a woman

desires a man to keep his complete freedom; it may be, for instance, that he is the younger, or that she knows she cannot give him a child." ³¹

And finally, in her earnest insistence on the advantage of an early and full development of the right kind of sexual union, Key is willing that young people should unite themselves, in some cases, before legal marriage. She prefers, where it is practicable, that some marriage form, simplified as it will be in the new society, shall be gone through with, but she wants the most complete freedom of divorce for young people as for others, and feels that this right will be widely used. Her plan is a vast improvement over the proposed trial marriages. The trial marriage looks at the union in a negative sense as temporary. Key's early marriage regards the union as one that is expected to be permanent, but is qualified by an absolute right of divorce. And she expects the widest use of this right:

"It is evident to every thoughtful person that a real sexual morality is almost impossible without early marriage; for simply to refer the young to abstinence as the true solution of the problem is, as we have already maintained, a crime against the young and against the race, a crime which makes the primitive force of nature, the fire of life, into a destructive element. But the consequence of early marriages must be free divorce. . . .

"It is known now that, although youthful love may be the surest basis of marriage, it is more often the reverse. Here, if anywhere, is the scene of accidents. . . .

"And it is just those young people who unhesitatingly realize their love in the belief of its lifelong continuance, that in coercive marriage are made the victims of their own pure will, their healthy courage, their bright idealism. . . .

"Nothing is commoner, especially for the woman

whose first experience of love is in marriage, than that she is in love with love and not her husband. . . .

"In other cases again, the husband is all she sees in him. But a young woman herself often goes through, during the years from twenty to twenty-five, so complete a transformation of feelings and ways of thought, that after a few years of marriage she finds herself in the presence of a man who is a perfect stranger to her.

"While love is fighting for its happiness it may transform an ordinary person into something higher than himself, as also into something lower. When the tension is relieved it is seen that in the former case—especially as regards men—love was able to

' . . . unmake him from a common man,

But not complete him to an uncommon one. . . . '

It was no organic growth of the personality, but only a straining of self that love called worth." ³²

Of course a thinker who has so long considered all phases of the subject has not failed to give attention to the possible children of these early marriages. Every form of union and every child is to be considered legitimate, but the man is to be held strictly responsible for fatherhood, and will therefore be to a very great degree dependent upon any woman with whom he unites himself:

"As soon as society decrees that the fact of two persons becoming parents makes their union *obligatory*, the relationship itself will gradually intensify their feeling and the man will wish to preserve and possess the elements of joy for which he must always bear the burdens." ³³

The word "obligatory" is unfortunate. What Key means, it appears from the context, is that the union shall be *responsible*, no matter how brief it may have

been. All children are to be legitimate, as they are already becoming under the laws of several countries, but the mother is to have the right to demand that the father shall share the responsibility. It is not proposed, as the word "obligatory" might suggest, to use any pressure to make the union more permanent than it would otherwise be, not even for the sake of the children, for, according to Key's view, all pressure that is brought to bear on the parents in behalf of the children is nothing less than an injury to the latter. She prefers rather that the two individuals concerned should each find another union which satisfies them, so that at least the children to be born later may receive what is more valuable than all else—namely, parents who are in love with one another. According to this idea, it is absolutely immoral for parents to live primarily for their children:

"The children begotten under a sense of duty would moreover be deprived of a number of essential conditions of life; among others that of finding in their parents beings full of life and radiating happiness, which constitutes the chief spiritual nourishment of children—and it may be added that parents 'who live entirely for their children' are seldom good company for them." ³⁴

That is, to live for the children means to deprive the children of parents who really love one another.

Key does not object to the restriction of the number of children in certain specified cases, but she objects to the motives under which restriction is often resorted to:

"To the evolutionist only the cause, not the manner, is the deciding point. Danger to the possible children or to the mother herself; the fear of pecuniary or personal insufficiency for the bringing up of the children; the desire of using all one's powers and resources for an im-

portant life work; a Malthusian point of view in the question of population—these and other motives are regarded by the evolutionist as good reasons for limiting or altogether abstaining from parentage.”³⁵

In this last paragraph we begin to see the serious effect of Key’s chief limitation, namely, her failure to take into account the vast possibilities of *economic* evolution and social revolution, without which, as she admits, no very great advance is possible along any of the lines she proposes.

With the new economic system Key herself advocates surely all these Malthusian considerations and most of the pecuniary grounds for restriction would pass away. And with these artificial grounds for restriction would go also those authoritarian preachings against restriction that formerly forbade any measures whatever in this direction. Yet she says:

“When only petty and selfish reasons—such as considerations of the children’s inheritance, personal good-living and voluptuousness, beauty and comfort—determine fathers and mothers to keep the number of their children below the average required *to secure the due increase of population*, then their conduct is anti-social. A person, on the other hand, who is content with few or no children, because he or she has a work to perform, may be able *to compensate society* by the production of another class of value.” (My italics.)³⁶

We have here an admission of the superior claim of society against the individual which is in absolute and astounding contradiction to Key’s whole system of thought, for, according to everything I have quoted up to this point, society has no right to demand any act from the individual, except such as develop the individual himself. To explain this extraordinary lapse we

have to realize that Key does not consider any revolutionary change in the *home* as possible. Until there is such a change, we must admit that a woman must either have servants, which merely puts off these tasks on other women, or she must carry practically all the present burdens of the home and child-rearing herself. This is the condition that Key regards as permanent.

This opinion leads Key, in the question of attending to the home and the rearing of children, to use two arguments which are entirely inconsistent with her whole process of reasoning. First, she tries to keep the woman to these tasks by telling her of the *duty* she owes to society, and, secondly, she suggests that when a woman wishes to undertake other activities at the same time with these domestic ones, this is due merely to a desire "to devote her purely human qualities to other tasks." I have pointed out how the first error contradicts Key's own philosophy. The second contradicts her demand for a full development for every human being. A married woman may wish to devote part of her energy in some measure or even largely to other tasks in order *to develop herself*, and thus incidentally to do the thing that is best for her children, who are so largely dependent on her development. It is perfectly natural that Key, seeing no solution of the problem as to who is to take care of the children and the home, should be driven back into a reactionary and illogical position. For if the choice had to be made between purely domestic functions and outside activities that involved the neglect of children, of course no real mother would hesitate.

Here is the way Key refers to the woman who devotes herself to other than home tasks:

"When, in order thus to be able to 'live their life,' they wish to be 'freed from the burden of the child,' one begins to doubt. For until automatic nurses have

been invented, or male volunteers have offered themselves, the burden must fall upon other women, who—whether themselves mothers or not—are thus obliged to bear a double one. Real liberation for women is thus impossible; the only thing possible is a new division of the burdens.

“Those already ‘freed’ declare that by making money, studying, writing, taking part in politics, they feel themselves leading a higher existence with greater emotions than the nursery could have afforded them. They look down upon the ‘passive’ function of bearing children—and rightly, when it remains only passive—without perceiving that it embodies as nothing else does the possibility of putting their whole personality in activity. Every human being has the right to choose his own happiness—or unhappiness.

“But what these women have no right to, is to be considered equally worthy of the respect of society with those who find their highest emotions through their children, the beings who not only form the finest subject for human art, but are at the same time the only work by which the immortality of its creator is assured.”³⁷

It is true that the problem of rearing children without a monstrous cost to the mother has not yet been solved, but far from making us turn away from the problem this failure should only make us give it all the more attention. While the mother must be supreme in raising the child, an infinity of possible aids with which economic and social evolution may provide her will suggest themselves to any thoughtful person, especially to anyone who has observed the tremendous changes now going on in the home aside from this child-rearing aspect.

It is true, as Key says, that the woman must not only have the child, but rear it, in order to develop her whole personality, but it does not follow that she may not be provided, in the course of evolution, with innumerable

aids to efficient child-rearing, which are now lacking. And certainly it is a strange thing for Key to say that the home and child-rearing in themselves give women the possibility "of putting their whole personality into activity," a statement which is contradicted by nearly every page she has written. In a word, Key has a vast faith in the possibilities of individual evolution, but a very narrowly limited faith in the possibilities of the evolution of social and economic institutions—even though she is a Socialist in all her *ultimate* ideals.

Mrs. Gilman may be wrong in her opposite assumption that the home is disintegrating so rapidly, and school education developing so rapidly, that there is practically no woman question and no home problem at all, aside from the economic one of hastening this evolution—but certainly she is right in that at present it is along these lines that we must look chiefly for progress.

And Olive Schreiner is surely justified in claiming that the woman who is developed exclusively through children and the home, unless she has become a specialist and an expert in this particular line, is unfit either as a comrade of man or as a mother of children:

"It is our faith that the day comes in which not only shall no man dare to say, 'It is enough portion for a woman in life that she bear a child,' but when it will rather be said, 'What noble labor has that woman performed that she should have the privilege of bringing a man or woman child into the world?'" ³⁸

Key by no means wishes to confine any woman during her whole life to her home, but only during the relatively few years when her children are very young. These years, however, are necessarily taken from the prime of her life.

Key develops at great length "the tragic situation" that calls the woman to serve her children and at the same

time to develop her own personality. This is what might be called a social dualism, in conflict with her own monistic philosophy. It is true that the problem may only be solved by time, but so will all the other questions with which she is concerned. Some of her passages might even suggest that she scarcely believes in economic evolution at all, as, for example, the following, where she fails completely to take into account the fact that the conditions of the home and child-rearing have ceaselessly evolved and are even undergoing a revolution at the present time. She assumes that the normal family will consist of not less than three or four children (we may agree with this, but neither should it, as a rule, consist in more than that number) :

“But in this case a mother must reckon that her children will occupy about ten years of her life, if she will herself give them the nursing and care which will make them fully efficient. And during these years—if her contribution in either direction is to have its full value—she must neither divide her powers by working for a living nor by constant public activity. During these years she may continue her own general development; she may take occasional part in social work; now and then she may have time for mental production. But any continuous and exhausting work outside the home will, at least indirectly, diminish her own vital force and that of her children.”³⁹

Not only is Key dualistic in this matter and oblivious to the past advances and future possibilities of economic evolution, but she practically identifies the family with the home. The evolution of the family is a much broader problem, and would take us far afield. The family is certainly here to stay with us for a long time, but it is in no way tied to the home. She points out that the children need family affection and care and

wastes eloquence on the proposition, for very few would agree with the opposite teaching of certain "State Socialists" that institutions will do *all* of this work better—though every thoughtful person will agree that institutions may render tremendous aid. She reminds us that institutions cannot furnish love, which must be strictly individual, and that what is needed is more family affection than we can have to-day, under conditions which permit parents and their children to see no more of one another than the poverty of the majority now allows.

All of this is obviously true, but it does not justify Key's identifying the need of every individual to "find himself at home in a single poor heart" with the need of finding himself at home in one poor corner of the world. Key herself admits that family conditions will change enormously, and that an increase of institutions of all kinds will be inevitable. She favors also a subsidy to mothers for the bringing up of children, and finally even makes a full admission of the possibility of economic evolution in the home itself, which she had practically denied by implication before. And the evolution of the home can only mean either that it will be profoundly modified and given a collective form, or that its functions will be more and more restricted as far as it retains its present individualistic state.

Even now we have not penetrated to the bottom of Key's error in consigning the overwhelming majority of women exclusively to home and child-rearing during a considerable period at the prime of their lives. The question is this: If Ellen Key is a Socialist and admits economic evolution, why does she take this conservative position? It is inconceivable that the error could be merely intellectual. What is the quality of the Socialism upon which this error is based?

Sometimes Key's Socialism is complete. In regard to

the right of every child to an equal opportunity for example, no Socialist could add anything to her views:

"The prevailing system of society has prompted fathers still more to enslave themselves in order to create an advantageous position for their children. The existing rights and duties of a father stand in immediate connection with the right of inheritance, one of the greatest dangers of our system of society. For inheritance often keeps inefficiency in a leading position, but efficiency in a dependent one; it favors the possibility of the degenerate propagating the race. . . .

"The goad of acquisitiveness would be broken through the limited possibility of increasing one's wealth and the needlessness of thereby securing the existence of one's children. A new system would do away with the necessity of applying to the state for increase of salary for the education of children as befits their class. For *if all children were placed in an equal position by the community providing everything*—from school materials to traveling scholarships—for the complete education of the bodily and mental powers of individuals, an education in which a true circulation of the classes would take place by *consideration being given only to ability*; if each thus had *the same position* when all entered upon their different careers; if each had *the same chances* of there attaining to the right use of his special powers, since he had every means of training them. . . . then the desire to favor one's own children at the cost of the rest would disappear.

"The father whose activity had procured him a position of power, which during his lifetime made his children's circumstances more favorable than those of a number of others, would certainly thus be able—and to the advantage of the whole community—to allow his children that differentiation and refinement which, for instance, the richer culture of their home might give. But when the right of inheritance disappeared—or at

least was greatly limited and heavily taxed—he could not exempt them from permanently securing by the exercise of their own powers the advantages of a higher or lower kind that they had learned to value at home.”⁴⁰

Here is the revolutionary Socialist ideal intact.

Again, when we look at Key’s conception of history, we find certain modifications of the usual Socialist view, but not any deformation:

“All thinking persons desire new conditions with growing earnestness. But new conditions do not arise, as the Socialist is far too willing to believe, through new external relations alone; nor through new ideas and discoveries, as the man of science with his bias is too apt to think. New conditions arise above all through new human beings, new souls, new emotions. Only these form new plans of life, new modes of action; only these revalue the objects which are then pursued day by day by innumerable individuals. A new idea becomes feeling and motive power, at first with one individual, then with a few, then with many, and finally with all.”⁴¹

This is merely the pragmatic modification of the Socialist formula. But we find that, even with the Socialist conception of history and the revolutionary Socialist ideal, Key is still a believer to a considerable degree in “State Socialism.” She believes, for example, that if society provided for the workers as a right, not as a charity, “then the desire to favor one’s own children at the cost of the rest would disappear,” along with the fear that one’s own children would suffer. This is pure Utopianism, unmodified by the facts of human nature, which show men and women ready, where unequal conditions exist, to do almost anything to give their children an unfair advantage over others.

Key admits the domination of society by financial interests and the necessity for the working class to struggle

against this domination, but she addresses herself primarily to the conscience of the educated persons among the upper and upper middle classes. She expects social advance to be very slow, since it is to be made by an appeal to "private conscience and collective conscience." She attributes the backwardness of culture to general stupidity and not to class rule, and in the very passage where she attacks the financial interests she refers also to the "inevitable self-surrender on the part of the *best* and the unconditional self-satisfaction on the part of the others." In a word, she represents that halfway position between revolutionary Socialism and Utopian "State Socialism," which is so common among upper class women to-day.

But the value of the rest of Key's work is by no means impaired throughout by this error, colossal and fundamental as it is. It is evident, for example, that she reaches her conclusions concerning the necessity of sex expression, as on other matters, not through her idea that the home is permanent and that women cannot carry on any other function while they are rearing their children, but on the basis of other principles I have outlined, and, above all, on the immeasurable importance of love.

There is little question that Key's views correspond to those of the overwhelming majority of educated and serious women who have given thought to these questions. The ideas of Olive Schreiner, for example, do not differ fundamentally, though they are somewhat less developed. With Schreiner, too, love comes first of all, and this is because of the esthetic, intellectual, and spiritual functions of love apart entirely from the instinct of physical reproduction. She believes that the love and sexual feelings of the future will not be less, but greater than they are to-day, and agrees that they will probably be concentrated upon fewer persons of the other sex,

and at the same time more intense when they are so centered. When Schreiner says that the sexes are moving together instead of moving apart, she means that the relation of man to woman is destined to play a more and more important rôle in society. And one of her chief purposes is to show that the new woman will be more lovable and will attract men even more strongly than the old. The facts that she will enter upon more fields of labor, that she will be "freer, more intellectual and more virile," she believes, will only serve to vastly intensify and develop sexual attraction.

Indeed, the present separation of the sexes, according to Schreiner, and in accord also with common observation, is due chiefly to a separation of occupation. As woman gives a smaller and smaller part of her time to the home, and less time, though more thought, to children, she will enter even more rapidly into new fields of labor than she is doing now. This tendency, indeed, is opposed even to-day not so much by retrogressive men as by retrogressive women, who cannot visualize or adapt themselves to the new life.

Not only will these new conditions increase vastly the amount of love in the world, and so vitalize and intensify all life, but they will have an immediately beneficial effect on sexual selection and the improvement of the race. The ruling class males of to-day who purchase women for marriage or otherwise have often "made" their own money, but this by no means shows any superior capacity for parenthood, and these will be reduced to compete for women like other men. And similarly those women of all classes, from the conventional bought wife to the prostitute, who live as willing parasites on these men, will have a smaller chance than to-day to pick out desirable male mates and to propagate the species. Men will not be attracted to such types of

women when, in order to maintain them, they are obliged to suffer some real loss, instead of shifting the expense on the subjected classes of society whom they exploit. There will be more women of the desirable kind for most men and less women of the undesirable kind for the beast of prey type of man. There will be more men, and of the right kind, for the new woman and far less for the parasite.

Schreiner's chief contributions lie in her insistence on the necessity of comradeship between the sexes, and of common occupations, and in her denunciation of parasitism, which not only leads away from comradeship, but also brings about degeneration of the minority who are placed in the position of parasites and a corresponding exploitation of the majority. Schreiner, like Mrs. Gilman, is an economic Socialist. In morality and ideals they could not be more Socialistic than Ellen Key, but both are more concerned with the more immediate and practical phase of the "woman question," namely its economic aspect. Ellen Key goes far more deeply than they do into questions that might remain, in very large part, even after the solution of the economic problem; but her failure wholly to grasp this problem has led her into exceedingly grave errors as to present-day life.

Strange to say, the too great emphasis on the possibilities that lie in economic changes alone, which we find in the case of Olive Schreiner, Mrs. Gilman, and others, is due to precisely the same political faith that brings Ellen Key to neglect economic progress. All are interested in reforms that appeal to the "private and collective conscience," and unconsciously shape their philosophy so that it may appeal to some element of the ruling class.

Schreiner says:

"Give us labor and the training which fits for labor!

We demand this, not for ourselves alone, but for the race." ⁴²

On the contrary, what is demanded by the masses of women is not more labor, but more life, a truth which Schreiner herself sees at times; for example, when she demands that women should have their place as "guiders, controllers, possessors." But she constantly reverts to the upper-class view, and is far more concerned for the ten per cent who constitute the upper and middle classes than she is for the other ninety per cent—whose interests she does not ignore, but constantly puts in a secondary position.

Schreiner is disturbed chiefly by the parasitism of the upper class women on the males of that class. She practically admits that the males are also parasites on society as a whole, but this fact becomes of entirely secondary importance in her reasoning. She admits that it is only class rule and exploitation and the existence of wage slaves that make the female parasite of the upper class possible:

"Under no conditions, at no time, in no place, in the history of the world have the males of any period, of any nation, of any class, shown the slightest inclination to allow their own females to become inactive or parasitic, so long as the actual muscular labor of feeding and clothing them would in that case have devolved upon *themselves!*

"Without slaves or subject classes to perform the crude physical labors of life and produce superfluous wealth, the parasitism of the female would, in the past, have been an impossibility." ⁴³

But, strange to relate, after these admissions she expresses the fear that the women of the working classes

themselves will, within a period of fifty years, become parasites in a somewhat similar way:

"The ancient forms of female, domestic, physical labor of even the women of the poorest classes will be little required, their place being taken, not by other females, but by always increasingly perfected labor-saving machinery." ⁴⁴

Her description of the upper-class female parasite is scathing, but it seems to be due far more to her regret that the upper class woman does not labor and is therefore degenerating than to her indignation that this woman lives on the backs of the masses:

"Then, in place of the active laboring woman, upholding society by her toil, has come the effete wife, concubine or prostitute, clad in fine raiment, the work of others' fingers; fed on luxurious viands, the result of others' toil, waited on and tended by the labor of others. . . .

"Finely clad, tenderly housed, life became for her merely the gratification of her own physical and sexual appetites, and the appetites of the male, through the stimulation of which she could maintain herself. And, whether as kept wife, kept mistress, or prostitute, she contributed nothing to the active and sustaining labors of her society. She had attained to the full development of that type which, whether in modern Paris or New York or London, or in ancient Greece, Assyria or Rome, is essentially one in its features and its results. She was the 'fine lady,' the human female parasite—the most deadly microbe which can make its appearance on the surface of any social organism. The relation of female parasitism generally to the peculiar phenomenon of prostitution is fundamental. Prostitution can never be adequately dealt with, either from the moral or the scientific standpoint, unless its relation to the general phenomenon of female parasitism be fully recognized. It is the

failure to do this which leaves so painful a sense of abortion on the mind, after listening to most modern utterances on the question, whether made from the emotional platform of the moral reformer, or the intellectual platform of the would-be scientist." ⁴⁵

It does not seem to have occurred to Schreiner that perhaps society could be best advanced by the decay and disappearance of these upper class women and their descendants, rather than by *their regeneration to become more effective exploiters and perhaps to build up a lasting caste system*. This confusion of thought leads to many other strange confusions, which, however, are typical of the thinking of many middle-class radical women. It is supposed, for example, that the fact that the wealth is unearned in itself leads to degeneration, though different amounts are required to bring about this effect according to individual characters. Yet Schreiner has pointed out that the men of the same class do not degenerate to such a degree, though their wealth is equally unearned according to her own standpoint. It is evidently a lack of activity, and not consumption of wealth, that leads to degeneration.

Again Schreiner speaks of the lack of *incentive* to exertion as being another cause of degeneration, whereas the truth is that it is only a lack of experience of reality and of actual exertion, from whatever motive, which is at fault. The men of the exploiting class have no more economic incentive to work than the women, but they have other motives that keep them in contact with reality—the love of excitement, the love of power.

Moreover, Schreiner states repeatedly that a healthy condition requires not only the rearing of children, but also other labor, yet the moment she becomes affected by the degeneration of her upper-class parasites she forgets this and demands only that they should attend to the

rearing of their children. Undoubtedly this would improve them and their children, but it is difficult to see how it would put an end to the parasitism or the degeneration it brings about.

The case of Olive Schreiner shows that it is almost impossible to expect a woman who writes for upper-class readers to maintain the Socialist point of view, even after she has mastered it. The upper class woman is certainly a burden and a disgrace to our civilization, as Schreiner says, but the disgrace lies not in the fact that she does not work or rear her own children, but that she is a parasite on the community and therefore on other people's children. The trouble is not that she fails to be an active exploiter like her husband, but that she keeps a vast army of women and of men at work for her as servants or as workers engaged in producing the luxuries she consumes.

Mrs. Gilman also appeals primarily to the upper classes. But her contributions on the question of the economic evolution of woman and of society, especially in so far as it relates to woman, are of the utmost value, comparable only to what Ellen Key has written on love and marriage. Her "Woman and Economics" and her work on "The Home" have shown both what society has suffered and is suffering by the economic backwardness of woman and the home, and what vast possibilities are offered by future economic evolution.*

Like the other writers of the day, Mrs. Gilman is

*I am dealing rather briefly with Mrs. Gilman's work in this connection, though I have quoted her at length in other chapters. Certainly no woman writer has made more influential contributions to modern social philosophy. But I consider her work far more important in the general field of sociology than in the discussion of sex, marriage, love, and other specific aspects of the woman question—important as her achievement is in these matters also.

wedded to "evolutionism," and frequently reaches conclusions not only based on the experiences of man in the remote past, but even on the life of insects and unicellular organisms. She says, for example, that, for a few centuries or so, men need not object to the criticism she has made of them, implying that the readjustment she speaks of will not be made within a lesser period, though even her own discussion of impending changes might lead the reader to a far more hopeful view. But in spite of this, her thinking is pragmatic almost at every point. Where she does not consciously guide herself by the needs of our time, she does so unconsciously.

Mrs. Gilman's fundamental defect, as I have said, is her unwillingness to admit that an appeal to "private conscience and collective conscience" is insufficient unless accompanied by a struggle to abolish class rule, with or without the consent of the ruling classes.

For example, she refers to ethics as a *science* at once "simple and practical." This is not only the opposite to the pragmatic view, but it gives opportunity to the ruling class of to-day or to-morrow to say what the conclusions of such ethics shall be. It is the dogmatic spirit which has guided all tyrannies and will undoubtedly guide the tyranny of "State Socialism."

The ideal of the common welfare seems to her a relatively simple matter that all normal persons should admit, and if we do not she attributes our backwardness, not to class government or class interest but to masculine government or to the stupidity of society generally:

"It is the old masculine spirit of government as authority which is so slow in adopting itself to the democratic idea of government as service. That it should be a representative government they grasp, but representa-

tive of what? of the common will, they say; the will of the majority—never thinking that it is the common good, the common welfare, that government should represent. It is the inextricable masculinity in our idea of government which so revolts at the idea of women as voters. 'To govern:' that means to boss, to control, to have authority, and that only, to most minds." ⁴⁶

Mrs. Gilman does not seem to realize that the women of the ruling class have now and doubtless will continue to have the same ideal of government as the men—though their treatment of servants might surely have suggested as much. The present transition from private capitalism to state capitalism she seems to regard as a transition from masculine to human rule, while she appears to take it for granted that, in proportion as governments' functions increase, governments will serve society. She accepts the Socialist ideal, but also, apparently without criticism, the present capitalistic reforms which are leading first of all not to Socialism, but to "State Socialism":

"In this change of systems a government which consists only of prohibition and commands, of tax collecting and making war, is rapidly giving way to a system which intelligently manages our common interests, which is a growing and improving method of universal service. Here the Socialist is perfectly right in his vision of the economic welfare to be assured by the socialization of industry, though that is but part of the new development." ⁴⁷

And finally, Mrs. Gilman attributes our backwardness primarily not to the government of society in the interest of a single class, but to mere stupidity and old methods of education:

"We are beginning to learn a little of the nature of humanity; its goodness, its beauty, its lovingness; and

to see that even its stupidity is only due to our foolish old methods of education." ⁴⁸

According to this view, all that is necessary in order to institute a new system is to educate the masses and the upper classes alike. It is natural that one who has such an implicit confidence in government and in all social classes should feel free to invent all imaginable forms of institutional improvement. Undoubtedly the larger part of Mrs. Gilman's proposals, which are legion, would prove entirely practicable at one or another stage of social advance, but she fails to distinguish between those which can be and will be used for the maintenance of the present class rule and parasitism and those which will be applied only by a Socialist society. She fails, moreover, not only to see that some of these institutional changes cannot be introduced until class rule is abolished, but that some of them if applied before that time and by capitalists would actually prove despotic, reactionary to the last degree. She thus fully justifies many of the attacks and criticisms that have been made by Ellen Key and others. Her deficiencies, however, by no means destroy the enormous value of Mrs. Gilman's work in pointing out that in the home and the rearing of children precisely similar and equally great revolutions are to be expected, and are already beginning to take place, as have already occurred in industry.

But Mrs. Gilman, proceeding in precisely the contrary direction from Ellen Key, goes to the opposite extreme, and is inclined to disregard the home entirely, in the belief that it will ultimately disappear, and with it the present problem of child-rearing. She has an excellent Socialist precedent for this view in the opinion of Marx's collaborator, Frederick Engels, who believed that the disappearance of the home would also revolutionize the

family and the relation between the sexes and wrote, in "The Origin of the Family":

"With the transformation of the means of production into collective property the monogamous family ceases to be the economic unit of society. The private household changes to a social industry. The care and education of the children becomes a public matter. Society cares equally well for all children, legal or illegal. This removes the care about the consequences which now forms the essential factor—moral and economic—hindering a girl from surrendering unconditionally to the beloved man. Will not this be sufficient cause for a gradual rise of a more unconventional intercourse of the sexes and a more lenient opinion regarding virgin honor and female shame?"

But whatever the *ultimate* transformation of the home, the change is not at present toward state institutions or their sequels, as suggested by Engels, but rather toward the collective home, with its equally revolutionary but widely different effects.

The possibility that the home will gradually cease to be individual and become collective has been ably stated by Montessori, who reasons on the basis of her own experiments:

"The 'Children's House' is the first step toward the *socialization of the home*. The inmates find under their own roof the convenience of being able to leave their little ones in a place, not only safe, but where they have every advantage. . . .

"We are all familiar with the ordinary advantages of the communistic transformation of the general environment. For example the collective use of railway carriages, of street lights, of the telephone, all these are great advantages. The enormous production of useful

articles, brought about by industrial progress, makes possible to all clean clothes, carpets, curtains, table-delicacies, better table-ware, etc. The making of such benefits generally tends to level social caste. All this we have seen in its realization. But the communising of *persons* is new. That the collectivity shall benefit from the services of the servant, the nurse, the teacher—this is a modern ideal.

“We have in the ‘Children’s Houses’ a demonstration of this ideal which is unique in Italy or elsewhere. Its significance is most profound, for it corresponds to a need of the times. We can no longer say that the convenience of leaving their children takes away from the mother a natural social duty of first importance; namely, that of caring for and educating her tender offspring. No, for to-day the social and economic evolution calls the workingwoman to take her place among wage-earners, and takes away from her by force those duties which would be most dear to her! The mother must, in any event, leave her child, and often with the pain of knowing it to be abandoned. The advantages furnished by such institutions are not limited to the laboring classes, but extend also to the general middle class, many of whom work with the brain. Teachers, professors, often obliged to give private lessons after school hours, frequently leave their children to the care of some rough and ignorant maid-of-all-work. Indeed, the first announcement of the ‘Children’s House’ was followed by a deluge of letters from persons of the better class demanding that these helpful reforms be extended to their dwellings.

“We are, then, communising a ‘maternal function,’ a feminine duty, within the home. We may see here in this practical act the solving of many of woman’s problems which have seemed to many impossible of solution. What then will become of the home, one asks, if the woman goes away from it? The home will be transformed and will assume the functions of the woman.

"I believe that in the future of society other forms of communistic life will come." 49

With the progress toward communistic life along these lines, the majority of the defences of the older sexual morality and marriage institutions will disappear, and here we come to the heart of the woman question.

The citadel of all reactionary and conservative ideas as to woman is the home, not the "home" of the working woman, but the home of the upper classes with servants and nurses to do the work. As servants become more and more expensive and tend altogether to disappear and as collective homes are at the same time made more feasible, the old individual home will find a dwindling number of defenders, and with it the whole of the old system will go, not only the old attitude to woman and her life, but also the old individualism which grew up around the isolated family and the home.

This liberation from the tyranny of the home will permit the freedom for love of which Ellen Key speaks, and will bring men and women together in their work as Olive Schreiner desires.

As men and women are brought together in their work our admiration for the able and unscrupulous men of business and politics will disappear, along with our admiration for family egoism and our worship of the mere mother and the mere wife. Already financier, lawyer, statesman and diplomat are becoming terms of ridicule or even of reproach, together with the German word "hausfrau," while we are getting to have the same feelings with regard to the notorious sentence of the Kaiser that women should be confined to "children, clothes, kitchen and church." And so with everything that is distinctively masculine, as well as everything that is distinctively feminine, *under our present artificial relationships*. Whatever the new masculine and feminine qualities will

be, sports, heavy drinking, cynical talking and vile stories will no longer appeal to men, just as sentimental romance, mere prettiness, timidity and softness will no longer appeal to women. Man's cynicism will go along with woman's hypocrisy, and it will be seen that life is neither a battle for mere survival or for power over others, as most men now hold, nor merely an amiable experiment in coöperative living, as is held by Key, Gilman, Schreiner and the overwhelming majority of all those middle-class women, who feel that a successful appeal can be made to the conscience of the ruling classes to surrender their privileges and power.

APPENDIX A

SOCIALISM AND PRAGMATISM AS SEEN IN THE WRITINGS OF MARX AND ENGELS

How does it happen that the modern Socialist philosophy did not come from the Socialist movement. I do not mean to imply that we should expect all the elements of Socialist thought and all the features of a Socialist society to come from the Socialist movement, for my main contention is that Socialism is constantly assimilating new elements from all quarters, and it is just as significant if science and philosophy evolve toward Socialism as it would be if Socialism itself should produce the scientific philosophy. What I mean is that, since Marx and Engels made a decided beginning in the direction of pragmatism more than half a century ago, we might have expected that the Socialist movement would also produce the socially radical philosophy of the present day.

But we have only to apply the Socialist conception of history and society to philosophy to see that the formulations of Marx and Engels, even in the Socialist view, must necessarily have been so limited by the science and the society of their day as to make them unavailable in a twentieth century philosophy and society. The chief formulations of modern Socialism were written from 1848 to 1875, a full generation before the first appearance of present day pragmatism. In spite of this Marx and Engels undoubtedly had a firm grasp of some of the chief elements of the new philosophy; broadly speaking they were pragmatists, but they missed some of the most basic and essential features of the new philosophy.

The radicalism that followed the French Revolution, and the republican revolutions of 1848, produced not only new social theories, but also new philosophies, some of them astonishingly free from the prejudices of the science of the day. This is true to a large degree of several of the German social philosophers, but especially of Marx and Engels. For, in their general philosophy, fortunately, they were influenced even more by a revolutionary social theory (which has proved of lasting value) than by the physical natural science of their time or the theory of evolution just gaining possession of the world in the period in which they wrote. Though they imagined they were giving equal weight to these passing theories, it is fortunate that their philosophical like their social conceptions were based, as a matter of fact, on studies of the history or evolution of man, and not on biological evolution.

Engels has given a far more elaborate expression to the philosophical aspects of Socialism than has Marx, and his point of view is in most striking accord in many points with that of the present-day pragmatists. He taught that if one proceeds with scientific investigation from the evolutionary standpoint, then "a stop is put, once and for all, to the demand for final solutions and for eternal truths; one is firmly conscious of the necessary limitations of all acquired knowledge, of its hypothetical nature, owing to the circumstances under which it has been gained."¹

But while Engels is opposed to those philosophies that demand final solutions and external truth he is equally opposed to those that deny the possibility of knowing such practical truths as are required for human purposes. Against the view of Hume and Kant, who "dispute the possibility of a perception of the universe or at least of an exhaustive perception," Engels is in complete reaction:

"The most destructive refutation of this as of all other fixed philosophic ideas is actual results, namely, experiment and industry. If we can prove the correctness of our idea of an actual occurrence by experiencing it ourselves and producing it from its constituent elements, and using it for

our own purposes, into the bargain, the Kantian phrase, 'Ding an Sich' (thing in itself) ceases to have any meaning."²

"Before there was argumentation," says Engels elsewhere, "there was action. And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these *perceptions* have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, *so far, agree with reality outside ourselves*. And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them--what we call defective reasoning."³

And again, referring to Kant's celebrated unknowable "things-in-themselves," Engels says:

"But one after another these ungraspable things have been grasped, analyzed, and, *what is more, reproduced* by the giant progress of science; and what we can produce, we certainly cannot consider as unknowable."⁴

Here we have the pragmatic and realistic view. It is, to be sure, only what the common sense of the majority of scientists says to-day, and has said for many years. But it is only recently, or in these early cases of Marx, Engels, Stirner and others, that such a standpoint has been elaborated into a philosophy. And this philosophy is as much needed and as practically valuable as the vastly important concrete labors of science.

Engels claims that the Marxian philosophy of history

is in itself a philosophy of science and life. Whether this claim is entirely justified I have discussed elsewhere (see Chapter V). However, whether the Marxian philosophy of history has reached this goal or not, it has certainly proceeded far in that direction.

In his sketch of "Feuerbach," which is published with the suggestive sub-title "The Roots of the Socialist Philosophy," Engels not only gives his own views, but also some notes of Marx's, written in 1845. Feuerbach's being the leading materialist philosophy at the time, the notes of Marx concerning him give in the briefest possible way his (Marx's) general philosophical position, which is very similar to that of Engels:

"The chief lack of all materialistic philosophy up to the present, including that of Feuerbach, is that the thing, the reality, sensation is only conceived of under the form of the object which is presented to the eye, but not as human sense—activity, 'praxis.' . . . Feuerbach is willing, it is true, to distinguish objects of sensation from objects existing in thought, but he conceives of human activity itself as not being objective activity. He, therefore, in the 'Wesen des Christenthums,' regards *only theoretical activity as generally human*, while the 'praxis' is conceived and fixed only in its disgusting form." ⁵

The words italicized show Marx's reaction against abstract theory, even in its materialistic form, and his insistence on human activity as the basis and center of all philosophy.

Engels expresses himself at greater length in the same volume:

"As regards all philosophers, their system is doomed to perish and for this reason, because it emanates from an imperishable desire of the human soul, the desire to abolish all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all disposed of, we have arrived at the so-called absolute truth, history is at an end, and yet it will continue to go on, although there is nothing further left for it to do—thus a newer and more insoluble contradiction. So

soon as we have once perceived—and to this perception no one has helped us more than Hegel himself—that the task thus imposed upon philosophy signifies that a single philosopher is to accomplish *what it is only possible for the entire human race to accomplish, in the course of its progressive development*—as soon as we understand that, it is all over with philosophy in the present sense of the word. *In this way one discards the absolute truth, unattainable for the individual, and follows instead the relative truths attainable by way of the positive sciences.*" (My italics.)⁶

Here the words italicized again show an exact parallel to Dewey's principle—that all philosophy must ceaselessly evolve, just as science does.

Discussing Feuerbach as a typical materialist, Marx says:

"Feuerbach does not see that religious feeling is itself a product of society, and that the abstract individual which he analyzes belongs in reality to a certain form of society.

"The life of society is essentially practical. All the mysteries which seduce speculative thought into mysticism find their solution in human practice and in concepts of this practice.

"The highest point to which materialism attains, that is the materialism which comprehends sensation not as a practical fact, is the point of view of the single individual in bourgeois society.

"The standpoint of the old materialism is 'bourgeois' society; the standpoint of the new, human society, or associated humanity."⁷

Similarly, Engels sketches the history of philosophy as being explicable only on an economic basis:

"Parallel with the rise of the middle-class went on the great revival of science; astronomy, mechanics, physics, anatomy, physiology, were again cultivated. And the bourgeoisie, for the development of its industrial production, required a science which ascertained the physical properties of natural objects and the modes of action of the forces of Nature. Now up to then science had but been the humble handmaid of the Church, had not been allowed to over-

step the limits set by faith, and for that reason had been no science at all. Science rebelled against the Church; the bourgeoisie could not do without science, and, therefore, had to join in the rebellion.”⁸

So much for the eighteenth century. Coming now to the nineteenth, Engels writes:

“The materialism of the preceding century was overwhelmingly mechanical, because at that time, of all the natural sciences, mechanics, and indeed, only the mechanics of the celestial and terrestrial fixed bodies, the mechanics of gravity in short, had reached any definite conclusions. Chemistry existed at first only in a childish, phlogistic form. Biology still lay in swaddling clothes; the organism of plants and animals was examined only in a very cursory manner, and was explained upon purely mechanical grounds; just as an animal was to Descartes nothing but a machine, so was man to the materialists of the eighteenth century. The exclusive application of the measure of mechanics to processes which are of chemical and organic nature and by which, it is true, the laws of mechanics are also manifested, *but are pushed into the background by other higher laws*, this application is the cause of the peculiar, but, considering the times, unavoidable, narrowmindedness of the French materialism.

“The second special limitation of this materialism lies in its incapacity to represent the universe as a process, as one form of matter assumed in the course of evolutionary development.” (My italics.)⁹

The advent of biology to the center of the stage, and the theory of evolution, are the new scientific developments on which Engels laid emphasis. To-day, on the contrary, anthropology, psychology and sociology are the sciences which are most rapidly modifying our philosophic outlook.

Marx's and Engels' “materialistic” conception of history is purely pragmatic. I have already indicated that the philosophy of these fathers of Socialist theory is by no means “materialistic” in ordinary sense. Marx wrote in 1845:

“The materialistic doctrine that men are the products of conditions and education, different men therefore the prod-

ucts of other conditions and changed education, forgets that circumstances may be altered by men and that the educator has himself to be educated. . . . The occurrence *simultaneously* of a change in conditions and human activity can only be comprehended and rationally understood as a revolutionary fact.”¹⁰

And as late as 1890 Engels explained what he and Marx had meant by their materialist conception of social evolution:

“Marx and I are partly responsible for the fact that the younger men have sometimes laid more stress on the economic side than it deserves. In meeting the attacks of our opponents it was necessary for us to emphasize the dominant principle denied by them, and we did not always have the time, place, or opportunity to let the other factors which were concerned in the mutual action and reaction get their deserts.”¹¹

The pragmatism of Marx and Engels, however, was much affected by their effort to adapt the Hegelian philosophy to Socialist purposes. Writing at the time they did and in Germany, it was almost inevitable that this should have been the case. While neither was in any sense a mere disciple of Hegel, both were in so far under his influence that they were in reaction against him, and no man that ever lived was perhaps further from being a pragmatist than was Hegel. James denies the value not alone of Hegel's philosophy but also his very method of reasoning, his “dialectics” which Marx and Engels were trying to *adapt*—recognizing at the same time the revolutionary and important rôle he played in the history of philosophy. Of the attitude of the typical Hegelian toward the master James writes:

“What others feel as the intolerable ambiguity, verbosity, and unscrupulousness of the master's way of deducing things, he will probably ascribe—since divine oracles are notoriously hard to interpret—to the ‘difficulty’ that habitually accompanies profundity. For my own part, there seems something grotesque and saugrenu in the pretension

of a style so disobedient to the first rule of sound communication between minds to be the authentic mother-tongue of reason, and to keep step more accurately than any other style does with the Absolute's own ways of thinking. I do not therefore take Hegel's technical apparatus seriously at all. I regard him rather as one of those numerous original seers who can never learn how to articulate. His would-be coercive logic counts for nothing in my eyes; but that does not in the least impugn the philosophic importance of his conception of the Absolute if we take it merely hypothetically as one of the great types of cosmic vision."¹²

Neither do pragmatists deny that Hegel saw some things clearly. "What he really worked by," says James, "was his own empirical perceptions which exceeded and overflowed his miserable, insufficient, and illogical categories in every instance of their use." Similarly in so far as the earliest Socialist writers followed Hegel in his antiquated process of reason, they may nevertheless have had their eyes all the time on this concrete reality that Hegel saw—so that it is possible that *they* themselves lost nothing by using his dialectical method. It is only *we* that must try to avoid misconception arising out of this obsolete phraseology and dialectics. Not many of us are likely to master Hegel's philosophy sufficiently to understand the early Socialist writers. But fortunately many of the leading Socialists now alive have done so and have reproduced all the best of these old ideas in terms of the thought of our time, as, for instance, Kautsky, Mehring, and La Fargue.

Engels explains what he really admired in Hegel's philosophy: "It once for all gave the coup de grace to finiteness of results of human thought and action."

"Truth lay now in the process of knowledge itself, in the natural historical development of learning. . . . In face of it nothing final, absolute or sacred exists, it assigns mortality indiscriminately, and nothing can exist before it save the unbroken process of coming into existence and passing away, the endless passing from the lower to the

higher, the mere reflection of which in the brain of the thinker it is itself." ¹³

It is evident that Engels was attempting to use the Hegelian dialectic in a pragmatic manner, but the question is whether it is possible to do so.

The only important truth we may allow in Hegel's philosophy is its relative advance over what went before, which is very well expressed by Engels:

"As the bourgeoisie through large scale industry, competition, and the world market, destroyed the practical value of all stable and anciently honored institutions, so this dialectic philosophy destroyed all theories of absolute truth, and of an absolute state of humanity corresponding with them." ¹⁴

But we cannot agree, from the point of view of our own generation, that, though Hegel reached "a very tame political conclusion," it was by means of a thoroughly revolutionary method of reasoning, nor that, while "the conservatism of this philosophical view is relative, its revolutionary character [is] absolute." The Hegelian dialectic may have been revolutionary in 1840. It may be revolutionary to-day in the minds of those thinkers who insist on using it for purposes of revolutionary thought, but it does not play an important part in modern thinking, and a vast amount of cumbrous and doubtful interpretation would certainly be necessary even to make it acceptable.

An illustration may be taken from the field of history, and it is here, indeed, that some of the most dogmatic and, in the light of present knowledge, some of the most crude of the Marx and Engels' parallels were drawn. It is not that we object to the thought that lay at the bottom of their minds, but the questions they put are now so antiquated, that either to accept their answers, or to reject them, would be equally valueless or misleading for the purpose of clear thinking. The historical illustration follows:

"All civilized peoples began with common property in land. Among all peoples which pass beyond a certain prim-

itive stage the common property in land becomes a fetter upon production in the process of agricultural development. It is cast aside, negated, and, after shorter or longer intervening periods, is transformed into private property. But at a higher stage, through the development still further of agriculture, private property becomes in its turn a bar to production, as is to-day the case with both large and small land proprietorship. The next step, to negate it in turn, to transform it into social property, necessarily follows. This advance however does not signify the restoration of the old primitive common property, but the establishment of a far higher, better developed form of communal proprietorship, which, far from being an impediment to production, rather, for the first time, is bound to put an end to its limitations and to give it the full benefit of modern discoveries in chemistry and mechanical inventions.”¹⁵

I shall leave it to the modern reader to add the numerous qualifications which are necessary to get any utility out of such a dogmatic formula as this. Another sociological illustration of dialectic reasoning given by Engels is quoted directly from Marx:

“The capitalistic method of production and method of appropriation, that is to say capitalistic private property, is the first negation of individual private property founded on labor of individuals, the negation of capitalistic production will be self-produced with the necessity of a natural process, etc.’ ”¹⁶

Here we have, in fact, merely a continuation of the illustration previously quoted.

The length to which Engels will go may be seen in the following statement giving us the “kernel of the dialectic view of nature”:

“The view is reached under the compulsion of the mass of scientific facts, and one reaches it the more easily by bringing to the *dialectic* character of these facts a consciousness of the laws of *dialectic* thought. At all events, the scope of science is now so great that it no longer escapes the *dialectic* comprehension.”¹⁷

It is certainly evident that modern thought is not following this method, much as it may accord with the general conclusions of Engels' philosophy.

In his "Feuerbach," Engels says that, during the fifteen years before he wrote (1886), "new material of knowledge was furnished in hitherto unheard of measure," and that "the fixing of inter-relations and therewith of order in the chaos of overwhelming discoveries was rendered possible quite lately for the first time."¹⁸ This statement might be still more aptly applied to-day to almost everything that Marx, Engels, Darwin, Spencer, or Haeckel wrote. Certainly, the rate of scientific discoveries has been ten-fold, if not a hundred-fold more rapid in the *last* fifteen years than in the period of Engels' writing. If the ordering of the sciences was not possible in Feuerbach's time, it was scarcely more possible, according to our present perspective, at the time of Engels—and, indeed, we have reached the conclusion that "the fixing" of inter-relations is something at which we do not want to aim at all.

Indeed, Engels himself wrote that "the results of the investigation of nature need only be conceived of dialectically, that is in the sense of their mutual interconnection, to arrive at a system of nature *sufficient for our time*."¹⁹ Here is an entirely satisfactory statement, and one that automatically relegates the methods Engels based on the science of *his* time into the background to-day. These conclusions were founded primarily on the great biological discoveries which were taking place in his day, and were centered mainly around the name of Darwin. As modern scientific psychology had not even appeared on the horizon, the whole field of psychology and logic was still left to the realm of metaphysics. It is at this historic juncture that Engels declared that "all belongs to the positive sciences of nature and history," except logic and the dialectic. These Engels proposed to build up on the basis of philosophy—which, all science having been subtracted, can mean only metaphysics. Thus restricted

by the knowledge of his time he deprived philosophy of science and science of philosophy.

It is scarcely to the discredit of the Socialist movement, as the social embodiment of pragmatism, that its early thinkers were unable completely to formulate that philosophy in 1850 or 1875. Not only did these thinkers definitely state that their philosophy was limited by the exigencies of the organization of the movement and its political and economic defence, as well as the science of their time, but the later Socialists show every indication of a growing acceptance of the pragmatic spirit and method (which are the whole of pragmatism). Karl Kautsky, for example, in a recent number of the official weekly of the German party, of which he is editor, attacks certain dogmatic "Marxists" as follows:

"They forget that a theory is an abstraction, not a completed but a simplified picture of life. It is just through this simplification that the theory is able to bring sense and order into the chaos of phenomena and to find its position in this labyrinth. But it remains only an Ariadne's thread through the labyrinth. It never becomes the labyrinth itself, it never becomes identical with reality, but rather requires further and continual observation of it." ²⁰

As an illustration of this dogmatic tendency of many Marxists, Kautsky gives their narrow interpretation of the class struggle and proposes in its stead his own broader view, which is undoubtedly that of the Socialist movement as a whole. He explains that the purpose of his pamphlet on the class struggles of the French Revolution was to show not only the depth of the insight into history which can be gained from the application of the theory of the class struggle, but also the depth of *the problems* which grow out of the class struggle:

"It [Kautsky's pamphlet] endeavored in this way to counteract not only the simplification of the theory of the class struggle but also that of its practice, by showing that Socialist politics can never satisfy itself by merely stating the class opposition between Capital and Labor, that it

must investigate the whole social organism in all its details, since underneath this great opposition countless others exist in society, of less importance, but which cannot be overlooked, and the understanding and utilization of which may make proletarian tactics very much easier and more fruitful."

Just as "the class struggle" is the central tenet of the political and economic movement, just as "the materialist conception of history" is the central tenet of its philosophical aspect, so pragmatism is the method and the spirit of modern Socialist thought.

APPENDIX B

SOCIALISM AND RELIGION

THERE is in evidence in Great Britain and America, and even in those countries of continental Europe where Socialism has become a political factor of the first rank and needs only relatively small increase of votes to gain possession of government, a tendency among Socialist parties to try to get the leading Socialist writers and speakers to avoid public statements of the full implications of the Socialist position. While it is perfectly true, as I pointed out in my "Socialism as It Is," that the organized Socialist movement of the present day is purely political and economic, this revolutionary political and economic movement cannot fail to have a profound effect on every other part of life. Could it possibly be a mere coincidence that in France and Germany, and in all countries where Socialism is most highly developed, we find that, of all the anti-religious elements in the population, and they are very numerous, a very large part, often a majority, are Socialists; and, second, that of the membership of the Socialist Parties an overwhelming majority are either non-religious or anti-religious?

As the non-religious and anti-religious elements of the population are far less numerous in Great Britain and America than on the continent of Europe, the ultra-practical members of the Socialist Parties are, of course, extremely nervous lest the real nature of Socialism in this matter may be disclosed. While such Socialists often argue that true religion necessarily leads to Socialism, they deny that the Socialist movement has anything to say

about religion. And this would seem to be in entire accord with the established position of the German Party and of the international movement generally, namely that "religion is a private matter."

Stewart D. Headlam, for example, writes in his booklet, "The Socialist Church":

"Owing to the divorce of Socialism from the Church, there has grown up a tendency among some Socialists to exalt Socialism itself into a kind of religion and to maintain that it contains in itself a reasoned theory and philosophy of life. It cannot be too emphatically stated that Socialism has but one end in view—the establishment of a righteous industrial and material condition."

Of course I do not assert that Socialism provides a religion, but it does seem to provide a substitute for religion, and it does undoubtedly produce "a reasoned theory and philosophy of life."

Indeed Socialism must provide a reasoned theory and philosophy of life or deny the proposition which has been the basis of all Socialist Party thought for nearly three-quarters of a century. The "materialist conception of history" means nothing unless it means that each social class must develop a complete outlook on life. This is why Socialism claims to represent not only the political and economic attitude but also the thinking of the working class in so far as it affects this political and economic attitude. And this is why it believes also that a change in this economic basis must affect all civilization.

The *New Age* claims that nothing human can be alien to Socialism: "It may be true that no one of the specific theories of religion or marriage so far put forward by Socialists has any claim to be called the Socialist view; but there is all the difference in the world between such an admission and the denial that Socialism has any concern with the question at all."¹ And a prominent moderate Socialist, Sidney Ball, one of the founders of the Fabian Society, expresses the view that Socialism means

"almost a revolution in the moral and religious attitude in the majority of mankind." ²

The leading figures of the German and international movement were even more positive and outspoken. Engels said: "Beyond nature and man there exists nothing." Wilhelm Liebknecht wrote in *Der Volkstaat*: "It is our duty as Socialists to root out the faith in God with all our zeal, nor is one worthy of the name who does not consecrate himself to the spread of atheism."

In his pamphlet "Die Sozialdemokratie und die katholische Kirche," Kautsky has given reasons why an unreflecting member of a Christian Church may be a good Socialist, and why a full understanding of Socialism is incompatible with a full understanding of Christianity. The Socialist movement does not inquire into the faith of its adherents as long as they are good Socialists. The philosophy of the Socialist movement leads directly away from all religion, but as religion, historically considered, has been one of the means by which the race has gradually struggled away from supernaturalism to a scientific habit of thought, it is impossible for Socialists to assume an inquisitorial or condemnatory attitude toward persons who still consider themselves to be religious—provided they are good Socialists.

"The antithesis between the Church and Social Democracy by no means signifies that a sincere Christian cannot at the same time be a Social Democrat. Christianity is the product of many factors; it has undergone many social changes and adapted itself to them, so that the notion of a 'Christian' has become an exceedingly vague one, as also the notion of religion, which admits of various contradictory conceptions. . . .

"One can, therefore, be a sincere Christian and nevertheless feel the warmest sympathy for the class struggle of the proletariat. This holds still more true for those millions who, like the masses, are members of a church merely as a matter of habit, without having reflected much on the matter. The organized movement of the struggling proletariat has not the slightest reason for keeping this

element aloof from them, provided the latter are able and willing to fight the class struggle in our way."

The above was printed in the first edition of the pamphlet. Kautsky thereupon received a host of indignant letters from Socialists, protesting that the movement had always been anti-religious. He then stated the other side of the Socialist position in the preface of the second edition, namely, that the progress of Socialism means the gradual elimination of religion:

"As many letters addressed to me have shown that this sentence has been misunderstood, I do not think it out of place to remark that I do not view as possible the union of Christianity with Social Democracy as a political party in the sense that it is possible to arrive at a full understanding of Socialism from the standpoint of Christianity. . . .

"Incompatible with scientific Socialism in particular is the idea of a God-Man or Superman who was empowered by force of his personality to redeem mankind or to bring it to a higher plane of existence. . . ."

But Kautsky's most important conclusion is directed not merely against Christianity, but against all religions, that is all belief in God or immortality:

"The acceptance of a personal God (and an impersonal God is a meaningless word) and of personal immortality is incompatible with the present stage of scientific knowledge in general, of which scientific Socialism is a part that cannot be severed from the whole."

August Bebel is firmly convinced that Socialism "leads finally to atheism," and has the following to say (in his "Woman") on the future of religions:

"As with the state, so it will be with religion. It will not be 'abolished,' God will not be 'dethroned,' people will not be 'robbed of their faith,' as all the foolish arguments are worded that are directed against atheistic Socialists. Such follies Socialists leave to bourgeois idealists who attempted such measures during the French Revolution and, of course, failed utterly. Without any forcible attack or expression of opinions, of whatever nature they may be,

the religious organizations will gradually disappear and the churches with them. . . . The ruling class, seeing its existence threatened, clings to religion, the support of all authority, as every ruling class has done. The bourgeoisie itself does not believe, and, by its entire development and by modern science that sprang from its lap, it has destroyed the faith in religion and in all authority.

"Ignorance or hypocrisy in religious matters are nowhere greater than in the United States. The less the power of the state guides the masses by its organization, the more must it be done by religion, by the church. Therefore the bourgeoisie appears most pious wherever the power of the state is weakest. Besides the United States, this is the case in England, Belgium and Switzerland." ³

In the New York Socialist organ, *The Call*, occurs the following editorial statement:

"To be sure, scientific Socialism has certain aspects with which the church must of necessity disagree. On its purely religious side the church consists of a body of dogmas, or articles of belief, which are in a necessary and unavoidable conflict with the results, and even more so with the methods of all science. The church must, therefore, also assume an aspect of hostility toward the scientific aspect of Socialism. But why single out Socialism for the attack? Why not attack at the same time the natural sciences? Can it be that natural sciences are spared for the reason that they are indispensable to the existing social order, while Socialism as a science is assailed because it establishes the transitory nature and inevitable passing away of this social order?" ⁴

This is the only logical attitude even for the most "practical" of Socialists to take. There is no doubt that Socialism, like science, not only has a disintegrating effect on churches, but also on all forms of religion. I have spoken of the proportion of Socialists who are non-religious or anti-religious; the proportion among scientists is perhaps even greater.

The fact that the Socialist Party does not as a rule make it part of its official position to attack religion begs the

question. It is true that Socialist parties all declare that religion is a private matter. They mean by this only that religion is not a matter for interference on the part of their organizations. They do not at all mean that religion has no public aspects, that religion is not a public question. Otherwise nearly all the leading Socialists would have been expelled from the movement for discussing religion as a matter of public importance and especially so to Socialists.

The Socialist Party of Vermont, in its convention of 1912, made this official declaration:

“When we say that religion is ‘a private matter’ we do not mean that it has no social significance. Such a contention would be manifestly absurd. Religion is inseparable from conduct, from human relations, and hence it is a social force of the greatest importance. What is meant by the declaration is that religious belief or non-belief is a matter for the individual conscience with which the State, or political parties within the State, can have nothing to do.”

This statement only needs to be supplemented by saying that not only does religion have a social significance, but also that every movement which has a social significance must have a profound effect on religion.

We may slightly paraphrase Bebel's statement above given and say that the majority of Socialists are firmly convinced that Socialism and modern science must finally lead to a state of society where there will be no room whatever for religion in any form. Bebel is certainly correct when he denies that the Socialists will make any violent onslaught on religion, even in its crudest form, as long as it remains, as it does in some Protestant churches, practically a matter of the individual conscience, and not an organized doctrine. But he equally represents the views of the overwhelming majority of Socialists in all countries where Socialism has become an important factor in society, when he expresses the belief that all that we know by the name of religion is likely to disappear *without any violent attack, and when he works to hasten that day.*

NOTES

INTRODUCTION—SOCIALISM A NEW CIVILIZATION

1. Anton Menger, *L'Etat Socialiste*, p. 360.
2. Jean Jaurès, *Histoire Socialiste*, Vol. I, p. 6.
3. H. G. Wells, *New Worlds for Old*, pp. 344-346.
4. Walt Whitman, *Prose Works* (1892), p. 205.
5. *The New Review*, January 25, 1913.
6. H. G. Wells, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

CHAPTER I

PRAGMATISM AS A SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHY

1. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 197-200, 268.
2. John Dewey, *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*,
p. 298.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
4. John A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 272.
5. William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p.
60.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 221, 222.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
10. William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp.
261, 265.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 172, 173.
12. R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp.
200-226.
13. William James, *Pragmatism*, p. 201.
14. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
15. Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 95 (note).

16. Perry, op. cit., pp. 212, 213.
17. William James, *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. xix, 195.
18. John Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 27.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
25. *The Bearings of Pragmatism on Education*, *Progressive Journal of Education*, January, 1909.
26. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 334.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
28. *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 157.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
36. Henri Bergson, *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. viii.
37. *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 73.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

CHAPTER II

THE APPEAL TO SCIENCE

1. John A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 265.
2. Herbert Spencer, *Man vs. The State*, pp. 57, 66.
3. Herbert Spencer, *Study of Sociology*, p. 157.
4. *Darwin's Influence on Philosophy*, p. 72.
5. John Dewey, *Psychology and Social Practice*.
6. John Stuart Mill, *Logic*, p. 562.
7. Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, p. 307.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
9. Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 157.
10. Nietzsche, *Thoughts Out of Season*, Part II, p. 136.
11. Nietzsche, *Thoughts Out of Season*, Part II, pp. 23, 111.
12. Nietzsche, *A Genealogy of Morals*, pp. 203, 207.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

CHAPTER III

"EVOLUTION"

1. Mrs. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Human Work*, pp. 188, 215.
2. Max Nordau, *The Interpretation of History*, p. 43.
3. John A. Hobson, *op. cit.*, pp. 263, 266.
4. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 587.
5. Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, pp. 477-479.
6. *Ibid.*, 522, 523.
7. Max Stirner, *Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum*, (Reklam), p. 416.
8. Darwin and Modern Science, p. 457.
9. Mrs. Gilman, *op. cit.*, 167.

CHAPTER IV

THE REIGN OF BIOLOGY

1. John A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism*, pp. 184, 185.
2. J. R. MacDonald, *Socialism and Society*, p. 33.
3. H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, pp. 93, 94, 101.
4. *Ibid.*, 102, 111, 133.
5. Darwin and Modern Science, p. 457.

CHAPTER V

THE ABUSE OF HISTORY

1. Ostwald, *Die Wissenschaft*.
2. Darwin and Modern Science, pp. 531-539.
3. William Godwin, *History of the Commonwealth*, p. ix (London, 1829).
4. Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
5. J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, p. 266.
6. Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
8. John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 36.
9. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
10. *Die Neue Zeit*, August 25, 1911.
11. *Die Neue Zeit*, December 20, 1912.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thoughts Out of Season*, Part II, p. 55.
13. *Ibid.*, Part II., p. 54.
14. *Ibid.*, " p. 53.
15. *Ibid.*, " p. 27.
16. *Ibid.*, " p. 15.
17. *Ibid.*, " p. 28.
18. *Ibid.*, " p. 31.
19. *Ibid.*, " pp. 31-32.
20. *Ibid.*, " p. 71.
21. *Ibid.*, " p. 76.
22. *Ibid.*, " p. 83.
23. *Ibid.*, " p. 84.
24. *Ibid.*, " p. 91.
25. *Ibid.*, " p. 34.
26. *Ibid.*, " pp. 40, 65.
27. *Ibid.*, " p. 68.
28. *Ibid.*, " pp. 48, 49.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIETY AS GOD

1. Herbert Spencer, *Study of Sociology*, pp. 9, 10.
2. Nordau, *op. cit.*, pp. 108 ff.
3. Jean Jaurès, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 841.
4. J. R. MacDonald, *Socialism and Government*, p. 7.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
8. J. R. MacDonald, *Socialism and Society*, p. 12 note.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
10. *Socialism and Government*, pp. 82, 83, 109.
11. John A. Hobson, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-81.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*.
13. Sherger, *The Evolution of Modern Liberty*, p. 253.
14. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 587.
15. Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics*, p. 352.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
17. *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. III, pp. 587-589.
18. Herbert Spencer, *Essays*, Vol. II, p. 462.
19. *Study of Sociology*, p. 100.
20. *Essays*, Vol. II, p. 170.
21. Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics*, p. 297.
22. *Essays*, Vol. III, pp. 294, 295.
23. *Social Statics*, p. 407.
24. C. N. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 274.

CHAPTER VII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE NEW SOCIETY—AS SEEN
BY STIRNER

1. All the quotations from this chapter are taken from Stirner's "Der Einsige und Sein Eigentum."

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIALISM AND MORALITY

1. Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 192.
2. Karl Kautsky, *Ethics* (Chas. H. Kerr), p. 192.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
6. J. R. MacDonald, *Socialism and Government*, Vol. I,
- p. 10.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 11.
8. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 369.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 521.
10. Maeterlinck, *The Double Garden*, pp. 109, 111.
11. H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, p. 53.
12. Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 448.
13. William James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 194.
14. Grote, *History of Greece*, Vols. VIII and IX.
15. Oscar Wilde's *Essay, the Soul of Man Under Socialism*.
16. Mrs. Gilman, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
17. Dewey's *Essay on Ethics*, pp. 20, 21.
18. Dewey's *Moral Principles in Education*, pp. 42, 43.
19. Dewey's *Essay on Ethics*, p. 8.
20. H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, pp. 149, 151.

CHAPTER IX

NIETZSCHE AND THE NEW MORALITY

1. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sec. 3.
2. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sec. 4.
3. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sec. 5.
4. *Twilight of the Idols*, Sec. 2.

5. Genealogy of Morals, Sec. 24.
6. Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 63.
7. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 2.
8. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 307.
9. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 44.
10. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 547.
11. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 354.
12. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 354.
13. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 355.
14. Twilight of the Idols, Secs. 10 and 11.
15. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 125.
16. Thoughts Out of Season, Vol. II, p. 107.
17. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 3.
18. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 111.
19. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 11.
20. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 349.
21. Twilight of the Idols, Sec. 14.
22. Genealogy of Morals, Sec. 12.
23. The Antichrist, Sec. 57.
24. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 21.
25. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 105.
26. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 9.
27. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 117.
28. The Antichrist, Sec. 1.
29. Zarathustra, Old and New Tables, Sec. 5.
30. Genealogy of Morals, Sec. 27.
31. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 338.
32. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 338.
33. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 134.
34. Zarathustra, New and Old Tables, Secs. 4 and 5.
35. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 146.
36. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 145.
37. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 99.
38. Twilight of the Idols, Sec. 35.
39. Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 259.
40. Genealogy of Morals, Sec. 6.
41. Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, Sec. 2.
42. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 103.

43. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 174.
44. Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 57.
45. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 107.
46. Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 32.
47. Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 77.
48. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 97.
49. The Twilight of the Idols, Sec. 33.
50. The Dawn of Day, Sec. 164.
51. The Twilight of the Idols, Sec. 32.
52. The Twilight of the Idols, Sec. 6.
53. Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 41.
54. Joyful Wisdom, Sec. 370.
55. Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, Sec. 28.
56. The Antichrist, Sec. 2.

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIALIST EXPLANATION OF RELIGION

1. Jane Ellen Harrison, Essay on "The Influence of Darwinism on the Study of Religions" in the volume, Darwin and Modern Science.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. Levy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions Mentales des Sociétés Inférieures.
6. Irving King, The Development of Religion, p. 329.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
8. *The American Magazine*, October, 1909.
9. Harrison, op. cit.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. Ostwald, op. cit.
13. Hubert et Mauss, Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions, p. 41.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

15. Hubert et Mauss, *Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions*, p. 32.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
17. King, op. cit., p. 89.
18. Emerson's Essay on The Over-Soul.
19. Human Work, p. 146.
20. *The Conservator*, Vol. XXIII, p. 108.
21. Herbert Spencer, First Principles.
22. Professor Lighter Witmer in *The Psychological Clinic*.
23. Dr. Henry R. Marshall in *The Hibbert Journal*.

CHAPTER XI

THE NEW EDUCATION

1. Heinrich Schulz, "Die Schulreform der Sozialdemokratie."
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-100.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-66.
6. John Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 25.
7. John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, pp. 10, 17.
8. John Dewey, *Hibbert Journal*, 1907.
9. *Psychology and Social Practice* (pamphlet).
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. "The Bearings of Pragmatism Upon Education."
17. *Progressive Journal of Education*, February, 1909.
18. *Ibid.*, February, 1909.
19. *Ibid.*, January, 1909.
20. *Ibid.*

21. *Progressive Journal of Education*, October 15, 1909.
22. *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 22.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
25. *How We Think*, p. 165.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
28. Boris Sidis, *Philistine and Genius*, pp. 58, 60.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
31. Stanley Hall, *Educational Problems*, p. 479.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 478, 483.

CHAPTER XII

SOCIALISM AND THE NEW EDUCATION

1. Stirner, *The Ego and His Own*.
2. Tolstoy, "On Popular Education," 1862.
3. do. "On Popular Education," 1862.
4. do. "On Popular Education," 1875.
5. do. "On Popular Education," 1862.
6. do. "On Popular Education," 1875.
7. do. *Thoughts on Education and Instruction*, 1899-1901.
8. Monroe, *Text Book on the History of Education*, p. 719.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 720.
10. Charles W. Eliot, *More Money for the Public Schools* (booklet).
11. *The School Review*, April, 1909.
12. *The Youth's Companion*, January 6, 1910.
13. Carlton, *Education and Industrial Evolution*, p. 303.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
15. *Socialism As It Is*, pp. 99-106.
16. *Berliner Vorwaerts*, March 17, 1912.

CHAPTER XIII

MAN, WOMAN, AND SOCIALISM

1. August Bebel, "Woman," translated by Meta L. Stern, p. 98.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 469.
3. Ellen Key, Love and Marriage, pp. 24, 253.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 360.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 398.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 311-319.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
38. Olive Schreiner, Woman and Labor, p. 216.
39. Ellen Key, op. cit., p. 228.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 371-373.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
42. Olive Schreiner, op. cit., p. 27.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-81.
46. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Man-Made World, p. 187.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
49. The Montessori Method, pp. 63-66.

APPENDIX A

PRAGMATISM AND SOCIALISM

1. Frederick Engels, Feuerbach (Chicago, 1908), p. 97.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
3. Frederick Engels, Socialism Utopian and Scientific (Chicago, 1910), p. 19.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
5. Feuerbach, p. 129.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
8. Socialism Utopian and Scientific, p. 24.
9. Feuerbach, p. 65.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
12. William James, A Puralistic Universe, Essay on Hegel.
13. Feuerbach, p. 43.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
15. Frederick Engels, Landmarks of Scientific Socialism, p. 169.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
18. Feuerbach, p. 69.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
20. *Die Neue Zeit* (Stuttgart), August 12, 1912.

APPENDIX B

SOCIALISM AND RELIGION

1. *The New Age*, October 10, 1907.
2. Sidney Ball, The Moral Aspects of Socialism, p. 23.
3. August Bebel, op. cit., pp. 437-439, 447, 448.
4. *The New York Call*, January 5, 1910.

INDEX

Aristotle, 20, 21.

Bacon, Francis, 35.

Ball, Sidney, 387.

Balzac, 214.

Barlow, Joel, 122.

Bancroft, 95.

Bebel, August, 257, 296, 321, 325, 390.

Bergson, Henri, XVIII, 3, 7, 23, 24, 25, 51, 53.

Bernstein, Edward, XVIII.

Boas, Franz, 71, 80, 162, 163.

Bonsor, Frederick G., 282, 285.

Brisbane, Arthur, 64.

Bryan, W. J., 54.

Burke, Edwin, 63, 122.

Bury, J. B., 89, 90.

Carlton, Frank T., 312-314.

Carlyle, Thomas, 40.

Carnegie, Andrew, 63, 64.

Canalejas, Premier, VII.

Christ, 170, 182, 185, 248, 250.

Comte, Auguste, 112, 114.

Cooley, C. N., 136, 137.

Cotton, 123.

Cunow, Heinrich, 97.

Darwin, Charles, 27, 81-84.

Dewey, John; On Pragmatism,

IV, 3-6, 9-27, 34-40;

On Evolution, 531;

On Morality, 169, 170, 185-188;

On Education, 263-286.

Eliot, Charles W., 250, 296, 297, 309.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 105, 250.

Engels, Friedrich, 27, 98, 369, 373-385, 388.

Fabian Society, The, XVIII.

Ferrer, Francis, 267, 304-306.

France, Anatole, 191.

Frazer, J. G., 57, 58.

George, Henry, 68-70.

Gilman, Mrs. Charlotte Perkins:

On Evolution, 50-52, 56;

On Morality, 185;

On Religion, 251;

On Woman, 325, 326, 354, 365-369.

Godwin, William, 91, 92, 115.

Gorki, Maxim, 191.

Hadley, Arthur T., 310, 311.

Haeckel, Ernst, 24, 31, 33, 238, 239, 252, 253.

Hall, G. Stanley, 293, 294, 311, 312, 339.

Harrison, Jane Ellen, 230-232, 234, 238-242.

Headlam, Stewart D., 387.

Hegel, 2, 3, 22, 23, 32.

Hobson, John A., VIII, 5, 33, 34, 65, 73, 120, 121.

Höfding, 84.

Hubert, H., 245-247.

Huxley, 118.

Ibsen, Heinrich, 192.

James, William:

On Pragmatism, 3, 6-18, 27;

On Morality, 174-178;

On Religion, 235-237, 244, 245, 254-256.

Jaurès, Jean, VI, XVIII.

Kant, 2, 22, 23, 176, 177, 183, 184, 189, 225, 227.

Kautsky, Karl:

On Pragmatism, 31, 32, 384, 385;

On History, 96-109;

On Morality, 164-166, 168;

On Religion, 388, 389.

- Key, Ellen, 325-337, 343-359.
 King, Irving, 233-235, 244, 247, 248.
 Levy-Bruhl, 233-235.
 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, XII, 388.
 Lloyd-George, David, 64.
 MacDonald, J. R., 75, 76, 117-120, 168, 169.
 Mach, 114.
 Maeterlinck, Maurice, 171, 172, 191, 250.
 Marx, Karl:
 On Socialism, XIX, XXIII;
 On Pragmatism, 27, 32, 373-385;
 On History, 96, 97, 102;
 On Morality, 161;
 On Religion, 228.
 Mauss, M., 245-247.
 Menger, Anton, VII.
 Mill, John Stuart, 38, 42, 43, 167.
 Monroe, Paul, 307-308.
 Montessori, Maria, 258-264, 369, 370.
 Morley, John, XXII, 62, 115.
 Morris, William, 191.
 Napoleon, 161, 193.
New Age, The, 387.
New York Call, The, 390.
 Nietzsche, Friedrich:
 On Science, 44-46;
 On History, 103-111;
 On Society, 122;
 On Morality, 189, 191-227.
 Nordau, Max, 53, 93, 94, 114.
 Ostwald, Wilhelm, 41, 42, 88, 243.
 Pannekoek, Anton, XVI.
 Pascal, 114.
 Paul, Saint, 178, 249.
 Plato, 20, 21, 178, 179, 180, 181, 255.
 Perry, R. B., 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13.
 Ranke, 95.
 Revisionists, The, XIX.
 Robinson, J. H., 94, 96.
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 63.
 Rousseau, J. J., 117, 122.
 Ruskin, John, 40.
 Schelling, 95.
 Schiller, F. C. S., 6, 13.
 Schopenhauer, 225.
 Schreiner, Olive, 326, 354, 359-365.
 Schulz, Heinrich, Die Schulreform der Sozialdemokratie.
 Sidis, Boris, 286-291.
 Simmel, 114.
 "Socialism as It Is," II, XII, 315.
 Socrates, 179, 180, 181, 202.
 Spencer, Herbert:
 On Pragmatism, 2, 24, 27, 31-38;
 On Evolution, 48, 49, 52, 59-61, 66-68;
 On Biology, 85, 86;
 On Sociology, 112-116, 124-135;
 On Morality, 178;
 On Religion, 231, 254.
 Stirner, Max:
 On Evolution, 72;
 On History, 111;
 On the Individual in the New Society, 172-183;
 On Education, 298.
 Syndicalists, The, XIX.
 Thomson, J. Arthur, 76.
 Tolstoy, Leo, 40, 46, 192, 298-304.
 Traubel, Horace, 252.
 Tufts, James H., 17, 169, 170, 173, 185.
 Vorwaerts (Berlin), 317, 318.
 Wallace, Alfred Russell, 253.
 Wallis, Louis, 248, 249.
 Ward, Lester F., 43, 44, 56, 68, 137, 138, 307.
 Wells, H. G., VII, XIII, XX, 56, 77, 78, 172, 176, 189.
 Westermarck, 162, 163.
 Whitman, Walt, IX.
 Wilde, Oscar, 184, 185.

THE following pages contain advertisements of
books by the same author or on kindred subjects.

Socialism As It Is

A Survey of the World-Wide Revolutionary Movement

By WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

Cloth, 12mo, \$2.00 net; postpaid, \$2.12

PROFESSOR JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS:

"I have seen this movement at pretty close hand for so many years that I can judge fairly well, I think, of your analysis and characterization. It is a strong and faithful bit of work. I have rarely enjoyed a book so much with which I so widely differ in its main inferences."

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science:

"An excellent analysis of Socialist tactics, in fact the best that has ever been published."—*Review by Professor Ira B. Cross.*

The American Library Association Booklist:

"A scholarly, detailed study of Socialism as it has been modified by changes in economic conditions since the time of Marx and Engels, based on a twelve years' study in Germany, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Belgium."

The American Economic Review:

"The book reveals an enormous amount of reading and an intimate, inside acquaintance with every phase of the subject. . . . Mr. Walling points out constantly that extension of state action is not necessarily Socialism." . . . —*Review by Professor Herbert E. Mills.*

MRS. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, in *The Forerunner*:

"Scholarly and thorough in treatment . . . the whole weight of the book is in support of what may be called orthodox Marxism, and will give pleasure to all Socialists of that division, as well as being of general service in its clear definitions and distinctions."

PROFESSOR CHARLES ZUEBLIN:

"I am enjoying and profiting by your book on Socialism, as I find everybody else has who is reading it. Its analysis is admirable, and I think nobody has stated the trend of things as you have."

The New York Sun:

"Mr. Walling has written a thoughtful book. His manner is judicial, though his attitude toward Socialism is sympathetic. He has allowed no rant to enter into his pages."

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers

64-66 FIFTH AVENUE

New York

Books by JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS

Author of "As Others See Us," "The Social Unrest," etc.

American Syndicalism: The I. W. W.

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.25 net

One of the most discussed topics of the day is Syndicalism, and for all those who want to know just what the term implies this book is intended. Probably no writer is better fitted for the task of fully explaining this big question than Mr. Brooks. He has been investigating it and giving his attention largely to it for some time. It will be remembered that he is the author of what might well be called the pioneer book dealing with social problems, "The Social Unrest," which, though published many years ago, is still widely read. His new work will be found to be a valuable interpretation of modern problems, quite as suggestive as anything he has hitherto done.

Social Unrest

Cloth, 8vo, \$1.50 net

"The author, Mr. John Graham Brooks, takes up and discusses through nearly four hundred pages the economic significance of the social questions of the hour, the master passions at work among us, men *versus* machinery, and the solution of our present ills in a better concurrence than at present exists—an organization whereby every advantage of cheaper service and cheaper product shall go direct to the whole body of the people. . . . Nothing upon his subject so comprehensive and at the same time popular in treatment as this book has been issued in our country. It is a volume with live knowledge—not only for workman but for capitalist, and the student of the body politic—for every one who lives—and who does not?—upon the product of labor."—*The Outlook*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers

64-66 FIFTH AVENUE

New York

The Elements of Socialism

By JOHN SPARGO and GEORGE LOUIS ARNER

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.63

The volume is divided into five parts, which deal respectively with the Socialist Indictment, with the Socialist Theory, Socialist Ideal, the Socialist Movement, and the Socialist Program. There is also a supplementary chapter in which the objections to Socialism are discussed. The work will be of great service, not only to the general reader, but also as a textbook in college and university courses of economics. In its bold expansion of the collectivist ideals the volume is perhaps the most readable straightaway account of Socialism that has appeared.

Socialism

By JOHN SPARGO

Author of "The Bitter Cry of the Children"

New Edition, Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.62

"Anything of Mr. Spargo's is well worth reading, for it is written with conviction and with a sense of concrete life far removed from mere doctrinairism. Anybody who wants to know exactly what the American Marxian of the saner sort is aiming at will find it here. It is a book that every thoughtful person will want to read and read carefully."—*World To-day*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers

64-66 FIFTH AVENUE

New York

Revolution

By JACK LONDON

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.62

Jack London, as is well known, is a socialist. Some of the feelings that actuate him he has expressed in this volume of essays. Readers of his novels will see in this book the same daring originality, the same contempt for convention, which mark his novels and stories.

New Worlds for Old

By H. G. WELLS

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.61

"To the great majority of readers this is the most satisfactory exposition of the nature and intentions of moderate socialism that can be had. Mr. Wells is always clear, sane and reasonable."—*The Watchman*.

"This is a statement, very lucid and direct, of the aims, ideals, and objects of socialism. It is valuable for the intelligent simplicity of its explanations and its complete freedom from rancor."—*Everybody's Magazine*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers

64-66 FIFTH AVENUE

New York

Socialism and the Ethics of Jesus

By HENRY C. VEDDER

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.63

This work gives a brief history of Socialistic principles and parties in modern times and examines with great thoroughness the foundations on which these principles rest. The author inquires in what respects these principles correspond to the ethics of Jesus, and wherein the two differ. This consideration of the points of similarity and of difference between the ethics of Jesus and the Socialism of to-day is not the work of the champion of any social theory but of an impartial and candid student of history, religion, economics and social institutions.

A History of Socialism

By THOMAS KIRKUP

Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged, Cloth, 12mo, \$2.25 net;
by mail, \$2.37

"Socialism grew to be a very important question during the nineteenth century; in all probability it will be the supreme question of the twentieth."—*Thomas Kirkup*.

"None have surpassed Mr. Kirkup in philosophical grasp of the essentials of socialism, or have presented the doctrine in more intelligible form."—*The Nation*.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Publishers

64-66 FIFTH AVENUE

New York

Socialism in Theory and Practice

By MORRIS HILLQUIT

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.63

"The 'man in the street' will find this little volume an up-to-date exposition of the Socialism that is alive in the world to-day."—*Review of Reviews*.

Socialists at Work

By ROBERT HUNTER

Author of "Poverty"

Cloth, 12mo, \$1.50 net; by mail, \$1.61

"It is a vivid, running characterization of the foremost personalities in the socialist movement throughout the world. The world sweep of the movement has never before been so clearly brought before the American reading public."—*Review of Reviews*.

The Essentials of Socialism

By IRA B. CROSS, Ph.D.

Cloth, 12mo, 152 pages, \$1.00 net; by mail, \$1.08

The work is characterized by a charming conciseness, and the reader who is looking for a clear exposition of a much discussed and much misunderstood subject, but who has not the time for lengthy tomes, will find in Dr. Cross's work just what he wants.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY


Publishers

64-66 FIFTH AVENUE

New York

APR 17 1913

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 029 826 031 1